CIHM 
Microfiche 
Series 
(IMonographs) 


ICIMH 

Collection  de 
microfiches 
(monographles) 


C«n.di.n  Inttitut.  for  Historical  IMicror.prodoction.  /  Inttltut  e.n.di«n  do  microroproduction.  hittoriquo. 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best  original 
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may  be  bibliographicatly  unique,  which  may  alter  any  of 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
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checked  below. 


a 


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I      j   Covers  damaged  / 


Couverture  endommag^e 

□   Covers  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
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i'ombre  ou  de  la  distorsion  le  long  de  la  marge 
int^rieure. 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restorations  may  appear 
within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these  have  been 
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apparaissent  dans  le  texte,  mais,  lorsque  cela  6\a\\ 
possible,  ces  pages  n'ont  pas  6\6  film^es. 


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I  Vj  Additional  comments  / 


Commentaires  suppl^mentairas: 


Various  paglngs. 


L'Institut  a  microfilm^  le  meilleur  exemplaire  qu'il  lui  a 
6\6  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
plaire qui  sont  peot-Stre  uniques  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier  une  image  reproduite, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  modification  dans  la  m^tho- 
de  normale  de  filmage  sont  indiqu^s  ci-dessous. 

I     I  Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

I I  Pages  damaged  /  Pages  endommag6es 


D 


Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
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0  Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed  / 
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I     I  Pages  detached  /  Pages  d6tach6es 

|v/|  Showthrough/ Transparence 

I     I  Quality  of  print  varies  / 


D 
D 


D 


Quality  in^gale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppl^mentaire 

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possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ou 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une 
pelure,  etc..  ont  6\6  film^es  k  nouveau  de  fagon  k 
obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 

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discotourations  are  filmed  twice  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
filmdes  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilleure  image 
possible. 


■ii 


This  Ittm  Is  f  ilmsd  at  tha  rtducllon  ratio  chtcktd  balow  / 

Ca  documtnt  aat  filing  au  taux  da  reduction  indlqu4  el-d«tiout. 


lOx 

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^Ow 

Tha  copy  filmad  h«r«  ha*  l»Mn  raproducad  thanks 
to  tha  ganaroaity  of: 

National  Library  of  Canada 


L'axampiaira  film*  fut  raproduit  grica  *  la 
gAntrosit*  da: 

Bibliothaqua  nationala  du  Canada 


Tha  imagas  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
poasibia  contidaring  tha  condition  and  iagibility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  itaaping  with  tha 
filming  aontraat  apacifieationa. 


Original  copiaa  in  printad  papar  covara  ara  fllmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  en 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustratad  impraa* 
•ion.  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  origirMi  copiaa  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustratad  impraa- 
sion.  artd  anding  on  tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad 
or  illuatratad  imprassion. 


Tha  laat  racordad  frama  on  aach  microficha 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  *-^  Imaaning  "CON- 
TINUEO").  or  tha  symbol  ▼  (moaning  "END"). 
whichavar  applias. 


Las  imagas  suivantas  ont  OtA  raproduitas  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin.  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nanat*  da  l'axampiaira  film*,  at  an 
conf  ormltO  avac  laa  eenditiona  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Laa  axamplairas  originaux  dont  la  couvartura  an 
papiar  aat  imprimOa  sont  filmOs  an  commancant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  soit  par  la 
darniOra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illustration.  soit  par  ii  sacond 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  laa  autras  axamplairas 
originaux  sont  filmOa  an  commandant  par  ia 
pramiOra  paga  qui  comporta  urta  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illuatration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darniira  paga  qui  comporta  una  taila 
amprainta. 

Un  daa  symbolos  suhrants  tpparaitra  sur  la 
darni*ra  imaga  da  chaqua  microficha.  salon  la 
caa:  la  symbols  «»  signifia  "A  SUIVRE".  la 
symbola  ▼  signifia  "FIN". 


Maps,  platas.  charu,  ate,  may  ba  filmad  at 
diffarant  raduction  ratios.  Thosa  too  larga  to  ba 
antiraly  includad  in  ona  sxposura  mrm  filmad 
baginning  in  tha  uppar  laft  hand  comar.  iafr  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  framas  as 
raquirad.  Tha  following  diagrams  illustrata  tha 
mathod: 


Laa  cartaa.  planchaa.  ubiaaux.  ate.  pauvant  atra 
filmOa  A  daa  taux  da  rOduction  diffOrants. 
Lorsqua  la  documant  aat  trap  grand  pour  Atra 
raproduit  an  un  saul  clichO.  il  ast  film*  A  partir 
da  I'angla  supAriaur  gaucha.  da  gaucha  A  droita. 
at  da  haut  an  baa.  an  pranant  la  nombra 
d'imagaa  nAcassaira.  Las  diagrammaa  suivan  • 
Uluatrant  la  mOthoda. 


1  2  3 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

MKXOCOPV   RBOIUTION   TBT  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  ^) 


13.2 


IB 

IB 
U 


2.0 


13^ 


m 

i 


1.8 


^    APPLIED  ItVMGE     Inc 

^^         1653   Cos!    Mom   SIrMi 

RochMttr,    N«w   York         U609       USA 
(716)   482  -  0300  -  Phon. 
(716)   2M  -  5989  -  Fa» 


I 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


A  STUDY  OF  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF 
A  FEDERAL  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 


BY 


RALEIGH  C.  MINOR 

Professor  of  Constitutional  and  International  Law  at  the 
University  of  Virginia 


NEW  YORK 

OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

AMERICAN  BRANCH :  SB  West  88nd  Street 

LONDON,  TORONTO.  MELBOURNE,  AND  BOMBAY 

1918 


.'  I'V 


172362 


,     V 


COPYRIGHT  1918 

Br  THE 

OXFORD  CNIVBHSITY  PRESS 
Amibioam  Bbaxob 


PREFACE 


i 


No  discussion  of  international  relations  during  the 
progress  of  a  great  war  such  as  is  now  raging  can  be 
expected  to  be  altogether  accurate  in  respect  of  mere 
details.  Not  only  the  geographical  boundaries  of 
states,  but  forms  of  government  and  important  na- 
tional policies,  are  shifting  from  day  to  day.  Even 
a  discussion  limited  to  fundamental  principles  like  that 
contained  in  the  following  pages  cannot  be  entirely 
free  from  the  influence  of  these  sudden  and  far-reach- 
ing changes. 

For  example,  Russia  is  treated  throughout  this 
work  as  a  great  empire  under  one  government,  indeed 
as  one  of  the  Great  Powers.  As  these  words  are 
written  this  is  far  from  the  fact,  but  who  can  tcU  what 
will  transpire  in  that  wide  unknown  region  before  the 
war  is  ended  or  within  a  limited  period  afterwards? 
She  may  reappear  a  great  despotic  empire  as  before, 
or  a  united  limited  monarchy,  or  a  magnificent  federal- 
ized republic  of  many  states;  or  she  may  ultimately 
be  divided  into  many  small  states  or  groups  of  states, 
thus  forfeiting  her  claim  to  be  one  of  the  Great 
Powers. 

In  view  of  these  uncertainties  it  has  not  been  deemed 
wise  to  make  any  modification  of  the  tentative  plan 
of  international  government  herein  proposed,  which 


VI 


PREFACE 


supposes  the  continued  existence  of  Russia  under  a 
single  government  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers. 

In  other  respects  also  it  has  been  found  necessary 
to  base  this  discussion  upon  facts  as  they  were  known 
to  exist  before  the  war,  without  heeding  alterations 
that  may  have  resulted,  or  may  in  the  future  result, 
from  the  conflict.  Thus,  in  estimating  the  populations 
of  the  various  states  engaged,  no  regard  has  been 
paid  to  possible  reductions  due  to  the  casualties  of 
war,  or  to  the  conquest  and  temporary  occupation  of 
territory. 

These  things,  however,  are  not  of  the  essence  of  our 
theme.  The  fundamental  principles  of  an  interna- 
tional government  would  be  much  the  same  whether 
Russia  constitutes  one  great  nation  or  many  small  in- 
dependent states;  whether  or  not  there  be  a  shift  of 
population  from  the  control  of  one  state  to  that  of 
another;  whether  or  not  forms  of  government  shall 
have  changed  from  monarchy  to  republic. 

But  there  are  certain  principles,  for  the  establish- 
ment of  which  this  war  is  now  being  waged,  which 
are  essential  to  the  foundation  of  any  league  of  na- 
tions leading  to  an  international  control  of  the  causes 
of  war.  Among  these  are  the  inviolability  of  treaties 
and  the  dominance  of  international  good  faith;  the 
abolition  of  militarism;  the  right  settlement  of  great 
war-breeding  political  Issues  now  pending,  such  as  the 
self-determination  of  nationalities  and  the  rectification 
of  ancient  wrongs;  and  the  substitution  of  a  spirit  of 
justice  and  equality  among  the  nations  in  the  place  of 


PREFACE  vii 

the  selfish  and  oppressive  policies  too  prevalent  in  the 
past. 

All  these  results  may  reasonably  be  hoped  for  in 
the  event  of  a  complete  victory  for  the  United  States 
and  their  Allies,  and  with  their  advent  it  would  not 
be  so  great  a  step  to  an  adoption  by  the  nations  of  some 
such  form  of  international  government  as  that  advo- 
cated  in  the  pages  to  follow. 

As  the  thirteen  American  Colonies  were  prepared 
through  their  joint  labors  and  sufferings  during  the 
American  Revolution  for  the  Articles  of  Confedera- 
tion, and  later  for  their  closer  union  under  the  Consti- 
tution, so  the  Allied  Nations  at  least,  having  passed 
through  years  of  co-operation,  trial,  and  suffering  to- 
gether, seem  now  ready  to  accept  some  form  of  per- 
manent league  or  alliance  which,  while  guaranteeing 
to  each  its  rightful  and  proper  independence  in  the 
control  of  its  internal  affairs,  will   also  adequately 
guarantee  each  against  oppressive  and  unjust  viola- 
tions  of  that  independence  by  neighbors  stronger  or 
better  prepared  to  utilize  their  strength. 

The  author  will  indeed  be  glad  if  the  book  shall 
contribute  in  any  degree  to  the  solution  of  the  many 
profound  problems  of  statecraft  that  must  be  settled 
satisfactorily  before  there  can  be  assurance  that  never 
again  shall  humanity  be  subjected  to  such  an  ordeal 
as  It  will  have  passed  through  during  the  terrible  years 

University  of  Virginia, 
May,  19 1 8. 


INTRODUCTION 


The  human  race  has  with  greater  or  less  success 
worked  out  many  difficult  governmental,  political  and 
sociological  problems,  but  all  would  doubtless  agree 
that  it  has  never  set  for  itself  a  more  serious  task  than 
the  discovery  and  application  of  a  feasible  and  prac- 
ticable plan  that  will  abrogate  the  necessity  of  war  as 
a  method  of  redressing  disputes  between  nations. 

Of  late  years  considerable  progress  has  been  made 
in  the  organization  and  establishment  of  "  arbitral 
courts,"  to  which  the  nations  may  submit  their  disputes, 
and  '*  commissions  of  inquiry' "  whose  duty  it  is  to 
ascertain  the  facts  in  an  international  controversy. 
Steps  have  also  been  taken  to  encourage  and  facilitate 
the  effectual  use  of  the  "good  offices"  of  mutual 
friends,  and  the  use  of  mediation  and  conciliation. 
And  the  time  seems  to  be  near  when  the  nations  may 
establish  an  international  court,  with  judicial,  instead 
of  merely  arbitral,  authority  and  jurisdiction,  which 
will  perhaps  be  able  to  deal  with  certain  cases  with 
which  courts  of  arbitration  could  not  satisfactorily 
cope. 

The  judicial  court  differs  from  a  court  of  arbitration 
in  the  manner  of  its  organization,  in  the  mode  of  reach- 
ing its  decision,  in  the  decision  itself,  and  in  the  value 


"  INTRODUCTION 

of  the  decision  as  an  authoritative  precedent  upon  the 
matter  with  which  it  deals.  ^ 

A  judicial  court  is  created,  and  fully  organised  in 

f:7:  "i  '"*"'°"'  '"  *''  '"  "■=""'"»  "c  not  se- 
lected by  the  parties  to  the  controversy  and  are  able  to 
decde  ,mpart,ally  between  the  contention,  of  the  it 
pnts.  On  the  other  hand,  an  arbitral  court  is  com- 
posed  of  members  selected  by  the  parties  after  the  d". 
pute  has  ansen  (usually  two  by  each  who,  themselve 
select  an  umpire).  From  this  circumstan  e  thru^; 
ally  results  more  or  less  of  a  tendency  •,„  the  part  of 
the  arbitrators  to  regard  themselves,  not  as  impartia 

n^fd''    Tr  "'™"'"  "  «P«-'«ives  or  per  l 
friends  of  the  party  selecting  them 

While  therefore  a  judicial  court  will  attempt  to  ar- 
rn'e  at  the  facts  and  the  law  governing  the  case   and 

cttr.^m'''"'""''*''""'''"^-''-^!'"' 
court  ,s  ,n  many  cases  to  conciliate,  mediate  or  com- 

prom.se  the  claims  of  the  litigants,  so  that  its  dec  sion 

decision  of  the  judical  court,  on  the  other  hand,  will 
een  r,ny  be  favorable  to  one  party  or  the  other  a,^" 
while  of  course  eminently  satisfactory  to  the  successfli 
.  .gant.  will  often,  if  fair  and  jus,,L  les,  b S 
able  to  the  unsuccessful  party  than  would  be  mere 
compromise. 

Finally,  the  mode  of  organization  of  the  iudicial 

bers  and  the  fact  that  it  seeks  impartially  to  conTtr^e 
.he  law  and  apply  it  to  the  fact,  of  the  case,  all  tend 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

to  give  it  a  greater  dignity  and  its  opinion  greater  au- 
thority than  an  arbitral  court  can  claim. 

In  cases  susceptible  of  these  modes  of  trial,  if  each 
party  to  the  dispute  is  sure  of  his  rights  and  bona  fide 
desires  and  designs  a  peaceable  settlement,  he  would 
prefer  usually  to  submit  his  case  to  a  judicial  court 
which  would  decide  the  qtiestions  involved  without 
compromise,  rather  than  submit  it  to  an  arbitral  court 
in  whose  decision  each  litigant  will  perhaps  find  only 
part  of  the  redress  to  which  he  deems  himself  entitled. 
But  if  each  is  more  or  less  doubtful  of  his  claims,  or 
suspects  that  he  is  claiming  more  than  he  is  really 
entitled  to,  both  would  probably  welcome  a  resort  to 
an  arbitral,  in  preference  to  a  judicial  court,  since  each 
would  be  sanguine  of  securing  something.  Finally,  a 
third  case  might  arise  wherein  one  of  the  parties  feels 
sure  of  his  rights,  while  the  other  is  very  uncertain 
of  his.  In  such  case,  the  tendency  of  the  former  would 
be  toward  the  judicial  court,  while  that  of  the  latter 
would  be  toward  the  court  of  arbitration,  and,  should 
neither  yield,  a  settlement  by  court  procedure  would 
become  impossible.  Such  a  situation  might  well  be 
fraught  with  grave  perils. 

li  seems  to  be  the  belief  of  many  that  the  mere  es- 
tablishment of  a  judicial  court  to  which  the  nations 
may  resort  for  a  settlement  of  their  disputes  will  in 
itself  go  far  to  solve  the  problem  of  international  wars. 
But  this  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  the  conviction  of 
those  who  have  given  the  most  profound  thought  and 
study  to  the  subject.    They  realize  that  the  field  of 


Xll 


INTRODUCTION 

usefulness  of  such  a  court  is  limited,  as  is  that  of  the 
court  of  arbitration,  the  commission  of  inquiry,  con- 
ciliation and  mediation,  the  good  offices  of  mutually 
friendly  nations  and  diplomatic  correspondence.  Each 
has  its  appropriate  function  in  settling  or  helping  to 
settle  certain  sorts  of  international  controversies;  but 
despite  all,  there  is  a  large  and  important  field  of  dis- 
putes, for  the  settlement  of  which  none  of  these  is  in 
the  least  adequate. 

Even  an  incomplete  analysis  of  the  various  sorts  of 
controversies  that  may  arise  between  nations  will  suf- 
fice to  sho\\'  how  many  and  how  constantly  recurring 
are  the  disputes  in  which  none  of  the  modes  of  re- 
dress  above  mentioned  is  of  great  value. 

If  we  classify  all  international  controversies  into 
two  great  classes,— /?rj/,  disputes  behind  which,  on  one 
side  or  both,  lie  ulterior  evil  or  illegitimate  designs  of 
aggression  or  attack  upon  the  rights  of  other  nations, 
and  second,  disputes  arising  spontaneously  and  without 
ulterior  designs,  it  is  obvious  that  none  of  those  of  the 
first  class  would  be  subject  to  treatment  in  any  of  the 
modes  already  considered,  and  indeed  that  under  pres- 
ent  conditions  nothing  but  war  or  the  fear  of  war  would 
prove  adequate  to  prevent  the  threatened  attack.  The 
offender  in  such  case  would  doubtless  put  forward 
untenable  claims  as  an  excuse  for  his  oppressive  ard 
tyrannical  conduct,  but  such  claims  would  not  be  justi- 
ciable,  that  is,  capable  of  settlement  in  a  court  of  justice 
or  arbitration,  because  the  offender  does  not  intend, 
and  would  not  allow,  them  to  be  thus  settled.    For  the 


Xlll 


-  INTRODUCTION 

like  reason,  commissions  of  inquiry,  conciliation,  medi- 
afion,  good  offices,  and  diplomatic  protests  would  all 
alike  be  of  no  avail.  His  design  is  to  use  force  or 
fraud  against  his  neighbor  and  under  existing  condi- 
tions nothing  but  force  or  the  fear  of  it  will  deter 
him. 

Suppose,  for  example,  a  nation  urged  by  dynastic, 
military,  or  territorial  ambitions  bent  on  taking  the 
territory  of  its  neighbor;  or  suppose  it,  influenced  by 
cupidity  and  greed  of  wealth,  determined  to  capture 
forcibly  or  fraudulently,  and  without  regard  to  the 
rights  of  its  neighbors,  certain  trade  routes  or  seats  of 
commercial  influence,  or  resolved,  by  the  use  of  tariffs 
or  the  unfair  use  of  a  favorable  geographical  position, 
to  engage  in  unfair  competition  against  other  nations; 
or  suppose  it,  influenced  by  the  spirit  of  nationalism,' 
to  contemplate  a  union  of  those  of  its  race  who  are  the 
subjects  of  neighboring  powers  through  the   use   of 
force;  or  suppose  it  is  filled  with  a  desire  to  overawe 
and  bully  its  neighbors,  so  that  it  indulges  to  a  dan- 
gerous  extent  in  militarism  and  jingoism.     These  are 
not  uncommon  manifestations  among  the  nations,  and 
none  of  them  are  justiciable  or  remediable  in  any  way 
except  by  war  or  the  threat  of  it. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  class  of  disputes  wherein 
the  remedies  before  mentioned  would  be  often  inade- 
quate  to  prevent  war.    Even  in  the  case  of  honest  dis- 

^  putes  behind  which  lurks  no  evil  design  of  aggression. 

t  many,  indeed,  most,  would  not  be  justiciable,  and  could 
only  be  adjusted,  short  of  war.  through  diplomacy, 


XIV 


INTRODUCTION 


the  good  offices  of  mutual  friends,  mediation,  compro- 
mise, or  possibly  arbitration.  Whether  they  would 
actually  be  settled  in  any  of  these  modes  or  would  lead 
to  war  would  depend,  as  su  •  matters  always  have 
depended,  on  the  self-restraint  of  the  nations  involved 
and  the  earnestness  of  their  desire  to  reach  a  peaceful 
settlement. 

Among  this  group  of  controversies  may  be  classed : 

1.  Misunderstandings  and  wrongs  committed  un- 
intentionally, or  by  accident  or  mistake. 

Such  disputes  as  these  lose  all  their  importance  after 
the  facts  are  understood  and  usually  are  readily  ad- 
justed by  diplomatic  correspondence.  They  need  no 
special  consideration. 

2.  Disputes  arising  from  Invasions  of  national 
pride,  honor,  or  prestige. 

If  these  invasions  result  from  mere  accident,  mis- 
take, or  innocent  misunderstanding,  they  belong  prop- 
erly to  the  first  class,  and  involve  little  danger  of  war. 
They  are  dismissed  with  a  diplomatic  explanation  or 
apology. 

But  if  they  are  intentional, — the  result  of  a  bona 
fide  insistence  upon  its  rights  by  each  nation,  confident 
i-  'e  rightfulness  of  its  attitude  and  assured  that  it 
V.  id  be  injurious  to  its  honor,  dignity,  interest,  or 
safety  to  recede,  then  the  controversy  becomes  danger- 
ous and  carries  the  seeds  of  international  complica- 
tions. 

Such  disputes,  involving  as  they  do  national  honor 
or  national  prestige, — the  position  of  the  nation  among 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

its  fellows, — are  not  easily  justiciable,  but  must  ordi- 
narily be  adjusted,  short  of  war,  by  the  good  offices 
of  mutual  friends,  mediation,  suggestions,  or  offers  of 
compromise,  and  the  like, — only  occasionally,  if  turn- 
ing on  questions  of  fact  or  of  law,  by  arbitral  or  judi- 
cial action. 

3.  The  next  class  of  bona  fide  international  dis- 
putes consists  of  those  which  arise  from  clashes  of 
sincere  and  honest  national  policies,  such  as  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  the  Balaiice  of  Power,  national  and 
racial  sympathies,  military  preparedness,  commercial 
policies,  etc. 

Such  disputes  ere  neither  justiciable  nor  arbitrable. 
We  cannot,  for  instance,  conceive,  under  existing  con- 
ditions, of  the  American  people  agreeing  to  submit 
to  a  judicial  or  arbitral  court  the  question  whether  a 
strong  foreign  power  shall  be  permitted  to  seize  terri- 
tory in  Central  or  South  America  or  in  Canada,  It 
is  not  a  question  of  law  or  justice  at  all,  but  one  of 
policy,  of  self-preservation,  the  decision  of  which 
would  never  willingly  be  left  to  an  alien  body,  be  it  a 
judicial  court  or  a  court  of  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion. 

And  what  is  true  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  ap- 
plies to  America,  is  equally  true  of  the  great  principle 
of  the  Balance  of  Power  in  Europe,  of  the  open  door 
to  trade  in  China,  of  the  right  of  a  nation  to  prepare 
itself  in  a  military  way  against  dreaded  attacks,  of 
great  nationalistic  and  racial  movements  like  Pan- 
Slavism,  Pan-Germanism,  and  others.     Disputes  like 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

these,  arising  from  sources  of  profound  national  in- 
stinct or  policy  cannot  be  settled  or  checked  by  judi- 
cial or  arbitral  decrees- 
Aside  from  conciliatory  and  persuasive  measures, 
there  is  at  present  no  recourse  save  to  war  or  the  threat 
of  it,  if  the  execution  of  such  national  policies  results 
in  the  invasion  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  other 
States.  The  establishment  of  international  judicial 
or  arbitral  courts  would  be  of  no  avail. 

4.  Another  class  of  disputes  between  nations  would 
consist  of  those  of  long  standing,  arising  from  some 
long  past  act  of  gross  injustice,  such  as  the  annexation 
of  territory  formerly  belonging  to  another  nation,  or 
the  robbery  of  a  nation's  liberty  or  independence. 
That  these  unjust  acts  of  the  distant  past  are  not  al- 
ways forgotten  is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  French 
yearning  for  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  the  Italian  call  to 
"  Italy  Unredeemed,"  and  the  Polish  vision  of  a  re- 
united Poland. 

Such  festering  sores  as  these  upon  the  international 
body  are  not  curable  by  judicial  or  arbitral  treatment. 
They  can  only  be  healed,  if  at  all,  by  the  slow  lapse  of 
time  o'  by  the  bleeding  process  of  war. 

5.  Another  class  of  disputes  consists  of  those  aris- 
ing from  breach  of  treaty. 

These  may  often  be  adjusted  without  resort  to  war. 
The  breach  may  be  regarded  as  an  abrogation  of  the 
treaty,  justifying  the  other  party  In  regarding  it  as 
void.  In  many  cases,  doubtless,  the  breach  would  pre- 
sent an  arbitral  or  justiciable  question,  in  the  settle- 


INTRODUCTION 


xvii 


ment  of  which  the  international  courts  might  take  a 
prominent  part.  But  in  other  cases  the  breach  would 
present  political  f  nd  not  justiciable  questions,  and  for 
the  decision  of  these  courts  would  be  useless.  Thus, 
many  writers  on  International  Law  lay  down  the  doc- 
trine that  a  nation  is  justified  in  violating,  and  is  bound 
to  violate,  a  treaty,  if  its  execution  becomes  morally 
impossible  by  reason  of  the  destructive  damage  such 
execution  would  inflict  on  itself  or  on  another  nation. 
It  is  evident  that  the  question  raised  by  the  violation 
of  a  treaty,  when  based  upon  this  ground,  is  much 
more  of  a  political  than  a  legal  nature,— one  which  it 
would  be  impossible  to  expect  any  nation  to  leave  to  a 
judicial  or  arbitral  tribunal  to  decide. 

6.  The  last  class  of  international  controversies  to 
which  reference  will  be  made  would  embrace  those  aris- 
ing from  disputed  facts  or  from  disputed  principles 
of  law  applicable  to  the  facts.  Given  both  litigants 
willing  to  rest  upon  their  legal  rights,  these  constitute 
clearly  and  distinctly  justiciable  questions,  to  the  de- 
cision  of  which  an  international  court  would  be  fully 

competent. 

While  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  disputes 
likely  to  arise  between  nations  may  be  expected  to 
partake  more  or  less  of  the  character  of  this  class  of 
controversies,  not  so  many  would  be  entirely  of  this 
sort,  but  rather  partly  o^  this  class  and  partly  belonging 
to  one  of  the  other  classes  before  mentioned.  And  the 
more  the  characteristics  of  other  sorts  of  disputes 
enter  into  the  case,  the  less  the  chance  of  the  questions 


I' 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

raised  being  justiciable  and  capable  of  decision  by 

judicial  or  arbitral  process. 

While  the  enumeration  above  given  is  perhaps  not 
exhaustive  of  all  the  various  sorts  of  dispute  that  may 
arise  between  nations,  it  is  sufficiently  complete  to 
demonstrate  how  few  of  such  cases  would  be  suscep- 
tible of  settlement  through  an  international  court. 
Under  existing  conditions,  therefore,  it  cannot  be  ex- 
pected that  the  establishment  of  international  judicial 
courts  or  courts  of  arbitration  will  go  very  far  to 
prevent  wars  between  nations. 

The  fact  is  that  these,  as  well  as  all  the  other  reme- 
dies  that  have  been  mentioned,  have  for  their  object 
the  redress  of  grievances  after  they  have  arisen.  They 
do  not  propose  or  attempt  to  prevent  the  original  rise 
of  the  grievance.  The  international  doctor  has  habitu- 
ally treated  the  symptoms  and  effects  of  the  disease, 
but  has  not  attempted  to  go  to  the  root  of  the  trouble, 
find  the  cause  of  the  disease  and  prevent  the  occurrence 
of  that  cause.  Not  until  this  is  recognized  as  the 
scientific  method  of  dealing  with  the  problem  will 
its  solution  be  near. 

If  it  were  possible  today  to  erect  a  world  court,  with 
the  widest  judicial  jurisdiction  conceivable,  and  to  gain 
or  compel  the  consent  of  every  nation  to  submit  to 
that  court  every  international  dispute  of  a  justiciable 
character,  the  worlc  would  be  but  little  better  off,  so 
far  as  the  actual  danger  of  war  is  concerned.  While 
human  nature  remains  as  it  is,  with  no  other  restraint 
than  that  of  an  international  court,  there  would  be  the 


INTRODUCTION 


XIX 


same  national  ambitions  and  greed,  the  same  use  or 
dread  of  force  or  fraud,  the  same  need  of  preparedness 
against  attack,  the  same  fear  of  the  stronger  by  the 
weaker  and  smaller  States,  and  often  the  same  con- 
quest and  destruction  of  the  liberties  of  the  less  pow- 
erful of  the  family  of  nations.  Only  justiciable  dis- 
putes could  be  settled  by  the  court  and  wars  grow  far 
more  frequently  out  of  political,  than  out  of  justiciable 
or  legal,  controversies. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  if  the  experience  of  the  United 
States  be  examined,  it  will  be  found  that  the  Supreme 
Court  has  habitually  .exercised  the  jurisdiction  to  de- 
cide disputes  arising  between  the  sovereign  States  of 
the  American  Union,  as  the  British  Judicial  Committee 
of  the  Privy  Council  has  also  determined  controversies 
between  British  colonies  and  provinces.  It  will  be 
pointed  out  that,  in  all  the  many  interstate  controver- 
sies so  far  brought  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  that  court  has  never  yet  failed  to  find 
that  the  dispute  was  justiciable  nor  declined  jurisdic- 
tion on  the  ground  that  the  question  was  political.  The 
consequence  has  been  that  all  these  disputes  have  been 
amicably  settled,  and  neither  war  nor  the  threat  of  it 
has  arisen  out  of  any  of  them.  Why  then,  it  may  be 
asked,  would  not  the  analogy  hold  in  the  case  of  an 
international  court,  if  the  nations  will  agree  to  submit 
their  disputes  to  its  cognizance? 

If  it  could  be  shown  that  the  happy  results  apparent 
in  the  American  system  were  due  solely  or  even  chiefly 
to  the  establishment  of  a  court  with  jurisdiction  to  de- 


XX 


INTRODUCTION 


cide  interstate  disputes,  the  analogy  between  it  and  a 
world  court  would  indeed  be  striking,  and  the  presump- 
tion strong  that  similar  results  would  follow  as  between 
the  nations  upon  the  establishment  of  a  world  court. 
But  when  we  carefully  contrast  the  circumstances  that 
would  surround  the  two  courts,  we  find  that  there  is 
no  real, — at  least  no  close, — analogy  between  them. 

The  powers  and  rights  that  may  be  exercised  by 
one  nation  towards  another  may  with  accuracy  be 
divided  into  two  classes,  first,  political  powers,  and 
second,  legal  rights.  Out  of  the  exercise  of  political 
powers  would  arise  for  the  most  part  political  or  non- 
justiciable disputes;  out  of  the  exercise  or  invasion  of 
legal  rights  would  arise  the  legal  or  justiciable  con- 
troversies. The  only  way,  therefore,  to  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  any  disputes  between  nations  or  States 
other  than  those  which  are  justiciable  or  susceptible 
of  judicial  or  arbitral  determination,  would  be  to  elimi- 
nate the  international  or  interstate  political  powers, 
which  are  the  war-breeding  powers. 

This  elimination,  as  between  the  States  of  the  Amer- 
ican Union,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has 
accomplished,  as  has  also  the  constitution  of  every 
federal  republic  or  empire  in  the  world  today,  as  be- 
tween its  component  States.  It  is  because  of  this  great 
accomplishment,  not  because  of  the  mere  establish- 
ment of  a  court  with  jurisdiction  to  determine  disputes 
between  the  component  States,  that  such  disputes  are 
always  justiciable  and  are  always  susceptible  of  judi- 
cial settlement. 


INTRODUCTION 


XXI 


An  examination  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  for  example,  will  reveal  that  each  of  the  United 
States  has  surrendered  either  entirely  or  to  the  States 
United,  to  be  exercised  by  them  all  jointly,  and  not  by 
each  separately,  the  following  powers :  ( i )  to  declare 
war;  (2)  to  keep  troops  (exclusive  of  militia)  and 
ships  of  war;  (3)  to  acquire  the  territory  of  another 
State,  except  by  consent  of  the  legislatures  of  the 
States  concerned  as  well  as  of  Congress;  (4)  to  levy 
duties  on  imports  or  exports;  (5)  to  regulate  inter- 
state or  foreign  commerce;  (6)  to  make  treaties  or 
alliances  with  foreign  States;  (7)  to  make  agreements 
or  compacts  with  other  States  except  with  the  consent 
of  Congress;  and  (8)  to  deny  to  citizens  of  sis< 
States  the  rights  and  immunities  of  citizens.  The  sui 
render  of  these  political  and  military  powers  has  at 
one  stroke  removed  from  the  realm  of  interstate  re- 
lations the  right  and  the  ability  of  each  State  to  exert 
political  power  or  influence  as  against  sister  States 
of  the  Union.  It  follows  that  no  dispute  thenceforth 
arising  between  two  of  the  United  States  could  be 
political  in  character,  but  must  always  be  vithin  the 
limit  of  legal  and  justiciable  questions. 

How  different  the  existing  situation  of  the  nations 
of  the  world  1  They  have  not  only  not  surrendered 
to  the  whole  jointly  their  individual  power  to  declare 
war  and  to  keep  troops  and  war  vessels,  but  have  been 
steadily  and  persistently  increasing  their  armaments 
year  by  year.  They  therefore  not  only  possess  in- 
herently the  force  to  compel  other  States  to  do  their 


XXll 


INTRODUCTION 


will,  but  their  ability  to  use  it  promptly  and  efficiently 
constantly  increases. 

Possessing  this  inherent  and  constantly  augmenting 
power,  they  are  more  and  more  subjected  to  the  temp- 
tation to  exert  it  unlawfully  and  tyrannically  against 
weaker  sister  nations,  since  they  have  never  surrend- 
ered, as  have  the  American  States,  the  power  to  acquire 
the  territory  of  another  State  without  its  consent  or  to 
maltreat  its  citizens  or  subjects,  or  the  right  to  levy 
heavy  tariff  duties  on  international  commerce  or  to 
secure  control,  as  far  as  might  be  within  their  power, 
of  international  trade,  trade  routes  and  seats  of  com- 
merce, regardless  of  the  just  and  equal  rights  of  other 
nations.  None  of  these  powers,  nor  the  right  to 
make  alliances,  whether  for  aggressive  or  defensive 
purposes,  nor  the  right  to  make  (or  break)  treaties 
with  other  nations  have  they  surrendered.  And  out 
of  the  exercise  of  these  powers  arise  the  so-called 
"  political  "  questions,  which  are  usually  non-justiciable, 
having  no  relation  to  abstract  justice,  but  based  on 
theories  of  policy,  self-interest,  or  self-preservation. 

If  therefore  we  would  have  an  international  court 
serve  the  same  purpose  as  between  the  nations  as  a 
supreme  federal  court  among  the  component  States 
of  a  federal  union,  some  device  must  be  utilized  that 
will  eliminate  "  political  "  controve-sies  between  them, 
arising  out  of  the  exercise  of  interstate  "  political " 
powers,  and  reduce  their  disputes  to  those  of  a  legal 
or  justiciable  character. 

That  the  only  effective  device  by  which  this  may 


XXIU 


INTRODUCTION 

be  accomplished  is  the  creation  of  some  sort  of  federal 
union  of  nations  and  a  surrender  by  each  to  all  jointly 
of  i*8  right  to  exercise  individually  those  of  its  po- 
litical  powers  (and  no  other)   the  exercise  of  which 
would  tend  to  breed  war,  is  the  conclusion  to  which  the 
writer's  reflections  and  study  have  led  him,  and  his 
efforts  will  be  devoted  in  the  following  pages  to  es- 
tabhsh  this  contention  and  to  work  out  feasible  and 
practicable  international  agreements  as  to  the  respec 
tive  powers  of  the  league  and  its  component  nations, 
together  with  such  checks  as  will  effectively  safeguard 
the  real  rights  and  '^   '.vies  of  the  States  and  peoples 
concerned.     These  aj..  cements,  for  the  sake  of  con- 
venience,   have  been  phrased  in  the  language  of  a 
tentative  written  constitution,  which  will  be  found  in 
the  Appendix,  and  which  will  form  the  basis  or  frame- 
work of  the  future  discussion,  though  it  would  be  pos- 
sible  perhaps  to  arrive  at  fairly  similar  results  in  some 
other  form. 

It  may  be  said  also  in  this  connection  that  while  in 
form  the  Constitution  herein  proposed  bears  some 
resemblance  to  that  of  the  United  States,  it  differs 
widely  from  it  in  many,-it  might  perhaps  with  truth 
be  said  in  most.—substantial  respects. 

Before  entering  upon  that  discussion,  however,  it 
may  be  well  to  inquire  whether  any  device  might  be 
suggested,  short  of  a  surrender  by  the  nations  of  the 
right  individually  to  exercise  the  "  political  "  powers 
above  mentioned,  which  would  attain  the  end  desired 
and  whether  the  attainment  of  that  end  would  be 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

worth  the  sacrifice  of  national  political  independence 
involved. 

Taking  the  last  point  first,  it  presents  a  question,  the 
answer  to  which  would  obviously  depend  upon  how 
desirable  is  the  end  to  be  attained  and  upon  the 
amount  of  sacrifice  involved.  These  values  in  turn 
must  be  measured  by  the  yardstick  of  the  individual 
reader's  convictions  and  judgment. 

Certainly,  prior  to  the  great  European  War,  few  of 
this  generation  would  have  been  found  of  an  imagi- 
nation so  vivid  as  to  possess  a  real  vision  of  war's 
horrors,  or  so  impressed  by  them  as  to  advocate  the 
slightest  surrender  of  the  sovereignty  and  independ- 
ence of  the  individual  nation  in  order  to  secure  the 
blessings  of  a  rightful  and  abiding  peace. 

But  that  war  has  searched  the  hearts  of  many,  es- 
pecially in  the  bleeding  countries  of  Europe.  The 
world  is  prepared  to  examine  realities  and  discard  an- 
cient illusions  and  shibboleths  which  would  formerly 
have  presented  impassable  barriers  to  freedom  of 
thought. 

Has  not  the  general  conception  of  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  nations  hitherto  been  somewhat 
of  an  illusion — somewhat  of  form  without  substance, 
— somewhat  of  a  mental  confusion  between  an  un- 
bridled license  and  a  true  liberty  and  independence? 
Is  any  nation  in  the  world  today  absolutely  sovereign 
and  independent?  Are  they  not  all  bound  in  chains 
by  inviolable  treaties  and  by  national  necessities  of 
policy,    greed,    jealousy,    dread    of    attack?      Even 


] 


i 


'%,..' i)um. 


18 


INTRODUCTION  xxv 

prior  to  the  great  war,  despite  their  boasted  inde- 
pendence, h-^ve  not  the  nations  groaned  under  the 
burden  of  armaments,  and  will  not  their  groans  be 
doubled  and  redoubled  when  they  feel  the  full  weight 
of  the  burdens  added  by  the  war?  Are  they  not  con- 
stantly haunted  by  fears  and  suspicions?  Are  these 
the  indications  of  national  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, or  of  an  international  license  that  usurps  the 
name. 

Would  it  then,  after  all,  be  such  a  violent  break  with 
the  past  realities  (not  illusions)  if  the  nations  should 
come  to  an  agreement  whereby  each  would  surrender 
to  the  joint  exercise  of  all  that  portion  only  of  its 
so-called  independence  which  is  susceptible  of  use  to 
the  injury  of  its  sister  nations?  Would  not  its  own 
feeling  of  peaceful  security  from  the  attacks  of  others 
compensate  each  for  the  surrender  of  the  right  to  in- 
flict injustice  and  ^-arm  on  others?  It  is  not  suggested 
that  any  part  of  its  rightful  and  just  independence 
shall  be  sacrificed  but  only  that  portion  which  would 
be  either  itself  wrongful  and  unjust,  or  which  is  sus- 
ceptible of  such  exercise  as  to  inspire  sister  nations 
with  suspicion  and  fear  of  unjust  and  oppressive  con- 
sequences. 

The  rights  each  nation  would  be  called  upon  to 
resign  would  be  the  power  to  regulate  or  control  com- 
merce between  the  component  nations;  to  acquire  the 
territory  of  other  States;  to  mistreat  their  citizens; 
to  lay  burdens  upon  imports  or  exports;  to  keep  more 
than  a  certain  proportion  of  troops  or  war  vessels; 


X 


% 


XXVI 


INTRODUCTION 


to  make  treaties  of  alliance  or  confederation  with  other 
States;  and  to  declare  war,  except  when  invaded  or  in 
such  imminent  danger  thereof  as  not  to  admit  of 
delay. 

Since  almost  all  wars  grow  out  of  the  desire  to 
seize  international  trade  or  keep  other  nations  from 
seizing  it,  out  of  the  desire  to  acquire  territory,  or  out 
of  the  mistreatment  by  one  State  of  the  citizens  of 
another,  or  out  of  a  suspicion  that  these  things  are 
being  attempted  or  contemplated,  if  the  power  of  the 
individual  nations  to  exercise  these  functions  were  sur- 
rendered to  the  joint  action  of  all,  there  would  be  no 
need  of  larger  armies  or  navies  than  would  be  de- 
manded  by  the  internal  conditions  of  each  country,  nor 
of  alliances,  nor  of  the  power  to  declare  war.    There 
would  thus  be  only  three  real  surrenders,  the  surrender 
of  the  power  to  regulate  international  commerce  to  the 
injury  of  other  nations,  of  the  power  to  acquire  their 
territory,  and  of  the  power  to  treat  unjustly  or  oppres- 
sively the  citizens  of  other  States.    This  would  surely 
seem  not  an  onerous  price  to  pay  for  national  security 
and   insurance    against   future   wars,    provided   such 
checks  are  supplied  as  would  effectually  induce  the 
international  league  to  whom  some  of  these  powers 
would  be  confided  to  exercise  them  impartially  for  the 
best  interests  of  all  the  component  nations,  freeing 
those  nations  from  all  fear  that  they  might  be  exer- 
cised to  their  destruction  or  oppression. 

Let  us  consider  briefly,  in  the  last  place,  whether 
there  is  any  other  practicable  device  than  that  just 


INTRODUCTION  xxvH 

mentioned  which  might  effectually  secure  the  nations 
against  the  unlawful,  unjust  or  tyrannical  abuse  by  sis- 
ter nations  of  the  "  political  "  powers. 

No  other  restraint  suggests  itself  except  the  vague 
and  tardy  influence  of  public  opinion.  The  past  ex- 
perience of  humanity  has  not  encouraged  us  to  repose 
much  confidence  in  the  mere  power  of  opinion  to  pre- 
vent that  class  of  political  dispute  which  so  often 
lead  to  war.  Nor  is  this  surprising  when  we  re- 
member that  to  the  effective  operation  of  public  opin- 
ion two  conditions  are  essential,  knowledge  of  the 
fundamental  facts  of  the  controversy  and  time  for  the 
crystallization  of  sentiment  upon  the  merits  o/  t. 
These  conditions,  difficult  enough  of  attainment  in  na- 
tional affairs,  are  in  most  cases  impossible  of  fulfill- 
ment in  the  more  complex  international  controver- 
sies,—at  least  until  too  late  to  avert  disastrous  conse- 
quences,— however  potent  they  might  be  in  bringing 
the  rupture  to  a  conclusion,  in  influencing  the  final 
adjustment  between  the  combatants,  or  in  compelling 
them  to  find  or  to  invent  plausible  excuses  for  breaking 
the  peace. 

Nor  can  popular  opinion  within  the  disputant  States 
themselves  be  expected  to  exert  much  of  an  inhibitive 
power.  The  people  as  a  whole  are  accustomed  to  fol- 
low their  leaders  and  know  too  little  of  the  details  of 
international  relations  to  be  able  to  judge  for  them- 
selves of  the  real  merits  of  such  controversies.  It  is 
easy  for  the  national  leaders,  if  they  arc  so  disposed, 
to  give  out,  keep  back  or  distort  information  so  as  to 


il 


Mi 


xxviii  INTRODUCTION 

make  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason  and  to  mis- 
guide the  nation.  The  atmosphere  of  international 
intercourse  is  that  of  secrecy.  No  real  security  can 
be  hoped  for  from  this  quarter. 

There  remains  then  only  some  form  of  international 
organization  whereby  the  mischievous  exercise  of  these 
interstate  political  powers  shall  be  controlled  or  else 
machinery  provided  for  the  peaceful  solution  of  the 
political  disputes  sure  to  result  from  their  uncon- 
trolled exercise.  If  the  nations  choose  the  former 
alternative,  by  controlling  the  causes  of  war  they  se- 
cure themselves  against  war  itself.  If  they  adopt  the 
latter,  the  causes  of  controversy  are  left  to  flourish 
in  full  vigor,  while  the  effort  is  expended  on  the  at- 
tempt to  check  the  evil  consequences 

So  far  as  the  surrender  of  sovereignty  und  independ- 
ence is  concerned,  there  would  seem  to  be  little  to 
choose  between  them.  An  international  league  for 
the  enforcement  of  compulsory  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion, with  a  covenant  by  all  to  unite  in  war  or  other 
forcible  measures  against  any  nation  declining  to  en- 
gage  in  either  form  of  settlement,  however  sacred  and 
dear  to  it  the  matter  involved,  can  hardly,  if  success- 
ful, be  looked  upon  as  a  conservator  of  the  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  the  nations.  True  it  would  leave 
the  nations  fice  as  at  present,  to  exercise  their  jj- 
litical  powers  to  the  injury  and  oppression  of  their 
neighbors,  but  if  the  plan  were  successful  they  would 
be  held  to  so  strict  an  accountability  for  the  result- 
ing  injuries  that  they  would  in  effect  cease  to  enjoy 


INTRODUCTION  ^xix 

the  sovereign  independence  they  now  possess  to 
bully,  oppress  and  defraud  other  nations  as  thev 
please.  ' 

Such  a  league  might  prove  a  more  or  less  efficient 
safeguard  against  international  wars;  but  it  would 
certainly  not  leave  the  independence  of  the  nations  un- 
touched. 

But  it  is  submitted  that,  aside  from  the  inherent 
difficulty  of  securing  the  consent  of  the  nations  to  any 
plan  effective  to  prevent  war,  there  are  practical  ob- 
stacles  in  the  way  of  the  successful  operation  of  a  plan 
of  this  nature  arising  out  of  the  difficulty  that  would 
manifest  itself  among  the  nations  of  the  league  of  se- 
cunng  concert  of  action  in  compelling  a  recalcitrant 
nation  to  resort  to  compulsory  arbitration  or  concilia- 
tion.    How  would  each  leaguer's  proportion  of  troops, 
ships   and  expense  be  ascertained?    Who  would  com- 
mand?    How  induce  the  people  of  the  several  nations 
of  the  league  to  look  with  favor  upon  a  war  waged 
to  compel  a  sister  and  perhaps  distant  nation  to  adjudi- 
cate  questions  that  to  them  will  often  appear  to  involve 
mere  abstract,  technical  matters  of  national  policy  or 
international  law,  about  which  most  of  them  would 
know  little  and  care  less?    Or  if  a  nation  be  jealous 
or  suspicious  of  the  superior  strength,  military  or  com- 
mercal  of  the  State  threatened  with  attack,  how  shall 
Its  zealous  support  be  secured  of  a  concerted  action 
hat  would  prevent  such  attack?     Who  would  settle 

equally  difficult  if  the  nation  called  on  to  inter^-ene 


•  iM 


XXX 


INTRODUCTION 


were  commercially  or  diplomatically  on  peculiarly 
friendly  terms  with  the  aggressor? 

These  are  some  of  the  reasons  (and  others  will 
appear  in  subsequent  chapters)  why  the  plea  is  made 
in  the  following  pages  that  the  league  take  the  form 
of  the  establishment  of  a  federal  international  gover  ■•- 
ment,  by  which  the  nations  will  either  agree^  und  ;r 
proper  safeguards,  to  surrender  to  the  government 
of  all  jointly  their  power  to  injure  or  work  injustice 
upon  their  sister  States  or  agree  that  they  shall  not  be 
exercised  at  all.  The  powers  that  need  be  thus  sur- 
rendered are  very  few,  but  very  important  to  the  at- 
tainment of  the  end  desired.  They  may  be  briefly 
enumerated  as  follows:  (i)  The  grant  on  the  one 
hand  to  the  league  of  the  power  to  regiilate  interna- 
tional commerce  and  communication  by  special  legislir- 
tion  for  the  purpose  and,  on  the  other,  the  surrender 
by  the  component  nations  of  the  right  to  tax  imports, 
exports,  or  the  instrumentalities  of  international  com- 
merce; (2)  the  right  to  acquire  any  part  of  the  terri- 
tory of  another  nation  without  the  consent  both  of  the 
latter  nation  and  of  the  international  government; 

(3)  the  right  to  treat  tyrannically  or  oppressively  the 
citizens  of  other  States  while  within  their  borders; 

(4)  the  right  to  keep  more  than  a  reasonable  propor- 
tion of  troops  and  war  vessels,  adequate  to  the  task  of 
internal  police,  while  granting  to  the  joint  government 
the  right  to  keep  sufficient  troops  ai.J  ships  to  guaran- 
tee the  protection  of  all;  (5)  the  right  to  make  treaties 
of  alliance  and  confederation  individually  with  any 


INTRODUCTION 


XXXI 


nation,  or  any  treaty  that  would  violate  the  compact 
of  union,  while  granting  to  the  joint  government  the 
power  to  make  treaties  with  any  nation,  not  a  member 
of  the  union,  concerning  matters  to  which  the  powers 
granted  to  the  joint  government  shall  extend;  and  (6) 
the  right  to  declare  or  make  war,  unless  in  case  of 
invasion  or  imminent  danger  thereof,  while  granting  to 
the  league  the  right  to  declare  war  against  States  with- 
out the  union. 

It  has  been  said  before,  but  it  may  well  be  re- 
peated,— indeed  too  much  emphasis  cannot  be  laid 
upon  the  statement, — that,  conceding  the  surrender  by 
the  nations  of  the  first  three  of  the  powers  above 
enumerated,  there  would  be  little  or  no  need  of  the 
exercise  of  the  last  three,  so  that  under  the  plan  pres- 
ently to  be  considered,  the  nations  would  in  reality 
only  be  called  upon  to  surrender  three  items  of  their 
present  independence  namely:  the  right  to  control  or 
regulate  international  commerce  generally,  but  only  to 
an  extent  that  would  be  considered  by  the  joint 
judgment  of  all  as  essential  to  the  general  interest, 
(though  as  to  the  right  to  tax  or  burden  imports,  ex- 
ports, or  the  instrumentalities  of  international  com- 
merce, the  surrender  should  be  absolute) ;  the  right  to 
acquire  the  territory  of  another  State  to  the  detriment 
of  that  State  or  to  the  detriment  of  the  joint  interests 
of  all ;  and  lastly,  the  right  to  treat  unjustly  or  oppres- 
sively, according  to  certain  designated  standards,  the 
citizens  of  other  States  while  within  their  borders. 

Gone  would  be  the  dread  of  economic  bondage,  the 


xxxu 


INTRODUCTION 


fear  of  territorial  conquest,  the  danger  of  injustice  to 
citizens  in  foreign  lands.  When  these  shackles  are 
struck  from  the  limbs  of  the  nations,  the  causes  of 
international  war  are  practically  swept  away,  and  with 
them  war  itself. 

But  the  nations  would  rightly  prefer  to  bear  the  ills 
they  have  rather  than  fly  to  others  they  know  not  of, 
and  unless  they  can  be  assured  that  in  the  destruction 
of  these  age-long  chains  they  do  not  find  other  and 
stronger  fetters,  they  would  be  justified  in  declining 
to  try  the  experiment.  Even  though  it  be  granted 
that  the  general  principles  above  enunciated  are  sound, 
yet  there  remains  the  great  task  of  devising  such  auto- 
matic checks  and  balances  as  will  render  it  impossible 
that  this  joint  government  shall  encroach  upon  the  just 
liberties  of  the  component  States  or  their  people.  Due 
care  must  be  taken  that  a  majority  of  the  component 
States  shall  not  engage  in  oppressive  conduct  toward 
a  minority  or  even  toward  a  single  State;  that  a  ma- 
jority composed  of  the  small  States,  shall  not  override 
the  united  will  of  the  fewer,  but  more  influential, 
'*  Great  Powers,"  and  that  the  more  influential  shall 
not  override  the  wishes  of  a  majority  composed  of  the 
smaller  States;  that  the  international  government, 
both  in  its  legislative  and  executive  departments,  be 
at  all  times  subject  to  the  joint  control  of  the  r  im- 
ponent  States;  that  a  small  minority  on  the  one  hand 
shall  not  be  permitted  to  block  the  legitimate  will  of 
the  majority  of  the  States  in  the  ordinary  conduct  of 
business,  while  on  the  other,  in  regard  to  matters  of 


INTRODUCTION 


xxxiii 


vital  importance,  a  bare  majority  of  States  shall  not  be 
permitted  complete  control;  that  the  internal  affairs 
of  a  State  be  not  interfered  with  at  all  by  other  States 
acting  jointly  or  separately;  that  a  constituent  State  do 
not  persistently  neglect  or  disregard  its  pledged  obliga- 
tions to  the  union  or  its  sister  States, — in  short,  that 
all  needful  precautions  be  taken  to  insure  an  adminis- 
tration of  the  international  government  in  the  common 
interest  of  all,  as  evidenced  by  the  free  and  untram- 
meled  voice  of  each  in  the  international  legislature. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  following  study,  while  doubtless 
imperfect  and  inadequate  in  details,  may  at  least  serve 
to  suggest  a  basic  foundation  upon  which  to  rear  an 
international  organization  which  will  remove  the  great 
subjects  already  mentioned,  the  breeders  of  interna- 
tional strife,  from  the  baneful  influence  of  secret  and 
often  sinister  diplomacy,  and  deliver  them  to  the  open 
and  public  debate  of  an  international  legislative  body, 
wherein  every  nation  will  be  fairly  represented. 

Note.— The  reader's  attention  is  specially  called  to  the  index- 
heading,  "Checks  and  Balances,"  wherein  will  be  found  a  complete 
analysis  of  the  many  safeguards  against  invasions  of  national  and 
individual  independence  contained  in  the  constitution  proposed. 


m 

iffl 

I 


ill. 


l  if 


f 


m 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 
Federal  ^Unions    Prevent    Wars    Between  the    Component 

^Zti^J''^"""  u*  '°*^'"'  nioiJlity  among  men.-Social 
morality  among  the  nations.-Law  between  nations  suppli-d. 

b^tw^T^'n  w''"*'^  >  *,"^"-'^  unions-Some  distinction's 
between  ordinary  federal  unions  and  a  federal  league  of 
independent  nations.  «:«isuc  or 


It 


-■11 


iNTKOOUCnON 


PAGE 

ix 


Utility  of  arbitral  tribunals  in  preventing  wars.— Judicial 
and  arbitral  courts  contrasted.— Many  sorts  of  disputes  can- 
not be  settled  by  either  tribunal.— International  disputes 
classified.— Justiciable  and  political  questions  contrasted.— 
Why  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  can  deter- 
En  \>  f7"i"  '^V''"1.  *'  ^'^*"  °^  »he  American 
h!.,,^  rr^  •"'2'c''""*''^?*''"^  P°^«"  «^  States  surren- 
dered  to  United  States.-No  such  surrender  by  independent 

^fT/T  T i"'*"""'    ?*    sovereignty    illusory.— Feasibility 
^L    I  '  '"S"'  °*  nations—Federal  union  of  nations 

and    league   merely   to   enforce   peace   contrasted.-Note   to 
the  reader  touching  the  checks  and  balances  of  the  Con- 


;ii 


111 


CHAPTER  II 
Peace-Making  Elements  of  a  Federal  Union 

The  war-checking  powers  of  a  federal  union.— The  causes 
Ifi  "^  V  """"f  "ted— National  immorality.-National  cupid- 
ity—National ambition.-National  pride  or  honor— Na- 
tional prejudice  and  ignorance— National  jealousies  and 
suspicions.— Lack  of  adequate  peaceable  modes  of  redress. 

CHAPTER  III 
Federal  Union  of  Lvdependent  Nations  Proposed 

XXXV 


lO 


as 


XXXVl 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  IV 

Okganization  of  the  Legislative  Department 

Distribution  of  powers. — Legislative  department  of  one 
or  two  chambers?— Appointment  of  representatives — Terms 
of  office.— -Sessions  of  the  International   Congress — Recesses 

and      adjournments. — Compensation     of      repre«     natives. 

Privileges  of  representatives. — Limited  life  of  -nue  and 
commercial  measures. — National  veto  of  international  legis- 
lation.— Power  of  impeachment  or  removal.—Other  de- 
tails of  organization. 

CHAPTER  V 

Powers  to  be  Conferred  on  International  Congress  . 

Preliminary  observations. — Power  to  raise  revenue. — 
Power  to  borrow  money. — To  issue  paper  currency. — To 
coin  money. — To  punish  counterfeiting. — To  fix  standards 
of  weights  and  measures. — To  regulate  international  com- 
merce.—To  regulate  pr  \l  and  other  internatit^nal  com- 
munication.— To  proviov  for  international  copyrights  and 
patent  rights. — To  constitute  inferior  international  courts. 
— To  define,  punish  and  redress  wrongs  on  the  high  seas 
and  offences  against  the  Law  of  Nations. — The  war  pow- 
ers.— The  seat  of  the  international  govcr  .me;  .  -Anciliaiy 
powers. — Citizenship. — Power  of  naturalization. 


PACK 

30 


66 


CHAPTER  VI 

Organization  of  the  Executive  Department 

Dependence  of  the  executive  upon  the  legislative  depart- 
ment.—Selection  of  a  prime  minister. — The  nominating 
committee,  its  organization  and  functions. — Eligibility  of 
ministers. — Selection  of  subordinate  ministers. — The  number 
of  ministers.— Their  terms  of  office. — Their  compensation.— 
Distribution  of  executive  functions  among  the  ministers. 


100 


CHAPTER  VII 

Powers  to  be  Conferred  on  the  Executive  Department  . 

The  pardoning  power. — The  treaty-making  power.— 
Appointment  and  removal  of  officers.— Recognition  of  am- 
bassadors and  public  ministers. — The  axecution  of  inter- 
national laws,  tre;>ties  and  judicial  decisions.— Official  com- 
missions.— Interpellations  and  interrogations. — The  sum- 
moning and  proroguing  of  the   Congress. 


"S 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


XXXVll 


CHAPTER  VIII 

FACE 
ORGANIZATION    OF    THE    JUDICIARY    DEPARTMENT  .         .         .125 

Appointment  of  international  judiciary.— Independence  of 
the  judiciary.— Inferior  international  tribunals.— The  in- 
ternational Supreme  Court.— Equality  of  national  repre- 
sentation upon  the  Supreme  Court.- Division  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  into  sections.— Appeals  from  the  sections  to 
the  Supreme  Court  as  a  whole. 

CHAPTER  IX 
Jurisdiction  of  the  International  Courts 136 

Scope  of  the  international  judicial  power.— Interpreta- 
tion of  the  constitution,  laws  and  treaties.— Power  to  ad- 
judge laws  and  treaties  unconstitutional  and  void.— Check 
upon  the  power.— Cases  affecting  ambassadors,  public  min- 
isters and  consuls.— Offences  and  wrongs  committed  on 
the  high  seas.— The  United  Nations  a  party.— Controversies 
between  component  nations.— Controversies  between  com- 
ponent and  other  nations.— Controversies  between  nations 
not  members  of  the  league.— Cases  between  citizens  of  dif- 
ferent States.— Original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court. 
—Its  appellate  jurisdiction.— Limitations  upon  the  inter- 
_  national  judicial  power.— Suits  by  individuals  against  com- 

''^  ponent  nations.— Suits  against  the  sovereign,  chief  executive 

or  ministers  of  a  compor-ent  nation. 

CHAPTER  X 

Limitations  upon  the  Powers  of  the  United  Nations— (n 

Political  Limitations '.       .     156 

„  ^."■.'''""'"^^y  observations.- Territorial  acquisitions  — 
Citizenship  of  the  United  Nations."—"  Treason  against  the 
United  Nations."— Power  of  taxation.— Appropriations  of 
public  money.— Purposes  of  appropriations.— Bounties  and 
pensions.— Commercial  preferences  as  between  the  com- 
ponent nations.— Titles  of  nobility  and  privileged  orders. 
— Grants  of  titles  or  emoluments  by  other  States. 

CHAPTER  XI 

Limitations  upon  the  Powers  of  the   Unfted  Nations:— (II) 

Guarantees  of  Civil  Rights  of  the  Individual     .       .     168 

Prompt  discharge  from  illegal  imprisonment.— Religious 
liberty.— Freedom  of  speech  and  press.— Rights  of  assembly 
and  of  petition.— The  keeping  and  bearing  of  arms.— Quar- 
tering of  soldiers  on  the  people.— Jury  trial   in  civil  cases. 

— Power  of  eminent  domain. — Due  process  of  law Equal 

protection  of  the  laws. 


mi 


if 

m 


4 


xxxviii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XII 


rAci 


Limitations  upon  the  Powers  of  the  United  Nations:— (III) 
Guarantees  of  Rights  of  Individuals  in  Criminal 
Cases i8i 

Due  process  of  law. — Equal  protection  of  the  laws. — Bills 
of  attainder. — Ex  post  facto  laws. — General  warrants  of 
arrest  and  search. — Double  jeopardy. — Self-incrimination. — 
The  grand  jury.— Speedy  and  public  trial.— Jury  trial  in 
criminal  cases.— Other  guarantees  in  criminal  cases. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Limitations  upon  the  Powers  of  the  Component  Nations  . 

General  limitations  of  a  non-political  nature. — Political 
powers  haying  no  bearing  on  war.— Treaties,  alliances  and 
confederations. — Taxation  of  international  commerce. — 
War  powers  of  component  nations. — Territorial  acquisitions 
by  component  nations. 

CHAPTER  XIV 

Relahons  of  Component  Nations  to  Each  Other  and  to  the 
Union  

Prctection  of  fundamental  rights  of  citizens  of  one  State 
while  in  another. — Protection  to  citixens  of  component  States 
while  in  foreign  countries. — Protection  of  component  States 
against^  invasion. — Internal  aissensions  in  component  States. 
— Admission  of  new  States  to  the  league. 


190 


213 


CHAPTER  XV 
Reserved  Rights  of  the  Component  Nations 


323 


General  reservation  of  sovereignty  and  of  all  rights  not 
surrendered. — Right  of  component  nation  to  withdraw  from 
the  league. — Rights  of  seceding  State  in  the  common  prop- 
erty of  the  league- 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Supremacy  of  International  Constitution.  Lav       vd  Treaties    229 

The  declaration  of  supremacy — Official  »    (b  f        ipport 
th^  Constitution. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XVII 


XXXIX 


Amendments  t^ 


■iVST.TL'TION 


232 


En?ctmenl     "'"''''''.-'""'■   ->P'>'^^     of     amendments.- 
amendment. 


I  irndrnents.-    Limitations  upon  the  power  of 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
Discipline  of  a  Component  Nation  . 


242 


nJi^n  MA  institutional  obligations  by  a  component 
nation.— Modes  of  discipline  proposed.— Embargo  on  trade. 
—Expulsion  ^rom  the  league.— Check  upon  disciplinary 
power  of  the  Congress.— Requirement  of  a  three-fourths  vote 
in  each  chamber. 

CHAPTER  XIX 
Establishment  of  the  Constitution 

Number  of  assenting  nations  required  to  establish  the 
Constitution.— Number  of  the  Great  Powers.— Method  of 
latification  of  tht  Constitution. 

Appendix 

Index    


248 


257 
299 


•t. 


h 
U 


t|;ff 

'I 


Mil 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


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CHAPTER  I 

FEDERAL    UNIONS    PREVENT    WARS    BE- 
TWEEN THE  COMPONENT  STATES 


t  5  »f 


•'? 


I 

Foundations  of  Social  or  Civic  Morality 
Among  Men 

In  the  first  stages  of  every  primitive  society  there  is 
a  period  during  which  the  laws  protecting  ind'  ridual 
rights  are  but  vaguely  defined  and  weakly  enforced. 
Each  man's  ability  to  hold  his  own  depends  upon  his 
strength  or  cunning  or  upon  the  alliances  he  can  form 
with  others  for  common  protection. 

But  as  the  society  becomes  more  stable  and  civilized, 
influences  begin  to  work  which  materially  improve  the 
condition  of  mankind.  A  spirit  of  co-operation  and  of 
mutual  aid  and  dependence  takes  the  place  of  the 
former  spirit  of  rapacity;  common  interests  make  men 
more  friendly;  suspicion  and  distrust  give  way  to  mu- 
tual  confidence;  selfish  ambition  and  cupidity  yield 
more  or  less  to  an  appreciation  of  the  rights  of  others; 


■y 


1 


2  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

and  violence  surrenders  dominion  to  the  gentler  arts 
of  reason  and  peace. 

What  is  the  cause  of  this  great  change  in  the  gen- 
eral attitude  of  men  ?  It  is  the  rise  and  development 
of  LAW,  divine  and  human,  and  the  proper  enforce- 
ment of  justice  and  right.  This  marks  the  birth  of  a 
social  or  civic  morality  among  men,  unknown  to  the 
era  of  lawlessness  and  of  the  personal  application  of 
the  maxim  that  might  makes  right. 

All  individual  morality  is  based  upon  four  broad 
foundations:  The  fear  of  consequences,  the  hope  of 
reward,  hereditary  predispositions,  and  environment. 
All  these  are  directly  or  indirectly  supplied  and  built 
up  by  the  operation,  as  between  man  and  man,  of  just 
and  wise  law,  firmly  enforced  by  a  superior  power. 

So  long,  therefore,  as  we  suppose  men  born  without 
hereditary  predispositions  to  justice  and  respect 
for  the  rights  of  others;  surrounded  by  others  with 
as  little  conception  of  these  ideals  as  themselves,  and 
with  as  little  understanding  or  appreciation  of  them; 
owing  such  ease,  comfort  and  happiness  as  they  enjoy 
to  violence  and  the  unjust  disregard  of  other's  rights; 
and  strong  enough  to  be  devoid  of  much  fear  of  conse- 
quences;—we  have  a  condition  in  which  ordinary 
morality,  and  the  dictates  of  reason  and  justice,  can 
find  but  little  root. 

But  with  the  advent  of  Law,  properly  enforced,  pro- 
tecting the  weak  against  violence  and  punishing  the 
oppressor,  all  this  is  changed.  The  teachings  of  divine 
law  arouse  the  conscience,  while  the  fear  of  certain 


MORALITY  AMONG  NATIONS  3 

punishment  under  human  law  suffices  to  deter  most 
men  from  its  ruthless  violation.    The  hope  of  reward 
ceases  to  lie  in  the  violent  or  fraudulent  taking  of  the 
property  of  others,  but  finds  its  source  in  the  acquisi- 
tion  of  goods  by  the  honest  labor  of  men  secure  in  the 
peaceful  possession  of  their  own,  or  in  their  desire 
to  obtain  and  to  deserve  the  good  opinion  and  plaudit 
of  their  fellows  and  the  approval  of  their  own  con- 
sciences.    It  is  soon  discovered  that  these  constitute 
much  greater  rewards  than  could  be  attained  under 
the  old  system  of  lawlessness  and  license.    And  as  these 
influences  spread  amongst  men,  they  speedily  become 
reinforced  by  those  of  hereditary  predisposition  to 
just  dealings  and  peaceful  conduct,  and  of  an  environ- 
ment  of  the  like  kind. 

Thus  it  is  that  the  advent  of  Law  brings  about  a 
condition  among  men  in  every  civilized  society,  by 
reason  of  which  violence  and  private  wars  among  them 
are  rare. 

II 

Social  Morality  Among  the  Nations 

There  is  a  family  or  society  of  nations,  but  its 
condition  is  closely  akin  to  that  of  the  primitive  so- 
cieties of  men,  to  which  allusion  has  been  made.  As 
yet,  the  nations,  in  their  dealings  with  each  other,  have 
by  no  means  advanced  along  the  road  of  moral  con- 
ceptions as  far  as  has  the  individual  unit  of  society. 

Nor  is  this  surprising  when  we  remember  that  the 


V 

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4  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

nations  generally  have  not  been  subjected  to  the  in- 
fluences that  make  so  strongly  for  the  development 
of  the  morality  of  the  individual. 

The  laws  governing  international  relations  have  not 
the  sanction  of  a  superior  power.  They  are  vaguely 
outlined,  and  are  obligatory  only  so  long  as  the  na- 
tions' self-interests  demand  their  recognition.  The 
only  well-recognized  law  controlling  them  in  the  past 
has  been  that  might  makes  right.  Accordingly  much 
the  same  phenomena  have  presented  themselves  in  this 
society  of  nations  as  in  that  primitive  society  of  men 
already  referred  to. 

The  strong  nation,  unafraid  of  consequences,  de- 
spoils the  weaker  of  its  territory,  its  independence,  or 
its  wealth,  and  finds  its  highest  reward  in  the  violent 
or  fraudulent  acquisition  of  the  liberty  or  property  of 
its  neighbors.  Its  environment  has  not  been  such  as 
to  improve  these  tendencies,  since  all  the  rest  of  the  so- 
ciety of  nations  would  think  and  act  like  itself  under 
the  same  circumstances.  Nor  has  there  been  any 
influence  operating  upon  the  nations  analogous  to  the 
hereditary  predispositions  to  just  and  right  dealings, 
which  operate  so  powerfully  to  create  and  keep  alive 
individual  morality. 

Hence  in  the  society  of  nations,  as  in  that  of  primi- 
tive men,  we  find  the  same  tendencies  to  violence, 
rapaciiy,  cupidity,  ruthless  ambition,  suspicion,  and  dis- 
trust, constant  injustice,  constant  conflicts. 

That  the  absence  of  social  morality  among  nations 
is  due  to  the  absence  of  Law  and  a  superior  power 


EFFECT  OF  FEDERAL  UNION  5 

adequate  to  enforce  it,  is  seen  from  the  fact  that  within 
the  last  century  there  has  been  a  considerable  develop- 
ment  of  it,  synchronizing  with  the  many  international 
congres.cs  and  conferences  that  have  from  time  to  time 
been  held  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  and  adopting 
laws  to  regulate  international  relations,-and  this,  de- 
spite  the  fact  that  but  very  inadequate  and  imperfect 
instrumentalities  have  been  as  yet  created  for  the  en- 
forcement  of  the  laws  made. 


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1;  '• 


I 


III 

Law  Between  Nations  Supplied  and  Wars 
Averted  by  Federal  Unions 

Important  and  valuable  testimony  to  the  fact  just  al- 
luded  to,-that  an  international  morality,  which  will 
put  an  end  to  international  abuses  and  the  wars  result- 
ing from  them,  will  always  be  developed  in  the  pres- 
ence  of  effectual  and  enforceable  international  law- 

Ih^^l  '"  ^  P'''"'"">^  ^°"^P'^^^  «»^«ss  with 

which  the  various  federal  unions  of  the  world  have  not 
only  averted  wars  between  their  component  States,  but 
have  substituted,  in  the  place  of  the  vindictive  na- 

•onal  passions  that  would  soon  engender  war  between 
em  If  left  to  themselves,  a  spirit  of  co-operation  an" 

r.endly  emulation  for  the  common  weal  entirely  un- 
known  as  between  separate  nations.     The  advent  of 

Z  'T^  "'''°"'  ''  '^"^  ^""  '«  P'-^d^ce  niuch  the 
same  effects  as  among  individuals. 


6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  German  Empire,  Switzerland,  the  Dominion  «  f 
Canada,  the  Australian  Commonwealth,  the  Argentine 
and  Brazilian  Republics,  all  speak  a  common  language 
on  this  point. 

The  only  exception  is  the  United  States,  whose  rec- 
ord in  this  respect  has  been  dimmed  by  the  War  of 
1861  between  the  States.  But  upon  due  examination 
it  will  be  found  that  this  exception  is  apparent  rather 
than  real,  since  that  war  was  due  to  an  irreconcilable, 
but  none  the  less  sincere,  difference  of  opinion  upon 
the  point  of  the  constitutional  right  of  a  State  to  secede 
from  the  Union ; — a  point  which  the  Constitution  had 
not  expressly  provided  for.  No  one  acquainted  with 
the  American  people  would  believe  that  a  war  would 
ever  have  occurred  upon  this  point  if  the  Constitution 
had  explicitly  declared  either  for  or  against  the  right 
of  secession.  That  war  therefore  cannot  justly  be 
said  to  have  resulted  on  either  side  from  a  want  of 
social  morality  or  from  lawlessness,  but  rather  from 
the  desire  of  each  party  to  the  quarrel  to  enforce  the 
law  as  each  saw  it. 

With  respect  to  the  United  States,  however,  it  can 
certainly  be  said  that,  with  the  exception  of  this  war, 
her  experience  has  been  the  same  as  that  of  all  the 
other  federal  unions.  The  component  States  have 
exercised  toward  each  other  that  courtesy,  self  restraint 
and  consideration  which  take  the  place  in  such  federa- 
tions of  the  rapacity,  greed,  ambition,  and  mutual 
jealousy  and  distrust,  characteristic  of  the  relations 
existing  between  distinct  nations. 


FEDERAL  UNIONS  CONTRASTED        7 

The  British  Empire,  too,  should  be  mentioned  in  this 

coijnecon.     For  though  it  is  not  in  form  strictly  a 

federal  un.on,  ,t  ,s  actuated  in  the  government  of  its 

^at  regulate  the  relations  between  a  federal  union  and 

;ts  component  States,  the  principles  of  freedom  and 

ndependence   m    all   local   matters    and   protection 

agamst  mvas,on,  in  return  for  the  more  or  less  can- 

1  aTJ°'  °'  '"'"""  'O"""™  '"  ">=  "hole  Em- 
Z.,  I  ^"'•°'"'  "">"•  ^'  find  the  operation  of 
the  same  Iaw,-,he  component  State,  actuated  by  good 
w,ll  towards  each  other  and  a  desire  to  serve  the  com- 
mon  good  of  all,  instead  of  a  constant  striving  for 

it  en^nde::"'''"'  "'""  ""  ""«■"»««■'«  i"'o-- 

Is  it  not  then  a  just  and  reasonable  conclusion  that 

here  are  elements  in  every  federal  union  that  tend 

0  destroy  the  grounds  of  ordinary  international  quar- 

rlTf  I  "u'^u  ""?  ""™S  ""  ""•Ponent  nations? 
Tha   such  has  been  the  result  in  the  actual  experience 

.  t^thlu^iTr^'  "'*  "■'  """"'-'-"  ■"-•-""d 
as  to  the  United  States,  there  is  no  doubt. 


IV 

Some  Distinctions  Between  Ordinary  Federal 
Unions  and  a  Federal  Union  of  Independ- 
ent Nations 

wouldTnl"''"^:''"''"  ""  ""^'"''°"  J""  ""h'd 
»ould  apply  m  hke  manner  or  degree  to  a  general 


1^ 


I 


8 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


union  of  nations,  it  is  important  to  observe  that  all 
existing  federal  unions  are  composed  of  States,  all 
of  which  have  much  the  same  institutions,  language, 
and  nationality.  It  mig  it  be  questioned  whether  quite 
the  same  successful  results  would  follow  upon  a  federal 
union  of  nations  speaking  different  languages,  possess- 
ing different  institutions  and  racial  characteristics,  and 
accustomed  to  different  modes  of  thought. 

There  is  another  point  of  distinction  to  be  noted 
between  a  federal  international  union  and  the  federal 
national  unions  with  which  the  world  is  familiar. 
The  latter  have  always  been  designed  for  two  pur- 
po:;ps; — first,  to  substitute,  as  between  the  component 
Strifes,  the  co-operative  and  friendly  for  the  rapacious 
and  militaristic  spirit;  and,  second,  to  create  to  a 
greater  or  less  degree  out  of  the  component  States  a 
single  nation.  For  the  purpose  last  mentioned  it  has 
always  been  necessary  to  bind  the  States  together  by  a 
close  union,  they  surrendering  to  the  federal  govern- 
ment a  considerable  number  of  sovereign  rights  they 
might  have  exercised  as  independent  States,  even 
though  no  danger  of  war  might  result  from  the  exer- 
cise of  them.  The  federal  international  union,  on  the 
other  hand,  being  designed  mainly  to  preserve  the 
peace  between  the  component  nations,  and  to  create  a 
new  State  only  in  a  very  limited  sense,  need  not,  and 
indeed  could  not,  be  so  close  a  union  as  the  others 
nor  require  the  surrender  of  so  many  important  sov- 
ereign powers. 

In  the  case  of  an  international  federation,  these  two 


FEDERAL  UNIONS  CONTRASTED        9 
grounds  of  distinction  would  perhaps  operate  in  some 
degree  to  diminish  the  salutary  operation  of  that  law 
underlying  federal  unions,  which  makes  them  very  com- 
p  ete  conservers  of  the  peace  between  the  component 
btates;  but  it  by  no  means  follows  that  this  influence 
would  be  seriously  impaired  either  in  kind  or  degree 
If  we  remember  that,  in  case  of  such  a  union,  the  com^ 
ponent  States,  through  the  federal  legislative  and  ex- 
ecutive  departments,  would  be  co-operating  much  more 
constantly  than  now,  and  would  thus  come  better  to 
understand  each  other's  view  points;  that  the  war  pow- 
ers,  and  others  calculated  to  cause  conflicts  between 
them  would  be  surrendered  to  the  federal  government, 
with  a  corresponding  disarmament  of  the  nations  them- 
selves; and  that  actual  disagreements  between  them 
would  be  determined  by  the  decrees  of  the  federal 
judiciary,  backed  if  need  be  by  the  influence  of  the  en- 
tire union  ;-there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  the 
causes  of  war  between  the  nations  would  be  effectually 
abohshed  or  robbed  of  their  harmful  qualities,  and 
that  a  reign  of  international  law  would  be  established 
m  the  place  of  the  existing  dominion  of  a  universal 
international  license,— ushering  in  peace  and  concord 
where  now  prevail  violence  and  war. 


--11 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  PEACE-MAKING  ELEMENTS  OF  A 
FEDERAL  UNION 

I 

The  War-Checking  Powers  of  a  Federal 
Union 

In  the  preceding  chapter  it  has  been  pointed  out 
that  the  political  expert  ice  of  mankind  clearly  teaches 
the  lesson  that  groups  of  independent  States  may  suc- 
cessfully avoid  war  amongst  themselves  by  entering 
into  a  federal  union;  and  that  this  is  true  even  when 
the  number  of  component  States  is  large,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  United  States,  composed  now  of  nearly  fifty 
great  commonwealths. 

Why  do  these  federal  unions  possess  this  universal 
attribute, — for  it  is  much  more  than  a  tendency, — the 
elimination  of  wars  among  its  members? 

The  answer  is  found  in  the  nature  of  a  federal  union 
and  its  inherent  qualities,  which  naturally  and  in- 
evitably destroy  the  germs  of  war  as  between  the  com- 
ponent nations,  and  without  attempting  any  direct  al- 
terations of  human  nature,  divert  the  v/ar-breecmg 
passions  of  men  into  safer  and  saner  channels. 


TO 


* 


FEDERAL  UNION  CHECKS  WAR        „ 

ti.Tnf'lu^"r/"  ^''  ^""'^^"^ental  and  inherent  quali- 
ties  of  the  federa    union  >    If  we  h.m  f«  .u        • 
federafmnc   (  "  ^°  *"^  existing 

federations  for  an  answer  and  examine  them  to  dis- 

cover  those  attributes  that  are  common  to  them  a 
we  must  find  among  these  the  particular  principlTs  n  1 
cessitating  this  like  effect. 

The  most  important  of  these  common  phenomena 

fact  that  all  such  unions  have  adopted  the  principle  of 
a  surrender  to  the  federal  government  of  certain  pow- 

to  all  the  component  States,  with  a  correlative  reser- 

of  local  '"'^P'^"^!"''  '"  '^°^^  ^^^^"  '"  ^»  -otters 
ot  local  concern  only. 

np^tn^r^l  """""^  ""  POWERS  SURREN. 
DERED  by  the  nations  severally  we  find  the  power 
to  eontrol  war;  the  power  ,„  eontrol  commerce  between 

power  to  ,mpose  dut,es  on  goods  imported  or  exported 

he  federal  government;  the  power  to  make  at  least 

^ss  subject  to  the  control  of  the  federal  government 
--  me  power  to  determine  for  themselves  the  mode 

2S3  measure  of  redress  for  -,11.^.^ 

-  satcr  ^t.J.    '''';"' ^°'  ^"^g^d  ^^rongs  committed 

^^  .17  k""JTu^'  '''  ''''  P"^P-^'  -hose  de. 
_^e5  :nay  be  backed  by  the  combined  influence  of  the 
estates  in  union. 

Otier  powers  also,  having  no  special  relation  to  the 


^■■ 


h. 


J«  '%:> 


12 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


preservation  of  peace  between  the  component  nations, 
are  usually  conferred  upon  the  federal  government, 
such  as  the  control  oi  the  currency,  banking,  copyrights, 
and  other  national,  but  not  war-breeding,  powers,  and 
varying  in  number  and  degree  with  the  grade  of  na- 
tional strength  and  centralized  power  it  is  desired  to 
create  in  the  federal  government.  But  the  purpose 
of  granting  such  powers  as  these,  with  a  corresponding 
weakening  of  the  component  States,  is  in  the  main 
to  create  a  single  nation  of  the  composite  group,  and 
not  merely  to  prevent  war  between  the  States  con- 
cerned. 

It  is  among  the  first  class  of  powers,  therefore, 
rather  than  the  second,  we  must  look  to  find  the  reason 
for  the  fact  that  by  federation  nations  save  themselves 
from  the  horrors  of  war.  Reviewing  these  powers  as 
they  have  been  enumerated,  it  is  difficult  to  select  any 
as  not  fulfilling  an  important  part  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  result. 

May  we  not  justly  conclude,  then,  that  in  the  forma- 
uon  of  a  federal  union  for  the  preservation  of  peace 
among  the  component  nations,  it  would  be  unsafe,  to 
say  the  least,  to  omit  any  of  these  from  the  powers 
to  be  granted  to  the  proposed  federation  ?  It  may,  or 
it  may  not,  be  found  convenient  to  include  other  pow- 
ers also,  but  these  at  least  should  certainly  be  included. 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  ,3 

II 
The  Causes  of  War  Enumekated 

It  may  be  asked,  how  is  i.  certain  that  the  surrender 
preseiv    ,'l, '""'"  f "''  '"""''"'"'  '"  ««"'!=!  to 

rati™     I  "'  "*""  "■'  '""  "'«  ^"  ™«i"8  fed. 

erat,o„s  have  provided  for  the   surrender  of  these 

powers  on   the  part  of  the   nations   entering   in": 

A  careful  analysis  of  the  causes  or  motives  that 

"  ri^^ci:^,  """"  "f'--.--«iog  from  cU  ! 
"at.on  evil  wars  and  wars  ba«a  fde  waged  for 
self-preservation  or  in  behalf  of  another  oppre«ed  na 

on  ne„her  of  which  could  occur  if  the  ler  pa^ 
to  he  war  were  not  unjustified  in  the  conduct  leading 
melrd  "";'■"  '"  ""'  ""•"  "--  'hose  just 
source?       '""^     ""^  ""'  "  """'  "^  ""e  following 

,h,'/   T!"  '"''  "'  '  '"■"P"  "'"national  morality  ,0 
.to  nations  scarcely  hesitate  to  engage  in  condu«  t" 

ea'ch  :Slt;       ''"'""'  '"  "°'"'  •"  "'"■  «'-"«  "> 

trad.;'^"'"""'  ""'''''''■  "'"•  "'"'"«  '»  '"'itory  or 

3.   National  ambitions,  military  or  political- 

4-  National  pride  or  honor; 

5-  National  prejudices  and  ignorance  or  misunder- 


H 


a 


14  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

standing  of  the  ideals  and  characteristics  of  other  na- 
tions ; 

6.  National  jealousies  and  suspicions ;  and 

7.  The  absence  of  an  assured  method  of  determin- 
ing bona  fide  disputes  between  nations  otherwise  than 
by  a  resort  to  force. 

Ill 

National  Immorality 

As  to  the  first  of  these, — national  immorality,  as 
shown  in  the  existing  conditions  of  international  law- 
lessness or  license,— it  has  been  attempted  to  explain  in 
the  first  chapter  how  a  federal  union  operates  to  check 
it,  as  between  the  component  States,  substituting  a 
spirit  among  them  of  co-operation  and  friendly  emula- 
tion for  the  common  good  in  the  place  of  the  spirit 
of  disintegration  and  potential  hostility  that  normally 
prevails  between  separate  independent  nations.  Refer- 
ence to  that  explanation  will  suffice. 


IV 

National  Cupidity 

National  cupidity,  or  the  undue  desire  for  na- 
tional  aggrandizement  either  in  the  direction  of  terrl- 
tory  or  of  trade  or  both,  is  a  fruitful  source  of  inter- 
national  strife. 

This  desire  for  territory  may  arise  from  the  wish  to 


li 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  ,^ 

exploit  its  resources  or  trade  to  the  enrichment  of  cer- 
tarn  classes  m  the  State,  or  from  the  wish  to  secure 
other  supposed  advantages  in  commerce,  such  as  con- 
vement  shippmg  ports  or  monopolies  of  trade  with 
the  people  mhabiting  or  adjacent  to  the  territory;  or 
It  may  spnng  from  the  assumed  military  advantages 
to  accrue  to  the  nation  from  its  possession,  or  from 
the   supposed   political    strengthening   of   the   nation 
ansmg  therefrom,  such,  for  example,  as  the  chance 
It  affords   to   have   the   nation's   surplus   population 
migrate   th.ther.   remaining  under  the   original   flig 
and  allegiance    rather  than  lose  all   future  benefits 
of    that    population    through    emigration    to    other 
countries. 

This  national  yearning  for  increased  territory  is 
neither  improper  nor  calculated  to  stir  up  strife  be- 
tween  nations  so  long  as  it  is  confined  to  territory  not 
in  the  present  possession  of  any  other  nation.  But 
unfortunately  in  modern  times  all  the  desirable  terri- 
tory  of  the  world's  surface  is  possessed  and  occupied- 
and  hence  any  present  national  desire  of  this  sort  must 
ontent  itself  with  the  acquisition  of  undesirable  terri- 
tory,  or  else  must  look  to  the  forcible  or  fraudulent 
acquisition  of  the  territory  of  another  nation,  to  which 

Iht'Tu  "'  "^^'  ''''  '^''  °^  predominant 

dlslrlhll  r"^"^"^^  •'  ^hat  in  proportion  to  the 
de.rabi.ty  of  the  territory  upon  which  a  nation  has 
^ed  the  eyes  of  its  affection  is  the  danger  of  war  to 
obtain  It.  And  whether,  as  an  economic  or  military 
question,  the  territory  when  obtained  is  worth  the  cost 


.;ra 


1 6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  securing  it  is  a  matter  generally  lost  sight  of  in  the 
final  outcome. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  if  component  nations  were 
to  surrender  to  a  federal  government  their  right  to 
impose  duties  on  imports  and  exports  and  other  re- 
strictions upon  international  trade  and  commerce,  and 
also  their  war  powers,  all  need,  and  the  corresponding 
desire,  for  increased  territory  would  at  once  vanish, 
and  this  cause  of  war,  as  between  such  nations,  would 
be  abolished.  This  has  been  the  experience  of  all 
existing  federal  unions  as  between  their  component 
States. 

The  same  principle  would  also  apply,  under  similar 
conditions,  to  abolish  wars  between  such  nations  result- 
ing from  national  desire  for  increase  of  trade.     By 
giving  the  control  of  the  international  commerce  of  the 
nations  concerned  to  the  combined  nations  as  repre- 
sented  in  a  properly  organized  federal  government,  as 
every  existing  federal  constitution  does,  the  temptation 
is  removed  from  the  several  nations  to  use  unfair 
and  unjust  means  to  promote  their  own  commerce  at 
the  expense  of  their  neighbors,  so  that  justice  and  right 
will  on  the  whol;  prevail  in  such  regulations  rather 
than  injustice  and  greed;  and  thus  another  fruitful 
cause  of  war  has,  as  between  those  nations,  been  abol- 
ished,  and  trust  and  confidence  between  them  has  to 
that  extent  replaced  suspicion  and  jealousy. 


■r^ 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  ,7 

V 
National  Ambition 

In  the  next  place,  national  ambition  either  for  mili- 
tary  or  political  greatness  is  a  constant  source  of  ag- 
gression and  war.  These  are  indeed,  in  the  last  analy- 
sis one  and  the  same.  For  while  it  is  possible  that 
national  political  aggrandizement  may  be  attained  by 
other  methods  than  the  military,  it  is  always  true  that 
the  ultimate  purpose  of  national  military  success  is 
a  political,  and  usually  a  territorial  or  commercial, 
aggrandizement.  ' 

But  if  the  effect  of  a  federal  union  is  to  abolish,  as 
between  the  component  nations,  the  temptation  to  ac- 
quire territory  or  to  augment  the  national  commerce  by 
violent  or  unjust  means,  the  national  desire  for  po- 
1't.cal  predominance  is  thus  deprived  of  all  its  noxious 
consequences,  and  nothing  of  it  is  left  but  the  benefi- 
cent ambition  to  shine  in  ability  and  usefulness  to  the 

sTeUrtiTn''"*  ""°"^  '^'  '"''"  '''"  °^  '^'  ''"»'  ^°"- 

VI 
National  Pride  or  Honor 

The  same  results  follow  in  the  case  of  national 
P  de  as  a  cause  of  war.  As  bet,  en  independent 
nations,  there  is  no  surer  way  of  bringing  on  war  than 
to  offer  an  affront  to  national  pride  or  national  honor, 


I' 


1 8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

because  each  nation  is  jealous  and  suspicious  of  the 
other,  and  fearful  that,  should  it  show  the  least  sign 
of  weakness  or  fear,  other  nations  are  ready  to  pounce 
upon  it,  or  at  least  ready  to  entertain  doubts  of  its 
courage  and  to  impose  unjust  and  improper  demands. 
It  is  because  of  this  quickness  to  resent  insults  or  of- 
fensive conduct   (real  or  supposed),  even  at  a  cost 
perhaps  ruinous  to   itself,   that  the   nations   are   so 
punctilious  in  their  dealings  with  each  other.     Slight 
departures  from  established  international  customs  with 
regard  to  these  matters  may  produce  serious  conse- 
quences. 

The  federal  union,  as  between  the  nations  compos- 
mg  it,  supplies  the  remedy  for  this,  not  by  destroying 
national  pride,  honor,  and  patriotism,  but  by  removing 
the  necessity  for  a  prompt  resentment  of  an  affront 
offered  by  another  component  nation.    Just  as  a  man, 
living  in  a  civilized  community  and  knowing  that  the 
law  protects  him  from  unprovoked  violence,  can  af- 
ford  to  overlook  an  affront  to  his  dignity  rather  than 
go  to  the  extreme  length  of  killing  the  offender  to 
avenge  it,  so  a  nation  which  is  a  member  of  such  a 
union,  aware  that  neither  the  offending  nation  nor 
others  would  be  permitted  to  use  force  against  it,  can 
afford  to  overlook  the  offense.    But  as  a  matter  of  fact 
such  affronts  would  never  be  likely  to  occur,  unless  by 
accident  or  misunderstanding,  for  all  temptation  to  of- 
fer  them  would  be  lacking. 

Again,  a  people's  sense  of  national  pride  or  honor  is 
sometimes  invoked  to  support  a  war  of  aggression. 


i 

! 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  ,, 

the  r«l  design  being  ,o  secure  territory  or  trade  while 

he  people  themselves  are  led  to  believe  that  it  is  „ag  d 

^avenge  a„  msult  or  to  preserve  the  nation's  integrity. 

a"  a  ch^l      "'"'""  °'  '  ''"'"'  ""'""  "»"•"  «"' 

VII 

National  Prejudice  and  Ignokance 

dices  and  ,p„rance  of  the  aims,  ideals,  virtues   and 
^aracte™.      „f  ,,„  „,,„„^     ^^^  ^^;^  ^^    «.  -d 

powerfully  co-operates  with  other  inBuences  in  produc 
ng  wars,-wars  which  would  never  occur,  if  the  na- 
horn  involved  understood  each  other's  motive, 
Prelents'T"  "\""'P™=«  «'""•  >  federal  union 

prejudices  and  misconceptions.     The  representative, 

of  these  nations  are  constantly  thrown  together  in  The 

onduc    of  the  federal  government,  and  the  n  "ion 

hems,  v„  „e  continually  coK>pera.i„g  in  various  w^y 

"art  thr„"'"7"  ■'?  ""^  P°«"".  -d  "=  neces. 

^^L  K  IT,  """'■  """•'  '""■"=''  "l^ions  than 
would  be  probable  had  they  remained  entirelv  inde 
pendent  The  freedom  of  trade,  the  absence  oVrt 
Non  m  the  mutual  intercourse  of  their  citizens,  com- 
mon  interests  and  cOK-peration,  and  a  hundred  oZ 
in  uences  are  constantly  at  work  to  lead  them  to  a 
better  understanding  of  one  another. 


m 


nta 


I  '8, 


20  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

It  Is  true  that  this  tendency,— strongly  marked  in  all 
of  the  existing  federal  unions,  composed  as  they  are  of 
States  whose  people  are  usually  of  the  same  nation- 
ality, speaking  the  same  language,  possessed  of  much 
the  same  laws  and  political  institutions,— might  not 
be  actually  so  pronounced  in  a  union  composed  of 
nat:  >ns  differing  radically  in  these  respects;  but  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  the  beneficial  effects  in  the  lat- 
ter case  would  be  proportionately  as  great,  and  prob- 
ably much  greater,  as  the  prejudices  and  misconcep- 
tions to  be  removed  would  be  so  much  the  more  ex- 
tensive. 

VIII 
National  Jealousies  and  Suspicions 

Next  in  our  enumeration  of  the  causes  of  war 
come  national  jealousies  and  suspicions.  To  es- 
tablish  that  these,  perhaps  with  no  sound  basis  for 
them,  suffice  sometimes  to  cause  war,  we  need  look 
no  further  than  to  the  titanic  European  struggle.  It 
might  be  that  the  national  and  popular  suspicions  and 
jealousies  on  all  sides  that  caused  this  war  were  not 
based  on  real  facts.  That  the  convictions  and  as- 
sumptions of  the  several  nations  concerned  were  er- 
roneous is  entirely  immaterial  if  those  nations  held  and 
believed  them.  The  war  would  certainly  have  fol- 
lowed, whether  or  not  the  various  assumptions  were 
correct. 

The  immediate  causes  of  the  war  were  that  Austria 


21 


CAUSES  OF  WAR 

territory;  Russia  suspected  Austria,  despite  her  dis 
lury,  /lustria  and  Germany  suspected  thai- 

fz:::r,t  t"T  '"  ^"'"'  -"=  >  ™""-''"" 

flu^l       A  "°  ''"' '""'""»'  acquisitions  or  i„. 

fluence  ,„  Aus.na  or  the  Balkaas;  Germany  suspected 
that  France  was  encouraging  Russia  in  order  thatshe 
m,gh  se,ze  the  opportunity  to  recover  Alsace  and  L^ 

thTsl/f    h"  """f  "'«  Germany  was  stirring  up 
the  strife  because  the  present  was  the  best  time  Z 

conquer  and  wealcen  France;  England  suspect  dtht 
Germany  „<,„,d,  ,,  ,i„„^,^^^^  ^.^^  ^^^    P  ^.  d  Aat 

French  coasts  m  order  the  better  to  attack  her  at  a 

whol    tur^oi.  ':;  '""^*'"  "'"'  '"'"g-^'ed  the 

«liole  turmoil  m  order  to  seize  the  opportunity  to 

It  .s  not  material  to  the  present  discussion  which 

f:ti-=---££^ 

does  prove  is,  in  the  firs,  place,  that  wa     ma"  or  ^  tT 

nrr'fl"^"'"™'  '■"  '"""™"'  """"er  based 
on  true  or  false  premises;  and,  in  the  second,  that  if 

he     na  io„,  h,d  been  united  by  an  effectual  ^ompa 
»f  federal  union,  by  virtue  of  which  they  would  have 


22 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


I 


been  under  no  temptation  to  rob  each  other  of  territory 
or  to  extend  their  commerce  by  forcible,  fraudulent 
or  unfair  means  at  each  other's  expense,  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  their  peoples  to  have  entertained 
these  suspicions,  and  there  would  have  been  no  war. 
Indeed,  without  this  concrete  illustration,  the  con- 
clusion is  a  necessary  one  that  if  a  federal  union  has 
the  effect,  as  between  the  component  nations,  of  abol- 
ishing  all  the  other  causes  of  war  heretofore  discussed, 
it  must  also  destroy  that  which  grows  out  of  interna- 
tional jealousies  and  suspicions,  since  such  distrust  can 
only  subsist  upon  the  fear  of  unjust  and  aggressive  at- 
tack for  some  of  the  reasons  before  mentioned.    There 
are  no  others  that  have  been  revealed  in  history  except 
the  last  one  of  our  enumeration,  which  we  are  now 
briefly  to  consider. 

IX 

Absence  of  Adequate  Peaceable  Modes  of 

Redress 

The  seventh  and  last  of  the  enumerated  causes 
of  war  is  the  absence  of  any  assured  method  of  peace- 
ably  and  finally  determining  bona  fide  international 
disputes. 

In  the  existing  conditions  of  international  relations, 
it  is  true,  attempts  have  been  made  to  supply  means 
of  settling  such  disputes  by  the  establishment,  through 
international  agreement,  of  the  Hague  Courts  of  Ar- 
bitration.   These  have  been  quite  successful  in  a  cer- 


M 


CAUSES  OF  WAR  ,3 

It^^Ll-  "«'•-«»"  "h"™  ehc  diUerences  of 

either  ron!    J       ""''^  '''"  °^  '^'^  '^^"^cter  that 

Hate  C^nT'"'  "'™''"  '•"'  »''"  ">«"  ""d'  by  the 
he  Pl/n  h '''I  T   T"'  "'  '"'"""'''^  dispute,,  b„, 

No  «.«„,  fede„,^'::rrf  :7rr:z- 

wh  ch       „  '"'"'"  '°  P™"""""  final  decree. 

The  f!d^  >"'.'"''"""  °'  ">=  State,  i„  union 
the  ol  """'""''""^  having  already  removed  ali 
tue  political  cause,  of  war  betws<.n  ,L 

^ates,  no  potential  conflict,  re^rLtt   S^' 

■"8  .n  respect  to  matters  of  strict  lega'l  rl^h"  aTd 


Vfv 


■'/*•■ 


24 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


these  may  readily  be  solved  through  judicial  proceed- 
ings. 

Thus,  whether  we  view  the  success  of  federal  unions 
as  preventives  of  war  from  the  standpoint  of  human 
experience,  or,  as  has  been  attempted  in  this  chapter, 
from  the  a  priori  standpoint  of  natural  cause  and  ef- 
fect, the  conclusion  is  the  same.  Political  science  can 
point  to  few  principles  more  firmly  established  than 
that  such  unions  prevent  wars  between  the  component 
nations, — not  through  the  application  of  actual  force 
or  the  invasion  of  the  just  and  proper  independence 
of  the  States  concerned,  but  by  substituting  interna- 
tional law  for  international  license  in  the  regulation 
of  their  conduct  towards  each  other,  thus  diverting  the 
riotous  and  tumultuous  tide  of  human  passions  into 
the  calm  and  deep-flowing  streams  of  human  reason- 
ableness and  justice.  And  all  this  may  be  accomplished 
without  the  sacrifice  of  the  real  independence,  the  wel- 
fare or  the  prosperity  of  the  nations  concerned,  but 
always,  as  experience  has  proved,  greatly  to  their 
advancement. 


CHAPTER  III 

FEDERAL  UNION  OF  INDEPENDENT 
NATIONS  PROPOSED 

ot  the  world,  or  by  the  leading  nations,  of  a  federal 
form  of  m,,rnanonal  government  would  be  doubtks 
met  by  the  nations  themselves  wifh  (.       •     i  °°"°"^" 
Picion,  doub,  and  pe.hT  I  :Mic:;  "  H^.^vtT.iX 
be  regarded  by  the  peoples  who  n,„s.  beTr  .he  buTdt 

come   a   Ske„s l  „  government  n,igh,  be- 

--,po.rSt7-„gTXr:fz^ 
SrXarc::T;:,:xrt^^^^ 

tn  tu^-  ^^^^^  machme  and  use  \t 

•he  other  ha  d. ha    ""'"  ""'""°"  '"^™''"^'  "  »" 
hand  that  a  major.ty  of  the  weaker  nations 

25 


•■I 


26 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


i  j- 


might  override  the  wishes  or  threaten  the  rights  of 
the  minority  of  stronger  members. 

But  all  such  arguments  lose  much  of  their  force 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  same  objections  have 
actually  been  made  to  the  organization  of  every  exist- 
ing federal  union,  yet  in  each  case  the  fears  were 
proved  by  actual  experience  to  have  been  without 
foundation;  in  each  case  It  has  been  found  that  the 
checks  and  balances  provided  in  the  organization  of  the 
federal  government  have  sufficed  to  avert  the  dangers 
anticipated. 

Before  the  nations  will  be  induced  to  assent  to  any 
plan  of  union,  it  must  be  shown  that  it  contains  within 
itself  such  checks  and  balances  as  will  fully  protect 
them  against  the  unjust  and  unconstitutional  aggres- 
sions of  federal  power;  the  minority  of  the  nations 
in  the  union  against  the  improper  action  of  the  ma- 
jority; the  more  numerous,  but  weaker,  nations  against 
the  acts  of  the  stronger,  and  vice  versa;  and  even  the 
reserved  rights  of  a  single  nation  when  invaded  by  the 
unanimous  aggression  of  all  the  rest.  These,  and 
many  other  safeguards  must  be  provided  in  any  plan 
that  would  prove  acceptable. 

The  difficulties  in  devising  such  a  plan  are  admit- 
tedly great,  but  in  the  light  of  experience  afforded  by 
the  constitutions  of  existing  federal  unions  and  a  care- 
ful analysis  of  existing  international  conditions,  it 
would  seem  possible  to  propose  a  plnn  which  might 
at  least  serve  as  a  basis  for  discussion,  however  far 
removed  it  may  be  from  the  final  practical  form  such  a 


FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS 
Ltr  "'  '■""'°"""'  ""-P"'  would  be  likely  .„ 

very  difficuir:„d  d  .tniotr''""  °'  "™  »'  "« 

organization  of  a  federa,  C"™/  P"""'^"'  '"  *= 
ers  to  be  granted  ,0  ;/         ^°  "'  ""'""'•  ">«  Pow- 

concerned^d le  pr„Tb?"'  "' ^'t  """>- 
*«  proper  limitations  1"  1  """'''  ""^  ">="" 
constitutional  relation,  or,!"  '"'"""  ^'""'''  "-e 
"ch  o^her  and  .0  he  U„ Ll  tr"""";'"  ""'°"=  '" 
»"d  «.  ...lishing  th  col  °t 'a  '"'""  °'  ^""""""^ 
ernment,  and  tl  ma  y  ch  L  " h";'"""™'  °'  «''^- 
s«ure,  on  the  on^  .-7    "       „'      ^'""'  ""^ful  to 

-n.emandtp;::iX:erer""^'- 
-mrh:et;en°'re7lfd""°' '"""■■''"•  "'■''"'V 
-Pa«,  and  th"e  ^ J,  tpprZotttT  "' 
n-u,  the  union  i,  spoken  of  a,  "tL     r   .  t  x,"' 
'ions";  the  comnarf^,*  '^""^<'  N=- 

'"•ion"  of  the  Un  ed  vT""""f  "  "•=  "  ^"""i" 
"  ■'.he  Cong  res;"'  f,  ^'T'  ""  ''«'''"'''  ''"''y 
»nd  the  ••  House  of  D  ILT  ""'"'  "  ""^  "  S'"'"  " 
"ecutive  offic  as  "?h  T  •  respectively,  the  chief 
"  'he  "Cound'l  of  M^P""" ,?'"'«"  "i 'he  Cabinet, 
'ional  court  a,  he  "^"'  n  ""  '"■«''"'  '"•"■'»' 
>n  nead,  and  the  constituent  units  of  the 


t 


28  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Scales"""    "'°™P°"<="'    nations-    or    "component 

It  is  to  be  observed  also  that  since  this  union  of 
nations  is  designed  for  the  purpose  of  abolishing  wars 
between  them,  and  not  to  establish  a  single  new  na- 
tion,  the  union  must  necessarily  be  less  close  than  are 
any  of  the  existing  federal  unions  (the  purposes  of 
which  are  to  create  single  nations  out  of  their  com- 
ponent  States,  as  well  as  to  prevent  war  between  their 
members) ;  and  especially  so  since,  in  our  case,  the 
members  would  diflFer  so  radically  in  language  and 
political  and  legal  institutions  and  ideals. 

For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  Constitution  of  the 
Umted  States,  as  creating  the  least  centralized  and 
nationalized  of  these  unions,  has  been  selected  as  the 
starting  point  and  the  fundamental  foundation  of  our 
study,  which  will  follow  in  the  main  the  order  of  treat- 
ment  laid  down  in  that  instrument,  but  with  many  im- 
portant  and  substantial  additions,  omissions,  and  modi- 
fications, all  of  which  will  be  examined  as  briefly  as 
possible.  ' 

The  tentative  Constitution  will  be  found  set  out  in 
extenso  in  the  Appendix,  together  with  the  Constitu- 
tion  of  the  United  States,  in  parallel  columns,  so  that 
the  divergences  may  be  seen  at  a  glance. 

Upon  reference  to  the  Appendix  it  will  be  noted  that 
the  proposed  international  Constitution  is  divided  into 
eleven  Articles,  as  follows: 

,.^''''^'1'7^^'  Legislative  Department,  its  Organi- 
zation and  Powers; 


/ 


OUTLINE  OF  COMPACT 
'^"vl^^^-^'-'^"^  "Pon  .He  Po„„s  o, 

ponri^aZ-"-^  ''""-  ^--^^  ",  .e  C„™. 

Article  VIII  — T»i-  c 
CWi,„,io„,  L,ws  td  tS  *"  •"'  '"'""-"-' 

A«,c.    X  JtI  St  m'  :'  '  ^'""'""■"«  Nation : 
(ion.  EMabhshment  of  the  Constitu- 

be  '^"oled  Irr  f™"'  "  ""  "-  «<■«"■  order 


*f; 


f 


this  study. 


IS  in- 


CHAPTER  IV 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  LEGISLATIVE 
DEPARTMENT 


I 


Distribution  of  Powers 

In  devising  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  a  federal 
league  of  the  nations,  the  first  problem  that  presents 
itself  is  the  fundamental  question,  how  shall  the  pow- 
ers of  government  be  distributed.  It  would  be  quite 
a  radical  departure  from  the  previous  practice  of  the 
nations  if,  following  the  example  of  the  American  and 
other  federal  unions,  three  departments  of  govern- 
ment be  created,— the  legislative,  the  executive,  and 
the  judicial. 

And  yet  it  would  not  really  be  quite  so  radical  as  at 
first  glance  it  appears,  even  omitting  from  considera- 
tion the  established  examples  of  existing  federal  unions. 
The  germs  of  all  three  of  these  departments  may  be 
said  to  have  been  already  planted  as  between  the  in- 
dependent nations. 

In  the  Hague  Conference  we  sec  in  embryo  an 
international  legislative  assembly,  though  much  ham- 
pered in  its  work  by  lack  of  organization  and  by  inter- 


m  '--Cr 


DISTRIBUTION  OF  POWERS  „ 

national    suspicions   and  jealousies       In    ,k     u 
Courc.  we  behold  the  beginnZ   of    '    •         "'^"' 
I-d'cary,  also  sadly  handicarp  d     ° L  la:;:''^'"'""' 
zadon  and  of  an  mtem-,,:/  ,      '^  ^  "'  "''g"'"- 

in  .he  execution  of  ^        "ef  rnd",""  ""''  '"  "'" 
to  affirm  that  the  nucleus  of,'  "  ""  '^  "'"'^'' 

power  lies  in  ehe  vanWh        "  '"'"""ional  executive 

•™e  to  time  est  hi "   j^rTh  "  T''^''  """^  """  f™- 
"«ionaI  projects  and  a .rtme:.:'™'"'""''""  °'  '■""■ 

e-eslri/^enls'rffel'alf"  "■'  ""'"'^''™-  »' 
W'  for  them,  and  nd"a  fthe"" '''\""'' ^'^"''^ 
might  result  from  thc^r  ^  I  ^''"'  '""="'»  "•« 
'-•ning  and  sCfZcuti^tast'"""'  "'"'"  "  ""•""■ 
v-"fh:'e:;:,::i:r:/-''«-»-'<eratio„s,  „e  re. 

ing,  the  conclusion  seems  to  I    ;   "T'  ""^  "'«- 
in  order  ,o  create  a  , It    ?    '  '"""^  "P""  ■»  'hat, 

k«P  the  peace         h  toWdT™"""'  ''""""  '° 
hmited  powers  granted  To      Ih  „"  'r'."""  *"  "" 

tive  and  executiv',  a    we«  a     he"  '^-f"  ""  ''«''^'- 
It  is  fh*.r.f«  "^  judicial. 

prop«;  con:::;,r:i" '  """-^  ■«>''« ""'  ">« 

of  nations  all  sorTs  "f?"'  '"  '""  '''"''  -o" 

"»'  government  muTbe  orr'"';"'*  """  "■=  ''* 

^ponding  legislative    exet„vf' Hi  7  ""  ""'" 
ments.  «^*ccutive,  and  judiciary  depart- 


f  i  i 


32  A  REPUBLIC  OF  xNATIONS 

II 

Legislative  Department  of  One  or  Two  Houses? 

The     international     conferences     and     congresses 
hitherto  called  have  always  been  organized  on  the 
basis  of  a  single  chamber,  in  which  each  nation  repre- 
sented would  have  an  equal  voice,  each  having  a  veto 
upon  the  acts  of  the  conference  and  bound  by  them 
only  if  it  assent  thereto.     While  some  good  results 
have  been  attained,  the  fact  remains  that  this  is  an 
impracticable  basis  upon  which  to  rest  a  truly  legisla- 
tive body  from  which  may  be  expected  that  prompt 
and  detailed  legislation  which  would  be  necessary  to 
the  operation  of  a  federal  union  of  nations.     There 
must  be  to  a  certain  extent  the  rule  of  the  majority, 
and  should  each  nation  insist  upon  the  right  to  veto 
any  and  all  measures  that  do  not  meet  with  its  ap- 
proval, no  legislation  of  importance  would  be  likely  to 
be  enacted.    The  union  would  be  doomed  to  failure 
from  the  beginning. 

But  it  does  not  follow  that  a  nation  should,  in  no 
case,  possess  the  right  of  veto  upon  the  legislation  of 
the  central  body.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  every 
reason  why  a  single  nation  or  group  of  nations  should 
be  authorized  to  exercise  this  right  in  cases  where, 
in  their  judgments,  the  federal  legislature  is  exceeding 
the  powers  conferred  upon  it  and  is  seeking  to  infringe 
the  reserved  sovereign  rights  of  the  component  nations. 
The  details  of  this  veto  power,  however,  will  be  re- 


i  ^ 


LEGISLATURE-OKCiANIZATION        33 
served  for  f„.urc  «a„„„„io„  „  a  more  appropriate 

n      re  of  LI'-  T"  '"'  '"  ""'"^  ™'  "■a',  ,he 
nature  of  the  legislative  power  to  be  .ranted  undor 

l^^L   1  ''"""  "'"  '''"•""'  ""cised  in  in- 

ternattonal  conferences  and  congresses.  I„  a  fede  al 
umon  of  „at,ons,  in  regard  to  legislation  clear  y  within 
the  powers  granted,  the  majority  must  rule.  Bea  in. 
■n  m,nd  th,s  very  material  change  in  conditions™' 

be  in^slgatd   """"'"  '"  """""  "«  '-"-  - 
Until  now  the  custom  of  nations  has  been  to  claim 

■><:  "fT'"'"",  ■"  '"'""«'°-'  conferelt™ 
.inuTto  be  th  m'"''  '"■""■«"'^-  S'"'"'''  *is  con. 
Zlcorl  .fV"  "".'■  ^"'"""■^  international  legis- 
lature, or  should  the  nations,  by  virtue  of  the  superior 

rep'rtrd       "'""'  "'  """"  "'  ^^  "'  '^  -b 

e  ce    „   he  ',"  ".7°;"°"  •"  ""*'  POP"'"'""  "r  Mu- 
ence,  m  the  fam.ly  of  nations;  or  ought  there  to  h.  , 

combmation  of  the  two  forms  of  repres    tat"     so  ha 

both  soveretgnty  and  population   (or  other  meaure 

of^natjonal  .nfluence  and  importance)    be  uZ'Z 

We  must  pause  here  to  inquire  what,  for  purpose, 

con  ft  r:  rr;" ':  ■"'"""'"""'  '=«■''»"'«.  ^"z 

elativ"  i„  '"^  """'  "°''^''''  ">"»"«  of  tb« 

relative  ,„fl„ence  and  importance  of  nation,. 

Many  element,  enter  into  the  influence  a  State  may 

ary  or  TT"""'  l"""'    "^  P°P"'«-".  i '  2 
«ry  or  naval  strength,  it,  commerce,  dome,.ic  and 


34  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

foreign,  and  its  resources,  the  state  of  its  arts  and 
saences,  all  these  and  other  things  besides  may  enter 
nto  the  equation,  though  those  mentioned  would  cer- 
amiy  constitute  the  most  obvious  and  the  most  impor- 
tant  elements.  ^ 

In  the  organization  of  an  international  government 
he  mam  purpose  of  which  is  to  do  away  with  wa^  "d 

ha, T""'        ^T  """'"■'"''•  ''  -°""  »«">  plain 
ought  to  play  no  part  m  the  question  of  the  voice  it 
should  have  m  the  management  of  the  affair,  of  com! 
mon  merest  committed  to  the  international  govern- 
ment.    To  make  these  a  basis  of  representation  in  the 
international  legislature  would  be  to  base  a  perma 
nent  arrangement  on  an  evanescent  quality,  for  if  the 
.n,er„at,onal  organisation   were   suciessfu  ,   all  very 
great  differences  in  military  or  naval  strength  Z7d 
soon   disappear.     These   considerations   would   seem 
suScen.  to  eliminate   this  element   from  the   pro" 

Nor,  because  of  it,  extreme  indefinlteness,  doe,  it 
wiL'^St  t'  ?K  """'  '^'  """'"O"  °'  "'^"-"o 
sciences  there,  a  bas.s  of  representation.     Different 
nations  have  different  ideals  of  civilization,  of  art 
.tera,„„,  music,  labor  conditions,  law.  criminology,' 
hem''  '"^.""""f"'-"-     Who  is  to  judge  betweTn 

This  also,  It  would  seem  must  be  eliminated  as  a  basis 
of  representation  in  the  international  government. 


i 


LEGISLATURE-ORGANIZATION       3^ 

"res  of  isMuence    //•""•  "  """'"'  '""^ 
affairs.  "''  ""?»«»"«  in  international 

nael:  rtfi:':':  rr"" "'"'  -— » <"  » 

«u.nce  would    ppearln  i    «"  "  f  """""  "'  '"  '"■ 

wealth  above  hum    i'".  '1  7  ""! '°  '■'  ""'"^  "P 

""man  rights  and  lib  rries     ^1"      ,7'""  ^'""' 

be  a  sound  basis  upon^h th  ,ol°       "°'  '"""  '° 

national  or  interna', ionll^B:        thT  r"™?' 

swept  aside  as  theoretical  onlvnthl  .'""""  "" 

of  a  practical  sort     H    °?''^V      "  "">■ '"  P«sented 

•ry  eo'be  detXed?"  Would  IT""""  "'  '  "»■ 
•he  foreign  co„,n,erce  out'tttZT::'  ""'  " 
or  on  y  the  for^irm  .  .  '"*°  account, 

andun^deve;^;-^™'::::^^-^^^^^^^^^ 

'rade,-all  the  ^7,  .    ,        '""'°'"  °'  ""  """'"'•' 

alone  be  considered,  how  much  1.  .h  ^  "*' 

responsible  for,  and  hoT  Zlt       du    ^7  ''"" 

pTs  1-t"  """'""^ '» ">-™  '^  whicrr 

ports  mainly  raw  rmf*.r;oi.        j  •  '   wmtn  ex- 

ished  goods  on  an,?     ,.:      ''  ""P""'  ''i8''ly  fin- 

revers'   even  though  ^h     ""'  """'^  "'■'''■  '°"  *' 
,   even  tnough  the  money  value  of  th^  *«*  i 

forcgj,  trade  of  each  be  the  same?  '  """' 


ii: 


36 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


world  affairs  and  of  the  voice  it  should  have  in  the 
proposed  international  government. 

Indeed,  all  things  considered,  it  seems  that  popula- 
tion  is  at  once  the  most  convenient  and  the  most  prac- 
ticable measure  of  such  representation.  It  is  the  most 
convenient,  because  it  can  be  more  easily  and  more 
definitely  ascertained  than  any  other.  It  is  the  most 
practicable,  because  on  the  whole,  it  stands  in  large 
measure  collectively  for  what  each  of  the  others  repre- 
sents individually.  As  a  rule  the  total  wealth  of  a 
State  holds  some  relation  to  its  population;  so  does 
its  commerce,  domestic  and  foreign;  as  population  in- 
creases land  becomes  more  valuable;  as  commerce  in- 
creases there  is  greater  development  of  arts  and  sci- 
ences, wages  tend  to  increase,  the  standard  of  living  be- 
comes higher;  even  the  potential  military  strength  of  a 
nation  bears  a  relation  to  its  population. 

Population  therefore  would  seem  to  be  the  proper, 
indeed  the  only  feasible,  measure  of  the  influence, 
wealth,  and  importance  of  a  nation  in  international  af- 
fairs,  so  that  wherever  in  the  plan  herein  discussed, 
it  becomes  necessary  to  weigh  a  nation  in  the  scale  of 
these  qualities,  population  is  taken  as  representing 
them. 

There  yet  remains,  however,  an  important  question. 
There  are  populations  and  populations.  The  popula- 
tion of  one  State,  while  as  numerous  as  that  of  an- 
other, may  in  whole  or  in  part  consist  of  backward  peo- 
ples, who  themselves  possess  but  a  dim  or  shadowy 
conception  of  civilization  as  Europe  and  America  view 


^1 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  37 

it.  For  example,  the  population  of  the  British  Empire 
•n   1913  amounted  to  about  396,000,000,  of  whom 

tTZl'r  --V"'"^--  P-'^^Ps  63,000,00^ 
were  Anglo-Saxons.  For  purposes  of  representation 
(accordmg  to  population)  in  the  international  legisla- 
n^re  ought  the  63,000,000  Anglo-Saxons  to  be  counted 

Tard  peXlL  p"'^  "  '''  ^^"^^'"'"^  ^^^'°°^'-°  ^-^• 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  ideal.-at  least  the  Eu- 
ropean and  American  ideal,-the  Anglo-Saxon  popu- 
ation  (m  the  case  of  the  British  Empire)  ought  to 
count  several  times  more  per  man  than  the  res  '   B  t 
the  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  measuring  the 
proportion  of  ''  backward  peoples  "  within  each  ftate 
as  well  as  of  measunng  the  various  degrees  of  back- 
wardness and  ascertaining  the  boundary  line  between 
tose  that  are  ''backward"  and  those'that  are  not 
seem  to  present  msurmountable  obstacles  to  the  appli- 
cation o    any  log.cal  and  general  rule  for  the  estimate 
of  populat^n  for  purposes  of  international  represe! 
tation  based  upon  the  distinction  between  the  compara- 
tive     progressiveness  "  or  "backwardness"  of  peo- 
pies  or  races.  ^ 

With  exceptions  or  qualifications  presently  to  be 
noted,  we  would  approach  the  truth  very  nearly  if  we 
assume  that  the  white  nations  and  peoples  of  the  w  rid 

ar    m  the  mam  backward.    It  would  also  be  true  that 
on  '^;,^«S'-"^'^.^""^  «nd  enterprise  of  the  white  na- 
tions that  necessitate  the  organization  of  an   inter- 


i 


I 


38 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


national  government  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the 
world,  and  it  is  the  warfare  between  them  that  is  so 
disastrous.  The  international  organization  would  be 
primarily  an  instrumentality  of  self-government  among 
the  white  nations,  devised  to  permit  them  to  substitute 
international  freedom  and  order  in  the  place  of  the 
international  license  that  now  prevails  between  them. 
Incidentally,  the  colored  nations  and  peoples  would 
profit  by  the  exchange,  and  ought  to  be  permitted  to 
enter  into  the  organization  and  thus  secure  a  guarantee 
of  their  national  rights  and  liberties  also.  But  they 
would  in  general  have  no  right  to  expect  the  same 
representation  and  the  same  voice  in  the  affairs  of 
the  international  government  as  the  white  nations  and 
peoples  would  possess. 

At  least  one  exception,  however,  should  be  made  to 
this  general  rule.  Japan  is  one  of  the  Great  Powers, 
and  has  shown  herself  as  progressive  as  the  western 
nations  themselves.  She  ought  to  be  admitted  into  the 
international  organization  on  the  same  basis  as  the 
white  nations. 

Listing  the  Japanese,  therefore,  for  purposes  of  in- 
ternational representation  as  "  white,"  let  us  adopt  ten- 
tatively and  arbitrarily  the  proportion  of  one  to  three 
as  the  relative  values  of  "  white  "  and  "  colored  "  or 
"  mixed  "  populations  for  this  purpose,  which,  for  the 
sake  of  convenience,  we  shall  hereafter  designate  as 
the  "federal  population." 

Thus,  if  we  suppose  the  actual  population  of  the 
British  Empire  to  be  396.000,000,  of  whom  63,000,- 


.^ 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION  39 

Diood  the     federal  population  "  would  be  arrived  at 

ItL^To'tf  '"'T  "■""""  "^  '^«=  -"  »"*  8  'h 
qt.ot„„t  to  the  numbc,    ,„  ...^  n-hifs  so  that  the  W- 

eral  population  of  t   .,  )'  ,  ;  ;,   j.  „  ,  ,'    ^  ''" 

to  .74,000,000.    C,    ,,..;,.,    ■      .  """'d  '-nount 

000,000  of  actu  .   ,.....;         ^   ■"  '  on  the  396,. 

voice  that, he  B.  ::,•,:;:,■,■■,,,,';;,'  ■^'.  ■'^^^d^ny 
national  govern     ,.    ./l     '  ■;'","   'r'- 'he  mter- 

penduponinterna.:,..V    .:,".'"    '"'"  ""S'"'''- 

or^;:St ":;:'''.':. i;;''-''---^^  "T- 

of  about  9,000,000  ™,  o7:Horabr:otr 

000  are  whue  and  j^.ooo.ooo  are  colored.    HeTfcd 
-population    therefore    would   be   approxijlf, 

EuriTpel';  f/r""'"''™  "'  *^  ^""-  E-Pire  in 

(should  she  become  a  member  of  the  lea^e)     ould  b? 
approximately  70,000,000.  '     "*  '= 

The  total  population  of  the  Russian  Emp.re  in  ,0., 
amounted  ,0  .60,000,000,  of  whom  perhaps    0  000 

"a^pita't  d  "■"  *■"  '''="'  p°N-i-  r:d 

'M\e  approximated  140,000,000 

-^r':?  '^.h^:r?.":r;  ^--he  purposes  ,f  this  dis. 
Tin.n.».P  '  '^^'^^'^^   population   of  the 

or  r  tr  r 'r°:^i""-^" '".- «-: 


15.000,000  crlored  population 


I'  i 


i  I 


H 


40  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

be  included,  her  federal  population  would  amount  to 
59,000,000. 

Italy,  within  all  her  territories,  in  19 13,  had  a  popu- 
lation of  some  32,000,000  whites  and  6,000,000  col- 
ored, so  that  her  federal  population  would  approxi- 
mate  34,000,000. 

Austria-Hungary  in  19 13  possessed  a  population  of 
about  50,000,000,  all  of  whom  practically  are  white, 
so  that  the  total  numbers  and  the  federal  numbers 
would  correspond. 

The  United  States  possessed  a  population  of  some 
84,000,000  white  and  20,000,000  colored  in  19 13 
(including  amongst  the  "colored"  negroes  and  in- 
habitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Hawaii). 
Their  federal  population  therefore  would  approxi- 
mate 90,000,000. 

The  Netherlands  in  19 13  had  a  white  population  of 
about  7,000,000,  and  a  colored  population  in  her  col- 
onies of  some  34,000,000,  so  that  her  federal  popul.i- 
tion  would  approximate  18,000,000. 

Portugal,  with  a  white  population  of  about  6,000, 
000,  has  a  colored  population  of  some  9,000,000. 
Her  federal  numbers  would  aggregate  about  9,000,000. 
None  of  the  other  white  European  States  have  any 
colored  populations  worthy  of  consideration,  so  that 
we  may  assume  their  federal  populations  to  be  identical 
with  their  actual  populations.  In  19 13  these  were  esti- 
mated approximately  as  follows: 


If' 


CONGRESS-ORGANIZATION  4, 

Spain  .... 

Norway         20,000,000 

Sweden 2.500,000 

♦Belgium 5,500,000 

c    V      ,     ', 7,000,000 

Switzerland    ...  ' 

Greece  .  3.75o,ooo 

Denmark  '.[ ''^°°'°°° 

Rumania....   ''^^^'^^^ 

c     .  .  0,000,000 

oerbia   .... 

Bulgaria ...'.' .'  .* .'  .* .' .' .' .' .'  .* ; ; ;  • ;  ^'ill'l2 

Montenegro  . .                        •••,-,     o 
^  225,000 

c  !  »1    t-    'T'"""'  "™"  •"  '■'''  '"  ^'^™  >  fed- 
eral popuU,,on  of  .40.ooo,„„o,  not  far  below  that  of 

Tm    "■'";"'«  "  8>-"'  as  'hat  of  the  French  Re- 

,h,  l"  u        , ,"  """"'"'  "•«  "■=  Great  Power,  of 

!  „!      "°''"  """"'  "■  ^''■"'  '"  "■=  internationa 
coun  ,1,  a  vo,ce  greater  than  their  own.    Her  vast  size 

popula„o„,  and  resources,  taken  in  connection  wh   he' 

backwardness  of  her  civiliea.ion  and  commerce   would 

consftute  her  an  exception  to  almost  a™    u7e  of 

representation  in  the  international  CongressThat  mi.h 

be  suggested.     The  probability  i,  ,h!t  she  muT  t 

'reated  separately,  and  admitted  to  the  union  upon 


k. 


i  I 


42  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

special  conditions  as  to  the  representation  and  influ- 
cnce  to  which  she  shall  be  entitled. 

Passing  to  the  States  in  America,  other  than  the 
United  States,  we  are  again  confronted  to  no  small 
extent  with  the  problem  of  colored  or  mixed  races. 
In  some  of  the  Central  and  South  American  countries, 
the  great  mass  of  the  populations  are  either  colored  or 
of  mixed  blood,  and  comparatively  few  full-blooded 
whites  are  to  be  found.     In  Haiti  and  San  Domingo 
the  people  are  practically  all  negroes.     In   Mexico, 
Brazil,  Chile,  Peru  and  other  of  these  countries  large 
portions  of  the  population  are  Indian   or  of  mixed 
race.     Statistics  are  not  at  present  available  to  show 
what  proportion  of  these  populations  are  respectively 
white  and  colored  or  mixed,  so  that  it  would  not  be  pos- 
sible to  reproduce  here  the  federal  populations  of  each 
of  these  States.    Th^  total  p  pulations  in  19 13  were 
estimated  as  follows: 

^^^^''   20,500,000 

^^«'<^o   15,500.000 

Argentina 7,500.000 

Colombia 4,500,000 

^1"" 4,500,000 

^""^ 4,250,000 

"^'^n^Mch     2,600.000 

B*^''^'»    2,270.000 

^""^ 2,050.000 

Ciuatemala   1,800.000 

^^'^'ador 1,700,000 


f>, 


COXGRESS-ORGANIZATION 

Ecuador ^^ 

Haiti    1.500,000 

Uruguay 1.400,000 

Paraguay 1. 110,000 

Dominican  Republic 635,000 

Nicaragua   610,000 

Honduras  .    .  . 600,000 

Panama 550,ooo 

Costa  Rica.  ... 360,000 

350,000 

waller  ones  would  .ZiJ"  '''""'"^  "■"  ">= 

"'ificd,  consent  ,„  ,h  re^ior tj*"  7  "",  ""^  ""'" 
"■■"•  l.indin,,  power  wh  h  .  /  '''^'''"'"  '""'v. 
combi„a,i„n'„f  .1  G:e  ,.:;""  '^  *™'"^'='^  "^  » 
in  a  body  wherein  renr  '  ''  ""'''''  ""^  'i^ely 

n"p..ia.io„/;nd  Z':r'T"  r"  '^  •"«"  -p™ 

posed  of  the  smiller  <;,  ,  ^^ '  ^y  '^  majority  com- 
".c  ™crn,J„-^  ;,.':.!•  "  """'J  "'•  likel,  If  in 
"<  M  the  States  ST    I        '  ''l"^'^'">«'«n 

orcigntv.  '  ">"''■  •"  ''""'  of  ^'qual  s,„-. 

These  consideruions  e..'T^-.  »       i- 

l-ili'y  "f  either  of  Z,":']  """"■■  ""  P""'- 

the  two  l,rst  m,n„„n.J  fo^^,  „f 


f 

i 


44 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


representation  in  the  supposed  single  legislative  cham- 
ber, and  demand  either  that  the  idea  of  a  single  cham- 
ber be  abandoned  or  that  the  form  of  representation 
be  some  combination  of  sovereignty  and  population, 
that  is,  that  each  nation  be  entitled  to  a  representation 
in  the  federal  legislature  made  up  in  part  of  an  equal 
sovereignty  equally  represented,  and  in  part  of  an 
unequal  population  unequally  represented. 

For  example,  suppose  it  agreed  that  the  represen- 
tation of  the  sovereignty  of  each  State  shall  be  six 
votes  from  each  State,  and  the  representation  of  popu- 
lation shall  be  one  vote  for  each  four  millions  of  popu- 
lation or  fraction  thereof.  Belgium,  with  a  federal 
population  of  12,000,000,  would  then  be  represented 
in  the  federal  legislature  by  six  votes,  representing 
sovereignty,  and  three,  representing  population.  Ger- 
many, with  a  federal  population  of  70,000,000,  would 
have  six  votes  representing  sovereignty  and  eighteen 
representing  population.  France,  with  a  federal  popu- 
lation of  58,000,000,  would  have  six  and  fifteen  votes, 
respectively.  Italy,  with  34,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  nine  votes;  Japan,  with  59,000,01)0  (federal),  six 
and  fifteen  votes;  The  Netherlands,  with  iS, 000, 000 
(federal),  six  and  five  votes;  .Austria-Hungary,  with 
50,000,000,  six  and  thirteen  votes;  Norway,  with 
3,000,000,  six  and  one  votes;  Sweden,  with  6,000,000, 
six  and  two  votes;  Serbia,  with  3, 000,000,  six  and  one 
votes;  Brazil,  with  perhaps  9,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  three  votes;  Argentina,  with  nearly  8,000,000 
(federal),  six  and  two  votes;  Chile,  with  3,000,000 


CONGRESS—ORGANIZATION  45 

(federal),  six  and  one  votes;  the  United  States,  tvith 
90,000,000  (in  federal  numbers),  six  and  twenty- 
three  votes;  Russia,  with  140,000,000  (federal),  six 
and  th.rty-five  votes;  and  the  British  Empire,  with 
174,000,000  (in  federal  numbers),  six  and  forty-four 
votes. 

Thus,  Norway's  representation  would  be  increased 
seven  times  by  the  representation  of  her  equal  sov- 
ereignty;   Sweden's   would   be   quadrupled;    and    Bel- 
gium  s  trebled;  while  Great  Britain's  or  Russia's  would 
be  increased  scarcely  at  all.     It  is  possible  that  the  na- 
tions  last  mentioned  might  be  willing  to  accept  these 
or  similar  conditions,  but  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that 
proud  States  like  Germany  or  France,  occupying  inter- 
mediate positions   in   such  a    ratio  of  representation 
would  consent  on  the  one  hand  to  so  great  a  propor- 
tionate voice  in  the  conduct  of  the  common  affairs  as 
^orway•s  or  Belgium's,  or  so  great  an  actual  voice  as 
the  British  Empire's. 

The  example  above  given  supposes  a  ratio  between 
sovereignty  and  population  chosen  at  random,  but 
the  apparently  insuperable  objections  to  this  ratio 
would  seem  to  apply  as  strongly  to  any  other  similar 
ratio  that  might  be  selected. 

On   the    whole    therefore   the   conclusion    must   be 

government  will  ob- 


reached  that  no  plan  of  federal  „, 
tain  the  approv.,1  n(  the  nations  which  emb 
idea  of  a  single  Icgislat.  e  chami 
fion  to  be  noted  latrr) 
Discarding  this,  th 


HT 


:uith 


races  the 
a  qualilica- 


,  tjien,  \\c  come  next  to  the  c 


xamma- 


n 


S 


1 


'\^ 


46  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tion  of  the  possibility  of  a  legislative  body  composed 
of  two  chambers. 

Attention  is  at  once  arrested  by  the  fact  that  it  now 
becomes  possible  thus  to  retain,  in  part  at  least,  the 
existing  international  practice  as  to  conferences  and 
congresses,  that  is,  the  equal  representation  of  eaih 
State.  Such  representation  may  be  given  in  the  upper 
chamber  or  Senate,  while  at  the  same  time  in  the 
lower  chamber,  or  House  of  Delegates,  the  other  ele- 
ment may  be  represented, — the  element  of  national 
population  and  influence. 

Since  no  law  could  be  passed  without  the  consent  of 
both  houses,  every  law  would  have  to  receive  the 
assent  of  a  majority  of  all  the  component  nations  (in 
the  Senate)  and  also  the  assent  of  the  majority  of  the 
populous  and  influential  nations  (in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates). A  combination  of  a  few  populous  States  might 
carry  a  measure  detrimental  to  the  majority  of  the 
States  through  the  lower  chamber,  but  it  would  be 
checked  in  the  Senate;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  ma- 
jority of  the  States,  which  might  pass  measures  in  the 
Senate  that  would  be  injurious  to  the  fewer,  but  more 
populous,  nations  would  be  halted  in  the  lower  cham- 
ber. 

Thus  by  the  adoption  of  the  bicameral  system  ad- 
vantage ran  be  taken  of  the  great  principle  of  concur- 
rent majorities.  These  would  undoubtedly  be  the  two 
great  contending  forces  in  our  international  union, — 
f'opulatjnn  and  influence  on  rhe  one  side  and  equality 
of  sovereignty,  dignity,  and  rights  on  the  other.     The 


CONGRESS-ORGANIZATION  47 

thl"!"'  '"  IT"^'  '^""  '"  '°  8'«  "^fc  '  «.o  upon 
he  other,  wh.ch  may  be  successfully  accomplished  by 

of  bo,h  be,„g  necessary  for  legislation,  one  of  which 

erelZfT'  "'•  '""''''  "'  ™'"  ""  ^O-'   -- 
ereignty  of  the  nations,  and  the  other  b,  votes  in  pro- 

ZZh"  ''''"^' P-"""-™  'hall  represent  the  r  1- 
equal  mfluence  and  importance  in  human  affairs 

To  dlustrate:  Let  us  suppose  that  the  equal  soy. 
ere,gnty  of  the  nations  in  the  Senate  is  represented  by 
'WO  votes  from  each  State,  while  the  ratio  of  vote,  to 
population  for  purposes  of  representation  in  the  Hou  e 
0  Delegates  shall  be  one  vote  for  every  four  millio 
of  federal  population,  or  a  fraction  thereof.  Refer- 
ring  to  the  figures  already  given  as  to  the  federal  popu- 
ations  of  some  of  the  nations,  while  in  the  lower 

ation,   would  have  three  votes,-  Germany,   with  ^ts 
70,000,000,  eighteen  votes;  France,  with  5  ,000,000 
fifteen  vote,;  the  United  States,  twenty-three  vote": 
Russia,  thirty-five  votes;  and  Great  Britain,  fortyfoj; 
votes;  yet  ,n  the  Senate  each  nation  would  be  e  ual  y 

a  e  wolld  b  rr  "'  '  ""'""'y  "<  "-e  Sen' 

ate  would  be  essential  to  the  passage  of  all  legislation 

stitutl^T  "''"""f'  "■"  ""=  "-'"i'^J  States  Con! 

t.tution  has  organized  the  federal  legislature,  and 
'he  experience  of  more  than  a  century  and  a  quarter 
proclaims  that  this  dis,ri„utio„  „f  the  leUlati^  ^oj 

«.:dT;:;::pr '^  °' ^™-- •■'-^-^™"% 


II 


r 


wmni^mBz  wki'^m^im^ 


B 


r: 


48 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


The  proposed  federal  legislature  then,  we  shall  as- 
sume, ought  to  be  composed  of  two  chambers,  one  of 
which  should  represent  the  equal  sovereignty  of  the 
component  nations,  while  the  other  represents  their  re- 
spective populations  (in  federal  numbers). » 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  while  we  have  spoken  above  of 
two  chambers  of  the  legislature,  which  we  have  desig- 
nated  respectively  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates,  and  while  we  have  assumed  throughout  the  crea- 
tion of  two  separate  chambers,  very  much  the  same  re- 
sults may  be  accomplished  with  a  single  chamber,  if 
it  is  provided  that  no  measure  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
been  passed  or  to  have  become  a  law,  unless  it  pass  the 
chamber  twice,— once  by  a  majority  of  all  the  States, 
voting  equally  in  virtue  of  equal  sovereignty,  and  once 
by  a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  States,  voting  un- 
equally in  proportion  to  federal  population  (giving,  for 
example,  to  each  State,  upon  one  passage  of  the  meas- 
ure, a  voting  capacity  equal  to  one  vote   for  every 
four  millions  of   federal  population,   or   a   fraction 
thereof). 

This  would  constitute  in  eflFect  two  chambers,  the 
main  difference  between  the  single  chamber  thus  or- 
ganized and  two  actual  chambers,  being  that  in  the 
latter  case  there  would  be  two  separate  sets  of  dele- 
gates, while  in  the  former  the  delegates  would  be 
actually  the  same,  but  would  possess  a  different  vot- 
ing capacity  on  each  passage  of  the  measure. 

Thus,  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  rules  now  govern- 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U,  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec«.  i,  2.  j. 


it  .If"  i 


■.W:^m'i. 


CONGRESS-ORGANIZATION  49 

upon  th°  „ a,n  .  """"  "'  "■'  ""'"=""  binding 
time  require  tliat  any  measure,  to  be  binding  upon 
tl^em  muse  pass  .he  conference  twice  by  ,  maS 
of  votes,  the  votes  of  all  the  nations  upon  X  fim 
passage  ,0  be  equal,  while  on  the  second  passage  each 
nafon  shall  have  a  vote  proportionate  .0  it,  federal 

Zing  The  '  •'"''"'"  """^  "  -  '"  ""-  *« 
,W  Is  ,  I  '"""T""  "■"  ''  "■"»"«.  ">  be  bind, 
mg  as  a  law  upon  the  nations,  must  have  passed  the 
conference  by  a  majority  of  votes  cast  up  n^scl 
Afferent  pnncples,  would  have  much  the  same  e««t 
as   f  ,he  conference  were  itself  made  up  of  two    epa 

Bu   2    "l";"""'"-^  ""^  •"«'  "■"'  Principle 
.f.!r  th     r?    "■'  ."^g"'""""  of  a  single  Cham  er 

ei^:tt::fL^rz;d:^rjir 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  important  for  the  success  of 
an  international  government  thaf  rh. 
nf  fh-  ^a  .        ""^"'  fnaf  the  representat  ves 


KS^^IiL^iga^ 


^Iw'^J.' 


Mf 


so  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

In  the  next  place  (again  within  reasonable  limits) 
the  larger  the  number  of  a  nation's  representatives 
present  at  such  gatherings,  the  wiser  will  be  its  gov- 
ernment s  final  action  upon  questions  arising  for  set- 
tiement. 

The  mere  physical  limitations  of  space  would  stand 
;n  the  way  perhaps  of  the  best  interests  of  the  nations 
in  these  particulars,  if  the  plan  of  a  single  chamber  be 
adopted. 

Another  important  practical  argument  in  behalf  of 
a  bicameral  legislature  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  would 
m  the  end  probably  save  time,  since  one  measure  might 
be  under  debate  in  one  chamber  while  another  was 
bemg  debated  or  voted  upon  in  the  other,  and  in  any 
event  .t  would  insure  a  more  thorough  consideration 
of  each  measure  both  in  the  legislature  itself  and  by 
the  government  of  each  nation. 

Our  tentative  form  of  constitution  will  therefore 
treat  the  mternational  congress  as  actually  consisting 
of  two  houses  or  chambers. 

Ill 

Appointment  of  Representatives-Terms 
OF  Office 

In  the  existing  federal  unions,  such  as  the  United 
Mates,  the  German  Empire  or  the  Australian  Com- 
monwealth, the  rule  has  been  to  provide  for  the  elec- 
tion of  the  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the  federal 
legislature   by  the  people  of  the   several  component 


1. 1 '  I'f 


CONGRESS-SELECTION-TERMS       j, 
fo"s?.iSfA'  "'  "''1"°"  °'  """"""  of  'he  upper 

fcers  of  the  House  „fr  ^°'"""-8""='.  'he  mem- 
In  BraziltL  S      .      '^<'"'"'™»  elected  by  .he  people 

w:":':^:  'rr:.r 'rrr  'tJ'  -'' 

'n  .he  Argentine  Repub  c  "he  Sen!^"""  °'  ?'<'"''"■ 
".c  legislatures  of  'he  s«t-ai  Prov"  "'  ''r,'"  ^' 
Deputies  are  elected  by  the "LLe      ,"'i  "'"'',"'' 

chamber   „  prop„r„o„  to  p„pula,i„„,  a„d  (except   „ 
(Germany)  ,„  the  upper  chamber  equally.  "^ 


MKXOCOPV  RESOIUTION  TBT  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^m 

■  2.8 

|M 

w^m 

L£ 

l£ 

Hi 

Hi. 

|3^ 

IB 

U 

Ib 

125  iu 


|Z5 

1 2.0 
ii 
1.6 


jd 


^^PPLIED  IM/IGE 


1653  East   Mom   strMt 

Rocheslu.    Nt»   York         U609       USA 

(716)   482  -  0300  -  Phon, 

('16)  288  -  5989  -  fo. 


]  ( 


t  ! 


^ 


S2  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

But  in  our  federal  union  of  nations  it  would  be  ob- 
viously impracticable,  even  if  it  were  desirable,  to  adopt 
the  universal  principle  of  popular  election  of  members 
of  either  house  by  the  people  of  the  respective  States. 
Some  even  of  the  most  advanced  nations  have  terri- 
torial possessions,  the  inhabitants  of  which,  while  they 
ought  to  be  taken  into  account  for  purposes  of  repre- 
sentation, know  nothing  of  popular  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  some  governments  would  per- 
haps be  in  a  position  in  which  they  would  be  unable  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  their  people  to  the  organization 
of  such  a  federation  unless  the  nation's  delegations 
in  the  federal  legislature  might  be  made  directly  re- 
sponsive to  the  popular  will. 

A  proper  compromise  therefore  would  seem  to  be 
a  provision  that  the  delegates  in  both  chambers  be 
chosen  in  such  numbers  and  in  such  manner  as  the 
laws  of  each  component  nation  shall  direct;  and  shall 
be  subject  to  recall  at  the  pleasure  of  the  State  they 
represent,  in  accordance  with  its  laws. 

Thus  the  federal  government  would  be  placed  di- 
rectly under  the  control  of  the  component  nations, 
since  their  control  over  their  representatives  in  both 
chambers  will  be  as  plenary  and  absolute  as  each  na- 
tion by  its  own  laws  may  choose  to  make  it. 

This  principle  of  appointment  and  recall  would  also 
do  away  with  the  necessity  of  fixing  any  particular  term 
of  office  for  the  delegations  in  either  house,  the  entire 
matter  being  left  to  the  discretion  of  each  nation.' 

•  See  Appendix,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Seci.  a,  3,  4. 


CONGRESS-COMPENSATION  53 

IV 

Sessions  of  the  International  Congress- 
Recesses  AND  Adjournments 

In  the  existing  federal  unions  the  rule  is  to  require 
tha^  the  legislative  body  shall  meet  at  least  once  a 
year,  adjourning  when  their  business  is  completed,  and 
subject  to  be  called  in  extraordinary  session  by  the 
chief  executive  whenever  exigencies  may  demand  it. 

iSut  the  complexity  and   importance   of  the  mat- 
ters to  be  debated  and  determined  by  this  international 
congress,  and  the  modes  of  appointment  and  removal 
of  the  legislators,  would  seem  to  require  that  the  rule 
in  our  proposed  constitution  should  assume  rather  the 
opposite  form,  providing  that  the  Congress  remain  in 
perpetual  session,  subject  to  such  reasonable  rests  and 
recesses  as  the  two  chambers  may  agree  upon,  with 
the  right  given  to  each  chamber  independently  to  ad- 
journ  for  a  limited  period  without  the  consent  of  the 


Compensation  of  Representatives 

That  the  members  of  the  international  congress 
ought  to  receive  compensation  for  their  services  can- 
not admit  of  doubt.  The  important  question  is  whether 
that  compensation  should  be  fixed  and  paid  by  the 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N,  Art.  I,  Sec.  4,  cl.  a,  3. 


;'E' 


; 


a 


!    I 

:  I 


5. 


54 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


component  States  or  fixed  by  the  federal  congress  it- 
self and  paid  out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. 

This  point  was  earnestly  and  ably  debated  in  the 
convention  that  framed  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  wise  conclusion  reached  that  a  matter 
so  vital  to  thw  very  existence  of  the  federal  government 
ought  not  to  be  left  dependent  on  the  liberality  and 
good  will  of  the  component  States. 

This  principle  has  been  adopted  in  our  international 
constitution,  but  with  this  necessary  qualification: — 
That  since  the  number  of  delegates  in  the  delegations 
from  each  State  has  been  left  to  the  discretion  of  that 
State,  the  compensation  must  be  proportioned  to  the 
number  of  votes  the  delegation  is  entitled  to  cast,  not 
to  the  number  of  delegates.* 


VI 

Privileges  of  Delegates 

Existing  federal  constitutions  accord  to  the  mem- 
bers of  their  legislatures  the  ordinary  parliamentary 
privileges  of  freedom  from  arrest  for  trifling  offenses 
and  freedom  of  speech  in  debate. 

These  provisions  ought  to  be  contained  in  the  inter- 
national constitution  also,  with  certain  modifications. 

Following  to  its  logical  conclusion  the  principle 
adopted,  that  the  component  nations  shall  retain  com- 
plete control  over  their  respective  delegations,  each  in 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  6,  cl.  i. 


,\ 


I 


REVENUE  AND  COMMERCE  55 

accordance  with  its  own  laws,  the  general  rule  that  a 
legislators  remarks  and  votes  in  either  legislative 
chamber  are  privileged  communications,  from  legal  re- 
sponsibdity  for  which  he  is  exempt  elsewhere,  must  be 
modified  to  the  extent  tnat,  while  exempt  everywhere 
else  he  is  not  to  be  exempt  from  the  consequences  of 
such  remarks  or  votes  in  the  State  he  repre.ents,  except 
m  accordance  with  its  laws.' 

Again,  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  representatives 
of  the  component  nations  to  pass  through  other  coun- 
tries, either  members  or  not  members  of  the  union,  on 
their  way  to  and  from  the  seat  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment.    There  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  occupy 
the  same  position  and  possess  the  same  status  as  any 
other  representatives  of  their  country  on  the  way  to 
or   from   any   international   conference   or   congress. 
They  are  m  effect  ambassadors,  and  in  all  foreign  coun- 
tries  ought  to  be  accorded  the  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties  of  ambassadors:  and  the  international  constitution 
should  provide  that  in  the  territories  of  all  component 
nations  at  least  they  must  be  so  regarded." 

VII 

Limited  Life  of  Revenue  and  Commercial 
Measures 

It  is  a  principle  of  many  popular  constitutions  that 
revenue  measures  must  originate  in  the  lower  house 
;See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  I.  Sec.  6.  cl   a 
i>ee  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  6,  cl.  3.' 


IIJ 


56 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


of  the  legislature  as  most  closely  representing  the  peo- 
ple themselves  who  elect  its  members  directly,  upon  the 
theory  that  the  people,  through  their  own  immediate 
representatives,  have  a  better  right  to  tax  themselves 
and  a  better  knowledge  of  how  and  how  much  to 
burden  themselves  than  is  likely  to  be  possessed  by 
others. 

But  when  this  principle  is  applied  to  our  interna- 
tional government,  we  are  confronted  by  the  circum- 
stance that  the  members  of  neither  house  of  our  fed- 
eral legislature  need  directly  represent  the  people  of 
any  component  State,  but  may  be  appointed  by  its 
government,  the  mode  of  their  selection  being  left  to 
the  discretion  of  each  nation.  There  is  no  reason 
therefore  why  revenue  measures  should  originate  in 
the  one  house  rather  than  the  other. 

But  there  may  be  a  danger  in  respect  to  such  meas- 
ures which  it  would  be  well  to  guard  against,  namely, 
the  chance  that  such  a  law  passed  by  a  majority  in 
both  houses  may  prove  later  to  be  unjust  and  detri- 
mental to  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  great  interests 
represented  respectively  in  the  two  houses  of  the  Con- 
gress— either  to  the  majority  of  the  States  or  to  the 
majority  of  the  populous  and  influential  States.  Were 
this  condition  recognized  before  the  passage  of  the 
law,  it  would  of  course  be  defeated  in  that  chamber  in 
which  the  interest  injured  by  it  has  control. 

But  let  us  suppose  that,  after  its  adoption,  it  is 
ascertained  that  the  measure  is  hurtful  to  one  of  these 
great  interests,  while  correspondingly  beneficial  to  the 


b.4 


PS 


CONGRESS— NATIONAL  VETO         57 

other;  and  that  the  law  once  passed  cannot  be  re- 
pealed  save  by  the  consent  of  both  houses.  The  injus- 
tice would  then  be  perpetuated  until  the  consent  of  both 
houses  could  be  obtained  to  the  substitution  of  a  new 
and  juster  measure.  Such  a  condition  would  tend  to 
breed  ill  will  between  the  component  nations,  and 
would  constitute  a  departure  from  the  principles  of 
justice  and  concord  on  which  our  international  union 
should  be  founded. 

The  same  principle  would  apply  in  equal  degree  to 
laws  regulating  or  controlling  international  commerce. 
It  would  seem  to  be  a  proper  check  upon  this  pos- 
sible condition  to  insert  a  constitutional  provision  to 
the  effect  that  no  revenue  law  nor  law  regulating 
international  commerce  should  have  a  life  of  more 
than  (say)  ten  years,  after  which  it  would  expire  by 
limitation,  and  a  new  measure  (or,  if  it  be  desired, 
the  same  measure)  shall  be  passed  by  both  houses  of 
the  Congress.  Thus  every  ten  years  each  of  these  two 
great  interests  would  be  given  the  opportunity  to  veto 
any  revenue  or  commercial  law  that  is  proved  to  have 
operated  disastrously  to  either.* 


I 


VIII 

National  Veto  of  International  Legislation 

The  organization  of  the  two  legislative  chambers, 
so  that  one  represents  the  equal  sovereignty,  and  the 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  7. 


HK- 


i:' 


f  i 


ill 


58  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

other  the  federal  populations,  of  the  respective  com- 
ponent nations,  sufficiently  guarantees  the  fewer  more 
populous  and  influential  States  (the  Great  Powers) 
against  a  majority  of  the  less  populous,  and  vice  versa. 
We  have  now  to  consider  the  possibility  of  impos- 
ing an  adequate  check  in  behalf  of  a  single  nation  or 
a  small  group  of  nations  upon  the  legislative  action 
of  a  majority  in  both  houses, — in  other  words,  the 
grant  of  a  veto  power  to  each  component  nation  upon 
legislative  action  which  it  may  deem  seriously  inimical 
to  its  best  interests. 

It  may  be  assumed  that  the  grant  of  an  absolute  veto 
as  to  all  legislation,— even  that  most  clearly  within 
the  constitutional  powers  of  the  international  con- 
gress,— would  be  utterly  impracticable  because  it  would 
introduce  anarchy  and  chaos  into  the  legislative  delib- 
erations, and  would  effectually  prevent  any  serious  or 
valuable  legislation. 

But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  component  na- 
tions  should  possess  no  veto  power  at  all  or  that,  in- 
dividually, they  should  have  no  guarantee  that  the  sov- 
ereign rights  reserved  by  them  and  not  granted  to  the 
international  government  shall  be  preserved  inviolate. 
Even  without  a  veto,  it  is  true,  they  would  under  our 
proposed  plan  (as  will  appear  later)  have  the  protec- 
tion afforded  by  the  power  of  the  international  courts 
to  declare  unconstitutic  -  '  and  void  an  act  of  the 
Congress  thus  infringing  their  reserved  rights;  but  a 
decree  of  the  courts  would  possess  only  a  moral  sanc- 
tion   unless    reinforced   by    the    international    power, 


CONGRESS-NATIONAL  VETO  59 

and  this  would  be  under  the  control  of  the  Congress. 

in  fh"'  r'''  '^'  '"""'  '"''"^""^  '^^'  ^°"ld  induce 
n  he  two  houses  of  the  Congress  tyrannical  and  uncon- 
st.tut.onal  invasions  of  the  reserved  rights  of  a  single 
nation  or  a  small  group  of  nations,  would  perhaps  in 
time  make  themselves  felt  also  within  the  judicial  de- 
partment of  the  government,  which  might  thus  be  led 
to  perpetuate  the  injustice. 

It  would  be  highly  desirable  therefore,  if  practicable, 
to  dev.se  an  additional  check  that  might  be  used  by  a 
component  nation  against  tyrannical  and  oppressL 
functions  '"^^'•"^tional  legislature  of  usurped 

Such  a  check  is  found  in  the  constitutional  provision 
that  a  component  nation  shall  have  the  power,  under 
reasonable  conditions  of  notice  and  time,  to  veto  a 
eg.slat.ve  act  which,  in  its  judgment,  violates  the  in- 
ternational  constitution  by  trespassing  upon  the  re- 
served  rights  of  the  nations  forming  the  union 

absolute,  without  reference  to  the  opinions  and  inter- 
pretations of  the  constitution  held  by  perhaps  the  great 
majority  of  the  component  nations,  would  enable  a 
mgle  nation  or  a  fcyv  nations  permanently  to  hold  up 
enterprises  which  might  be  of  great  international  con^ 

A  fair  and  reasonable  compromise  between  these 
conflicting  pohcies  would  seem  to  be  found  in  allowing 
the  veto  to  each  State  under  the  conditions  above  men 
tioned,  but  permitting  it  to  be  overcome  by  such  a  vote 


I' 


6o 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


*  .■-  <*& 


in  both  houses  of  the  Congress  as  would  suffice  to 
amend  the  constitution,  that  is  (according  to  the  plan 
proposed,  as  will  later  appear)  by  the  assent  of  three- 
fourths  of  all  the  votes  of  each  house. 

Thus  if  more  than  one-fourth  of  all  the  component 
States,  or  if  States  representing  more  than  one-fourth 
of  the  entire  federal  populations  of  all  the  Stages  in 
union,  are  opposed  to  any  legislative  action  threaten- 
ing the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations,  their  opposition 
to  the  measure  would  put  an  absolute  and  irret -ievable 
quietus  upon  it;  but  the  opposition  of  less  than  that 
number,  or  of  a  single  nation,  would  but  serve  to  cause 
such  delay  as  would  be  allowed  by  the  constitution  be- 
fore a  veto  might  be  overriden  by  the  requisite  ma- 
jority.* 

IX 

Power  of  Impeachment  or  Removal 

Article  I,  Sec.  2  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  provides  that  the  House  of  Representatives 

"  shall  have  the  sole  power  of  impeachment," 
and  Article  I,  Sec.  3,  that 

"The  Senate  shall  have  the  sole  power  to  try 
all  impeachments.  When  sitting  for  the  purpose, 
they  shall  be  on  oath  or  affirmation.  When  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  tried,  the  Chief 
Justice  shall  preside;  and  no  person  shall  be  con- 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  8. 


CONGRESS-IMPEACHMENT,  ETC.      6, 

The  same  section  also  declares  that— 

exte/dte.Vfh'"'"'  °^  impeachment  shall  not 
extend  further  than  to  removal  from  office  and 
disquahfication  to  hold  and  enjoy  any  office  of 
h.?rX'  *''"^''  "'  P'-^fi^  ""der  th^uJed  States, 
and  subi'.?.'°""r  ^  ^^^"  nevertheless  be    able 

punisSe::;!  i^dtrtrf;  j^'>^'  ^"'^^"^'  -^ 

Lastly,  Article  II,  Sec.  4,  of  the  same  instrument 
diseases  what  officials  of  the  nited  States  are  subject 
to  the  process  of  impeachment.    It  provides  that- 

offll^^^  f'T^^r'^^^  Vice-President,  and  all  civil 
officers  of  the  United  States  shall  be  removld 
from  office  on  impeachment  for,  and  conSn 
dem^iror:.'"'"'^^^'  °^  «^^-  ^'^^  crimesTnd  misi 

The  phrase  "  civil  officers,"  of  course  excludes 
tary  and  naval  officers  and  is  not  considered  is 
braang  legislative  officers,  that  is,  the  membc^ 
either  house  of  the  Congress  (provision  for  whr- 
pulsion  from  the  house  of  which  they  are  respect, 
members  IS  elsewhere  made). 

Hence  the  officers  subject  to  impeachment  under  th^ 

icVicP  •?"'""  ^°-^'^"^-n  -e  the  President, 
the  Vice-President,  and  all  civil  executive  and  judical 
officers  of  the  United  States. 

Since  under  that   Constitution   the   President   and 


ill- 
m- 

>f 


Ill 


If         1    ^ 


& 


62  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Vice-President  are  elected  more  or  less  indirectly  by  the 
people  of  the  States  and  not  by  the  Congress,  and  since 
they  are  not  otherwise  responsible  to  that  body,  it 
would  seem  to  have  been  prudent  to  give  to  the  legis- 
lative body  this  check  upon  the  conduct  of  these  highest 
executive  officers.     And  since  the  inferior  executive 
officials  were  to  be  appointed  by  the  President  and 
removable  by  him,  and  not  by  the  Congress,  and  the 
judicial  officials  were  to  be  likewise  appointed  by  him 
and  to  hold  office  during  good  behavior,  it  is  plain  that 
the  check  of  impeachment  by  the  Congress  would  be 
desirable  as  to  them  too;  the  essential  principle  being 
that  Congress  ought  to  have  the  power  to  impeach 
all  those  officials  over  whose  appointment  and  removal 
it  would  have  no  other  control. 

Applying  this  principle  to  our  international  consti- 
tution, since  it  is  proposed,  as  will  appear  later,  to 
make  the  executive  arm  of  the  new  government  fully 
responsive  to  the  wishes  and  desires  of  the  Congress 
through  ministers  responsible  to,  and  selected  and  re- 
movable by,  that  body,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  need 
of  a  process  of  impeachment  as  to  any  executive  offi- 
cers of  the  international  government. 

But  in  the  case  of  judicial  officers  the  case  would  be 
quite  different.  The  plan  proposed,  as  will  be  seen 
hereafter,  calls  for  the  appointment  of  the  international 
judiciary  by  the  executive  authority  of  the  several 
component  nations,  to  hold  office  during  good  behavior. 
It  would  be  undesirable  to  leave  with  the  component 
nations  the  right  to  remove  the  judicial  officers  ap- 


yv 


CONGRESS-IMPEACHMENT,  ETC      6, 

therefore  tend   n  ^PPo'nt.ng  him,   and  would 

The  judge  who  is  g.  ley  of  Ir-ln  h 'K  "''""• 
tion,  or  other  high  crime  or  mUH  "^'  """P" 
removed  from  office  To  T  '""'"  ""«'"  '°  ""^ 
intrusted  morT  s:5\hl  to"  h"  T,  '^'^  P"""  "= 
Ponent  nations  sittha  Tn  thl  ,  T  '  '""'''  "'  "■"■ 
national  congres  "   Xh"         u°      f"  °'  *=  '"^"• 

to  remove  .   Z,  J  "^  '"  '"'"  '•='"''''  'hat, 

"luve  a  judge  of  an  mternat bnal  court   ;,  „     u 

he  necessary  to  semr,  ,k.  """nai  court,  it  would 

cquired   in   the   Constitution   of  the   United    S.o. 
(which  declares  thnt  f^«  u  ^     '"^"'^^^   States 

-.;-etH.s:,etv:^;--Lf-^^^^ 
ate  the  sole  power  to  try  impeachments).    Under  the 


64 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


m 


1^' 


.««, 


proposed  plan,  the  proceeding  for  the  removal  of  an 
international  judge  would  be  the  same  as  the  procedure 
for  the  passage  of  a  law ;  it  might  originate  in  either 
house,  and  if  passed  by  that  house,  upon  concurrence 
by  the  other,  the  removal  would  be  effected. 

Nor  is  any  reason  perceived  why  the  procedure 
should  call  for  more  than  the  ordinary  majority  of 
votes  in  each  house.  The  requirement  in  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution  of  a  majority  of  two-thirds  in  the 
Senate  to  convict  upon  impeachment  was  made  neces- 
sary because  the  President  of  the  United  States  was 
made  subject  to  the  process,  and  to  permit  him  to  be 
impeached  and  removed  from  office  by  the  vote  of  a 
bare  majority  in  either  house  would  have  destroyed  his 
independence  as  a  co-ordinate  department  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  would  have  made  his  office  the  football  of 
party  politics.  If  the  impeachment  process  had  been 
confined  to  federal  judges,  it  may  well  be  doubted 
whether  the  framers  of  that  instrument  would  have 
deemed  it  necessary  to  require  a  vote  of  two-thirds 
of  the  Senate  to  convict.  Be  that  as  it  may,  experience 
in  the  United  States  has  proved  that  under  the  im- 
peachment process  the  removal  of  a  judge  is  so  diffi- 
cult as  to  be  rarely  attempted. 

On  the  whole  it  is  believed  that  better  results  would 
be  attained  if  the  removal  of  international  judges  be 
permitted  by  the  concurrent  action  of  the  two  houses 
of  the  Congress  assented  to  by  a  majority  of  the  votes 
in  each  house. ^ 

'  See  Appendix,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art  III,  Sec.  3,  cl.  a. 


CONGRESS— ORGANIZATION 
X 

Other  Details  of  Organization 


65 


The  problems  above  examined  are  the  chief  ones  to 
36  confronted  in  the  organization  of  the  legislative 
department  of  our  international  government. 

There  are  of  course  other  details  to  be  considered, 
but  they  would  appear  to  raise  no  question  of  impor- 
tant  principle  and,  in  the  suggested  form  of  the  inter- 
national  constitution  appearing  in  the  Appendix,  are 
adopted  mainly  from  the  corresponding  details  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.^ 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sees.  2,  3,  5. 


I 


CHAPTER  V 

POWERS  TO  BE  CONFERRED  ON  THE 
INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS 


1^ 


i   ., 


ii 


I 


Preliminary  Observations 

No  portion  of  a  compact  for  an  international  union 
can  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  selection  of  the 
powers,  especially  the  legislative  powers,  to  be  con- 
ferred upon  the  federal  government.  It  is  essential 
that  these  powers  be  as  limited  as  possible  in  order  that 
the  nations,  seeing  that  their  sovereign  powers  are 
surrendered  only  to  an  extent  necessary  to  abolish  war 
among  them,  may  the  more  readily  assent  to  the  com- 
pact. 

But  at  the  same  time  it  is  possible  that  international 
convenience  may  demand  that  a  few  other  powers  be 
also  granted  to  the  Congress,  such  as  the  power  to  con- 
trol international  coinage,  'rurrency  and  banking,  or 
international  copyrights  and  patent  rights.  These  hav- 
ing little  or  no  bearing  on  the  causation  of  wars  be- 
tween the  component  nations,  would  have  no  place  in 
our  plan  if  we  adhere  strictly  to  the  design  merely  to 
eliminate  war  between  the  nations.    But  it  is  conceiv- 

66 


W 


fit 


CONGRESS— POWERS  67 

able  that  international  convenience  would  be  subserved 
by  placing  these  matters  too  under  the  control  of  a 
central  legislative  body  rather  than  by  leaving  them 
as  now  to  be  regulated  by  mere  treaty  stipulations 
among  the  component  nations.  It  would  at  least  be 
worth  while  to  consider  the  wisdom  of  including  them 
among  the  powers  to  be  granted  to  the  Congress,  and 
thus  at  one  stroke  achieve  the  permanent  neutraliza- 
tion  of  them. 

It  may  also  be  remarked  once  more,  as  preliminary 
to  the  discussion  of  the  many  problems  involved  in  this 
great  topic,  that  one  who  takes  the  trouble  to  compare 
the  various  existing  constitutions  of  federal  union 
will  at  once  see  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  approaches  much  more  nearly  the  model  we  are 
searching  for  than  any  of  the  others;  for  at  the  time 
ot  Its  adoption  the  American  States  regarded  them- 
selves  as  independent  and  sovereign  States,  and  were 
almost  as  jealous  of  their  sovereign  rights  as  the 
proudest  European  nation  of  today. 

The  consequence  is  that  the  American  Constitution 
confers  much  more  limited  powers  upon  the  general 
government  than  do  those  of  other  federal  unions 
and  IS  correspondingly  cautious  as  to  the  powers  sur- 
rendered by  the  component  States.     Yet  this  constitu- 
tion has  stood  the  test  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
years  of  active  operation  and,  with  the  exception  of  the 
War  of  1 86 1    (an  explanation  of  which  has  already 
been  givei.)   has  effectually  prevented  the  occurrence 
of  war  between  the  States.     Indeed,  the  question  of 


m 


mh 


^ 


•1       -"»»! 


i^ 


.  If- 


68  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

secession  being  settled,  about  which  the  War  of  1861 
was  fought,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  another  war 
bet\  p->  them,  so  closely  and  ever  more  closely  are 
free  trade,  common  interstate  laws,  and  the  ties  of 
business  and  social  intimacy  drawing  them  together. 

One  more  preliminary  observation  ought  to  be  made. 
It  is  a  well-established  rule  of  construction  of  the 
United  States  Constitution  that  a  power  granted  to 
the  federal  congress  is  twt  exdtishcly  vested  in  that 
body,  but  may  be  concurrently  exercised  by  the  com- 
ponent States,  except  in  the  three  following  classes  of 
cases : 

1.  Where  it  is  expressly  stated  that  Congress  shall 
have  the  exclusive  power  to  act  in  the  matter; 

2.  Where  the  power  is  conferred  upon  the  Congress, 
and  the  States  are  prohibited  to  exercise  the  power; 

3.  W^here  the  power  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it  can 
only  be  properly  exercised  under  one  uniform  rule, 
and  the  right  to  exercise  it  has  been  conferred  upon 
Congress.  In  such  case,  by  implication,  the  power  is 
presumed  to  have  bc-en  granted  to  the  Congress  exclu- 
sively, and  the  States  cannot  exercise  it  concurrently. 

But  when  the  States  have  the  right  to  exercise  a 
power  concurrently  with  Congress,  this  means  that  they 
may  exercise  it  only  so  long  as,  and  to  the  evtent  that. 
Congress  does  not  exercise  it.  For  the  Constitution, 
and  laws  of  the  United  States  are  expressly  declared  to 
be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  a  State  law  con- 
flicting  with  a  constitutional  law  of  Congress  is  of  no 
effect. 


CONGRESS-TAXING  POWER  69 

These  principles  are  to  be  applied  as  freely  in  the 
construction  of  our  proposed  constitution  as  in  that 
of  the  American  document.-with  one  qualification, 
namely,  that  no  opportunity  ought  to  be  permitted  to 
the  mternational  government  to  assume  exclusive  power 
by  implication  only,  nor  on  the  other  hand  ought  there 
to  be  under  any  circumstances  a  presumption  of  the 
surrender  of  powers  by  the  component  nations  by  im- 
plication  only.    In  every  case  the  claim  of  such  a  grant 
or  such  a  surrender  ought  to  be  sustained  only  by  some 
express  provision  of  the  international  compact 

Hence,  the  third  rule,  above  mentioned,  for  the  con- 
s  rucfon  of  the  American  Constitution,-that  where 
the  power  .s  of  such  a  nature  that  it  can  only  be  prop- 
eriy  exernsed  under  one  uniform  rule,  and  the  right 
to  exerc.se  ,t  ha.  been  conferred  upon  Congress,  the 
power  IS  presumed  to  have  been  granted  to  the  Con- 
gress  exclusively,  and  the  States  cannot  exercise  it  con- 
currently,--ought  to  have  no  place  in  the  rules  adopted 
for  the  mterpretation  of  the  international  compact 


II 

Power  to  Raise  RevexVue 

That  the  international  government  ought  to  be  self 
sustammg,  with  power  to  raise  its  own  revenues  by  its 
own  tax  measures,  is  a  proposition  needing  no  argu- 
ment.  If  proof  were  necessary,  it  might  be  sought 
•n  the  fact  that  all  federal  unions  have  found  it  essL 


i    . 


70  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tial  to  possess  this  power; — indeed,  without  it,  the 
union  would  not  be  a  true  government,  but  a  mere 
league  or  alliance,  dependent  upon  the  charity  or  lib- 
erality of  the  component  States  for  its  continued  ex- 
istence. 

The  constitutional  history  of  the  United  States  pre- 
sents  an  actual  illustration  of  this  condition,  before  the 
establishment  of  the  present  Constitution,  and  while 
yet  the  States  were  leagued  together  under  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  which  provided  that  the  States  should 
contribute  ratably  to  the  expenses  of  the  Union.  It  was 
then  notorious  that  some  of  the  States  failed  utterly 
to  pay  their  quotas,  while  others  paid  only  part.  It 
was,  indeed,  the  weakness  of  the  union  under  this 
system  that  finally  induced  the  States  to  accede  to  the 
present  Constitution. 

Assuming  that  the  Congress  ought  to  be  granted  the 
power  to  raise  its  revenue  through  its  own  powers  of 
taxation,  the  next  branch  of  the  problem  relates  to  the 
sorts  of  tax  it  should  be  permitted  to  lay. 

In  examining  this  very  important  question,  it  is 
hardly  necessary  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  power 
of  taxation,  while  it  is  an  essential  power  of  govern- 
ment, is  perhaps  the  most  dangerous  of  all  the  pow- 
ers, and  more  liable  to  abuse  by  a  dominant  majority; 
nor  does  the  exercise  of  any  other  demand  so  inti- 
mate an  acquaintance  with  the  domestic  concerns  and 
business  affairs  of  each  small  portion  of  an  extensive 
territory.  Taxation,  especially  by  means  of  duties  on 
imports  and  exports,  that  may  make  for  great  pros- 


CONGRESS— TAXING  POWER  71 

perity  in  one  section  of  such  territory  or  in  one  class 
of  the  population  may  impoverish  another,  and  thus 
may  operate  indirectly  to  make  one  section  or  one 
class  tributary  to  another. 

In  the  organization  of  a  world  government,  in  view 
of  the  widespread  diversity  of  conditions  among  the 
several  nations,  the   ignorance  of  the  conditions  in 
each  State  on  the  part  of  others  than  its  own  repre- 
sentatives,  and  perhaps  even  the  ignorance  among  those 
representatives   themselves    (remembering   that   they 
would  respectively  represent  some  millions  of  people) 
It  would  seem  the  part  of  wisdom  to  confine  the  in- 
ternational taxing  power  within  the  simplest  possible 
hmits,  and  to  permit  its  application  to  those  subjects 
only  which  may  be  found  in  every  State  in  uniform 
proportion. 

The  subject  best  answering  this  description  would 
seem  to  be  land.  This  is  found  in  every  country,  and 
IS  valuable  m  proportion  to  the  population  and  wealth 
of  the  country  itself,  affording  thus  an  approximate 
measure  of  the  ability  of  each  nation  to  pay  the  ex- 
pense  of  a  world  government,  with  its  insurance  against 
violence  and  war. 

And  while  primarily  this  tax  upon  land  is  a  tax  upon 
the  single  class  of  landowners,  the  burden,  extending  as 
It  would  over  so  large  a  portion  of  the  earth's  surface 
would  speedily  be  distributed  among  all  classes  of  the 
world  s  population.  Nor  would  the  tax  thus  uniformly 
distributed  be  a  heavy  burden  upon  the  several  na- 
tions,  when  we  consider  the  annual  savings  in  arma- 


1 


III 


w 


•72 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


merits  and  equipment  for  war,  not  to  mention  the  sav- 
ing of  the  expense  of  actual  warfare,  resulting  from 
the  establishment  of  such  a  government. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  suggested  gov- 
ernment would  be  one  of  strictly  limited  powers  and 
functions,  the  annual  expenditures  of  which  ought  not 
to  be  great  when  compared  with  the  benefits  to  accrue; 
and  that  the  component  nations,  through  their  abso- 
lute control  of  their  representatives  in  the  Congress  and 
their  consequent  control  of  the  expenditures  of  the 
government,  would  always  possess  the  power  to  put 
a  stop  to  any  unnecessary  extravagance. 

The  other  alternative, — that  of  granting  to  the  in- 
ternational government  the  power  to  lay  indirect  taxes 
such  as  taxes  on  production,  business,  imports,  or  ex- 
ports,— v.'ould  surrender  to  that  government  an  un- 
told power  for  harm  and  injustice,  and  would  permit 
a  majority  of  the  nations,  through  their  federal  agency, 
to  meddle  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  the  respective 
nations  in  what  might  prove  ruinous  fashion. 

The  plan  proposed  then  would  confine  the  power  of 
the  Congress  to  raise  its  revenue  to  the  taxation  of 
land  alone  at  a  uniform  rate  throughout  the  terri- 
tories of  the  component  nations. 

The  last  phase  of  the  problem  relates  to  the  proper 
limitations  upon  the  purposes  for  which  the  Congress 
may  exercise  the  power  of  taxation. 

Shall  it  be  permitted  to  raise  money  for  any  pur- 
poses that  to  it  seem  to  be  for  the  general  interna- 
tional welfare,  even  though  that  welfare  be  confined  to 


CONGRESS— TAXING  POWER  73 

improvement,  and  public  enterprises  undertaken  within 

I.m  ted  ,„  ,ts  nght  to  raise  money  to  those  matters 
«  .0  wh,ch  ,t  is  expressly  authorised  .0  legislTte? 

the  „  r?"!"""  '"'  '"'■  '""  ^'"'"^"^  ">e  people  and 
the  polmcal  parties  of  the  United  State,.    I,  arise, 

stitui!,  „:''"H'''™f  ^  '""^^ "'  "■'  A™"-"  c:  ■ 

sntution  providing  that 

colto  toes"E/'"-'"  •""=  Pr»  'o  lay  and 
J    5"  '""'*>  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  Rn  ^.T 

derj  ,0  pay  the  debts  and  provide  £0?^=  en™ 
m™  defense  and  general  w'elfare'of  the'ted" 

One  party  has  claimed  that  this  gives  Coneress  the 
power  ,0  raise  money  to  provide  for  anytJn'gwh  h 

U„^  d  7,  "  ''  '"'  """=  ^^""^'  welfare  oT  the 
United  States,"  regardless  of  whether  it  falls  within 
the  granted  powers  and  control  of  the  federa  go"  rn" 
men  The  other  claim,  that  "  the  general  welfare  Tf 
the  United  States"  has  all  been  provided  I     „  .h, 

notZr      7'  """'  "■'  '=''"''  government    t  a 
nothing  beyond  or  outside  of  those  powers  can  be 

the  Lnited  State,";  and  that  Congress  therefore  has 
•tppeanng  m  the  Constitution  itself 

the  case  of  a  single  nation  like  the  United  States    It 
'vould  seem  very  undesirable  to  permit  the  interrt";;; 


;!i 


;(ii: 


m 


74 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


\U'- 


government  to  exercise  any  such  paternal  care  over  the 
interests  of  the  component  nations,  which  are  fully 
able  to  take  care  of  themselves  and  their  own  enter- 
prises and  improvements  without  aid  from  the  rest 
of  the  world. 

The  powers  of  the  international  congress  in  this 
regard  ought  to  be  strictly  limited  to  the  raising  of 
money  for  the  sole  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  func- 
tions imposed  upon  the  federal  government  by  the 
constitution.* 

Ill 
Power  to  Borrow  Money — Paper  Currency 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has  provided 
that  the  Congress  shall  have  power 

'•  to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United 
States. 

This  has  been  construed  to  mean  not  only  that  Con- 
gress may  from  time  to  time  authorize  the  issuance  and 
sale  of  bonds  of  the  United  States,  but  also  that  it 
may  authorize  the  issuance  of  treasury  notes  and  other 
paper  currency  as  legal  tender  in  the  payment  of  pri- 
vate debts. 

That  the  international  government  should  be  given 
the  power  to  borrow  money  on  its  own  credit  through 
the  issuance  and  sale  on  the  public  markets  of  bonds 
not  intended  as  currency  would  seem  indisputable.  Not 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  i. 


[ff 


CONGRESS-MONEY  POWERS  yj 

only  might  unforeseen  events  occur  that  would  render 
such  a  course  necessary  or  else  would  entail  great  em- 
barrassment  to  the  government,  but  the  widesprefd 
d,stnbu.,on  of  such  bonds  among  the  component  na 
tK,„s  would  constitute  a  conservative  influence  tending 
to  increase  its  political  stability.  ^ 

But  the  question  becomes  much  more  complex  when 
we  consider  th=  express  or  implied  grant  to  the  ime" 
«  ..onal  government  of  the  power  to  issue  a  world-"  ide 
paper  currency  either  on  the  sole  credit  of  the  gove  n 
ment  or  through  a  bank  or  banks  instituted  by  it     t"^ 

no  s        1  bearing  on  the  question  of  war  or  peace  •  so 
that.^     grant  of  such  a  power  ^    -t  in  the  leas,' es 
sential  to  the  plan  of  international  Hon 

It  IS  to  be  remembered  that  every  unnecessary  grant 
of  power  to  the  international  government  involves^, 
correlative  extent  an  actual  or  potential  surrender  of 
power  by  the  component  nations,  and  tends  to  greate 
centralization  of  power,  which,  should  it  become  too 
great  w„„,„  defeat  the  very  purpose  cf  the  unTn  per! 
haps  by  causing  war  on  the  part  of  tl:,  component  na- 
■ons  ,0  regain  the  liberty  and  independence  they  have 
•00  rashly  surrendered.    These  observations  app'ly  „" 

to  s'ome  0:^""'^'"  """"  "°"  ""'"  "-"-'on 
to  some  others  that  are  to  be  mentioned  later. 

VVhile  all  powers  ought  to  be  surrendered  by  the 
component  nations,   the  exercise  of  which  by  th  m 

cartt'fa:,;tirr;h:  --^  ^""""  *-^ 

idiny  said  that  the  power  to  issue  paper 


m 


76 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


J  ■ 


II 


currency  is  one  of  these.  The  only  justification  of  such 
a  grant,  if  there  be  any,  would  be  found  in  the  in- 
ternational  convenience  resulting  from  the  abolition  of 
the  cost  of  exchange  and  in  other  ways.  Only  experts 
in  international  finance  could  determine  how  great 
the  advantages  of  this  change  would  be,  or  properly 
weigh  its  financial  advantages  against  the  finanaal 
dangers  incurred;  but  the  benefits  ought  to  be  clearly 
shown  to  be  very  great  before  the  power  is  granted. 

Should  the  power  be  granted  at  all,  it  ought  to  be 
express,  not  left  to  implication  from  the  mer»  power 
to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  j  itions. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  not  intended  to  be  granted, 
care  should  be  taken  so  to  word  the  grant  of  the  power 
to  borrow  as  to  exclude  the  implication  that  it  embraces 
also  the  power  to  issue  paper  currency.^ 

IV 

Power  to  Coin  Money 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  grants  to  the 
Congress  the  power 

"  to  coin  money,  and  regulate  the  value  thereof, 
and  of  foreign  coin." 

This  is  another  instance  wherein  the  question  is  pre- 
sented whether  a  power,  which  has  no  relation  to  the 

'  See  Appendix.  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  2.  The  power  t„ 
issue  paper  currency  is  placed  in  brackets  as  indicative  of  the  doubt 
as  to  its  inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


r 


i.« 


CONGRESS— MONEY  POWERS  77 

causation  of  war  between  the  component  nations,  ought 
to  be  granted  by  them  to  the  international  government, 
merely  because  it  might  subserve  international  conven- 
ience  in  commercial  dealings  or  otherwise. 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  the  mere  grant 
of  such  a  power  to  the  federal  government  would  not 
of  itself,  without  an  express  prohibition  upon  the 
States,  operate  as  a  negation  of  their  right  to  exercise 
the  same  power,  it  would  operate  to  give  the  complete 
control  of  the  subject  into  the  hands  of  the  Congress, 
who  might,  if  they  should  choose  to  do  so,  make  their 
own  exercise  of  the  power  exclusive,  and  deprive  the 
nations  of  their  concurrent  control  of  it. 

The  same  considerations  that  should  induce  caution 
m  granting  to  the  United  Nations  the  power  to  issue  pa- 
per currency  apply  in  this  case.  Unless  the  advantages 
to  mternational  finance  and  commerce  would  be  very 
great,  the  wisdom  of  augmenting  the  powers  of  the 
international  government  beyond  the  limits  necessary 
to  prevent  war  between  the  nations  would  admit  of 
doubt.* 


m 


Power  to  Punish  Counterfeiting 

It  has  been  assumed    lat  the  international  congress 
would  be  given  the  power  to  borrow  money  on  the 

coin^l^""'''''-^''?''".^-  ^-  ^''-  '•  ^"-  '•  «='•  3-  The  power  to 
com  money  etc..  ,s  placed  in  brackets,  to  indicate  the  doubt  of  the 
propriety  of  its  inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


78 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


3 


i  I 


!  i 


^M 


credit  of  the  United  Nations  through  the  issuance  of 
bonds.  Perhaps  also  the  power  to  issue  paper  cur- 
rency and  to  coin  money  would  be  granted. 

These  grants  would  very  possibly  imply  a  power  to 
provide  for  the  punishment  of  the  counterfeiting  of 
these  securities  and  money;  but  it  would  be  wiser  to 
leave  as  little  as  possible  to  implication  and  to  grant 
the  power  expressly  to  the  Congress. 

While  the  component  nations  would  also  doubtless 
possess  the  power  to  punish  the  counterfeiting  or  ut- 
terance of  counterfeited  securities  or  currency  of  the 
United  Nations  on  the  ground  of  the  fraud  thereby 
worked  upon  their  own  citizens,  it  would  be  imprudent 
to  leave  the  prevention  and  punishment  of  these  crimes 
entirely  to  the  several  States,  which  might  punish  them 
very  differently.* 

VI 

Power  to  Fix  Standards  of  Weights  and 
Measures 

The  remarks  made  in  connection  with  the  grant  of 
the  powers  to  issue  paper  currency  and  to  coin  money 
apply  here  also,  and  perhaps  with  even  more  force, 
since  the  benefits  likely  to  accrue  from  the  grant  of 
this  power  to  the  international  government  would  not 
be  so  great.  It  has  no  connection  with  war,  and  its 
admission  among  the  powers  granted  could  only  be 
justified  on  the  ground  of  great  inttrnational  conven- 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  4. 


if 


REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE  79 

lence.     It  is  very  questionable  whether  it  should  be 
included.' 

VII 

Power  to  Regulate  International  Commerce 

Much  light  will  be  thrown  upon  the  investigation  of 
this  interesting  and  important  topic  by  a  brief  review 
not  only  of  the  corresponding  clause  in  the  American 
Constitution  but  of  the  interpretation  given  it  in  the 
United  States. 

That  Constitution  declares  that  Congress  shall  have 
power 

"  to  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations  and 
t^Te"^'         '^''^'"^^  ^^''^"'  ^""^  '"''^^  ^^'^   ^"^'^" 

This  clause  has  received  a  very  liberal  construction, 
the  constant  tendency  being  to  transfer  to  Congress  the 
almost  complete  control  of  interstate  and  foreign  com- 
merce.  while  leaving  to  the  States,  respectively,  the 
absolute  control  of  all  commerce  conducted  entirely 
within  the  limits  of  each  State.  The  construction  of 
the  clause  comprehends  a  vast  field,  and  no  more  will 
be  attempted  here  than  to  outline  some  of  its  salient 
features. 

At  first  it  was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  that  the  clause  only  gave  to  Congress 

is  nuL'^''r''''L'  ^""''•"  ^-  ^^■-  ^"-  ^'  '"•  '•  ^'-  3-  This  power 
"Placed  m  brackets,  a,  indicative  of  the  doubt  of  the  propriety  of  h. 
inclusion  among  the  powers  granted.  ^ 


.''!! 
;'i' 


ll 


ii 


111 


il 

M 


^ 


80  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  power  to  pass  laxis  regulating  foreign  and  inter- 
state  commerce,  so  that  until  Congress  should  act 
upon  a  particular  matter  connected  with  such  com- 
merce,  the  several  States  might  pass  laws  dealing  with 

But  in  more  recent  times  the  Court  has  receded  from 
this  position,  and  has  held  that  the  purpose  of  the 
clause  for  the  most  part  is  to  place  the  entire  control 
of  such  commerce  within  the  power  of  Congress,  so 
that  if  it  has  not  acted  in  r.„pect  to  some  particular  of 
such  commerce,  it  is  an  indication  that  Congress  de- 
sires  to  leave  the  matter  undisturbed  by  legal  restric- 
tions, and  the  States  are  not  to  regulate  it. 

To  this  general  rule,  however,  there  are  important 
exceptions,  of  some  of  which  persons  extensively  en- 
gaged  in  interstate  commerce  loudly  complain,  prefer- 
ring  the  single  regulation  of  the  Congress  or  the  ab- 
sence of  regulation  to  the  multiform  rules  of  the  sev- 
eral States. 

One  of  these  exceptions  is  to  he  found  in  the  ad- 
mitted  right  of  the  respective  States  to  exercise  the 
so^ralled  "  police  power  "  for  the  preserx  ation  of  the 
safety,  health,  morals,  or  order  of  the  community. 
Such  laws  are  sustained  even  when  burdensome  to  com- 
merce, if  their  design  be  not  to  restrict  or  regulate 
interstate  or  foreign  commerce,  but  bona  fide  to  execute 
the  purposes  above  mentioned  by  methods  that  are  not 
unreasonable,  such  as  quarantine  regulations. 

Another  exception  relates  to  the  regulation  of  ports, 
harbors,  and  pilots.    In  such  cases  it  is  held  that  the 


;r- 
ct 
n- 

n 
e 
)1 
o 
f 


a 


REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE  8i 

several  States  may  control  until  Congress  chooses  to 
act,  since  each  State  is  in  a  better  position  to  regulate 
these  local  matters  than  Congress,  and  uniform  rules 
covenng  a  great  extent  of  territory  would  not  be  likely 
to  meet  the  local  needs. 

It  is  also  important  to  observe  that  the  term  "  com- 
merce  "  is  held  not  to  include  the  manufacturing,  agri- 
cultural, or  mining  production  of  goods,  but  only  mat- 
ters or  things  connected  with  their  distribution  and  the 
transportation  of  persons. 

Thus  it  includes  immigration,  and  the  control  of 
Congress  over  that  subject  is  based  upon  this  clause 
*  Mso  includes  trade  in  goods  by  sale,  barter,  or  ex- 
ch....ge;  the  articles  traded  in;  the  rules  of  navigation- 
the  highways  of  commerce,  such  as  harbors,  navigable 
waters    and  interstate  lines  of  railway  or  telegraph; 
he  vehicles  of  commerce,  as  ships,  railway  trains,  and 
telegraph  lines;  and  the  persons  engaged  in  commerce 
such  as  the  engineers  and  firemen  on  railway  or  steam- 
ship lines  engaged  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce. 
As  to  all  these  subjects  and  persons,  if  the  commerce 
be  forcgn  or  interstate,  the  States  are  without  control 
and   (with  the  exception  previously  alluded  to)    can 
lay  no  taxes  or  burdens  upon  them  as  such,  and  can 
make  no  regulations  affecting  commerce  through  them 
even  though  the  State  regulations  be  not  inconsisten; 
^Mth  acts  of  Congress. 

r.^l''' '"  u'''/.'''  '^"''^  °^  '^'  P"''^'"'  ^"^  ^'^onomic 
esuhs       the  United  States  of  the  construction  placed 
upon  this  constitutional  provision. 


ii; 


mv^^.- 


B! 


82  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

In  considering  whether  a  similar  power  ought  to  be 
granted  to  the  international  congress,  the  first  oue, 
t.on  would  be,  shall  the  Congress  be  given  any   o'  ro,' 
wha  ever  over  commerce?     If  so,  it  would  n'atu     , 
be  confined  to  the  commerce  between  the  several  com' 
ponent  „at,ons,  and  between  them  and  nations  not 
pa  .,es  o  the  compact  of  union.    Either  of  these  would 
fal   w,th,n  the  designation  "international  commcrc  '• 
l  he  pure  y  domestic  commerce,  on  the  other  hand 
would  be  left  under  the  complete  control  of  the  several 
constituent  States.  several 

Internationa,  jealousy  and  suspicion  would  prob- 
ably  prove  obstacles  to  the  grant  of  this  power  to  the 
proposed  government,  and  doubtless  certain  precau 
t,ons  ought  to  be  talcen  to  define  more  clearly  the  pre- 
cse  l,m,ts  of  ,t  than  the  American  Constitution  doll 
Out  tbat  „  would  be  wise,  and  indeed  necessary    to 
on        a  portton  at  least  of  this  great  power  upon 
the  ■nternat.onal  congress  is  sufficiently  apparent,  when 
we  remember  that  pe.-haps  most  of  the  wars  tha   have 
plagued  mankmd  have  had  their  origin  in  national  de! 
sire  to  promote  trade  by  devious  paths.    If,  then  the 
chief  design  ,n  establishing  this  union  is  to  eliml  t 
war     between  the  component   nations,   the   compact 
would  be  irreparably  defective,  did  it  omit  to  e«end 

ts'rrr '  '"^"  - "--  ^  •"'  "'-■•^-^  - 

Assuming  then,  that  some  degree  of  control  over 
.nterna  lonal  commerce  must  be  granted  to  the  Con- 
gress,  the  next  question  is  as  to  the  limitations,  if 


'-W 


REGULATION  OF  COMMERCE  81 

any,  which  ought  to  be  imposed  upon  (he  exercise  of 

he  power.    Shall  i,  be  complete  and  absolute,  as  under 

la  i^nT'T",.  :""'""•  "'"''"e  '<-  'h=  component 
nations  only  the  nght  ,0  pass  inspection  or  quarantine 
laws  or  other  "police"  regulations,  and  the  right  ^o 
regulate  purely  local  matters  such  as  harbors,  pilots, 

bridges,  and  dams  across  navigable  waters?  If  not  to 
what  extent  should  it  be  limited? 

It  is  dear  that  the  power  ought  not  to  be  extended 
so  as  to  g,ve  the  .nternational  congress  control  over 
the  proJuc.on  as  well  as  the  distribution  of  goods 
even  though  the  goods  be  intended  for  export  No; 
only  would  such  an  extension  increase  enormously  the 
power,  of  the  central  government,  but  i,  would  consti- 
^>c  a  direct  invasion  of  that  plenary  control  of  affairs 
domestic  that  each  nation  ought  to  reserve  to  itself 

Confinmg  ourselves  therefore  to  the  control  of  in- 
ernational  commerce  (in  contradistinction  to  produc 

observed  that  in  the  prevailing  mental  attitude  of  the 
n  t  ons  toward  one  another,  it  is  unlikely  they  could 
be  induced,  even  were  it  desirable,  to  grant  more  of 
<bis  power  than  would  permit  the  Congress  by  specia 

:LTZrr""°''  '"  '-^'"^  -tfrnatiolarco:. 

sTence  of  th    r"'"^'  "  '"  '""  ^"'''^  «'""'  "'e  mere 

ope"    e     '  X"'  '"  "'""'  '°  "  8'^'"  -»""  'o 

operate  as  an  inhibition  upon  national  action 

Again  since  the  Congress,  under  the  gui.e  of  regula 

'■ons,  might  easily  pass  laws  touching  intern    b„a 

commerce  which  would  operate  unequally  and  unjusUy 


i 


i 


!! 
M 


h 


'^ 


84  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

upon  different  nations,  thus  putting  one  or  more  na- 

.ons  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  prosecution  of  its  trade 

he  compact  ought  to  require  that  all  regulations  of 

such  commerce  passed  by  the  Congress  be  uniform  in 

their  operation. 

case  of  bilu  for  ra.smg  revenue,  that  no  law  regulat- 
•ng  mtcrn,  tional  commerce  shall  have  a  life  of  more 
than  (say;  ten  years,  so  that  at  the  end  of  that  period, 

of  botVh  '"''"";  'T"''  °""  "'^'•^  '•""  ^he  gauntlet 
of  both  houses  of  the  Congress  and  of  the  divergent 
interests  represented  therein. 

So  far  from  any  nation  being  permanently  injured  in 
^s  track  relations  by  the  grant  of  this  pow  r,  thus 
guarded    to  the  international  government,   it  i     su" 
mitted  that  it  would  be  a  great  boon  to  international 
commerce,    which    would    prosper    as    never    beforl 
\A  hUe  the  respective  nations  might  still  regulate  their 
onn   trade,   even  international  trade,  conflicting  and 
burdensome  as  the  regulations  might  be,  these  latter 
could  at  any  time  be  superseded  as  to  particular  mat- 
ers by  the  action  of  the  Congress,  whenever  the  con- 
flicts, restrictions,  or  other  evils  might  become  so  bur- 
densome  as  to  arouse  the  majority  of  the  States  to 

';  Commerce,"  as  the  term  has  been  construed  in  the 
Lnued   States,   includes   the  control  of  immigration 
em.gration,  and  the  migration  of  persons   from  on 
State  to  another.     But  it  can  scarcely  be  supposed,  at 
this  stage  of  international  intercourse,  that  the  several 


# 


POSTAL-OTHHR  COMMUXICATION  85 
nations  composing  an  international  union  would  consent 
to  surrender  the  control  0/  these  subjects  to  the  federal 
government  Hence  a  clause  has  been  inserted  ex- 
pressly exceptmg  them  from  inclusion  in  this  federal 
power.* 

VIII 

Power  to  Regulate  Postal  and  Other 
Communication 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  grants  to 
Congress  the  power 

"  to  establish  postoffices  and  post  roads." 

As  construed  in  America,  this  has  sufficed  not  only 
to    nable  the  federal  government  to  establish  and  cot 
trol  the  whole  postoffice  system  of  the  country,  includ 
•ng  the  appointment  of  postmasters,  but  also  to  m.lfe' 
appropnations  of  money  and  public  lands  for  th    bu  Id 

over  which  the  mails  may  be  carried,  a  "  post  road  " 

But  i,  has  never  been  held  that  the  above  clause  em 
■s  confined  to  the  smgH  n,ode  of  communication  by 

extended  ,1  T"  1  ^"T"  ""  ""•"•"*-  ''"" 
extended  to  these  other  subjects  through  the  extension 

S«  Appendi,,  Const-n  U.  N,  An.  I,  s„  5,  cl.  .. 


:!i 


11 


!l 


86  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  power  to  regulate  foreign  and  interstate  com- 
merce.  Thus  Congress  has  the  power  to  "  establish  " 
postoffices,  while  it  has  power  to  "  regulate  "  the  other 
modes  of  foreign  or  interstate  communication. 

International  postal,  telephonic,  telegraphic,  wire- 
less, and  cable  communications  must  be  considered  in 
certain  aspects  as  instrumentalities  of  war,  and  there- 
fore should  be  under  the  control  of  the  international 
congress. 

Indeed,  as  agencies  of  international  commerce,  it  is 
possible  that  the  clause  conferring  upon  the  Congress 
control  over  that  subject  would  suffice,  by  implication 
at  least,  as  a  grant  of  the  power  to  regulate  all  of 
these  modes  of  communication  (including  the  postal). 
And  the  many  international  conventions  touching  these 
matters  would  seem  to  indicate  that  there  is  a  real 
need  for  the  exercise  of  a  centralized  authority  over 
them. 

When,  however,  we  come  to  consider  the  extent  of 
the  power  thus  to  be  conferred,  we  are  confronted  with 
some  important  and  difficult  problems. 

To  make  the  power  complete  in  degree,  including  the 
establishment  of  post,  telegraph,  telephone,  wireless, 
and  cable  offices,  and  the  appointment  of  postmasters 
and  operators,  but  limiting  it  in  kind  to  international 
communica  ions  only,  leaving  the  intra-national  com- 
munications, as  now,  under  the  control  of  the  respective 
nations,  would  seem  to  involve  a  divided  responsibility 
and  control  that  would  be  likely  to  have  ill  results; 
and  would  enormously  increase  the  patronage  to  be 


^ 


COPYRIGHTS— PATENT  RIGHTS       87 

bestowed  by  the  international  government.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  make  the  control  of  the  Congress  over 
these  subjects  complete  in  kind  as  well  as  in  degree, 
confounding  the  domestic  with  the  international  com- 
munications, would  produce  even  a  worse  situation, 
and  is  not  to  be  thought  of. 

But  it  would  be  possible  to  grant  to  the  Congress  the 
power  to  pass  laws  regulating  these  means  of  com- 
munications, so  far  as  they  are  international,  without 
giving  it  the  power  to  establish  or  fill  the  offices,  just 
as  the  power  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  to 
regulate  foreign  and  interstate  commerce  has  never 
been  construed  to  confer  upon  that  body  the  power 
to  establish  business  houses  and  to  fill  them  with  gov- 
ernmental employees. 

A  clause  therefore  has  been  inserted  in  our  pro- 
posed constitution  granting  to  the  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  by  uniform  laws  these  means  of  interna- 
tional communication.* 

IX 

Power  to  Provide  for  International  Copyrights 
AND  Patent  Rights 


\m 


it' 


,•,' 


This  is  another  of  those  powers,  the  grant  of  which 
to  the  international  congress  is  not  to  be  justified  on 
the  ground  that  it  would  especially  tend  to  prevent  mis- 
understandings or  wars  between  the  component  na- 
tions.    If  to  be  justified  at  all,  it  must  be  on  the 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  6. 


88 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


ground  of  international  convenience  as  in  other  in- 
stances  we  have  seen. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  observe  that  the  corre- 
sponding clause  of  the  American  Constitution  has  been 
construed  not  to  include  the  power  to  regulate  trade- 
marks. But  under  the  clause  giving  power  to  regulate 
foreign  and  interstate  commerce,  Congress  may  regu- 
late and  protect  trade-marks  to  the  extent  that  they 
are  used  in  such  commerce,  but  not  with  respect  to 
purely  intra-state  commerce.  Doubtless,  the  same  rule 
would  be  applied  in  the  interpretation  to  be  placed 
upon  the  international  compact.* 


Power  to  Constitute  Inferior  International 

Courts 


Hi 


^^^M 

^^M 

^H 

_ 

H' 

,« 

^1 

^H 

H 

^H 

1 

One  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  is 

"  to  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to  the  Supreme 
Court." 

And  the  third  Article  of  the  American  Constitution 
provides  that 

"  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
vested  in  one  Supreme  Court  and  in  such  inferior 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  V.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  7.  This  power 
is  placed  in  brackets,  to  indicate  the  doubt  of  the  propriety  of  its 
inclusion  among  the  powers  granted. 


INTERNATIONAL  COURTS 


89 


courts  as  the  Congress  may  from  time  to  time  or- 
dam  and  establish." 

It  will  be  noted  that  these  provisions  do  not  im- 
peratively (ie.'.and  that  Congre"  create  any  inferior 
federal  courts.  It  is  given  a  discretion  in  respect  to 
the  matter,  and  it  is  conceivable  that  Congress  might 
have  omitted  to  create  such  courts,  vesting  the  "  judi- 
cial  power  of  the  United  States,"  in  such  cases  as  it 
might  determine,  in  the  courts  of  the  several  States. 
Indeed,  as  to  certain  classes  of  cases,  it  has  actually 
allowed  the  State  courts  to  exercise  concurrent  juris- 
diction with  the  inferior  federal  courts,  while  in  other 
cases  to  which  "the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
States  "  extends,  the  inferior  federal  courts  are  given 
no  jurisdiction  at  all,  the  State  courts  possessing  exclu- 
sive jurisdiction  with  regard  to  them. 

It  is  seen  therefore  that  there  is  no  inherent  neces- 
sity to  constitute  any  lower  federal  courts.  Were 
there  enough  State  courts,  it  would  be  possible  to  have 
left  to  them  all  the  cases  now  tried  in  the  inferior  fed- 
eral tribunals.  In  such  event,  however,  appeals  to 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  from  the  State 
courts  would  have  been  necessary  in  a  large  number  of 
cases,— especially  in  cases  arising  under  the  Constitu- 
tion, laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United  States,  since  other- 
wise there  would  result  different  holdings  in  the  sev- 
eral States  touching  the  construction  of  those  laws 
which  ought  to  possess  a  uniform  meaning  throughout 
the  country. 


HI 


1 


S 


I 


l., 


90  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

Whether  the  same  or  a  similar  power  should  be 
granted  to  the  international  congress  would  turn  upon 
the  important  point  whether  there  need  be  any  inter- 
national courts  inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court,  for  if 
they  are  to  be  created,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the 

nstitution  of  them  and  their  jurisdictions  must  be 
left  to  the  international  congress.  Arguments  of 
weight  may  be  adduced  on  either  side. 

On  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  urged  that  the  establish- 
ment rj  inferior  international  courts  throughout  the 
territories  of  the  component  nations  might  impose  a 
heavy  expense  on  the  federal  government,  as  well  as 
on  litigants  who  might  be  far  distant  from  the  seat  of 
the  court, — a  burden  particularly  heavy  in  criminal 
cases;  that  the  exercise  by  such  courts  of  jurisdiction 
within  the  limits  of  the  several  States  might  be  re- 
ri'ded  liv  them  with  jealous  disapproval,  not  tending 
to  strengthen  the  international  government  in  their  eyes 
but  rather  to  produce  friction,  and  that,  with  the  judges 
of  each  nation  under  obligation  to  enforce  the  inter- 
national constitution  and  the  laws  and  treaties  made  in 
pursuance  thereof,  an  adequate  number  of  such  judges, 
and  appeals  from  their  decisions  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  Nations,  there  would  be  no  sufficient  rea- 
son for  the  establishment  of  any  inferior  international 
courts. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  argued  that  it  would 
be  impracticable,  without  a  very  considerable  increase 
of  the  number  of  courts  in  each  State,  to  expect  those 
courts  to  deal  with  the  numerous  cases  that  would  be 


A 


I 


INTERNATIONAL  COURTS  91 

likely  to  arise  under  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
Nations;  that  as  the  expense  of  this  increase  ought  not 
to  be  borne  by  the  component  nations,  severally    it 
would  be  a  difficult  matter  to  apportion  the  expense 
properly  between  the  international  rnd  the  national 
governments;  that  if  "  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
Nations  "  were  left  to  be  enforced  entirely  by  the  courts 
of  the  several  nations,  there  would  often  be  grave 
danger  of  lapses  from  the  impartial  and  unprejudiced 
attitude  that  befits  a  court,  since  many  of  the  cases 
would  arise  between  citizens  of  nationalities  different 
from  that  of  the  judge,  or  in  the  form  of  criminal  pro- 
secut.ons  by  the  United  Nations,  or  in  the  form  of  pass- 
ing upon  the  validity  of  national  acts  alleged  to  violate 
the  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United  Nations 
Such  questions  would  often  compel  the  national  courts 
to  choose  between  the  national  and  the  international 
law,  between  the  rights  of  a  fellow  citizen  and  those 
ot  an  alien  or  those  of  the  international  government. 
1  here  would  thus  perhaps  be  a  tendency  to  decide  such 
questions  in  the  interest  of  the  State  in  which  the  court 
|s  sitting  rather  than  to  give  to  the  national  and  the 
international  law  each  its  true  weight. 

On  the  whole  it  would  appear  wise  to  give  to  the 
Congress  the  power  to  constitute  inferior  international 
courts  within  the  component  States,  leaving  to  that 
body  the  discretion  to  establish  them  or  not  as  it  may 
see  fit^  and  t.  apportion  "the  judicial  power  of  the 
United  Natu  :,  "  between  them  and  the  natir  .,^1  courts 
as  It  may  think  best. 


i 

i   i 


Ml  I 

V  H 

r 


M 


.  h 


92  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

But  the  grant  of  the  power  to  constitute  these  inter- 
national  courts  is  entirely  distinct  frc-.  U.c  mode  of 
selecting  the  judges  of  such  courts,  hould  they  -,e 
created.  The  latter  question  properly  b.  iongs  to  ihe 
organization  of  the  judiciary  department,  and  v/ul  be 
discussed  in  that  connection.* 

XI 

Power  to  Define  and  Punish  Wrongs  on  the 
High  Seas,  and  Offenses  Against  the  Law  of 
Nations 


1 
11 


At  present  all  independent  nations  exercise  the  right 
to  punish  piracies  committed  on  the  high  seas  and  of- 
fenses  against  the  Law  of  Nations.     It  is,  indeed,  a 
high  sovereign  prerogative,  inasmuch  as  both  the  of- 
fenses themselves  and  the  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction 
to  punish  them  may  sometimes  involve  the  nation  in 
misunderstandings  with  other  nations,  or  even  in  war. 
No  principle  of  public  international  law  is  more 
clearly  recognized  than  that  a  nation  must  at  all  haz- 
ards protect  the  persons  of  the  ambassadors  accredited 
to  It  from  violence  or  insult,  and  a  patent  failure  to 
do  so  may  easily  lead  to  war. 

Misunderstandings  have  also  arisen  sometimes  bo- 
tween  nations  by  reason  of  the  attempt  of  one  to  pun- 
ish the  citizens  of  another  for  alleged  crimes  committed 
on  the  high  seas  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  any  nation. 

'  See  post.    pp.    ,25    c,  „g,;   Appendix,    Const'..    U,    N     Art    III 
bei    ■».  cl.  I.  ''        '■    "    • 


CONGRESS— WAR  POWERS  93 

In  view  of  the  possibility  that  such  questions  might 
cause  trouble  not  only  as  between  the  component  na- 
tions  themselves  but  as  between  them  and  nations  not 
members  of  the  union,  it  would  seem  eminently  appro- 
pnate  that  the  power  should  be  conferred  upon  the 
mternat.onal  congress  to  define  and  punish  offenses 
committed  on  the  high  seas  and  against  the  Law  of  Na- 
tions. 

And  since  it  is  possible,  though  perhaps  not  prob- 
able, that  troubles  of  this  sort  may  also  arise  because 
ot  civil  or  private  wrongs  committed  on  the  high  seas 
outside  the  actual  jurisdiction  of  any  State,  the  power 
to  define  and  redress  such  wrongs  should  likewise  be 
granted  to  the  Congress. 

Another  reason  for  conferring  this  power  upon  the 
Congress  is  that  it  is  proposed  (as  will  appear  here- 
after) to  extend  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  Na- 
tions to  all  cases  of  crimes  and  private  wrongs  (other 
than  breaches  of  contract)  arising  on  the  high  seas, 
and  the  legislative  power  of  the  United  Nations  ought 
to  be  equally  extensive.* 


"  ii 


)   .jji. 


II 


XII 
The  War  Powers 

That  the  war  powers  of  the  component  nations  must 
be  substantially  surrendered  by  them  severally  and 
granted  to  the  nations  in  union  is  the  crux  and  axio- 

'  See  Appendix.  Consfn  U.  N,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  9. 


;    ' 


P 


i 


♦«'• 


i: 


li:f 


94  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

matic  foundation  of  the  federation,  the  entire  purpose 
of  which  'ould  be  defeated  without  such  a  grant. 

It  is  not,  however,  essential  to  the  design,  nor  would 
it  be  wise,  that  the  nations  surrender  absolutely  all 
right  to  possess  and  use  armed  forces  upon  occasion. 
Domestic  insurrections  or  sudden  invasions  of  their 
territory  may  occur,  and  it  is  necessary  to  their  safe«-y 
that  they  reserve  the  right  to  keep  certain  forces  for 
these  uses. 

The  essential  point  is  that  they  surrender  the  right  to 
keep  more  than  a  certain  small  proportion  of  the  troops 
and  ships  of  war  that  are  in  the  service  of  the  interna- 
tional government  (say  ten  per  centum)  so  that  no 
single  nation  or  small  group  even  of  the  more  power- 
ful nations,  may  easily  resist  the  international  force, 
or  be  tempted  by  the  militaristic  spirit  engendered  by 
large  armaments  to  engage  in  war  with  peaceful  neigh- 
bors either  within  or  without  the  union. 

This  surrender  of  great  powers  on  the  part  of  the 
component  nations  must  necessarily  suppose  a  corre- 
sponding guarantee  of  protection  by  the  international 
government  against  invasions  and  aggressions  of  all 
sorts  by  other  nations.  With  such  a  guarantee  no 
component  nation  would  have  need  of  great  arma- 
ments, unless  it  harbor  illegal  designs  against  its  neigh- 
bors. 

It  is  a  wise  provision  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  based  upon  English  precedent,  that  ap- 
propriations for  military  uses  shall  be  effective  only 
for  a  limited  term,  thus  making  it  necessary  at  short 


CONGRESS-oEAT  OF  GOVERNMENT     95 

intervals  to  refer  to  Loth  Houses  of  the  Congress,  rep- 
resentmg  difierent  in^^rests,  all  matters  relating  to  the 
size  and  character  of  the  army.  It  is  even  more  de- 
sirable  that  such  a  provision  be  Included  in  the  in- 
ternational  constitution,  since  the  interests  represented 
m  the  two  chambers  of  the  Congress  would  be  more 
divergent  than  in  the  United  States;  the  House  of 
Delegates  representing  peculiarly  the  Great  Powers 
and  the  Senate  the  equal  rights  of  all  nations/ 


,1 

.I'M 


XIII 

The  Seat  of  Government 

It  w  J  obviously  be  Impracticable  that  the  inter- 
national  government  should  have  its  capital  and  public 
bu.  dmgs  m  territory  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  any 
ot  th.  component  nations.  An  imperium  in  imperio  of 
th.s  sort  would  present  many  difficult  problems.     It  Is 

.t    hall  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  In  every  resoect,  in 

tV       Tk'  "°"  '"^'>'  '"  '^^  ^P^«'"^^^  sphere. 
It  may  readily  be  assumed  that  any  of  the  component 

nations  would  willingly  cede  to  It  such  territory  a 

might  be  needed  for  this  Durnose  tU^  rr..  • 

rcn^nnoM,,  .    purpose,  th;  maximum  amount 

reasonably  necessary  being  stipulated  in  the  compact 

shod'd"V^'  ''"'•'  ^.""""'P^'  ""''  P''"^'^^^^'  government 
should  possess  s.mil.ar  jurisdiction  over  all  land  ac- 

'See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9.  d.  ,0-15. 


'••Al 

i  is 


'M 


,  i,k 


ki 


jo  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

quired  by  it  in  the  several  States,  with  their  consent, 
for  purposes  of  public  buildings,  such  as  offices,  ar- 
senals, forts,  dock  yards,  etc.  If,  however,  the  prop- 
erty  be  acquired  without  the  consent  of  the  States 
wherein  the  same  may  be,  there  can  be  no  ground  upon 
which  it  can  be  assumed  that  jurisdiction  has  been  ceded 
to  the  international  government,  which  must  then  be 
regarded  as  an  ordinary  proprietor  whose  land  is  sub- 
ject to  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  State  wherein 
it  lies.^ 

XIV 

Ancillary  Powers 


I 


It  would  be  an  impossible  task  to  foresee  and  enu- 
merate all  the  specific  powers  the  international  con- 
gress might  find  occasion  to  exercise  as  incidental  to 
the  great  powers  granted  to  the  federal  government. 
The  broad  limits  of  its  proper  jurisdiction  have  been 
outlined  in  the  preceding  discussion,  but  in  order  to 
the  full  and  complete  exercise  of  this  jurisdiction,  it 
will  be  often  necessary  to  exercise  subordinate  and 
ancillary  powers.  The  right  to  do  this  would  doubtless 
be  implied  upon  the  general  principle  of  law  that 
everything  is  included  in  a  grant  which  is  necessary 
to  the  proper  enjoyment  of  the  thing  granted. 

But  it  would  probably  be  safer  to  follow  the  example 
of  the  American  Constitution  in  this  respect,  and  ex- 
pressly provide  for  the  exercise  of  such  ancillary  pow- 

'  See  Appendix,  Consi  ..  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  i6. 


I 


CITIZENSHIP-NATURALIZATION      97 

ers  of  legislation  as  may  be  found  to  be  reasonably 
necessary  and  proper  to  execute  the  powers  expressly 
granted  to  the  Congress  or  vested  in  other  departments 
of  the  government.' 

XV 

Power  of  Naturalizatiox—Citizenship 

The  American  Constitution,  in  declaring  who  shall 
be  eligible  to  be  President  of  the  United  States,  or  a 
Representative  or  Senator,  recognizes  the  existence  of 
such  a  legal  status  as  that  of  "  citizen  of  the  United 
States,"  both  native  born  and  naturalized.  Moreover 
that  Constitution  has  included  among  the  powers 
granted  to  the  Congress  that  of  establishing  "  an  uni- 
form  rule  of  naturalization";  and  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  has  declared  that 

"All  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the  United 
shnUh/v  ^"^J^^t  ,f«  the  junsdiction  thereof, 
shall  be  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
otate  wherein  they  reside." 

Indeed,  all  the  existing  federal  unions  recognize  that 
there  may  be  a  citizenship  of  the  union  distinct  from 
cmzensh.p  of  the  component  States;  that  all  citizens 
ot  the  States  are  ipso  facto  citizens  of  the  union  and  as 
such  entitled  to  its  protection  against  the  aggressions 
ot  loreign  countries  wherein  they  may  happen  to  be. 
^  1  his  IS  the  logical  consequence  of  the  fact  that  one 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  V.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  d.  17. 


mm 

Ah: 


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98  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

of  the  chief  designs  of  all  existing  federal  constitutions 
IS  to  weld  the  component  States  into  a  single  nation 
occupying  the  joint  territories  of  all  the  States,  in 
which  IS  vested  the  exclusive  power  to  deal  with  other 
members  of  the  family  of  nations. 

The  framers  of  the  international  constitution  would 
be   confronted  wi.h   the   like   question,   whether   the 
status  of  "  citizenship  of  the  United  Nations  "  shall  be 
recognized  in  law,  and  whether  the  power  of  naturali- 
zation  shall  be  conferred  upon  the  Congress  of  the 
United  Nations.    While,  under  this  constitution,  as  will 
presently  appear,  the  component  nations  would  not  be 
expected  to  yield  to  the  federal  government  exclusive 
control  of  all  foreign  relations,  it  is  unquestionably 
true  that  they  must  yield  all  power  to  compel  the  re- 
dress  of  international  wrongs  by  armed  force;  and  in 
return  for  this  concession,  the  federal  government  must 
guarantee  protection  to  the  citizens  of  each  component 
nation  while  in  other  countries. 

But  all  this  can  be  accomplished  without  the  assump- 
tion that  the  citizens  of  the  component  nations  are  also 
'  citizens  of  the  United  Nations."  Indeed,  the  very 
nature  of  this  proposed  international  union  is  such  as 
to  forbid  logically  and  theoretically  the  conception  of 
a  "  citizenship  "  thereof.  For  the  union  would  be  a 
mere  political  abstraction,-a  form  of  government  re- 
sulting from  a  compact  between  nations,— possessing 
no  territory  of  its  own  (except  the  seat  of  government 
and  the  land  held  hy  It  for  the  purpose  of  public 
buildings).    The  concept  of  citizenship  is  based  upon 


CITIZENSHIP-NATURALIZATION  99 
the  notion  of  country  or  territory  rather  than  upon 
that  of  mere  government  or  political  combination.  It 
would  be  absurd  to  speak  of  one  as  a  citizen  of  an 
alliance  or  compact  or  government;  one  can  only  be  a 
citizen  of  a  country.  A  Frenchman  is  not  a  citizen  of 
the  republican  form  of  government  in  France;  he  is  a 
citizen  of  France. 

The  only  persons  therefore  who  may  logically  be 
termed  "  citizens  of  the  United  Nations  "  would  be 
those  who,  being  citizens  of  no  other  country,  are  born 
and  reside  permanently  in  the  seat  of  the  government 
of  the  United  Nations,  which  would  be  subject  to  their 
exclusive  jurisdiction. 

It  follows  also  that  if  there  are  to  be  no  "  citizens 
of  the  United  Nations  "  (except  in  the  very  limited 
instance  just  mentioned),  neither  should  any  power 
of  naturalization  be  conferred  upon  the  international 
government. 


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CHAPTER  VI 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT 


Dependence  of  the  Executive  Upon  the 
Legislative  Department 

In  the  examination  of  a  proper  organization  of  the 
executive  department  of  the  international  government, 
a  prehmmary  question  presents  itself  whether  fol' 
lowmg  our  general  model-the  American  Constitu- 
tion,— the  entire  executive  power  ought  to  be  conferred 
upon  a  single  man,  who  in  his  own  person  shall  con- 
stitute a  separate  and  co-ordinate  department  of  the 
government,  entirely  independent  of,  and  without  re- 
sponsibihty  to,  the  Congress,  or  whether  the  exigencies 
of  the  case  demand  another  form  of  organization. 

In  the  United  States  the  President,  who  is  vested 
with  practically  all  of  the  federal  executive  power,  is 
chosen  by  an  "  electoral  college,"  the  members  of  which 
are  selected  in  the  several  States  in  such  manner  as 
each  State  shall  provide  by  Uw.  The  number  of 
electors  '  to  which  each  State  i.  entitled  equals  the 
combined  number  of  its  representatives  in  both  houses 

lOO 


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EXECUTIVE— ORGANIZATION 
of  the  Congress.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  each  State  has 
now  enacted  that  the  electors  to  which  it  is  entitled  in 
the  electoral  college  shall  be  elected  by  the  people  of 
the  State,  who  know  in  advance  what  candidate  for  the 
presidency  the  electors,  if  chosen,  will  respectively 
vote  for.  The  candidates  themselves  are  nominated 
by  national  conventions  of  the  several  political  parties 
in  the  country. 

Thus  the  President  is  in  effect  elected  by  the  States 
actmg  through  a  vote  of  their  respective  peoples;  and 
he  IS  responsible  to  them  alone  for  the  proper  exercise 
of  his  powers  as  chief  executive  during  his  term  of 
office,  which  is  four  years.    With  these  constitutional 
powers  Congress  cannot  interfere,  nor  can  they  during 
his  term  of  office  either  increase  or  diminish  his  salary 
nor  recall  him  nor  demand  his  resignation.    The  House 
of  Representatives  may  impeach  him  for  "treason 
bribery,  or  other  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors,"  but 
the  impeachment  must  be  tried  by  the  Senate,  of  whom 
two-thirds  must  concur  to  secure  a  conviction.     Be- 
yond  this,  he  is  entirely  independent  of  the  legislative 
department. 

This  absolute  independence  of  the  executive  carries 
with  It  the  result  that  the  government  of  the  United 
S'tates  IS  not  so  quickly  responsive  to  the  wishes  o. 
the  people  as  are  some  other  forms  of  government. 
Ihe  Lower  House  of  Congress  is  elected  every  two 
years,  the  President  every  four  years,  and  the  Senate 
every  six  years  (though  one-third  of  the  Senate 
changes  every  two  years) .    Hence  if  complete  political 


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102  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

control  has  been  given  to  one  party  at  an  election, 
the  earliest  possible  time  wherein  the  opposite  party 
can  gain  complete  control  is  four  years  later,— 
more  probably,  six  years,— even  though  the  political 
complexion  of  the  country  has  changed  some  years 
earlier. 

This  system  has  its  advantages,  but  it  also  has  dis- 
advantages, especially  in  cases  in  which  it  might  be 
desirable  that  the  governmental  agents  do  not  commit 
their  constituents  too  far  before  they  have  had  an 
opportunity  to  be  heard  from  effectually. 

Another  consequence  of  the  system  is  that  it  often 
happens  that  the  executive  and  legislative  departments 
are  antagonistic  rather  than  of  mutual  assistance. 
While  this  possesses  the  advantage  that  harmful  meas- 
ures are  sometimes  prevented,  it  frequently  prevents 
also  action  that  would  be  beneficial,  and  diminishes 
the  power  of  the  constituents  to  fix  the  political  re- 
sponsibility  where  it  properly  belongs. 

Comparing  this  with  the  English  and  other  parlia- 
mentary  governments  of  European  countries,  it  is  seen 
that  they  possess  a  certain  mobility  and  capacity  for 
quick  response  to  public  opinion  that  can  scarcely  be 
said  to  exist  in  the  United  States.  This  is  chiefly  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  executive  power  in  these  European 
systems  is  responsible  direatly  to  the  legislative  de- 
partment, and  is  subject  at  any  time  to  recall  by  that 
department  through  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence  or 
otherwise.  The  executive  of  the  moment  remains  in 
power  only  so  long  as  he  retains  control  in  the  legisla- 


h 


EXECL  nVE-ORGANIZATION  103 
tive  halls.  He  must  resign,  failing  such  control,  and 
give  way  to  others  who  may  command  the  confidence 
of  the  legislative  majority. 

Applying  these  well-known  principles  to  the  problem 
confrontmg  us  in  the  organization  of  an  international 
executive,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  mutual  jealousies 
and  suspicions  of  the  nations,  especially  the   Great 
Powers,  would  probably  veto  at  once  a  plan  similar  to 
that  adopted  m  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
whereby  the  complete  control  of  all  international  execu^ 
tive  functions  would  be  vested  in  one  man  for  a  fixed 
term,  without  imposing  on  him  any  responsibility  to 
the  Congress  or  to  the  component  nations. 

Particularly  would  this  result  be  likely  to  follow 
should  It  be  made  possible  for  the  chief  executive  tJ 
be  a  citizen  of,  or  dominated  by,  one  of  the  Great 
Powers.  It  would  seem  probable  that  the  only  con- 
dition  upon  which  the  nations  might  be  induced  to  agree 
to  such  an  organization  of  the  executive  would  be  the 
requirement  that  "  the  President "  be  always  a  citi- 
zen  of  one  of  the  weaker  Powers. 

But,  as  applied  to  an  international  government,  the 
disadvantages  of  the  American  system  would  outweigh 
Its  benefits.  Most  of  the  nations  would  be  accustomed 
to  a  different  and  in  many  respects  a  more  convenient 
system  m  ^heir  own  governments,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  avoid  international  suspicions  and  jealousies,  and  it 
would  seem  peculiarly  essential  in  an  international 
government,  frequently  called  upon  to  deal  with  mat- 
ters  of  great  complexity  and  importance,  that  its  or- 


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A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


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ganization  be  such  as  to  respond  quickly  to  the  views 
and  sentiments  of  the  component  nations. 

Let  us  turn  then  to  the  consideration  of  the  general 
principles  underlying  the  parliamentary  systems  in 
England  and  other  European  States. 

In  broad  outline  they  call  for  a  legislative  body  of 
two  chambers,  the  more  numerous  representing,  and 
elected  by,  the  people;  the  less  numerous  usually  rep- 
resenting some  other  interest,  or  selected  otherwise 
than  by  direct  popular  vote.  The  king,  president,  or 
other  titular  chief  executive  selects  a  prime  minister 
from  the  members  of  either  legislative  chamber,  call- 
ing upon  him  to  choose  a  cabinet  of  ministers  likewise 
members  usually  of  one  or  the  other  chamber,  all  of 
whom  are  directly  responsible  to  the  legislative  cham- 
bers, and  subject  to  recall  by  them  or  one  of  them  at 
any  time.  If  the  ministers  fail  to  retain  the  support 
of  these  bodies,  especially  that  of  the  chamber  repre- 
senting the  people,  they  resign  or  are  recalled,  and 
a  new  ministry  is  created  in  the  same  manner  as 
before 

This  bare  outline  o*  the  general  European  plan  of 
organization  of  tfe  ;nyrTtivr  department  of  govern- 
ment is  necessart^  oj  arsnrr  dun  we  may  see  clearly  what 
is  needeu  for  ths  adoptiar  at  a  similar  plan  in  the  pro- 
posed imenratiiiinai  coTsscriation. 

It  will  be  Tsmenmevzc  mar  our  first  Article  provides 
for  a  lc!iis!3rrive  j^rr-nrrent-  composed  of  two  cham- 
bers, miznt  bs  ar-antred  that  the  international  ex- 
ecutive    owrr  shall  be  exercse.:  by  a  ministry  '•espon- 


W-.^' 


i 


EXECUTIVE— PRIME  MINISTER      105 

sible  to,  and  removable  by,  either  or  both  of  these 
chambers. 

We  shall  assume  therefore  for  the  purposes  of  our 
proposed  constitution  that  some  such  form  of  execu- 
tive organization  ought  to  be  adopted,  if  possible,  since 
the  existing  international  bureaus  would  be  entirely 
inadequate  both  in  existing  powers  and  in  modes  of 
organization. 

II 

Selection  of  a  Prime  Minister 

In  European  countries,  as  has  been  said,  the  prime 
minister  is  chosen  by  the  sovereign,  president,  or  other 
irresponsible  head  of  the  State.  But  in  our  federal 
league  there  would  be  no  such  authority,  and  It  would 
appear  unwise  to  attempt  to  create  one,  though  he 
were  clothed  with  no  other  important  power  than  to 
select  a  premier  upon  occasion.  Resort  ought  not  to 
be  had  to  such  an  expedient  if  there  be  a  feasible  way 
to  utilize  for  the  purpose  the  instrumentalities  al- 
ready created. 

It  would  appear  practicable  to  leave  this  function  of 
the  selection  of  a  prime  minister  to  the  two  chambers 
of  the  international  congress  upon  nomination  by  a 
committee  composed  of  members  of  both  chambers; 
the  prime  minister  to  select  his  subordinate  ministers,' 
and  to  remove  them  at  his  pleasure;  the  prime  minister 
to  be  subject  to  recall  at  any  time  upon  resolution  to 
that  effect  passed  by  either  chamber;  and  in  case  of 


:' 


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failure  to  choose  one  of  the  nominees  of  the  committee, 
or  his  resignation,  or  recall,  another  nominating  com- 
mittee to  be  selected  who  may  nominate  other  persons 
from  whom  the  Congress  may  choose  a  new  premier. 
The  plan  thus  outlined  demands  further  examination 
as  to  details. 

Ill 

The  Nominating  Committee,  Its  Organization 
AND  Functions 


»»i 


f.    ': 


I   '^ 


Since,  under  the  plan  suggested,  this  committee 
would  exercise  the  function  of  the  sovereign  in  some 
European  countries,  in  nominating  the  prime  minister 
and  chief  executive  official  of  the  international  gov- 
ernment for  the  time  being,  it  is  proper  and  necessary 
that  its  organization,  powers,  and  duties  be  carefully 
worked  out. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  populous  and 
wealthy  nations  would  have  a  preponderating  influ- 
ence in  the  lower  house  of  the  Congress,  while  the  sov- 
ereignty  of  each  nation  would  be  equally  represented 
in  the  Senate,  so  that  in  that  house  a  combination  of 
smaller  nations  might  predominate  over  a  less  nu- 
merous combination  of  powerful  ones. 

Hence  to  permit  a  majority  of  thi^.  nominating  com- 
mittee to  be  chosen  by  either  house  would  tend  to  place 
the  control  of  the  executive  power  in  the  hands  of  the 
element  predominating  in  that  house.  To  avoid  this, 
the  nominating  committee  ought  to  be  composed,  in 


EXECUTIVE-PRIME  MINISTER      107 

equal  numbers,  of  the  members  of  each  house,  chosen 
respectively  by  the  houses  to  which  they  belong. 

The  result  would  be,  or  tend  to  be,  that  no  person 
would  be  nominated  for  the  office  of  prime  minister 
who  would  not  be  fairly  acceptable  at  least  to  both 
the  majority  of  the  component  nation*  and  to  the  ma- 
jority  of  the  Great  Powers.  But  to  make  this  result 
even  more  certain  it  ought  to  be  further  provided  that 
no  one  thus  nominated  shall  become  the  prime  minister 
unless  he  be  elected  in  each  house  by  the  majority  of 
the  votes  therein. 

In  a  matter  of  such  importance  as  the  mode  of  nomi- 
nating  a  premier  and  temporary  executive  head  of  the 
international  government,  it  would  be  prudent  to  ar- 
range even  the  details  in  the  constitution,  which  should 
declare  the  number  to  constitute  the  committee,  the 
manner  of  selecting  its  members,  the  number  of  names 
to  be  presented  by  it  to  the  consideration  of  the  Con- 
gress, and  the  course  to  be  pursued  in  case  no  one  of  its 
nominees  is  chosen  by  the  Congress. 

With  respect  to  the  number  to  constitute  the  com- 
mittee, the  possibility  of  the  selection  of  several  dele- 
gates from  the  same  State  suggests  the  necessity,  as  a 
safeguard  against  the  possible  evil  effects  of  this,  that 
the  committee  be  composed  of  sufficient  numbers  to 
minimize  the  importance  of  an  accident  of  this  kind. 
As  to  the  mode  in  which  each  house  shall  select 
Jts  members  of  the  committee,  it  is  an  interesting 
question  whether  they  ought  to  be  elected  by  ballot  in 
each  house,  appointed  by  the  presiding  officer  of  each 


■''^Iri 


■M 


io8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

house,  or  selected  in  such  manner  in  either  house  as  its 
rules  may  provide.  Experience  in  legislative  bodies 
generally  as  to  the  conduct  of  such  matters  would 
seem  to  point  to  the  first  method  as  preferable;  but 
if  a  discretion  be  given  to  each  house  in  respect  to  the 
matter,  its  own  experience  will  in  the  end  doubtless 
teach  it  the  best  method.  The  prudent  course  would 
seem  to  be  to  permit  each  house  to  choose  its  portion 
of  this  committee  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  its  rules. 

With  regard  to  the  number  of  names  to  be  presented 
by  the  committee  from  which  to  select  the  prime  min- 
ister,  it  may  be  observed  that  time,— an  important  ele- 
ment in  this  matter.—would  often  be  saved,  were  the 
committee  required  to  present  more  than  one  name. 
The  number  has  been  placed  tentatively  at  three  in 
our  proposed  constitution. 

Provision  should  also  be  made  for  the  case  where 
none  of  the  three  named  by  the  committee  receives  a 
majority  of  the  votes  of  both  houses  of  the  Congress. 
A  question  is  here  presented,  whether  the  same  com- 
mittee  should  then  name  a  second  list  of  three  or 
whether  that  committee  ought  to  be  discharged,  and  a 
new  one  selected  representing  a  new  group  of  States 
or  at  least  of  representatives.  The  latter  would  appear 
to  be  the  better  plan,  since  the  objections  to  the  first 
nominees  might  sometimes  be  not  so  much  personal 
to  themselves  as  due  to  the  combination  of  interests 
that  nominated  them.' 

'  See  Appendix,  Conu'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  j. 


h 


EXECUTIVE— MINISTRY  109 

IV 
Who  Eligible  to  Be  a  Minister 

Following  to  its  legitimate  conclusion  the  principle 
adopted  in  the  organization  of  the  international  execu- 
tive  department,— that  it  co-operate  with,  and  be  de- 
pendent upon,  the  legislature, — it  would  seem  clear 
that  the  prime  minister,  as  well  as  the  subordinate 
members  of  the  ministry,  ought  themselves  to  be  mem- 
bers of  one  or  the  other  legislative  chamber. 

To  accept  any  other  rule  would  be  to  adopt,  in  some 
measure  at  least,  the  weaknesses  of  the  Am.-rican  sys- 
tem without  its  compensating  advantages.  The  execu- 
tive officials  should  occupy  seats  in  the  Congress,  sub- 
ject at  any  time  to  interrogation  by  other  members 
of  that  body  upon  the  state  of  international  affairs.* 


~ 

-II 


Him 


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:n 


Selection  of  the  Subordinate  Ministers 

According  to  the  theory  already  outlined,  the  prime 
minister  would  be  the  responsible  agent  of  the  Congress 
for  the  administration  of  the  executive  affairs  of  the 
international  government,  his  responsibility  to  either 
house  being  fixed  by  the  power  to  recall  him  by  reso- 
lution. 

The  question  is  next  presented,  should  the  other 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cl.  i. 


«tt 


Hi 


K 


I 


'•^ 


iio  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ministers  also  be  appointed  and  removable  by  the  legis- 
lative  chambers,  or  by  the  prime  minister  alone? 

Were  the  first  alternative  adopted,  we  would  have 
authority  and  responsibility  divided  between  the  prime 
mmister  and  other  members  of  the  cabinet.  If  the 
premier  is  to  be  held  solely  responsible  for  the  entire 
conduct  of  executive  affairs,  his  should  also  be  the 
sole  authority.  Sound  principles  of  government  die 
tate  that  the  Congress  select  the  premier  alone,  hold- 
mg  him  to  a  strict  accountability  for  the  selection  of 
proper  subordinate  ministers  and  for  their  proper  per- 
formance  of  the  duties  allotted  to  them.* 

VI 

The  Number  of  Ministers 

In  determining  the  number  of  ministers  to  be  in  the 
cabmet,  it  would  be  desirable,  if  it  were  practicable, 
that  each  component  nation  be  represented  therein, 
wh.le,  on  the  other  hand,  no  nation  should  be  per- 
mitted to  have  an  excess  of  representatives  in  the  min- 
istry at  one  time.     Making  due  allowance  for  the  ac- 
cident that  the  delegation  from  a  particular  State  may 
possess  more  than  its  fair  proportion  of  able  men 
peculiarly  fitted  for  the  administration  of  international 
atta.rs,  a  provision  might  be  inserted  that  no  compon- 
ent nation  may  have  more  than  two  representatives 
in  the  ministry  at  one  time. 

'  See  Appendix.  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  d.  t. 


EXECUTIVE-MINISTRY  1 1 1 

But  in  examining  the  suggestion  that  each  nation  be 
represented  in  the  administration  by  at  least  one  min- 
ister,  several  practical  objections  would  at  once  present 
themselves. 

If  the  number  of  component  nations  were  large,  such 
a  provision  might  entail  the  creation  of  a  ministry 
too  unwieldy  for  the  prompt  action  that  would  fre- 
quently  be  necessary.  And  it  would  often  be  difficult 
for  a  prime  minister  to  find  among  delegations  from 
particular  States,  especially  minority  States,  men  who 
would  be  m  sympathy  with  his  views  and  policies. 

In  this  matter  therefore  it  would  seem  necessary 
to  rely  upon  the  discretion  of  the  Congress,  and  to  pro- 
vide  in  the  constitution  that  the  number,  as  weU  as  the 
duties,  of  the  ministers  be  regulated  by  law.' 


i. 

m 

»  !i 


\tl 


VII 
Terms  of  Office  of  Ministers 

In  order  to  insure  the  absolute  and  prompt  respon- 
sibihty  of  the  prime  minister  to  the  legislature,  it  is 
essential  that  the  Congress  possess  the  power  to  recall 
or  remove  him  at  any  time.  And  when  we  remember 
the  two  elements  represented  in  the  two  chambers 
respectively,— the  predominance  of  the  populous  States 
in  the  House  of  Delegates  and  that  of  the  greater  num- 
ber of  States  in  the  Senate,— it  would  seem  necessary 
to  go  further  and  provide  that  he  be  subject  to  recall 
'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  i,  cF.  i. 


nM 


M 


.»») 


112  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

or  removal  at  any  time  by  resolution  of  either  chamber 
m  like  manner,  if  the  prime  minister  is  to  be  held 
responsible,  perhaps  removed,  because  of  the  acts  or 
omissions  of  the  subordinate  ministers,  he  must  be 
given  the  same  right  to  remove  them,  or  any  of  them 
that  IS  given  to  either  house  of  the  Congress  r.spect- 
ing  himself.  '^ 

Furthermore,  since  the  whole  ministry,  the  premier 
included,  are  members  of  the  Congress  they  would  be 
one  and  all  subject  to  recall  from  the  Congress  at  any 
time  by  their  respective  home  governments,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  the  several  nations.  Such  a  re- 
call  would  of  course  terminate  their  offices  as  minis- 
ters, as  they  would  at  cnce  cease  to  be  members  of  the 
Congress. 

Usually  also  a  minister  might  be  counted  upon  to 
save  himself  from  actual  removal  by  a  timely  resigna- 
tion  of  his  office;  and  the  resignation  of  the  prime 
minister  would  be  likely  to  carry  with  it,  ultimately  at 
least,  that  of  his  entire  ministry.* 


VIII 
Compensation  of  Ministers 

The  prime  minister,  as  well  as  the  other  ministers, 
ought  to  receive  not  only  the  compensation  paid  to 
other  members  of  the  Congress,  but  a  further  stipend 
in  recognition  of  the  additional  important  and  re- 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec  i,  cl.  i,  a. 


EXECUTIVE— MINISTRY  1 13 

sponsible  work  they  are  called  upon  to  perform  as 
ministers. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  prescribes 
that  the  compensation  of  the  President  shall  neither 
be  mcreased  nor  diminished  during  the  period  for 
which  he  shall  have  been  elected,-a  provision  neces- 
sary to  secure  the  desired  independence  of  the  execu- 
tive  department  and  its  freedom  from  all  responsibility 
to  the  legislature. 

But  in  our  international  constitution  the  design  is 
just  the  reverse  of  this,-to  secure  a  full  and  complete 
responsibility  of  the  executive  to  the  legislative  depart- 
ment.  Hence  it  would  be  neither  necessary  nor  in  har- 
mony  with  the  general  plan  to  lay  restrictions  upon  the 
Congress  with  regard  to  the  compensation  to  be  paid 
the  ministers.* 

IX 

Distribution  of  Executive  Powers  Among  the 

Ministers 

The  plan  already  indicated  calls  for  the  number  of 
ministers  to  be  determined  by  the  Congress.  But  it  also 
calls  for  a  sole  executive  authority  and  responsibility 
m  a  prime  minister.  Between  these  two  principles  an 
important  question  is  presented,  whether  the  Congress 
or  the  prime  minister  ought  to  be  given  the  power  to 
apportion  the  executive  functions  among  the  minis- 

LCI  S* 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N..  Art.  II.  Sec.  «, 


'^itl 


;f 


%  I 


:■»♦< 


j 


i 


"4  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  principk  of  a  sole  reaponsibility  and  authorih, 
on  the  part  of  the  premier  in  international  adrainistra 
t.on  would  not  be  impaired  by  leaving  to  the  Congress 
<he  apportionment  of  the  executive  duties  amongsf  the 
™n.sters.  smce  his  authority  over  them  is  secured 

pfea^ure  ''"'""  """"  ""^  '"  '"""''  "■="•  « 

And  since  it  is  often  essential  to  the  success  of  leeis- 

..on  that  ,t  also  include  measures  and  instrumental . 

TJu'r  P™''"  '<'™"'«"ri<'".  it  is  appropriate 
that  the  Congress  be  given  the  power  not  only  ,„  fa  the 
number  of  mmisters  but  to  assign  to  particular  mi   s! 

-ri'i^rprfrrm'"""'""' " '" ""''""" '-  "- 

Thus  in  legislation  touching  war  or  commerce,  the 
Congress  would  probably  desire  also  to  create  ;or,! 
fo  OS  m  the  cabmet  for  the  proper  administration  of 

not  the  ^a  n  k"™  ."'  *'  """"  -"'"'«"  "i'l-er  or 
not  there  shall  be  such  ministers.' 

'  S.e  ApKodi.,  ConM'„  u.  N.,  An.  11,  Stc.  ,,  d.  ,. 


j^**-* 


The  Pardoning  Power 

This  power  is  generally  recognized  as  a  preroga- 
tive  of  sovereignty  to  be  exercised  by  the  executive  de- 
partment.  There  can  be  no  question  that,  so  far  as 
offenses  against  the  United  Nations  are  concerned,  the 
power  to  pardon  them,  or  remit  the  punishment  for 
them,  together  with  the  power  to  reprieve  and  com- 
mute  sentence,  should  be  vested  in  the  ministry/ 


If       a 


,■ 


CHAPTER  VII 

POWERS  TO  BE  CONFERRED  ON  THE 
EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT 


-:  i 


II 
The  Treaty-Making  Power 

In  all  governments  the  treaty-making  power  is  justly 
regarded  as  one  of  the  highest  prerogatives  of  sov- 
ereignty,  to  be  exercised  by  the  sovereign  himself, 
or  by  those  officials  constitutionally  authorized  to  ex- 
ercise  it  in  his  stead. 

"  See  Appendix,  Con«'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec. 


3>  ci.  I. 


"5 


M 


i  I 


^ 


II 6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

But  in  many  even  of  the  more  advanced  nations  it  is 
admitted  to  be  more  or  less  an  irresponsible  power,- 
one  that  may  be  exercised  secretly  and  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  legislative  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment.    Indeed,  the  facility  with  which  many  national 
governments  may  enter  into  these  secret  agreements 
and  understandings  with   each   other  has  been   one 
prominent  cause  of  the  mutual  suspicion  and  distrust  so 
prevalent  among  the  nations  of   the   world      It  is 
scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  it  is  one  of  the  indirect 
causes  of  the  great  European  War. 

The  American  Constitution  has  to  a  very  consider- 
able  extent  yarded  against  this  evil  by  requiring  that 
a  1  treaties  of  the  United  States  which  may  be  made  by 
the  President  must  be  ratified  by  two-thirds  of  the 
Senate;  and  while  the  Senate  usually  goes  into  execu- 
tive or  secret  session  for  the  discussion  of  treaties, 
this  IS  n^erely  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  freedom  of 
debate.  The  fact  that  a  treaty  is  being  considered, 
and  the  terms  of  it,  are  not  kept  secret 

Another  valuable  lesson  is  to  be  drawn  from  the 
requirement  of  the  American  Constitution  that  treaties 
shall  only  eake  effect  when  ratified  by  two-thirdlo; 
the  Senate.  When  it  is  remembered  that  this  body 
represents  the  equal  sovereignty  of  the  States,  it  wiH 
be  seen  that  this  constitutional  provision  to  a  consider- 
able extent  places  m  the  hands  of  the  States  them- 
selves the  treaty-making  power  of  the  Union,  the  re- 
quired  two-thirds  majority  of  the  Senate  being  at  least 
sufficient  to  present  an  effective  check  on  any  attemp 


EXECUTIVE  POWERS-TREATIES     117 

to  undermine  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States  through 
the  agency  of  treaties. 

It  would  be  desirable  to  incorporate  into  our  in- 
ternational  compact  a  similar  check  upon  both  of  these 
possible  evils,— secret  diplomacy  and  treaties  which 
might  affect  the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations.    Per- 
haps all  that  would  be  needful  for  this  purpose  would 
be  to  require  that  all  treaties  made  by  the  ministry 
should  receive  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the  votes  in 
the  international  Senate.     But  to  guard  against  the 
possibility  of  a  treaty  which  might  secure  the  assent 
of  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  and  yet  meet  with  the  dis- 
approval  of  most  of  the  Great  Powers,  it  would  per- 
haps  be  safer  to  add  the  requirement  that  treaties,  to 
be  valid,  shall  receive  the  assent  of  two-thirds  of  the 
votes  in  the  House  of  Delegates  also. 

There  is  still  another  limitation  that  ought  to  be 
placed  upon  the  treaty-making  power,-a  limitation 
that  does  not  clearly  appear  in  the  American  Consti- 
tution,  a  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  which  has  already 
caused  some  trouble  in  the  United  States,— that  is,  a 
provision  limiting  the  treaty-making  power  to  those 
matters,  control  of  which  has  been  surrendered  to  the 
federal  government. 

For  example,  after  limiting  the  powers  of  the  in- 
ternational  congress  to  the  regulation  of  international 
commerce  only,  and  excluding  it  from  the  domain  of 
intra-national  or  domestic  commerce,  and  from  the 
right  to  regulate  immigration,  it  would  be  highly  un- 
derirable  to  permit  the  ministry  and  the  Congress  by 


B 


■♦»? 


u8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

treaty  to  regulate  these  matters  that  have  been  so 
carefully  excluded  from  the  control  of  the  Congress  as 
a  legislative  body. 

The  treaty-making  power  of  the  United  Nations 
therefore  ought  to  be  confined  to  those  subjects,  the 
control  of  which  has  been  conferred  on  the  Congress 
or  other  departments  of  the  international  government, 
excluding  from  its  operation  those  subjects  reserved  to 
the  exclusive  control  of  the  several  component  nations. 
I  his  necessarily  supposes  that  as  to  the  latter  sub- 
jccts,  the  power  to  make  treaties  is  reserved  to  the 
component  nations,  respectively,  in  all  cases  wherein 
for  the  proper  regulation  of  the  matter  treaties  are 
necessary  either  between  the  component  nations  them- 
selves  or  between  them  and  nations  not  members  of 
the  union.' 

Ill 

Appointment  and  Removal  of  Officers 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides  that 
the  President  himself  shall  be  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the 
militia  of  the  States  when  in  the  actual  service  of  the 
Unued  States;  and  that  he  shall  appoint  governmental 
officials  whose  appointments  are  not  otherwise  pro- 
Sett       '  '  '°  '^'  '"^^''^  '""^  '°"''"'  ""^'^^ 

In  our  plan  of  international  government,  all  such 

'  See  .'Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3,  cl.  a. 


'  ii#* 


APPOINTMENTS-REMOVALS  1 19 
offices,  military,  and  civil,  would  be  filled  through  ap- 
pointments  by  the  ministry.  But  it  would  seem  un- 
necessary  to  insert  the  check  upon  such  appointments 
that  they  be  ratified  by  the  Senate  or  the  Congress, 
smce  the  runisters  would  not,  like  the  President  of  the 
United  Stites,  be  independent  of  the  Congress,  but  on 
the  contrary  directly  responsible  to  it,  through  the 
power  of  recall  which  either  house  may  at  any  time 
exercise. 

But  while  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has 
thus  given  the  President  the  power  of  appointment, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  it 
has  failed  to  provide  expressly  for  the  power  of  re- 
moval from  office,  otherwise  than  by  impeachment. 

For  many  years  the  question  was  debated,  whether 
this  power  of  removal  was  vested  in  the  President 
alone  or  whether,  like  the  power  of  appointment,  it 
could  be  exercised  by  the  President  only  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.     This  contro- 
versy  has  now  been  settled,— temporarily  at  least,— 
by  the  Act  of  Congress  of  1887,  repealing  the  act 
known  as  the  "  Tenure  of  Office  Act "  of  1867,  which 
had  in  effect  denied  to  the  President  the  power  to  re- 
move  public  officers  without  the  Senate's  consent.    The 
repealing  act  of  1887  seems  practically  to  concede  that 
the  power  of  removal  in  such  cases  rests  in  the  Presi- 
dent alone. 

In  the  case  of  our  international  constitution  the 
embarrassment  is  to  a  large  extent  removed  by  che  fact 
that  It  IS  not  proposed  to  submit  executive  appointments 


i 


;i 


h: 


i 

i 


I 


Hi' 


.*»• 


1 1' 


I  ■ 
I 


li  '  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  the  international  Senate  for  ratification,  and  hence 
there  would  be  no  reason  to  suppose  that  removals 
must  be  submitted  to  their  approval.  But  it  would  be 
more  prudent  to  include  specifically  the  power  of  re- 
moval with  that  of  appointment  as  vested  in  the  min- 
istry  alone. 

Appointees  may  be  sufficiently  protected  against 
wholesale  and  arbitrary  removals,  as  upon  a  change  of 
ministry,  by  laws  of  the  Congress  regulating  the  civil 
service. 

There  ought,  however,  to  be  an  exception  to  this 
ministerial  power  of  appointmer  'n  the  case  of  clerks 
of  court  and  other  inferior  court  officers  who  may  more 
htly  be  appointed  by  the  courts  themselves.' 

IV 

Recognition  of  Ambassadors  and  Public 
Ministers 

The  power  to  receive  ambassadors  or  other  public 
ministers  from  foreign  States  is  one  of  the  ordinary 
executive  functions.  It  embraces  also  the  right  to 
refuse  to  receive  such  ambassadors  or  ministers,  either 
because  they  arc  personae  non  gralae,  because  they  rep- 
resent  a  government  not  recognized  by  the  executive 
as  a  de  facto  government,  or  for  other  reasons  that 
may  be  deemed  sufficient.  It  also  embraces  the  right 
to  dismiss  a  minister  or  demand  his  recall  for  satis- 

'  See  Appendix,  Conifn  U.  N..  Art.  II,  Sec.  j,  cl.  i. 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAWS  121 

factory  reasons.  All  these  are  important  functions, 
relating  as  they  do  to  the  governmental  intercourse 
with  foreign  nations. 

In  the  United  States  all  that  has  been  found  neces- 
sary  in  order  to  clothe  the  President  with  these  powers 
is  the  simple  constitutional  provision  that  "he  shall 
receive  ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers." 

In  our  international  constitution  a  similar  provision 
would  doubtless  suffice.' 


^    -s 


The  Execution  of  the  Laws  of  the  Union 

This  is  so  obviously  the  chief  function  of  the  execu- 
tive department  of  every  government  that  it  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  do  more  than  mention  it  in  the  enumera- 
tion  of  the  executive  powers  to  be  conferred  on  the 
international  government. 

Every  declaration  of  war  by  the  Congress,  every  law 
regulating  international  commerce,  every  treaty  of  the 
United  Nations,  and  every  decision  of  an  international 
court  not  susceptible  of  enforcement  by  the  court's 
own  officials  must  be  executed  and  enforced  by  the  ex- 
ecutive arm  of  the  government;  and  every  criminal 
prosecution  must  be  conducted  by  it.* 

^  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  j,  cl.  4. 
'See  Appendix,  Con»t'n  U.  N.,  Art.  II.  Sec.  j,  cl.  5. 


U    I 


'H 


<*ii 


122  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

VI 
Official  Commissions 

The  commissioning  of  officers  duly  appointed  is  an 
executive  function  which  should  of  course  pertain  to 
the  mternational  ministry  so  far  as  relates  to  officials 
appointed  by  them.  And  since  all  executive  officers 
are  to  be  thus  appointed,  the  power  ought  to  be  vested 
in  them  to  commission  such  officials. 

But  it  is  otherwise,  under  the  proposed  plan,  with 
respect  to  the  legislative  and  the  judicial  officers  of 
the  United  Nations,  who  arc  to  be  appointed  by  the 
component  nations  themselves,  and  who  therefore 
ought  to  be  commissioned  as  the  laws  of  the  several 
nations  shall  provide.* 

VII 

Interpellations  and  Interrogations 

The  government  of  the  United  States,  by  reason  of 
Its  constitutional  structure  and  the  total  separation  of 
the  legislative  and  executive  departments,  knows  noth- 
mg  of  the  parliamentary  interpellations  and  interroga- 
tories so  often  addressed  to  the  ministerial  benches  in 
European  parliaments.     Indeed,  the  members  of  the 
American  cabinet,  that  is,  the  heads  of  departments 
appointed  by  the  President  and,  under  his  control,  in 
charge  of  the  various  executive  portfolios,  are  not  even 
'  See  Appendix,  Con»en  U.  N.,  Art.  II,  Sec.  3.  cl.  6. 


PARLIAMENTARY  INTERPELLATIONS    123 

given  seats  in  the  Congress ;  so  that  communication  be- 
tween these  high  executive  officials  and  the  lawmakers 
is  confined  to  formal  reports  or  to  official  testimony 
before  Congressional  committees. 

The  Constitution,  it  is  true,  seeks  to  supply  the  place 
of  these  interrogatories  by  providing  that  the  Presi- 
dent 

"  Shall  from  time  to  time  give  to  the  Congress 
information  of  the  state  of  the  Union,  and  recom- 
mend to  their  consideration  such  measures  as  he 
shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient." 


Accordingly,  the  President  sends  messages  from 
time  to  time  to  the  Congress,  or  appears  before  them 
in  person  and  addresses  them,  upon  these  subjects. 
But  this  is  a  formal  function,  closely  analogous  to  "  the 
address  from  the  throne  "  upon  the  opening  of  the 
British  parliament,  and  is  far  removed,  in  nature  and 
effect,  from  the  re  ugh  arJ  ready  interrogatories  ad- 
dressed to  ministers  in  F^uropean  parliaments. 

Under  our  proposed  plan  of  international  govern- 
ment, the  analogy  would  be  much  closer  to  the  Eu- 
ropean than  to  the  American  system.  The  ministers 
would  themselves  be  members  of  the  Congress,  re- 
sponsible to,  and  subject  to  recall  by,  either  chamber, 
so  that  there  is  no  need  of  any  express  constitutional 
provision  for  such  interpellations,  which  would  follow 
automatically  from  the  structure  of  the  ministry. 


■%: 


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a 


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ill  '5!    I'l 

ill  II I     |( 


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1'    f 
is'  I, 


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124  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

VIII 

The  Summoning  and  Proroguing  of  the  Congress 

In  the  United  States,  the  Constitution  requires  that 
the  Congress  shall  assemble  at  least  once  a  year,  though 
^s  session  does  not  usually  last  throughout  the  year 
1  ne  i'resident  is  given  the  power 

''on    extraordinary   occasions   to   convene   both 
houses  or  either  of  them,  and  in  case  ofdisagree 
ment  between  them  with  respect  to  the  time  of 

2?as tTj.^^   '''"^ " '-'  ^'-  ^' 

It  has  been  assumed  that  the  international  congress 
would  be  m  perpetual  session,  with  such  reasonable  re- 
cesses  as  the  two  houses  might  agree  upon.>  This 
clause  dispenses  with  the  need  of  any  special  provision 
either  for  summoning  or  proroguing  the  Congress. 
•  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  I.  Sec  4,  cl.  a. 


\ 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  JUDICIARY 
DEPARTMENT 


Appointment  of  International  Judiciary 

Assuming  the  necessity  for  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national judiciary  department,  the  first  point  to  engage 
our  attention  would  be  the  proper  method  of  appoint- 
ing the  judges. 

The  American  Constitution  provides  that  the  federal 
judges  of  the  United  States  shall  be  appointed  by  the 
President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.  This  involves  the  consequence  that  the  fed- 
eral judges  are  in  all  respects  officers  of  the  United 
States,  not  of  the  States,  severally,  wherein  they  per- 
form their  functions;  and  gives  rise  to  that  esprit  de 
corps  amongst  them  which  is  likely  to  develop  where 
men  are  conscious  that  they  are  parts  of  one  great 
organization. 

The  result  has  been  that  the  federal  courts  from  the 
beginning  have  shown  perhaps  too  great  a  tendency 
to  emphasize  and  enhance  the  powers  granted  to  the 
United  States  at  the  expense  of  the  reserved  powers  of 

I2S 


mil  ?■ 


Hi 


h 


126  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  States.    Nor  are  the  judges  to  be  blamed  for  this 
tendency.     It  arises  from  a  trait  honorable  to  human 
nature,  demanding  loyal  and  faithful  guardianship  of 
the  interests  committed  to  his  keeping  by  the  agent's 
employer  or  by  the  organization  of  which  he  forms 
a  part.    It  .s  then  not  to  be  wondered  at  that,  in  cases 
of  honest  doubt  whether  a  certain  power  has  been 
granted  to  the  United  States  or  has  been  reserved  to 
the  States,  the  tendency  has  been  on  the  whole  to  re- 
solve  the  doubt  in  favor  of  the  powers  of  the  United 
estates.    Thus,  step  by  step,  the  authority  of  the  fed- 
eral  government  has  been  gradually  extended,  while 
r^hts  once  supposed  by  all  to  have  been  reserved  to 
the  States  have  been  correspondingly  reduced. 

From  th.s  experience  in  the  United  States  it  seems 
possible  to  affirm  the  general  proposition  that  a  ju- 
dicary  appointed  by  federal  authority  will  demon- 
strate a  tendency  to  enlarge  the  federal  powers  by 
judicial  construction  at  the  expense  of  rights  reserved 
Dy  the  component  States. 

In  the  o^ga„i^ation  of  our  proposed  union  of  nation, 
t>lT"      ""t  "  ^"^'"^  ™8l.t  .0  be  minimised 

result  would  be  a  senous  obstacle  to  its  formation. 
1  he  cause  producing  this  tendency,  namely,  the  ao- 

r^red"' °i '!;'  '""r  "^  '«<'"■  -"-ority  ;:i    f 
reversed  and  the  appointments  were  made  by  the  com- 

tendency,  conshtutmg  ,„  additional  safeguard  against 
federal  usurpation  of  power. 


'?"^H, 


JUDICIARY-ORGANIZATION  127 

It  is  believed  therefore  that  prudence  would  dictate 
that  the  international  judges  of  every  degree  be  ap- 
pointed  by  the  several  component  nations,  acting 
through  their  executives,  in  accordance  with  a  general 
plan  that  will  develop  as  the  discussion  proceeds. 

Practical  considerations  also,  no  less  than  the  theo- 
retical, demand  this  method  of  appointment,  for  how- 
ever  familiar  a  prime  minister  might  be  with  the  ma- 
terial of  his  own  country  suitable  for  international 
judgeships,  it  could  hardly  be  supposed  that  he,  even 
with  the  aid  and  advice  of  his  council  of  ministers, 
would  be  in  a  position  to  make  the  most  suitable  ap- 
pointments from  distant  parts  of  the  world,  or  to  learn 
of  the  comparative  fitness  of  men  of  other  nationalities 
for  such  important  posts.     Certainly  these  appoint- 
ments might  most  properly  be  made  by  the  executives 
of  the  States  wherein  the  coi  rts  are  to  sit  and  perform 
their  functions,  and  whose  agents  they  are,  in  accord- 
ance with  regulations  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the 
several  component  States. 

Peculiarly  would  this  principle  apply  in  the  appoint- 
ment  of  the  judges  of  the  international  Supreme  Court, 
upon  whom  would  rest  some  of  the  most  important 
duties  and  responsibilities  involved  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  international  government.  It  is  they 
who  must  decide  the  great  controversies  that  would 
arise  from  time  to  time  between  the  nations,  who  must 
finally  pass  upon  the  validity  of  the  various  exercises 
of  legislative  power  by  the  international  congress,  and 
who  must  adjudicate  cases  wherein  the  component  na- 


YfM 


«ir 


128  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

lt"n?^"  !^,^^^"^'•^•«^d  powers  alleged  to  be  in  vio- 
ation  of  the  international  constitution.  laws,  and 
reat.es.  Surely  here  if  anywhere,  the  component  na 
tions  have  the  most  direct  concern  in  the  appointment 
of  the  strongest  and  most  learned  constitutional  law- 
yers  and  statesmen  to  be  found  within  their  dominions/ 

II 

Independence  of  the  Judiciary 

re^^Tt- '"  ^^^"'■^^"^^  ^'^h  the  conclusion  just 
rea  h  d,  the  mternat.onal  judges  ought  to  be  appointed 
by  the  executives  of  the  component  nations,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  they  ought  to  be  paid  by  them  Lo. 
On  the  contrary,  .t  would  seem  eminently  proper  that 
once  appointed  by  the  respective  States,  they  sLuld  be 
paid  an  equal  compensation  out  of  the  federal  treasury 
Otherw.se  States  paying  liberal  salaries  to  their  repre^ 
sentatives  on  the  bench,  and  thus  securing  their  best 
men.  might  sometimes  find  their  rights  determined  by 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.   Art   III   «...  ,     i 
»«™  proper  that  the  intern..io;.alo",ct  should  confer""""  "^ 
executive  of  each  component  State,  actW  alone   ,h,  ?  I    •"'"'"  '^' 
point  the  international  judge,  since  Z*  „f  Ik  ,/"'^  '°  ""■ 

the  United  States)  do  not  d/I^k  •         '  ""'""'  <'"  """'P'^. 

Judge,  or  ..basiadorr  rZ  ex^ecX^r:  °'  ''l''  '''^"  "^"■""^' 
by  their  Senates  or  legislative  .^I.Tki  t      '  '"*'"'"'  "'ification 

plan  calls  for  the  apS^ne  of  t^.  '^  """.''''•'«  ""^  P^P-'d 
ecutive  of  each  component  Stl  V  f  '"•""»'"'"='  J^^K"  by  the  ex- 
.hall  be  made  Talrd  „«  witl ',  V™"',"-*''"  '"^  "PPointmen. 
Kribed  by  the  law.  S  each  S-^-    Tl  "«"'«'»"»  "  -"ay  be  pre- 

or  .egis.i;ive  b;;:  ij  rtr:sj;rsf  ^'S"  t '' '' '- 


■'^f^% 


JUDICIARY— INFERIOR  COURTS      129 

the  judicial  representatives  of  other  nations  more  nig- 
gardly in  their  allowances,  who  would  be  of  inferior 
ability,  learning,  or  character. 

There  ought  also  to  be  a  prohibition  upon  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  compensation  of  any  judge  during  his  term 
of  office.  This  is  an  obvious  and  necessary  check  upon 
the  undue  influence  that  might  otherwise  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  judiciary  by  the  legislative  department. 

As  a  further  means  of  securing  the  independence  of 
the  judiciary,  our  constitution  ought  to  contain  the  pro- 
vision that  they  shall  hold  office  during  good  behavior, 
subject  to  removal  only  by  the  action  of  the  Congress, 
for  bribery  or  other  misfeasance.* 


Ill 

Inferior  International  Tribunals 

In  dealing  with  the  powers  to  be  conferred  on  the 
international  congress,  and  more  particularly  with  the 
grant  to  the  Congress  of  the  power  "  to  constitute  in- 
ternational courts  inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court,"  the 
conclusion  was  reached  that  this  power  ought  to  be 
granted.  But  in  the  same  connection  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  Congress  might  not  need  to  exercise  it, 
since  possibly  the  courts  of  the  several  nations  might  be 
deemed  adequate  to  determine  all  the  controversies 
likely  to  arise  in  inferior  tribunals  under  the  constitu- 
tion,  laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United  Nations. 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art  III,  Sec.  a,  cL  i. 


ii'"i}f;;.'l 


I 


Il'll 


Is  « 


...J- 

is-  ?! 


I.wl 


Hf 


130  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

gress.'  *^^  discretion  of  the  Con- 

IV 
The  International  Supreme  Court 

court.  ""  ""'  --epresentative  upon  that 


Equality  of  National  Representation  Up 
the  Court 


on 


•Sp.  A„     J.    ^  6      "»  justice  and  reason 

See  Appendu,  Consfn  U.  N,  Art.  Ill,  Sees.  ,,  ,. 


SUPREME  COURT— EQUALITY  131 
only,  in  which  respects  the  component  nations  are 
equal;  that  the  custom  of  nations  in  arbitration  pro- 
ceedings  has  been  to  submit  their  disputes  to  tribunals 
consisting  of  an  equal  number  of  representatives  of 
the  contending  nations  (regardless  of  their  respective 
influence  and  populations),  with  an  impartial  umpire; 
that  the  judges  of  the  court  would  not  be  partisans 
chosen  for  the  purpose  of  advocating  and  establishing 
certain  claims,  but  impartial  judges,  independent  of 
outside  influence,  and  sworn  to  hold  the  scales  of  jus- 
tice evenly  balanced  between  the  federal  government 
and  the  component  nations,  and  between  the  litigants 
before  it,  whether  nations  or  individuals;  that  in  every 
contest  between  two  of  the  nations  or  between  the 
federal  government  and  a  nation  or  its  citizens,  each  of 
the  nations,  though  not  an  actua!  party  to  the  litiga- 
tion, would  be  deeply  interested  in  the  precedents  set 
by  the  decision;  and  that  in  cases  involving  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  international  constitution,  laws,  and 
treaties,  or  the  constitutionality  of  laws  or  treaties  of 
the  comp-^nent  nations,  every  nation  would  have  an 
interest  in  the  decision  almost  equal  to  that  of  the  liti- 
gants themselves;— when  all  these  points  are  consid- 
ers!,  it  would  seem  eminently  proper  to  adopt  the  prin- 
ciple  that  each  component  nation  be  equally  represented 
upon  the  Supreme  Court. 

To  the  objection  that  a  representation  of  one  judge 
from  euch  nation  would  make  the  court  too  large  and 
unwieldy,  it  may  be  replied,  that  with  the  addition  of 
each  new  nation  to  the  union,  the  work  of  the  court 


'!*■ 


!   f 


Mi 
■tfS 


iJ 


'p^ 


«tt 


132  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

would  be  increased  to  an  amount  that  would  surely 
demand  the  labors  of  one  additional  judge,  and  that 
even  should  every  nation  in  the  world  join  the  union 
there  would  be  ample  work  for  the  forty  or  fortv-five 
judges  of  the  court  to  perform,  divided  into  .cio.s 
as  they  would  be  according  to  the  plan  presently  ;o  be 
suggested. 

The  real  danger  would  be  not  that  orr  i  ^u-crr-,.. 
tive  on  the  court  from  each  component  : . 
make  the  court  too  large,  but  that  the  r  ■.=.•  '^  ,,-  . 
ponent  States  might  not  be  great  enou^K  t..  e  .,.  -, 
court  composed  of  only  one  such  representaavc  m  ,'J. 
nation  properly  to  perform  its  functions. 

The  essential  principle  is  that  all  the  States  con- 
cerned be  equally  represented  upon  the  court 
Whether  this  be  ?  complished  through  the  medium  of 
one  or  two  or  more  representatives  of  each  nation  is 
a  detail  depending  upon  the  number  of  the  component 
nations,  and  ought  to  be  left  within  the  discretion  of 
the  Congress.^ 

2.   Division  of  the  Court  into  Sections 

The  Supreme  Court  would  be  called  upon  to  decide 
three  classes  of  cases  enumerated,  in  the  order  of 
their  dignity,  as  follows:  (i)  disputes  between  nations; 
(2)  civil  cases  involving  the  interpretation  of  the  in- 
ternational  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties,  ^he  constitu- 
tionahty  of  the  laws  or  treaties  of  the  United  Nations, 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  3.  cl.  i. 


Il/rht 


SUPREME  COURT— SECTIONS  133 
or  the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  the  laws  and 
treaties  of  the  component  nations;  and  (3)  criminal 
cases  involving  similar  questions. 

It  would  seem  proper,  therefore,  to  divide  the  court, 
as  nearly  as  may  be,  into  three  equal  sections;— the 
first  section  to  try  cases  of  the  first  order,  and  the 
second  and  third  to  try  cases  arising  under  the  second 
and  third  of  the  above  heads,  respectively.  The  judges 
first  to  compose  the  several  sections  might  be  deter- 
mined at  the  initial  meeting  of  the  court  by  the  draw- 
ing of  lots. 

A  second  drawing  of  lots  might  determine  the  rela- 
tive rank  each  judge  would  occupy  in  his  sec  lion,  the 
first  in  position  being  the  presiding  judge  of  his  section, 
with  the  next  in  rank  as  his  successor,  the  presiding 
judge  in  each  section  to  be  promoted  to  the  last  place 
in  the  section  immediately  above,  in  case  of  a  vacancy 
in  that  section;  and  upon  evjry  vacancy,  each  judge 
holding  rank  below  the  vacant  position  to  advance  on. 
degree.  The  presiding  judge  of  the  first  section  would 
be  the  chief  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

Upon  the  occurrence  of  a  vacancy  in  the  representa- 
-  on  of  any  component  nation,  the  new  appointee  of 
rnat  nation  would  begin  at  the  lowest  rank  in  the  third 
section. 

To  illustrate :  If  the  chief  justice  die,  the  judge  in  the 
first  section  who  is  second  in  rank  would  at  once  be- 
come chief  justice;  the  third  in  position  would  become 
second;  and  so  on  until  the  last  position  in  that  section 
IS  reached,  which  would  thus  be  left  vacant.     This 


i 


f'p. 


^4 


411 


1: 


m 


r  I'  , . 


4 


IS' 


134  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

vacancy  would  be  filled  by  the  promotion  of  the  pre. 
s.d.ng  judge  of  the  second  section.     Thereupon  the 
second  judge  of  the  second  section  would  become  the 
presiding  judge  of  that  section,  the  third  in  position 
would  become  second,  and  so  on  until  the  last  position 
of  that  section  is  reached,  which  would  be  vacant 
This  vacancy  would  be  filled  by  the  promotion  thereto 
of  the  presiding  judge  of  the  third  section,  whose  posi- 
.on  in  turn  would  be  taken  by  the  second  judge  of  the 
hu-d  section,  and  so  on  until,  each  of  the  remaining 
udges  moving  up  one  degree,  the  last  position  of  the 
hird  section  is  left  vacant.     This  would  be  filled  by 
the  new  appointee  of  the  State,  the  death  of  whose 
former  representative    (the  former  chief  justice    we 
have  supposed)  inaugurated  the  series  of  vacancies 
Jhus  no  nation  would  be  preferred  over  another, 
and  the  representatives  of  each  would  have  an  equal 
chance  to  interpret  the  international  constitution,  laws 
and  treaties,  and  to  decide  cases  in  the  various  forms  in 
which  they  may  arise  in  the  several  sections.     Exp  " 

of'the  llT\^^rr'  "°"'^  ^^  ^'^^  -'^  -"-res 
of  the  official  rank  of  the  representatives  of  the  several 
nations. 


h 


3-    Appeals  from  the  Sections  to  the  Supreme  Couri 

as  a  fFhole 

There  would  arise  two  classes  of  cases  whecein  the 
final  decision  of  the  questions  involved  ought  not  to  be 
See  Appfndi..  Cont.'n  t?.  N..  Ar..  III.  Sec.  j.  d,  a.  4,  ,. 


Jr  ♦^». 


SUPREME  COURT-SECTIONS  135 
left  to  the  particular  sections,  but  should  be  determined 
by  the  court  as  a  whole,  all  the  sections  sitting  to- 
gcther,  in  order  to  avoid  a  confusion  that  would  other- 
tvise  result. 

The  first  case  is  that  of  uncertainty  whether  the  par- 
ticular cause  falls  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  section 
to  which  it  has  been  brought  by  the  parties  appealing. 
If  the  poini  be  raised  before  the  section  that  the  case 
ought  to  go  to  another  section,  either  party  dissatisfied 
with  the  decision  upon  this  preliminary  question  ought 
to  be  allowed  to  appeal  to  the  court  as  a  whole  to  de- 
tcrmine  the  proper  section  in  which  to  try  the  case. 

The  second  instance  is  where  the  several  sections, 
in  adjudicating?  the  cases  of  different  sorts  brought  be- 
fore  them,  respectively,  have  rendered  conflicting  de- 
cisions interpreting  the  same  provisions  of  the  inter- 
national  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties,  or  passing  upon 
the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  the  laws  or  treaties 
of  the  United  Nations  or  the  component  States.  Great 
confusion  would  result,  if  no  means  of  ultimately  recon- 
ciling these  conflicting  decisions  were  provided.* 
•  Sec  Appeodu,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art  III,  Sec.  j,  cl.  3. 


hV 


■,iM^ 


CHAPTER  IX 

JURISDICTION  OF  THE   INTERNATIONAL 

COURTS 


1  f 


\ 


Scope  of  the  International  Judicial  Power 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  ^  out  that  it  is  as  es- 
sential to  grant  judicial,  as  legislative  and  executive, 
powers  to  the  international  government,  or  to  remind 
the  reader  how  important  is  the  careful  selection  of 
those  powers,  so  that  the  federal  government,  while  on 
the  one  hand  clothed  with  all  the  authority  needful  to 
the  successful  performance  of  irs  functions,  shall  not 
on  the  other  be  in  a  position  to  invade  the  proper  pro- 
vmce  of  the  several  component  nations. 

We  shall  begin  the  study  of  the  jurisdiction  of  tf-c 
mternational  courts  with  a  brief  examination  of  the 
subjects  to  which  it  would  seem  that  the  judicial  power 
of  the  United  Nations  ought  to  be  extended. 

/.    Inltrpntalion  of  the  Consiituiion,  Lazi.,  ,..„,/ 

Trcaiies 

No  argument  will  he  needed  to  convince  the  thouj^hf. 
ful  reader  that  it  i.  essentia!  to  place  in  judicial  han.ls 


l^  "&.i 


JUDICIAL  POWER  137 

the  power  of  authoritative  interpretation  of  the  inter- 
national constitution,  laws,  and  treaties,  whenever  such 
interpretation  becomes  necessary  to  the  decision  of  a 
question  suitable  for  judicial  cognizance.  The  rights 
of  htigants,  both  civil  and  criminal,  would  often  turn 
upon  the  proper  construction  of  these  instruments. 

To  leave  them  entirely  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts  of  the  component  nations  would  be  to  invite 
confusion  and  variety  of  interpretation.  The  interna- 
tional constitution  or  an  act  of  the  Congress  or  a  treaty 
of  the  United  Nations  might  then  mean  one  thing  in  one 
State  and  a  very  different  thing  in  another,  with  no 
power  in  any  single  court  or  system  of  courts  to 
straighten  out  the  tangle. 

Agam,  if  the  proposed  international  constitution  is 
to  protect  the  citizens  of  one  component  nation  against 
the  improper  acts  of  another  State  wherein  such  citi- 
zens  may  be,  as  is  later  suggested,  the  best  and  safest 
mode  of  protection  would  be  to  giv  such  citizens  the 
opportunity  to  have  their  rights  determined  by  some 
tribunal  more  likely  to  be  impartial  than  the'  courts 
of  the  nation  complained  of. 

For  these  and  other  reasons  not  needful  to  mention, 
It  would  be  imperative  that  our  international  compact 
provide  th.it  the  judicial  ponci  of  the  proposed  govern- 
ment shall  extend  to  controversies  arising  under  the 
constitution,  laws,  and  treaties  of  the  L  nited  Nations.' 
'See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  An    III,  r.ec,  4,  cl.  i. 


Iff 


■ 


138  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

2.    Power  to  Adjudge  Laws  and  Treaties 
Unconstitutional  and  Void 

In  the  adjudication  of  the  legal  and  constitutional 
rights  of  litigants,  it  would  often  be  necessary  for  the 
court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  case  to  compare  a 
law  of  the  Congress  or  a  federal  treaty  with  the  consti- 
tution,  or  a  law  or  treaty  of  a  component  nation  with 
the  international  constitution  or  the  laws  or  treaties 
made  in  purs'iance  thereof  touching  the  same  subject, 
and  it  might  sometimes  happen  that  such  examination 
would  reveal  the  particular  law  or  treaty  to  be  in 
contravention  of  a  higher  law. 

In  such  an  event,  what  should  be  the  measure  of  the 
court's  duty?  Is  it  to  accept  the  particular  law  or 
treaty  as  furnishing  the  rule  for  its  guidance,  on  the 
presumption  that  the  legislature  or  treaty-makinfr 
power  has  investigated  the  constitutionality  of  its  work, 
and  act  upon  the  theory  that  they,  and  not  the  court, 
are  the  proper  arbiters  of  that  question?  This  is  the 
rule  generally  adopted  in  European  countries,  even 
those  possessing  written  constitutions. 

Or  ought  the  principle  to  be,  as  in  the  United  States, 
that  the  judiciary,  as  a  co-ordinute  department  of  the 
government,  is  under  the  duty  to  determine  the  proper 
hw  to  be  applied  to  the  case  before  it;  and  that  as 
between  the  constitution,  which  is  the  higher  law,  and 
the  inconsistent  law  or  treaty  of  the  United  Nations, 
which  is  the  subordinate— or  as  between  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  Nations  or  the  laws  or  treaties  ot 


rv 


JUDICIAL  POWER  139 

the  union  made  in  pursuance  thereof  and  the  inconsist- 
ent  law  or  treaty  of  a  component  nation, — it  must  en- 
force the  higher,  and  refuse  to  recognize  the  subordi- 
nate as  a  valid  act? 

This  principle,  as  it  is  theoretically  applied  in  the 
United  States,  forbids  the  court  to  take  this  radical 
step  if  there  is  any  doubt  of  the  constitutionality  of  the 
act,  upon  the  theory  that  the  legislature  is  a  co-ordinate 
branch  of  the  government,  and  must  be  supposed  to 
have  at  heart  the  preservation  of  the  constitution,  and 
that  it  would  never  have  passed  the  law  had  it  not  been 
satisfied  of  its  constitutionality.  But  this  theoretical 
attitude  has  in  large  measure  been  neutralized  by  the 
practical  fact  that  in  many  of  its  most  important 
decisions  upon  constitutional  questions  the  Supreme 
Court  has  been  nearly  equally  divided,  and  has  de- 
clared laws  unconstitutional  by  bare  majorities  of 
the  court.  If  there  were  ever  to  be  a  doubt  as  to 
the  unconstitutionality  of  a  law,  this  would  seem 
to  be  the  case  where  it  is  most  certainly  proved  to 
exist. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  give  the  argu- 
ments for  or  against  the  European  and  American 
theories,  respectively,  on  this  poiot.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  it  is  believed  on  the  whole  that  the  peculiar  na- 
ture of  our  proposed  federation  would  make  accept- 
able to  the  nations  another  check  upon  the  powers  oi 
tiic  international  congress  and  treaty-making  power, 
such  as  would  be  contained  in  the  judicial  power  to 
adjudge  their  acts  unconstitutional  and  void.     .And  if. 


i.,f 


r^jii 


!"  . 


a 


:r 


♦♦i 


140  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

by  granting  this  judicial  power,  each  nation  may  secure 
itself  and  its  citizens  against  similar  unconstitutional 
laws  and  treaties  made  by  its  sister  nations,  it  ought 
to  be  willing,  in  its  turn,  to  permit  its  own  laws  and 
treaties  to  be  examined  in  the  same  way  and  with  the 
same  authority. 

Hence,  in  our  proposed  constitution,  it  is  assumed 
that  the  nations  would  consent  to  grant  to  the  judiciary 
department  the  power,  in  cases  where  such  a  course 
would  be  necessary,  to  declare  unconstitutional  and 
void  any  law  or  treaty  of  the  United  Nations  which 
clearly  violates  any  provision  of  the  international 
constitution,  or  any  law  or  treaty  of  a  component 
nation  in  contravention  of  the  constitution  or  of 
the  constitutional  laws  or  treaties  of  the  United 
Nations. 

But,  profiting  by  the  experience  in  the  United  States 
above  referred  to,  a  proviso  should  be  added  that 
when  such  a  case  is  before  the  Supreme  Court,  it  shall 
not  pronounce  any  law  or  treaty  unconstitutional  and 
void  unless  three-fourths  of  the  judges  agree  to  it. 
The  majority  of  three-fourths  is  selected,  because  it  is 
that  majority  of  the  two  houses  of  the  Congress  that 
would  be  necessary  in  order  to  change  the  constitution, 
or  override  the  court's  decision.  It  should  take  as 
large  a  majority  of  the  court  to  override  the  decision 
by  the  Congress  that  its  action  is  constitutional,  as  it 
would  of  the  Congress  to  override  the  decision  of  the 
court  and  amend  the  constitution.  In  the  one  case 
the  component  nations  are  acting  through  the  judicial, 


% 


JUDICIAL  POWER  141 

in  the  other  through  the  legislative,  organ  of  the  in- 
ternational body.' 


'4.  I. 

,  f 


\i 


5.    Check  Upon  the  Judicial  Power  to  Declare  Laws 
Unconstitutional 

As  the  principle  is  applied  in  the  United  States,  no 
check  is  found  upon  the  power  of  the  Supreme  Court 
to  declare  a  law  unconstitutional  and  void  save  in  the 
power  to  amend  the  Constitution,  and  thus  override, 
as  it  were,  the  court's  decision.  Indeed,  the  constitu- 
tional history  of  the  United  States,  reveals  at  least  one 
case  wherein  this  very  consequence  followed.  In  the 
great  case  of  Chisholm  v.  Georgia  the  Supreme  Court 
decided  that  under  the  Constitution  a  private  citizen 
of  one  State  might  sue  another  State  in  the  federal 
courts.  No  sooner  was  the  decision  announced  than 
a  great  outcry  arose  throughout  the  country  against 
such  an  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  and  the 
decision  was  speedily  followed  by  the  adoption  of  the 
Eleventh  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  declaring  that 

"  The  judicial  power  of  the  United  States  shall 
not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  suit  in  law  or 
equity,  commenced  or  prosecuted  aj^ainst  one  of 
the  United  States  by  citizens  of  another  State,  or 
by  citizens  or  subjects  of  any  foreign  State." 

But  under  the  American  Constitution  it  is  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  (obtain  amendment!^,  so  that  the  evil 

'See  Appendix,  Const'n  l".  N.,  .Art.  Ill,  Sic.  4,  cl.  i. 


t'^Ki 


I 


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pi' 

if  lii^ 
ft' 


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142  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

must  be  a  very  pronounced  one  before  it  is  likely  to  be 
remedied  in  this  manner. 

Under  our  international  constitution,  as  herein  pro- 
posed,  amendments  may  be  had  by  a  three-fourths  vote 
m  each  house  of  the  Congress.  If  therefore  the  Su- 
preme Court  should  at  any  time  declare  an  act  of  the 
Congress  unconstitutional,  and  that  opinion  is  dis- 
sented  from  by  a  sufficient  number  of  the  component 
nations,  it  would  be  a  comparatively  easy  matter  to 
secure  an  amendment  to  the  constitution  that  would 
correct  the  error  made  by  the  court.  To  this  end  the 
assent  of  at  least  three-fourths  of  the  States,  as  repre- 
sented m  each  house  of  the  Congress,  must  be  seeured. 

4>    Cases  Affecting  Ambassadors,   Public  Ministeis, 

and  Consuls 

Under  existing  international  conditions  so  great  is 
the  danger  of  ill  feeling,  or  even  war,  resulting  from 
an  affront  offered  to  the  public  representative  of  an- 
other nation,  that  it  is  manifestly  proper  that  the  ju- 
dicial power  of  the  international  government  be  ex- 
tended  to  all  cases  affecting  them.  Otherwise  it  would 
be  easily  possible  for  the  union  to  become  involved  in 
war  or  at  least  in  trouble  with  nations  not  members 
of  It  by  reason  of  the  improper  or  illegal  determination 
ot  a  case  affecting  such  representatives  by  a  court  of 
one  of  the  component  nations. 

For  somewhat  similar  reasons  this  power  should  be 
extended  also  to  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  public 


\. 


/  >*^. 


ism^^'Mmm. 


VltrJl^ 


JUDICIAL  POWER  143 

ministers,  and  consuls  accredited  to  any  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  by  other  nations,  whether  members  or 
not  members  of  the  union.  Since  (as  we  have  sup- 
posed) the  war  power  has  been  surrendered  by  the 
members  of  the  union  and  granted  by  them  to  the  in- 
ternational government,  it  devolves  upon  the  latter 
to  see  that,  as  between  the  component  nations,  their 
ambassadors  are  not  subjected  to  affront  or  injury, 
and  that,  as  between  these  and  nations  not  members 
of  the  union,  the  peace  of  all  be  not  jeopardized  by 
the  misconduct  or  bad  management  of  one  of  their 
own  number.  These  results  may  be  best  accomplished 
by  extending  to  all  such  cases  the  international  judicial 
power.* 

5.    Offenses  and  Wrongs  Committed  on  the  High  Seas 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  extends  the 
federal  judicial  power,  inter  alia, 

"to  all  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  juris* 
diction." 

The  jurisdiction  of  the  English  admiralty  courts,  to 
which  this  clause  refers,  was  threefold  (exclusive  of 
the  jurisdiction  of  prize  cases  in  time  of  war  under 
the  rules  of  international  law).  This  threefold  juris- 
diction consisted  of  the  powers  following: 

I.  To  try  and  sentence  persons  accused  of  crimes 
committed  on  the  high  seas  or  on  navigable  waters 

"  See  Appendix,  Coo«'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  2. 


I'  !!. 

\  I 


'I 


m 


i  •■»**. 


144  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

wherein  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows,  if  not  within  the  body 
of  any  county;  ^ 

2.  To  try  all  cases  of  "  maritime  torts,"  that  Is 
private  wrongs  (other  than  breaches  of  contract)  arisl 
ing  upon  the  high  seas  or  upon  tidal  waters,  whether 
or  not  withm  the  body  of  a  county; 

3.  To  try  cases  of  "  maritime' contracts,"  that  is 
contracts  wherever  made,  if  concerning  maritime  af- 
fairs. 

In  the  United  States  an  Act  of  Congress  has  pro- 
vided that  jurisdiction  of  crimes  in  admiralty  shall  ex- 
tend  to  crimes  committed  on  the  high  seas  or  on  navi- 
gable waters  not  within  the  body  of  any  State;  leaving 
crimes  committed  within  a  State,  though  on  navigable 
waters,  to  be  punished  by  the  State  courts 

With  respect  to  "  maritime  torts,"  it  has  been  de- 
eded in  the  United  States  that  the  admiralty  jurisdic- 
tion is  even  more  extensive  than  in  England,  because 
of  the  greatness  of  the  American  rivers,  many  of  which 
are  readily  navigable  far  above  tide  water.  Hence  the 
rule  has  been  established  that  the  admiralty  has  juris- 
diction  of  torts  committed  on  the  high  seas  or  on  cnv 
waters  navigable  in  fact  by  ships  that  may  be  used  in 
commerce,  regardless  of  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide. 

•  ^;^',^'^."'V"^^'''  °^  ^^"^'"'^  jurisdiction  remains 
in  the  United  States,  as  in  England,  dependent  upon  the 
nature  of  the  contract,  not  upon  the  locality. 

The  question  now  presents  itself  whether  the  judicial 
power  of  the  United  Nations  ought  to  be  extended  to 
these  cases  and,  if  so,  within  what  limits. 


li-. 


r 


JUDICIAL  POWER  145 

Following  the  general  principle  that  matters  of  local 
concern  shall  be  left  entirely  to  the  regulation  of  the 
component  nations,  and  only  matters  of  common  in- 
terest, the  regulation  of  which  by  the  several  com- 
ponent nations  might  engender  misunderstandings  or 
ill  will,  shall  be  given  into  the  control  of  the  interna- 
tional government,  it  would  result  that  at  least  those 
parts  of  the  admiralty  jurisdiction  above  described, 
which  involve  the  occurrence  of  events  upon  navigable 
waters  within  the  territorial  boundaries  of  a  particular 
nation,  should  remain  as  now  subject  to  the  exclusive 
juiisdiction  of  that  nation. 

The  application  of  this  principle  would  eliminate 
from  international  cognizance  all  crimes  and  torts 
committed  on  navigable  waters  within  the  limits  of  any 
nation,  and  all  cases  of  maritime  contract,  while  it 
would  extend  that  cognizance  to  offenses  and  torts  (or 
private  wrongs  other  than  breaches  of  contract)  com- 
mitted on  the  high  seas/ 


6.    The  United  Nations  a  Party 

Controversies  would  often  arise  to  which  the  United 
Nations  would  be  party, — such  as  prosecutions  of  in- 
dividuals for  violations  of  the  laws  of  the  union,  suits 
by  the  United  Nations  against  component  nations  or 
other  proceedings  wherein  they  might  be  complainants. 
To  all  such  cases  the  international  judicial  power  ought 
certainly  to  be  extended. 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  3. 


m 


MKXOCOPr  RKOUITION  TBT  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^ 


/APPLIED  IM/C3E    Ir 

1653  Eo«I   Main   Slr««l 

"ochtl'w.    N«w   York         14609        USA 

(716)  482  -  0300  -  Phon« 

(7t6)   288  -  5989  -  Fa. 


»i! 


h 


*?"% 


I4«  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

It  would  seem  equally  clear,  if  the  principle  of  the 
judcal  settlement  of  international  disputes  is  to  pre- 
va,l    that  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  Natfons 
ought  to  extend  to  all  suits  a,ai„s,  the  United  Na  on 
n  wh,ch  component  nations  or  nations  not  membe     o 
the  union  are  the  complainants. 

But  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  interna- 
.onal  courts  should  be  given  jurisdiction  of  suits  nsti- 

Here  ,,  to  be  apphed  that  principle  of  government 
demanding  that  no   sovereign   be  sued   even   in  hU 
own  courts  without  his  consent.    I„  such  case,,  ther 
fore   while  the  judicial  power  of  the  United  Nadons 

discretion  of  the  Congress  to  determine  whether,  and  to 
what  extent,  the  power  shall  be  exercised.' 

7-   Coniroversies  Beiwen  Component  Nations 

BoIe''r"'^^"^""^"'  '"'^  "P""  ""  P-""  "f  'his 
power  It  ,s  obviously  essential  that  the  international 
judical  power  extend  to  cases  of  this  sort,  if  the  hW 
purpose  of  the  union  is  .o  be  carried  out,-,he  a  ! 
ance  of  war  between  the  component  nations.' 

;Se.  Appendix.  Cm.fn  V.  N,  Ar,.  Ill,  s„.  .,  d  . 
S«  App,„d„,  Conrt  V.  N.,  An.  Ill,  s«,  ,,  ,1.  J! 


JUDICIAL  POWER 


147 


8.    Controversies  Between  Component  and  Other 

Nations 

The  same  reasons  that  necessitate  the  extension  of 
the  international  judicial  power  to  controversies  be- 
tween the  component  nations  themselves  would  demand 
its  further  extension  to  controversies  between  com- 
ponent nations  on  the  one  side  and  nations  not  mem- 
bers of  the  union  on  the  other. ^ 


II 


ml 


g.   Controversies  Between  Nations  Not  Members  of 

the  Union 

All  existing  federations  have  provided  for  the  exten- 
sion of  their  judicial  power  to  controversies  between 
their  component  States,  or  between  those  States  and 
foreign  nations.  But  they  have  all  stopped  at  that 
point.  Not  one  has  undertaken,  in  an  altruistic  spirit 
and  in  the  interest  of  general  peace,  to  place  its  courts 
at  the  disposal  of  two  or  more  nations  not  within 
the  union  for  the  judicial  settlement  of  their  disputes. 
Indeed,  in  the  case  of  an  ordinary  federation,  such 
a  proposal  would  appear  preposterous  and  ridic- 
ulous. 

But  in  the  case  of  a  federal  union  such  as  we  are 
examining,  established,  if  it  is  to  exist  at  all,  by  the 
most  powerful  nations  of  the  world,  for  the  very  pur- 
pose of  keeping  the  peace  between  them,  which  might 
be  jeopardized  by  a  local  war  in  a  distant  part  of  the 

'  See  Appendix,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  cl.  6. 


w: 


148  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

earth,  it  is  at  least  debatable  whether  the  international 
constitution  should  not  offer  the  services  of  its  Su- 
preme Court  for  the  judicial  settlement  of  disputes 
between  nations  not  members  of  the  union,  thus  giv- 
ing  them  the  benefit  of  an  impartial  court  already  or- 
gamzed  and  accustomed  to  hear  such  causes,  whose 
arbitrament  might  prove  an  acceptable  substitut 
for  that  of  a  war  the  final  outcome  of  which  upon 
foresee""         ^^'  '^^'^Ponent  nations  no  man  might 

If.  however,  such  a  provision  were  inserted,  care 
ought  to  be  taken  to  declare  expressly  that  the  sub- 
mission  by  outside  nations  of  their  controversies  to 
the  international  courts  shall  furnish  no  reason  or 
excuse  for  the  use  of  the  international  force  to  execute 
he  courts  decree.  That  must  be  left  to  the  honor  of 
he  nations  concerned,  or  else  the  entiie  purpose  of 
the  clause  is  defeated.* 


\ 


/•^ 


10.    Controversies  Between  Citizens  of  Different 

States 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  extends  the 
judicial  power  of  the  Union  to  cases  arising  between 
citizens  of  different  States  or  between  citizens  of  a 
atate  and  aliens. 

The  power  was  extended  to  these  cases  upon  the 
theory  that  the  courts  of  a  particular  State  would  not 
be  so  likely  as  would  the  federal  courts  to  adjudge 
'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  4,  d.  7. 


-1 


't  -J 


JUDICIAL  POWER  149 

impartially  the  rights  of  its  own  citizens  when  weighed 
against  those  of  aliens  or  the  citizens  of  other  States. 
But  Congress  has  never  adopted  this  theory  to  the 
extent  of  making  the  federal  jurisdiction  exclusive  of 
the  Staie  courts  in  such  cases.  Under  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress, if  the  amount  in  controversy  exceeds  $3,000,  the 
suit  may  be  brought  in,  or  removed  to,  the  federal 
court,  but  it  may  also  be  tried  in  the  State  court  if 
neither  party  objects.  If  the  amount  involved  be  less 
than  $3,000,  the  federal  courts  are  given  no  jurisdic- 
tion at  all. 

This  last  condition  is  in  itself  an  admission  by  Con- 
gress that  there  is  nothing  to  fear  from  the  injustice, 
prejudice,  or  partiality  of  the  State  courts  in  cases 
of  this  character.  And  experience  in  the  United  States 
points  to  the  same  conclusion.  In  the  vast  number  of 
such  controversies  that  have  not  involved  $3,000,  and 
have  therefore  been  left  entirely  to  the  disposal  of  the 
State  courts,  their  decisions  have  been  as  satisfactory  to 
the  litigants,  whether  citizens  or  aliens,  as  the  deci- 
sions of  the  federal  courts  have  been.  There  has  been 
little  evidence  of  the  local  partiality  and  prejudice, 
the  fear  of  which  led  to  the  extension  of  the  federal 
jud  cial  power  to  those  cases. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  possession  of  this  jurisdiction 
(where  the  amount  is  mere  than  $3,000)  has  enor- 
mously augmented  the  business  of  the  federal  courts  in 
the  United  States;  and,  more  serious  still,  has  given 
those  courts  increased  opportunity,  sometimes  availed 
of,  to  advance  the  power  and  prestige  of  the  federal 


» 

i 
1 

. 

H 

I     •«! 


Ill 


150  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

government  at  the  expense  of  the  powers  reserved  to 
the  States. 

In  the  international  constitution/   as  will  appear 
later,  tne  rights  of  aliens  or  of  citizens  of  one  com- 
ponent State,  while  in  another,  are  adequately  secured 
agamst  mvasion,  and  whenever  a  suit  involves  the  law 
ot  a  component  nation  alleged  to  violate  these  rights 
•t  would  constitute  "  a  controversy  arising  under  the 
constitution  of  the  United  Nations,"  to  which  the  inter- 
national judicial  power  would  extend.    It  would  seem 
unnecessary  and  unwise  to  extend  it  further  to  contro- 
versies between  citizens  of  different  States  or  aliens 
merely  because  the  parties  are  of  different  nationalil 
ties,  where  no  unfair  or  prejudicial  governmental  ac- 
tion has  been  alleged. 

For  these  reasons  it  is  believed  that  the  international 
judical  power  ought  not  to  extend  to  any  litigation 
between  private  parties,  except  in  cases  arising  under 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  Nations  or 
under  treaties  made  by  their  authority  or  by  authority 
ot  the  several  component  nations. 


i-€  ■ 


II 


Original  Jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court 

By  "  original  "  jurisdiction  is  meant  that  the  court 
has  jurisdiction  to  try  the  case  immediately  and  in  the 
hrst  instance,  without  the  previous  institution  of  any 
'  See  Appendix,  Con.t'n  U.  N,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  i. 


SUPREME  COURT— JURISDICTION    151 

suit  in  an  inferior  court.  The  term  is  used  in  contra- 
distinction to  "  appellate  "  jurisdiction,  which  supposes 
a  suit  first  instituted  in  a  lower  court,  and  then  brought 
to  the  higher  court  upon  appeal. 

Our  exemplar,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
upon  this  point  has  provided  as  follows : 


"  In  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  other  pub- 
lic ministers  and  consuls,  and  those  in  which  a 
State  shall  be  party,  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have 
original  jurisdiction.  In  all  other  cases  before 
mentioned  the  Supreme  Court  shall  have  appellate 
jurisdiction  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such 
exceptions  and  under  such  regulations  as  the  Con- 
gress shall  make." 


In  the  United  States  it  is  settled  that  the  original 
jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court,  having  been  con- 
ferred by  the  Constitution  itself,  can  neither  be  en- 
larged nor  diminished  by  the  action  of  Congress.  But 
while  the  Constitution  has  given  the  court  original 
jurisdiction  in  the  cases  mentioned,  it  has  not  declared 
that  jurisdiction  to  be  also  exclusive;  and  hence  it  is 
competent  for  Congress  to  enact  that  suits  of  this  kind 
may  be  originally  instituted  in  a  lower  court  as  well 
as  in  the  Supreme  Court. 

The  reasons  for  granting  the  court  original  jurisdic- 
tion in  these  cases  is  quite  apparent.  Reference  has 
already  been  made  to  the  jealousy  with  which  nations 
are  accustomed  to  regard  the  treatment  of  their  diplo- 
matic representatives  abroad.    Their  relations  to  the 


iitf 


I. 


i! 


in--. 


3^--J«-..!^-,. 


152  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

people  around  them  are  to  a  great  extent  regulated  by 
the  Law  of  Nations,  and  they  are  not  ordinarily  sub- 
ject to  local  jurisdiction.    It  is  not  only  essential  that, 
as  between  the  federal  government  and  the  component 
States,  the  protection  of  these  foreign  representatives 
should    elong  to  the  former,  but  in  the  exercise  of  the 
judicial  power  of  the  federal  government  in  cases  af- 
fecting them  it  is  important  that  such  cases  may  be  at 
once  instituted  in  the  highest  and  most  responsible 
federal  court  rather  than  drag  through  the  tedious 
processes  of  the  lower  courts,  reaching  the  Supreme 
Court  only  on  appeal. 

Analogous  reasons  led  to  the  inclusion  within  this 
original  jurisdiction  of  controversies  "  in  which  a  State 
shall  be  party."  Not  only  the  dignity  of  the  State, 
but  the  prevention  of  tedious  and  exasperating  delays 
and  other  grounds  for  the  development  of  ill-will  be- 
tween the  States,  dictated  that  such  controversies  be 
instituted  originally  and  in  the  first  instance  in  the  Su- 
preme  Court. 

In  the  case  of  the  international  constitution  these 
reasons  would  be  no  less  effectual  than  in  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution.  No  less  in  the  former  than  in  the 
latter  case  would  the  necessity  arise  to  avoid  or 
promptly  redress  affronts  to  ambassadors  or  ministers 
accredited  to  the  United  Nations  or  to  any  component 
nation,  and  to  consult  the  dignity  and  convenience  of 
the  component  or  other  nations  litigating  their  rights 
in  the  international  courts.* 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  5,  cl.  i. 


JUDICIAL  POWER— LIMITATIONS     153 

III 
Appellate  Jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court 

Unlike  the  Supreme  Court's  "  original "  jurisdiction, 
it  is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  that  its  "  appel- 
late "  jurisdiction  be  fixed  in  the  international  consti- 
tution. It  ought  to  be  left  entirely  to  the  discretion  of 
the  Congress. 

The  constitution,  following  its  American  prototype, 
should  do  no  more  than  provide  that  the  court  shall 
possess  such  appellate  jurisdiction  from  inferior  in- 
ternational courts,  and  from  the  courts  of  the  compo- 
nent nations  when  exercising  the  judicial  power  of  the 
United  Nations,  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  as  the  Con- 
gress shall  think  proper.^ 


IV 


Limitations  Upon  the  International  Judicial 

Power 

Before  concluding  our  examination  of  the  judicial 
power  that  ought  to  be  conferred  on  the  international 
government,  it  is  necessary  to  call  the  reader's  atten- 
tion to  several  important  limitations  that  should  be  im- 
posed upon  the  exercise  of  it. 

'See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  5,  cl.  2. 


'    J' 


.1        J 


MTiilMJi'Ji  '■■—----^ 


I  i 


154 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


J  :.«! 


/.   Suits  by  Individuals  Against  Component  Nations 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  governmental 
principle  that  no  sovereign  State  may  be  sued  without 
its  own  consent.  Nations  might  be  willing  to  surrender 
to  an  international  federal  government  the  judicial 
power  to  determine  controversies  between  themselves 
and  other  nations  as  a  means  of  avoiding  war,  and  yet 
may  properly  refuse  to  yield  to  a  quasi-alien  author- 
ity the  power  to  determine  suits  instituted  against  them 
by  private  individuals  without  their  assent.  To  permit 
this  would  be  to  impair  their  dignity  as  sovereigns 
without  adequate  reason. 

But  this  principle  would  not  apply  to  appeals  taken 
to  the  Supreme  Court  from  inferior  courts  in  suits, 
civil  or  criminal,  instituted  originally  by  a  component 
nation  against  an  individual,  where  the  decision  in  the 
lower  court  has  been  against  the  Individual  (he  being 
accordingly  the  appellant  and  the  nation  the  appellee) 
and  the  individual's  rights  or  immunities  under  the 
international  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  are  in- 
volved. 

Hence  there  ought  to  be  a  provision  in  our  constitu- 
tion to  the  effect  that  the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
Nations  shall  not  be  construed  to  extend  to  any  original 
suit  brought  by  a  private  person  against  a  component 
nation.' 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  6. 


S 


JUDICIAL  POWER— LIMITATIONS    155 

2.    Suits  Against  the  Sovereign,  Chief  Executive,  or 
Ministers  of  a  Component  Nation 

It  is  certain  that  no  nation  would  give  its  assent  to 
a  compact  which  did  not  clearly  provide  against  the 
possibility  of  any  action  of  the  international  federal 
government  whereby  its  so^'ereign,  president,  or  other 
chief  executive,  or  the  members  of  its  ministry,  could 
be  brought  before  the  international  courts  on  charges 
of  the  violation  of  the  federal  laws  or  treaties.  No 
nation  would  put  itself  in  a  position  where  such  af- 
fronts to  its  sovereignty  and  dignity  would  be  pos- 
sible, or  where  such  foreign  influences  could  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  its  governmental  policies. 

There  must  be  inserted  therefore  in  the  proposed 
constitution  still  another  limitation  upon  the  inter- 
national judicial  power  to  the  effect  that  it  shall  not 
extend  to  any  personal  proceeding  against  the  sov- 
ereign, chief  executive,  or  any  member  of  the  ministry 
of  any  component  nation.^ 

'  See  Appendix,  Consf  n  U.  N.,  Art.  Ill,  Sec.  6. 


m 


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CHAPTER  X 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 

UNITED  NATIONS— (I)  POLITICAL 

LIMITATIONS 

I 

Preliminary  Observations 

As  preliminary  to  an  examination  of  the  limitations 
that  ought  to  be  imposed  upon  the  international  govern- 
ment, it  is  proper  to  observe  that  the  corresponding 
limitations  upon  the  federal  government  of  the  United 
States,  contained  in  the  American  Constitution,  so 
completely  and  so  effectually  cover  the  ground,— es- 
pecially  i,  respect  to  the  guarantees  and  protection  they 
afford  to  the  rights  of  the  individual  against  the  en- 
croachments  of  the  government  in  the  exercise  of  its 
granted  powers,— that  they  need  but  few  modifications 
or  additions  to  suit  them  to  our  purposes. 

It  may  also  be  observed  that  so  far  as  concerns  the 
guarantees  of  the  individual's  civil  rights,  and  the  pro- 
tection  afforded  him  in  criminal  prosecutions,  by  the 
international  constitution,  no  nation  would  be  likely 
to  raise  serious  objection  to  its  adoption  on  account  of 
their  presence,  since  the  tendency  and  effect  of  all  of 

156 


NO  TERRITORIAL  ACQUISITIONS     157 

them  would  be  to  protect  the  citizens  of  each  nation 
from  unjust,  oppressive,  or  tyrannical  action  on  the 
part  of  the  international  government  alone,  and 
would  not  in  the  slightest  degree  affect  the  exercise 
of  their  customary  rights  by  the  governments  of 
the  several  component  nations  within  their  own 
limits. 

The  limitations  to  be  considered  may  be  best  classi- 
fied under  three  heads:  (i)  Limitations  of  a  political 
nature;  (2)  Guarantees  of  the  individual's  civil  rights, 
and  (3)  Guarantees  of  the  individual's  rights  in  crim- 
inal cases.  The  present  chapter  will  be  devoted  to 
the  political  limitations  upon  the  powers  of  the  inter- 
national government. 

II 

Territorial  Acquisitions 

Inasmuch  as  the  national  craving  for  territorial  ex- 
pansion is  one  of  the  most  pronounced  causes  of  war,  it 
would  be  anomalous  to  establish  a  federal  union  of 
nations  with  the  purpose  of  preserving  the  peace  of 
the  world,  and  yet  grant  to  that  international  govern- 
ment the  power  to  acquire  territory,  thus  inviting  the 
control  of  it  by  the  very  passions  and  temptations,  an 
escape  from  which  is  the  reason  for  its  establish- 
ment. 

Yet  this  government  must  be  given  the  power  to 
declare  and  wage  war  if  necessary  with  nations  not 
members  of  the  union;  and  this  cannot  be  accomplished 


i. 

II: 


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I'fi! 


.*! 


I 


158  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

without  invading  and  occupying,  temporarily  at  least, 
the  territory  of  the  enemy.  Sometimes  also  the  funda- 
mental cause  of  the  war  may  lie  in  the  fact  that  terri- 
tory thus  occupied  his  been  in  the  possession  of  the 
wrong  nation  from  the  racial,  political,  geographical, 
or  religious  point  of  view,  so  that  to  insure  future 
peace  it  may  become  necessary  to  unite  the  conquered 
territory  to  some  other  nation  better  fitted  in  these  re- 
spects to  govern  it;  or  it  may  be  found  advisable  to  es- 
tablish it  as  an  independent  State. 

But  whether  such  occupied  territory  be  returned 
after  the  war  to  the  nation  from  which  it  has  been 
taken,  or  be  surrendered  to  one  or  more  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  or  to  a  nation  not  a  member  of  the 
union,  or  be  raised  to  the  dignity  of  an  independent 
State,  in  no  event  ought  the  principle  to  be  admitted 
that  the  international  government  itself  shall  retain 
control  of  the  territory. 

Moreover,  the  possibility  of  the  surrender  of  such 
conquered  territory  to  one  or  more  of  the  component 
nations  after  a  war,  unless  carefully  safeguarded,  might 
itself  tend  to  encourage  war  in  two  ways: — either,  first, 
by  inciting  some  of  the  component  nations  to  try  to 
involve  the  international  government  in  war,  with  the 
hope  that  they  themselves  may  ultimately  obtain  some 
of  the  conquered  territory;  or,  second,  by  arousing 
jealousies  and  suspicions  among  the  component  nations 
in  the  division  of  the  spoils. 

It  is  possible  to  avoid  both  of  these  dangers  by  pro- 
viding that  in  all  cases  the  conquered  territory  shall 


LIMITED  CITIZENSHIP 


159 


be  restored  to  the  nation  from  which  it  has  during  the 
war  been  taken,  unless  a  certain  large  majority  of  the 
nations,  as  represented  in  each  house  of  the  Congress, 
shall  agree  in  assigning  it  to  one  or  more  of  themselves, 
or  to  a  nation  not  a  member  of  the  union,  or  in  erect- 
ing it  into  an  independent  State.  It  may  '  e  safely 
assumed  that  should  three-fourths  of  the  Congress  (the 
majority  needed  to  amend  the  constitution)  be  re- 
quired to  agree  upon  one  of  these  destinations,  the 
temptation  would  be  lacking  to  particular  nations  to 
bring  on  war  for  the  possession  of  such  territory,  and 
should  the  allotment  thereof  to  a  component  nation  be- 
come an  accomplished  fact,  it  v»^ould  then  leave  behind 
it  no  serious  sting  of  distrust  or  jealousy.* 


{ill 

m' 


III 


"  Citizenship  of  the  United  Nations  " 

In  dealing  with  the  powers  to  be  granted  to  the  in- 
ternational congress,  the  power  to  make  rules  touch- 
ing naturalization  was  considered,  and  the  conclusion 
reached  that  the  power  ought  to  be  denied  because 
theoretically  and  practically  it  would  be  unwise  to 
recognize  the  existence  of  such  a  legal  status  as  that 
of  a  "  citizenship  of  the  United  Nations."  It  is  un- 
necessary to  repeat  that  discussion. 

Indeed,  so  far  should  the  constitution  be  from  recog- 
nizing such  a  status  that  it  ought  expressly  to  disclaim 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  i. 


M 


wfim^ 


1 


■«it 


1 60  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  existence  of  it,  except  in  the  case  of  persons  born  or 
permanently  resident  in  the  seat  of  government* 

IV 
"  Treason  Against  the  United  Nations  " 

A  corollary  of  the  proposition  just  presented,— that 
there  is  no  such  general  legal  conception  as  that  of 
"citizenship  of  the  United  Nations,"— is  that  there 
could  be  no  such  general  crime  as  "  treason  against  the 
United  Nations,"  for  treason  is  peculiarly  a  crime 
growing  out  of  and  connected  with  the  relation  of  citi- 
zenship. 

No  citizen  of  a  component  nation  would  owe  alle- 
giance to  the  government  of  the  United  Nations  except 
by  and  through  the  adhesion  of  his  nation  to  that  gov- 
ernment which  becomes  part  of  his  national  govern- 
ment by  virtue  of  that  adhesion.  His  levying  of  war 
against  the  international  government,  or  his  attempt 
to  subvert  it,  would  be  treason  against  his  national 
government  and  punishable  by  it.* 


Power  of  Taxation 


i 


ft 


It  will  be  remembered  that  the  first  power  granted 
to  the  international  congress  in  our  proposed  constitu- 

I  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  a. 
*  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  3. 


f  ! 

I!  t 


TAXING  POWER  LIMITED 


i6i 


tion  is  that  of  laying  and  collecting  taxes  upon  land 
for  purposes  of  revenue.* 

In  our  examination  of  that  grant  of  power,  it  was 
pointed  out  that  the  extension  of  the  taxing  power  to 
the  laying  of  duties  on  imports  or  exports,  or  upon 
business,  trade  or  occupations  of  any  kind,  would 
place  a  most  dangerous  power  in  the  hands  of  the  in- 
ternational government,  in  case  a  majority  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  were  disposed  to  use  it  to  the  injury  of 
a  minority; — a  power,  the  exercise  of  which  might 
cause  suspicion  and  ill  feeling  between  the  nations 
instead  of  the  confidence  and  good  will  it  is  desirable 
to  cultivate.  There  is  no  easier  way  to  enact  prefer- 
ential legislation  in  favor  of  particular  classes  or  sec- 
tions than  through  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power, 
especially  through  tariff  and  excise  laws. 

The  express  grant  to  the  Congress  of  the  power  to 
tax  land,  accompanied  by  silence  with  respect  to  other 
forms  of  taxation,  in  the  case  of  a  government  of 
enumerated  powers  like  the  one  we  are  considering, 
might  very  possibly  carry  a  sufficient  implication  that 
other  forms  of  taxation  are  Inadmissible.  But  in  a 
matter  of  such  first  rate  importance,  it  would  be  impru- 
dent to  leave  the  question  to  be  determined  by  implica- 
tions.' 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  i. 
'  See  Appendix,  Contt'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  4. 


if 


ml' 

Mr 


w 

nv 


1 62  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


i 


i 


I 


VI 

Appropriations  of  Public  Monly 

The  next  of  these  political  limitations  upon  the 
powers  of  the  international  government,  suggested  by 
considerations  of  ordinary  business  and  governmental 
precaution,  is  to  the  effect  that  no  money  be  drawn  from 
the  treasury  but  in  consequence  of  appropriations  made 
by  law;  and  that  statements  of  all  public  receipts  and 
expenditures  be  published  from  time  to  time.' 

VII 

Purposes  of  Appropriations— Bounties  and 

Pensions 

In  dealing  with  the  purposes  for  which  the  inter- 
national congress  should  be  permitted  to  raise  revenue 
by  taxation  upon  land,  the  conclusion  was  reached  that 
the  constitution  ought  clearly  to  provide  that  it  be  con- 
hned  to  those  p.-rnoses  for  which  the  union  is  to  be 
formed. 

The  same  principle,  of  course,  should  apply  to  the 
appropriations  of  the  public  money  after  it  has  been 
raised  by  taxation;  and  it  is  so  provided  in  the  clause 
of  our  tentative  constitution  referred  to  below.=' 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  necessity  of 

^'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i   cl   c 
See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  6. 


LIMITED  CONTROL  OF  COMMERCE    163 

depriving  the  Congress  of  the  power  unduly  to  dis- 
criminate for  or  against  the  trade  and  occupations  of 
particular  nations  through  tariff  or  excise  legislation. 
But  this  would  be  of  little  use,  if  the  Congress  be  al- 
lowed to  reverse  the  process,  and  by  bounty  legislation 
encourage  unduly  the  trade  of  particular  nations.  It 
is  as  necessary  to  prohibit  the  Congress  to  legislate  for 
or  against  trade  in  this  form  as  under  the  guise  of  tax- 
ation. 

But  there  is  one  sort  of  bounty  legislation  not  sub- 
ject to  these  objections,  namely,  laws  providing  for 
pensions  to  superannuated  or  disabled  public  servants, 
civil  and  military.  The  power  to  legislate  on  this  sub- 
ject should  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Congress.* 


;!■)■ 


Iff 


VIII 


Commercial  Preferences  as  Between  the 
Component  Nations 

It  has  before  been  pointed  out  that  in  order  to  ac- 
complish the  end  aimed  at  by  our  international  com- 
pact,— the  preservation  of  peace  between  the  compo- 
nent nations, — it  is  essential  that  the  power  to  regu- 
late international  commerce  be  granted  to  the  federal 
government,  and  accordingly  this  is  one  of  the  powers 
granted  to  the  Congress  in  our  constitution. 

But  instead  of  preserving  peace,  it  would  hasten  war 
between  the  nations  if  it  were  possible  for  a  combina- 

•  See  Appendix,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec   i,  cl.  6. 


\ut 


i  I  '  - 


■:| 


.^ 


j^'^'/* 


164  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tion  of  them,  by  obtaining  control  in  both  houses  of 
the  Congress,  to  use  that  power  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
criminating in  commercial  regulations  in  favor  of  their 
own  trade  and  against  that  of  the  minority.  It  is  as 
necessary  to  the  peace  of  the  nations  to  guard  against 
such  preferential  legislation  as  it  is,  in  the  first  in- 
stance,  to  grant  to  the  Congress  the  power  to  regulate 
such  commerce. 

The  most  usual  instrumentalities  for  the  accomplish- 
ment  of  this  sort  of  preferential  legislation  are  the  gov- 
errmental  powers  to  impose  taxes,-especially  import 
and  excise  duties,— and  to  grant  bounties.  These  pow- 
ers,  as  we  have  just  seen,  have  been  denied  absolutely 
to  the  mternational  government  by  our  proposed  con- 
stitution. 

It  remains  to  impose  si-h  direct  limitations  upon 
the  power  to  regulate  international  commerce  as  may 
m  like  manner  prevent  serious  discriminations  for  or 
agamst  particular  nations  by  means  of  the  exercise  of 
It.    With  the  nowers  to  tax  trade  and  grant  bounties 
ehmmated,  it  would  seem  that  the  principal  other  meth- 
ods whereby  t.ie  -nternational  government  might  effect 
discriminations  of  this   sort  would  be  by  means  of 
regulations  giving  preferences  to  the  ports  or  trading 
centers,  to  the  ships  or  other  vehicles  of  commerce,  to 
the  navigable  waters  or  other  highways  of  commerce, 
or  to  the  persons  engaged  in  international  commerce,  be- 
longing to  one  nation  over  those  belonging  to  another. 
For   example,   by   harbor,   pilotage,    or   lighthouse 
regulations  it  might  be  possible  to  discriminate  in  favor 


NO  TITLES  OF  NOBILITY 


165 


of  or  against  the  ports  and  trading  centers  of  a  particu- 
lar nation;  by  clearance  regulations,  by  laws  regulating 
the  wages  or  qualifications  of  seamen  engaged  in  in- 
ternational commerce,  or  by  laws  regulating  the  con- 
struction or  equipment  of  ships  or  railroad  cars,  real 
advantages  or  disadvantages  may  be  created  with  re- 
spect to  the  trade  of  particular  nations;  and  the  same 
result  might  be  accomplished  by  the  appropriations  of 
money  for  the  deepening  of  the  navigable  waters  or 
improvement  of  commercial  routes  in  one  or  a  iew 
countries,  while  denying  such  advantages  to  others. 

Of  course  absolute  equality  in  the  operation  of  com- 
mercial regulations  is  not  to  be  expected,  and  the  mere 
fact  that  a  law  does  not  operate  everywhere  with  en- 
tire equality  and  uniformity  is  no  reason  for  declaring 
it  preferential. 

But  this  is  not  to  say  that  a  regulation  of  commerce, 
the  very  design  and  purpose  of  which  is  to  create  pref- 
erences, may  be  justly  supported  as  constitutional;  and 
giannj  inequalities  and  lack  of  uniformity  in  its  opera- 
tion may  well  be  taken  as  indications  that  the  law  is 
designed  to  be  a  preferential  regulation.' 


li 
ill 


tiff 


i 


i 

m 


IX 


Titles  of  Nobility  and  Privileged  Orders 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  our  proposed  government 
is  one  of  enumerated  powers,  among  which  has  not 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  .Art.  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  7. 


1 


m 


'1 S  ; 


■^i^ 


?ti 


i66  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

been  included  the  power  to  grant  titles  of  nobility  or 
establish  privileged  orders,  it  might  perhaps  be  re- 
garded as  unnecessary  expressly  to  negative  the  exist- 
ence  of  such  a  power. 

That  the  power  ought  not  to  be  granted  to  the  in- 
ternational government  is  very  evident.  Not  only 
would  it  be  of  no  assistance  in  furthering  the  purpose 
of  the  union, — the  prevention  of  war  between  the 
component  nations, — but  it  would  have  the  opposite 
tendency  of  exciting  discord  and  jealousies  amongst 
them.  Indeed,  the  existence  of  such  a  power  might  of 
itself  suffice  to  prevent  some  republics  from  joining 
the  union.  It  might  even  have  a  like  effect  upon  some 
monarchies  which  might  fear  the  establishment  of  or- 
ders superior  to  their  own. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  the  proposed  gov- 
ernment, while  some  of  its  component  States  would  be 
monarchies,  would  yet  itself  be  in  essence  republican 
in  form,  a  republic  of  nations,— so  that  the  creation  ot 
such  orders  would  be  inconsistent  as  well  as  inappro- 
priate. 

It  would  appear  the  safer  course  not  to  trust  to  the 
presumption,  arising  from  the  absence  of  a  grant,  that 
the  power  does  not  exist,  but  expressly  to  deny  its  ex- 
istence.* 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Set  t,  d.  8. 


h 


t 


TITLES  OF  OTHER  STATES  167 

X 

Grants  of  Titles  or  Emoluments  by  Other 

States 

Another  precautionary  limitation  upon  the  powers 
of  the  officials  of  the  international  government,  upon 
which  comment  seems  needless,  appears  in  our  pro- 
posed constitution  in  the  following  form : 

"  No  person,  while  holding  any  office  of  profit 
or  trust  under  the  United  Nations,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  Congress,  accept  of  any  present, 
emolument,  office,  or  title  of  any  kind  whatever 
from  any  king,  ruler,  or  State."  * 
•  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec  i,  cl.  9. 


H*  i 


I- 


I 


ii'u 


f 


!!■  *  '; 


I" 


I 


li- 


'^'t 


CHAPTER  XI 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 
UNITED  NATIONS-(II)  GUARANTEES 
OF  THE  CIVIL  RIGHTS  OF  THE  INDI- 
VIDUAL 


Prompt  Discharge  from  Illegal  Imprisonment 
The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  declares  that 

"The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
shall  not  be  suspended,  unless  when  in  cases  of  re- 
bellion or  invasion  the  public  safety  may  require 
it." 

The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  a  technical  remedy  for 
the  violation  of  the  constitutional  right  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  personal  liberty,  and  is  well  known  to  the 
English  and  American  law.  It  is  a  proceeding  whereby 
a  person  confined  may  have  an  immediate  judicial  in- 
quiry into  the  legality  of  his  imprisonment,  and  if  it 
be  found  illegal,  he  is  entitled  to  an  order  of  the  court 
that  he  be  at  once  released.  Upon  this  writ  there  can 
usually  be  no  investigation  of  the  justice  of  the  im- 
prisonment, that  is,  of  the  prisoner's  guilt  or  innocence 

i6S 


GUARANTEES— CIVIL  RIGHTS        169 

of  the  offense  charged,  but  only  of  the  legality  of  the 
confinement. 

This  right  is  recognized  also  in  other  than  English- 
speaking  nations,  but  not  under  the  technical  designa- 
tion of  the  right  to  a  habeas  corpus,  and  in  some  coun- 
tries it  is  not  recognized  at  all. 

Not  even  the  last  mentioned  nations,  however,  could 
have  any  just  ground  of  objection  to  our  proposed  con- 
stitution, should  it  contain  a  clause  guaranteeing  this 
right  to  its  citizens  as  against  illegal  arrests  made  by 
the  government  of  the  United  Nations.  The  clause 
would  in  no  way  operate  to  limit  the  powers  of  any 
national  government. 

But  the  non-existence  of  such  a  right  in  some  coun 
tries  and  the  designation  of  it  by  different  names  in 
others,  demands  that  the  privilege  be  defined  in  the 
international  constitution  as  well  as  secured  thereby.* 

In  defining  it,  our  constitution  would  limit  its  appli- 
cation to  illegal  imprisonments  occuring  under  or  by 
authority  of  the  international  government,  real,  or  pre- 
tended, or  contrary  to  the  international  laws  or  treaties, 
or  because  of  the  alleged  exercise  of  a  right  or  omis- 
sion of  a  duty  claimed  to  exist  under  the  constitution, 
laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United  Nations,  or  contrary  to 
the  Law  of  Nations.  It  is  not  to  be  extended  to  illegal 
imprisonments  of  other  sorts. 

Having  defined  the  right,  it  may  be  secured  in  much 
the  same  words  as  those  of  the  American  Constitution.* 

I  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  a,  cl.  i. 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  i. 


Ij 

11  fl 


w 


0 


I  i 
I 


,1 


170  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

II 

Religious  Liberty 

It  is  needless  to  argue  the  importance  of  a  clause 
limiting  the  power  of  the  international  government  to 
infringe  in  any  way  the  religious  liberty  of  the  individ- 
ual. 

In  this,  as  in  many  of  these  guarantees,  the  proposed 
constitution  has  followed  in  the  main  the  language  of 
the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  which  in  a  period  or  more  than  a  cen- 
tury have  proved  entirely  effectual  to  safeguard  these 
rights  against  governmental  invasion.^ 


« 


% 


("*ty 


'  A 


■■"It!' 


Ill 

Freedom  of  Speech  and  of  the  Press 

The  nations  differ  widely  in  their  conceptions  of  the 
extent  to  which  freedom  of  speech,  oral  or  written. 
may  justly  be  accorded  to  individuals.  In  some  coun- 
tries the  censorship  of  writings,  in  advance  of  publica- 
tion, is  a  recognized  right  of  the  government,  and  the 
publication  of  matter  reflecting  upon  the  rulers  mav 
be  punished  as  lese  majesie.  In  oth  rs,  as  in  England 
and  the  United  States,  except  in  times  of  war,  censor- 
ship in  advance  of  publication  is  unknown;  criticism 
of  officials  or  candidates  for  office,  if  bona  fide  and 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  *. 


h 


GUARANTEES— FREEDOM  OF  SPEECH    171 

not  malicious,  are  privileged  communications  and  go 
unpunished,  even  though  untrue;  and  the  speaker, 
writer,  or  publisher  is  in  no  case  punishable  otherwise 
than  under  the  common  law. 

Hence,  should  our  proposed  constitution  merely  pro- 
hibit any  law  abridging  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the 
press,  the  question  would  at  once  present  itself  as  to 
what  is  meant  by  these  phrases.  They  would  mean 
one  thing  in  one  country  and  a  different  thing  else- 
where.    It  is  necessary  therefore  to  define  them. 

One  mode  of  defin-  'hem  would  be  to  adopt  arbi- 
trarily  the  legal  principl  i,  prevalent  in  a  single  country 
touching  the  subject,  and  use  tnose  as  the  standard 
of  freedom  in  these  respects.  But  if  a  low  standard 
V  ere  adopted  this  would  certainly  be  unsatisfactory  in 
those  countries  possessing  higher  standards  of  such 
freedom;  and  if  a  high  standard  were  adopted,  it  would 
be  likely  to  cause  trouble  in  those  countries  wherein 
lower  standards  are  enforced. 

Perhaps  at  once  the  most  natural  and  the  most  satis- 
factory  standard  of  freedom  of  speech  for  the  inter- 
national constitution  is  to  be  found  in  accepting  for 
each  separate  nation  the  standard  it  recognizes  in  its 
OTH  dealings  with  its  citizens. 

Hence,  the  limitation,  as  it  appears  in  our  pro- 
posed  constitution,  is  in  effect  that  no  law  shall  be 
passed  by  the  Congress  abridging  freedom  of  speech 
or  of  the  press  in  any  of  the  component  States  to  a 
greater  extent  than  as  the  laws  of  each  State  permit.' 

'■  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N..  Art.  IV.  Sec.  2.  cl.  t. 


i'ii 


I' 


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i  I 


172  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

IV 

Rights  of  Assembly  and  Petition 

Two  civil  rights  that  ought  to  be  protected  from  in- 
fringement by  the  international  government,— what- 
ever  the  view  any  particular  national  government  may 
take  of  them,— are  the  rights  of  the  people,  first,  peace- 
ably  to  assemble  for  any  lawful  purpose,  whether  re- 
ligious,  charitable,  educational,  social,  or  political,  pro- 
vided only  that  the  assembly  be  peaceable  and  not  dis- 
orderly  or  calculated  to  excite  disorders,  and,  second, 
to  petition  the  international  government  in  a  proper 
and  respectful  manner  for  a  redress  of  such  grievances 
as  they  may  have  experienced. 

The  exercise  of  these  rights  should  forever  be  placed 
beyond  the  power  of  the  international  government  to 
prohibit  or  punish.* 


f 


The  Keeping  and  Bearing  of  Arms 

While,  under  the  plan  proposed,  the  war  powers  are 
to  be  conferred  upon  the  international  government,  it 
is  also  proposed  that  the  component  States  shall  retain 
a  certain  proportion  of  regular  armed  forces,  and  in 
addition  such  militia  as  they  may  severally  see  fit  to 
employ.  On  this  account,  if  on  no  other,  it  would  be 
proper  to  insert  in  our  constitution  a  limitation  upon 

•  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  4. 


QUARTERING  OF  SOLDIERS  173 

the  power  of  the  international  government  to  prohibit 
the  keeping  and  bearing  of  military  arms. 

But  the  limitation  is  as  important  when  applied  to 
the  people  generally  as  when  applied  to  the  armed 
forces  and  militia.  While  the  international  constitu- 
tion must  not  attempt  to  control  the  component  na- 
tions in  their  respective  attitudes  to  their  own  people 
in  this  matter,  it  ought  carefully  to  provide  that  the 
international  government  at  least  be  permitted  to  take 
no  step  which  would  deprive  the  people  of  any  State 
of  such  rights  as  their  State  may  give  them  to  keep  and 
carry  arms,  learn  the  use  of  them,  and  be  prepared  to 
employ  them  when  necessary  to  defend  their  liberties 
against  unjust  attacks. 

The  component  States  and  their  people,  in  entering 
the  international  union  and  surrendering  in  large  meas- 
ure their  own  war  .;owers,  would  do  so  to  preserve  an 
honorable  peace,  not  to  become  the  helpless  and  sub- 
servient victims  of  the  agency  they  have  created.* 


iliil  |i 
if  ' 


i 


k 


m 


VI 


Quartering  of  Soldiers  on  the  People 


Past  experience  has  taught  that  governments  may 
sorely  oppress  their  people  through  an  unequal  dis- 
tribution of  governmental  burdens,  whether  in  the 
form  of  taxation,  of  laws  lacking  uniformity,  or  other- 
wise. 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  5. 


K 


i 


T-»f  ^    ■ 


I  ^ 


m' 


174  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

One  way  in  which  this  has  sometimes  been  done  is 
by  quartering  soldiers  upon  the  homes  of  the  people, 
thus  not  only  imposing  unequal  burdens,  but  very  se- 
riously impairing  and  interfering  with  the  privacy  and 
freedom  of  the  home. 

In  times  of  peace  the  international  government 
ought  to  be  prohibited  to  do  this  altogether,  and  in  time 
of  war  except  in  the  mode  prescribed  by  law.* 

VII 
Jury  Trial  in  Civil  Cases 

The  Seventh  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  declares  that 

"  In  suits  at  common  kw  where  the  value  in 
controversy  shall  exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved;  and  no  fact 
tried  by  a  jury  shall  be  other\.ise  examined  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States  than  according  to  the 
rules  of  the  common  law." 

This  suggests  the  question  whether  a  similar  provi- 
sion ought  to  be  contained  in  the  proposed  international 
constitution. 

The  jury  system,  while  adopted  from  the  English 
common  law  into  the  jurisprudence  of  many  of  the  most 
advanced  nations  for  service  in  criminal  cases,  has  not 
been  widely  adopted  as  it  applies  to  civil  suits.  This 
fact  is  some  evidence  at  least  that  the  jury  system,  as 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  a,  cl.  6, 


GUARANTEES— EMINENT  DOMAIN  175 
applied  in  civil  cases  in  England  and  America,  is  not 
suited  to  the  needs  or  habits  of  many  of  the  other  na- 
tions. Nor  indeed  does  it  go  entirely  unchallenged  in 
America  itself,  for  there  is  a  growing  sentiment  among 
American  lawyers  and  jurists  that  in  civil  cases  conclu- 
sions as  to  disputed  facts  are  more  satisfactory  when 
reached  by  the  judge  than  by  the  jury. 

Th  ,se  considerations  point  to  the  total  exclusion  of 
this  ».iause  from  the  list  of  limitations  upon  the  powers 
of  the  international  government,  leaving  the  Congress 
free  to  adopt  such  system  as  it  may  deem  best  for  the 
determination  of  facts  in  civil  cases  litigated  *-  the 
international  courts. 

VIII 
Power  of  Eniinent  Domain 


m 

feij 

'Mm 


It  is  universally  recognized  that  every  man  holds  his 
property  subject  to  the  public  needs  of  the  State,  which 
has  the  power  to  demand  it  of  him  for  the  public  use 
and  benefit. 

But  to  require  him  to  surrender  it  for  the  public  use 
would  be  to  impose  upon  him  an  unequal  burden,  unless 
it  were  equalized  by  paying  him  a  just  compensation 
for  his  loss  out  of  the  proceeds  of  taxes  levied  ratably 
upon  all  members  of  the  community.  And  to  take  the 
property  of  one  for  the  mere  private  use  of  another 
cannot  be  justified  upon  any  sound  principle.  It  would 
be  mere  confiscation,— a  taking  of  his  property  "  with- 
out due  process  of  law." 


{I- 


\-1 


;B?  i  fi? 


176 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


:1      i 

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4       I 


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^ 


The  American  Constitution  has  recognized  this  prin- 
ciple, and  has  imposed  a  limitation  upon  the  powers  of 
the  federal  government  by  a  provision  that 

"  private  property  shall  not  be  taken  for  public 
use  without  just  compensation." 

In  the  United  States  this  has  been  construed  to 
mean  that  the  owner  of  property  which  has  been 
physically  and  corporeally  taken  or  invaded  by  the 
government  for  the  public  use  must  be  adequately  com- 
pensated; but  it  does  not  apply  to  those  mere  inci- 
dental damages  to  property  rights  that  result  from 
the  progress  and  growth  of  communities,  or  from  the 
enactment  of  legislation  restricting  businers,  trades, 
occupations,  or  a  person's  use  of  his  own  property, 
within  reasonable  limits.  These  may  create  restric- 
tions upon  the  legitimate  uses  the  owner  may  make  of 
his  own,  but  they  do  not  take  the  property  from 
him,  and  therefore  are  held  not  to  fall  within  the 
requirement  that  just  compensation  must  be  made 
him. 

Indeed,  no  general  law  can  well  be  passed  that  would 
not  injuriously  affect  someone  in  his  business  or  prop- 
erty rights.  For  such  losses  the  government  ought  not 
to  be  required  tc  nake  compensation.  Thus,  by  the 
enactment  of  a  law  reducing  the  tariff  rates  upon  cer- 
tain goods  or  prohibiting  the  manufacture  or  sale  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  the  State  docs  not  actually  take 
anyone's  property  from  him  for  public  use,  and  cannot 


j'^h 


if    I 


GUARANTEES— DUE  PROCESS        177 

be  required  to  pay  for  the  losses  incidental  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  new  regulations. 

A  similar  provision,  similarly  construed,  would  not 
come  amiss  in  our  tentative  constitution.' 

IX 
Due  Process  of  Law 

It  is  a  principle  of  justice,  written  in  indelible  char- 
acters upon  the  human  heart,  that  no  man  shall  be 
condemned  unheard  and  without  a  proper  and  rea- 
sonable opportunity  to  defend  himself  before  an  ap- 
propriate  impartial  tribunal  and  upon  regular  and 
orderly  proceedings.  Any  other  procedure  is  mere  an- 
archy and  the  execution  of  the  tyrannical  and  lawless 
will  of  the  mob,  whether  or  not  accomplished  under 
the  forms  of  law. 

This  principle  is  expressed  in  English  and  American 
law  by  the  phrase  "due  process  of  law"  or  "the 
law  of  the  land,"  and  in  other  countries  is  recognized 
under  other  names. 

^  It  would  be  as  illegal  for  government,  in  any  of  its 
-epartments,— legislative,  executive,  or  judicial,— to 
attempt  to  deprive  a  person  of  his  rights  without  "  due 
process  of  law  "  as  for  a  mob  or  a  private  person  to 
attempt  it;  and  the  fact  that  the  attempt  is  clothed 
in  the  attire  of  a  legislative  or  executive  act  or  a  judicial 
mandate  does  not  make  it  any  the  less  inherently  il- 

"  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  a,  cl.  7. 


m 


'  » *  * 


ll 


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178  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

legal,  if  suitable  opportunity  be  not  given  the  victim 
to  defend  himself  or  his  property  in  a  regular  and  or- 
derly procedure. 

Thus  it  would  be  as  illegal,  under  this  principle,  for 
the  legislature  to  declare  by  law  that  A's  property  shall 
be  taken  from  him  and  given  to  B  for  his  private  use, 
or  that  A  is  a  criminal  whose  life  is  forfeited,  as  it 
would  be  if  these  things  were  done  by  a  mere  party  of 
rioters;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the  judgment  of  a 
court  wherein  the  defendant  has  never  appeared  or 
been  notified  of  the  existence  of  the  complaint  against 
him,  or  of  a  court  which  has  no  legal  jurisdiction  to 
adjudge  the  question  at  issue.  If  these  may  be  justi- 
fied, then  so  m  ly  lynch  law. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has  aptly 
and  tersely  expressed  this  limitation  upon  the  federal 
power  by  providing  that  no  person 

"shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law."  f    f     j 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  term  "liberty"  as 
construed  in  the  United  States,  embraces  far  more 
than  the  mere  freedom  from  physical  confinement.  It 
extends  also  to  freedom  of  contract,  freedom  of  occu- 
pation  and  employment,  and  freedom  in  the  use  of  all 
those  faculties  that  contribute  to  human  happiness,  con- 
tent,  and  comfort. 

And  the  term  "  property  "  applies  tc  vested  rights 
m  subjects  of  ownership,  not  to  mere  contingent  or 
expectant  rights  such  as  the  expectancy  a  sole  child 


'■*•-. 


GUARANTEES-EQUAL  PROTECTION    179 

may  have  that  he  will  receive  all  his  father's  property 
at  the  latter's  death. 

In  the  proposed  international  constitution,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  phrase  suitable  to  convey  this  idea  common 
to  all  the  nations,  it  would  perhaps  be  unwise  to  use 
the  technical  phrase  of  the  English  and  American  law. 
It  thus  becomes  necessary,  in  the  place  of  the  term 
"  due  process  of  law,"  to  use  language  that  will  de- 
scribe the  principle  as  tersely  as  possible.' 


Equal  Protection  of  the  Laws 

The  governmental  power  to  pass  discriminatory  and 
preferential  legislation,  as  has  been  indicated  in  sev- 
eral connections,  is  often  a  source  of  grievous  injustice 
and  oppression  whether  it  be  aimed  at  the  component 
States  of  a  federal  union  or  at  the  persons  subject  to 
the  governmental  regulations. 

Instances  have  already  appeared  in  which  our  pro- 
posed international  constitution  has  prohibited  the  fed- 
eral government  to  enact  legislation  that  might  discrim- 
mate  in  favor  of  or  against  certain  of  the  component 
nations. 

It  ought  equally  to  be  prohibited  to  use  the  inter- 
national power  in  such  manner  us  to  discriminate  un- 
reasonably in  favor  of  or  against  particular  persons 
or  classes.     Hence  a  clause  has  been  inserted  in  our 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  a,  cl.  8. 


'1  I 


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m 


iff 


-|v 


1 80 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


constitution  providing  that  no  person  shall  be  denied 
by  the  United  Nations  "  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws," — a  phrase  which  is  found  in  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  to  the  American  Constitution. 

As  construed  in  the  United  States,  this  does  not  mean 
that  governmental  action  shall  be  absolutely  uniform 
in  its  application  to  all  persons.  It  permits  classifi- 
cations of  persons  upon  reasonable  lines,  and  author- 
izes the  application  of  different  legislation  to  the  dif- 
ferent classes.  But  the  classifications  must  not  be 
purely  arbitrary  or  based  upon  grounds  for  which  no 
sound  reason  can  be  given.  Subject  to  these  limita- 
tions, the  classifications  may  be  as  minute  as  the  legis- 
lature may  choose  to  make  them. 

When,  however,  the  classifications  have  once  been 
made,  it  would  be  a  denial  of  the  equal  protection  of 
the  laws  to  single  out  individuals  of  the  class,  and  make 
laws  applicable  to  them  which  would  not  apply  to  other 
members  of  the  same  class  who  cannot  be  differentiated 
from  the  former  upon  any  line  that  would  justify  the 
difference  in  the  laws  applicable  to  them,  respectively.' 
*  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  a,  d.  8. 


^ 


.,,***.. 


CHAPTER  XII 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 
UNITED  NATIONS-(III)  GUARANTEES 
OF  INDIVIDUAL  RIGHTS  IN  CRIMINAL 
CASES 


^1 
I 

-  j.'f 
mi 


Due  Process  of  Law— Equal  Protection  of 
THE  Laws 

The  two  limitations  last  examined  in  the  preceding 
chapter  apply  equally  to  guarantee  one's  rights  in  civil 
and  m  criminal  cases,  and  belong  as  much  to  this  as  to 
the  preceding  chapter. 

There  i.  no  need  to  repeat  the  discussion,  and  they 
will  be  passed  over. 

II 

Bills  of  Attainder— Ex  Post  Facto  Laws 

Our  model,  the  American  Constitution,  provides  as 
a  limitation  upon  the  federal  powers  that 

pa"ssed."  °^  ^"^'"^'^  °'  ^^  post  facto  law  shall  be 

These  two  phrases  are  technical  terms  of  the  Eng- 
hsh  and  American  law,  and  not  only  demand  some  ex- 

I8i 


» 


i 


i    'i 


Hf 


182  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

planation,  but  also  necessitate  the  use  of  periphrasis 
in  the  wording  of  the  corresponding  limitation  in  our 
international  constitution,  since  the  terms  would  be  un- 
known in  other  countries,  though  the  principles  them- 
selves might  be  recognized. 

A  bill  of  attainder  is  a  legislative  (instead  of  a  ju- 
dicial) adjudication  of  the  criminal  guilt  of  a  per- 
son and  a  legislative  sentence  of  the  person  convicted 
to  execution,  imprisonment,  fine,  or  other  punish- 
ment. 

An  ex  post  facto  law,  as  defined  in  America,  is  a 
law  which  makes  an  act  punishable  criminally  to  a 
greater  extent  than  when  committed,  or  which  alters 
the  rules  of  evidence  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  ac- 
cused, so  as  to  require  less  or  different  evidence  to 
convict  him.  It  applies  only  to  crimes,  and  not  to 
civil  rights,  remedies  or  procedure. 

These  two  provisions  afford  very  important  safe- 
guards to  the  personal  security  of  the  individual 
against  governmental  oppression,  and  ought  not  to  fail 
of  insertion  in  the  list  of  limitations  upon  the  powers 
of  the  international  government* 


IS 


r**»V 


III 

Gexeral  Warrants  uf  Arrest  and  Search 

Still  another  limitation  imposed  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  upon  the  federal  power  is  found 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i. 


'■''•.i'*»n#. 


GUARANTEES-GENERAL  WARRANTS    183 

in  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  that  instrument,  as  fol- 
lows: 

Der  Jrll'  h^^'  °^  '^'  P'°P'"  ^°  ^'  ««"^e  in  their 
persons  houses  papers,  and  effects  against  un- 
reasonable searches  and  seizures  shall  not  be  vio- 
XtJ      "°  warrants  shall  issue  but  upon  prob- 

n.rurT'{  TP°-t^^  ^y,""^'^  «'■  affirmation^nd 
and  hi  n'^  describing  the  place  to  be  sea;ched 
and  the  persons  or  thmgs  to  be  seized." 

Thus  has  been  imbedded  in  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  United  States  that  great  principle  of  liberty  ex- 
pressed  in  the  phrase,  -  One's  house  is  one's  castle  " 
and  which  Lord  Chatham  so  eloquently  proclaimed  in 
his  speech  on  General  Warrants,  in  the  famous  pas- 
sage : 

"  The  poorest  man  may  in  his  cottage  bid  de- 
fiance to  all  the  forces  of  the  crown.  It  may  be 
frail;  its  roof  may  shake;  the  wind  may  blow 
enter ^r";  H'  t^^'"' I^^V  enter;  the  rafn  may 
Al  hU  f  "'  '^'  '""^  °^  ^"8'^"^  '"^y  "ot  enter 
rle^\enemen?.'"  "°^  "°"  '""^  ^^^"^°^^  ^'  '^^ 

Whatever  the  domestic  laws  of  the  several  States 
with  respect  to  such  matters,  no  nation  in  joining  the 
proposed  union  could  have  other  than  a  feeling  of  relief 
that  the  international  government  would  be  prohibited 
to  exercise  such  arbitrary  powers  within  its  borders.^ 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


t  1; 


• .  I 

I      i 


iljlll 


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'} 


184  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

IV 

Double  Jeopardy 

Another  limitation  upon  the  powers  of  th  federal 
government  of  the  United  States  is  found  in  the  con- 
stitutional provision  that  no  person  shall 

"  be  subject  for  the  same  offense  to  be  twice  put 
in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb." 

This  is  the  English  and  American  legal  expression 
of  a  principle  of  justice  that  probably  prevails  in  one 
form  or  another  in  every  civilized  country,  that  is,  that 
an  accused  person,  havin^  once  been  tried  for  an  of- 
fense and  either  acquitted,  or  convicted  and  punished, 
shall  not  be  subject  to  another  trial  for  that  particular 
offense. 

This  is  a  principle  which  should  certainly  be  applied 
in  all  prosecutions  by  the  international  government  for 
violations  of  its  laws. 

But  in  its  technical  application  in  the  United  States. 
the  rule  has  sometimes  been  carried  further  than  strict 
justice  demands;  for  it  is  held  that  a  person  has  been 
in  jeopardy  as  soon  as  his  trial  commences,  that  is,  as 
soon  as  the  jury  has  been  sworn  and  charged  with  his 
deliverance,  and  that  therefore  the  right  to  try  him 
again  ceases,  however  guilty  he  may  be,  whether  a  ver- 
dict is  reached  or  not,  unless  the  trial  is  terminated  by 
some  inevitable  necessity,  such  as  the  illness  or  death 
of  the  judge  or  a  juror,  or  a  divided  jury,  or  unless 


/If.  ;.;■,. ^*, 


U>4i 


GUARANTEES-SEi.F-INCRIMINATION  ,85 
the  prisoner  himself  asks  or  consents  that  he  be  placed 
again  on  tnal  (as  he  might  do  if  he  were  convicted  and 
desires  a  new  trial). 

JZl  b!  "T  •"''"'■"''""  ""''  -fincments  would 
perhaps  be  unknown  ,„  other  eountries,  nor  do  ehev 

It  would  therefore  seem  preferable  to  depart  in 
.h.s  respect  from  the  precise  language  of  the  Amer  ca" 
Cons.,tut,on,  while  yet  recognising  the  principTe" 


:  ,1'- 


mil 

'1' 

i 

lii 


Self-Incrimination 

J^rr  '''™"  '''  '"^"'"'^  "  «'«  "i<'<^n«  that 
>ould  tend  ,0  conv,ct  him  of  a  criminal  offense  has 

caTlar  but- ''■^'"'"'  ","■""■"=  "'  ^"^"^'^  "'1  -W 
e  sa^t'o  „  '"  '■:  "™P'f -»  «  'e-t,  it  can  hardly 

The  question  then  is  presented  whether  this  should 
b    .ncluded  as  one  of  the  limitations  upon  the  pow    s 

.he  in;;: -ir'""" '-"""""' '-  -^^  p--- «; 

bvTh  '  T"rT  °'  '"  "°""  "'"^"^^y  1==  «'0"gly  urged 
/  *=  Enghsh-speaking  nations,  whose  people  arc    c 
stcmed  ,0  regard  it  as  a  fundamental  personal  right: 
and  no  other  nation  would  be  likely  to  Object  serious^ 

5«  App„dix,  Consfn  u.  N.,  Art.  IV,  s„.  3,  cl.  j. 


1% 
I 


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A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


to  its  insertion,  since  the  prohibition  would  decrease 
the  chances  of  the  oppression  of  its  own  citizens  by  the 
international  government^ 

VI 

The  Grand  Jury 

The  Fifth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  declares  that 

"  No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capi- 
tal or  otherwise  infamous  crime  unless  upon  a  pre- 
sentment or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in 
cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the 
militia  'vhen  in  actual  service  in  time  of  war  or 
public  danger." 

The  institution  of  the  grand  jury,  the  function  of 
which  is  not  to  try  the  guilt  of  the  accused  but  only  to 
determine  whether  the  evidence  against  him  is  suffi- 
cient  to  justify  his  trial,  is  well  known  in  England  and 
the  United  States;  but  it  is  unknown  in  most  of  the 
countries  of  the  world,  in  many  of  which  other  methods 
just  as  efficient  are  used  to  prevent  frivolous  or  mali- 
cious accusations  of  crime. 

It  would  seem  prudent  therefore  to  leave  this  mat- 
ter to  the  discretion  of  the  Congress. 
'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IV,  Sec.  j,  cl.  3. 


ii;f,i :  -^/^mtw 


GUARANTEES— JURY  TRIAL 


187 


\/'T 


Speedy  akd  "tuc  Ti  ,al  ,n  Criminal  Cases 

tancVofT'''  """'"',  '"  "'™"'="'  "P""  *e  impor- 
tance of  a  constitunonal  guarantee  of  a  speedy  and 
publ.c  tnal  to  one  accused  of  crime 

In  the  absence  of  such  guarantee,  not  only  may  an 
accused  person  be  left  ,„  languish  indefinitely  in  prison 
awa,t,ng  a  trial  that  does  not  come,  and  thus  in'eZ 
be  punished  for  an  alleged  crime  without  a  trial    bu" 

ZnT    ^      i    "'''  "^"'^'"'  °'  'he  eyidence  of  hi, 
De  tolerated  by  general  opinion.* 


in 


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VIII 
Jury  Trial  in  Criminal  Cases 

The  Sixth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Const! 
tufon  provides  that  in  criminal  cases  the  trial  shall" 

whe'rdn  t\^rrnie^"s?alf  hat 'i;^^^  ^"'^  ^''^^^ 
which  district  shall  hlvl  t  ^^^".  ^""i^itted, 
tained  by  law."      "         '  •"'"  previously  ascerl 

.    T^''  ''^'"^^  's  construed  as  demanding  in  all  rrim 
-1  prosecutions  instituted  by  the  United  ^l^Z 

5«  Appcndi,,  Consfn  U.  N,  Art.  IV.  Sec.  j,  cl.  4. 


Ill 

i 


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i  i 

I 

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:/^ 


5    •■    *     z 


1 88  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  prisoner  shall  be  deter- 
mined, in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  English 
common  law,   by   an   impartial   jury  of  twelve   men 
(neither  more  nor  less),   whose   unanimous  verdict 
after  hearing  the  legal  evidence  adduced,  shall  be  iieccs^ 
sary  to  convict  or  acquit.     If  any  juror  dissents  from 
the  verdict  of  his  fellows,  there  is  a  mistrial,  and  the 
prisoner  may  be  tried  again  by  another  jury;  but  if  all 
the  jurors  agree  that  he  is  innocent  or  that  no  sufficient 
evidence  of  his  guilt  has  been  adduced,  the  verdict  is 
"  not  guilty,"  and  he  cannot  be  again  tried  for  that 
offense. 

The  jury  system  in  criminal  cases,  at  one  time  con- 
fined  to  English-speaking  nations,  has  now  been 
adopted  with  more  or  'jss  modiHcation  in  many  of  the 
European  countries  and  elsewhere,  and  may  be  said 
to  have  fullv  proved  its  usefulness  in  those  cases. 

From  the  standpoint  of  a  constitutional  protection  to 
the  accused,  its  advantage  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  tempers 
the  severity  of  the  abstract  law  and  the  possible  mal:\.- 
of  prosecutors  and  government  officials  with  the  pubi;. 
opinion  of  the  community  as  represented  by  the  jurv. 
It  is  not  essential,  however,  for  these  results  th..: 
the  jury  should,  as  in  England  and  in  the  United  States. 
consist  of  twelve  men,  or  that  they  should  be  unanimous 
in  their  verdict. 

While  it  would  seem  wise  to  insert  in  the  proposed 
constitution  a  requirement  of  trial  by  jury  in  crimin;! 
cn^es  prosecuted  before  the  international  courts,  su.h 
matters  as  the  number  of  the  jurors  and  the  majorirv 


OTiJiiR  guaraxj fa;s 


1R9 


necessary  to  find  a  verdict  might  well  be  left  to  the  dis 
cretion  of  the  Congress.' 


m 


w 


IX 

OriiKR  Glak.\mi:j.s  r.\  Ckimixai.  Caseo 

Every  sentiment  of  justice  and  fairness  demands  that 
an  accused  person  shoulu  be  informed  of  the  nature 
and  cause  of  the  accusation  against  him;  that  he  be 
confronted  with  his  accusers  and  the  witnesses  against 
h.m  w.th  the  nght  to  cross-examine  them  and  e!icI^  the 
truth;  that  for  the  purposes  of  his  defense  he  be  placed 
upon  an  equal  plane  with  his  powerful  antagonist.  .' 
government,  and  be  given  the  right  to  obtain  the  com- 
pulsory  attendance  of  witnesses  in  his  favor;  that  he  be 
not  den.ed  the  aid  and  comfort  of  legal  counsJ   in 
h.s  defense;  and  that  he  be  allowed  his  freedom  while 
awamng   tr.al    for    a    crime    not   too   serious,    upon 
g'vmg  bad  or  proper  security  that  he  will  appear  to 

As  in  the  other  cases  heretofore  considered,  no  na. 
t:on  would  be  likely  to  object  to  the  imposition  of  these 
■mitat.ons  upon  the  mternational  government,  since 
they  would  all  constitute  valuable  safeguards  of  life 
:ind  liberty  to  its  own  citizens  against  possible  tjran- 
nical  encroachments  of  the  federal  government.^ 

;  ?ee  .Appendix,  Conn'n  V.  N..  Art.  IV,  Sec    ,    cl    s 
««  AppeuJij,  Contfn  U.  N.,  Art.  IV  ' 


Sec. 


3.  cl.  5. 


f 


•i 


i  ..f 


CHAPTER  XIII 

LIMITATIONS  UPON  THE  POWERS  OF  THE 
COMPONENT  NATIONS 


General  Limitations  of  a  Non-Political  Nature 

As  preliminary  to  an  examination  of  the  limitations 
which  must  be  imposed  upon  the  powers  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  in  order  to  the  success  of  an  interna- 
tional union,  it  is  proper  to  observe  that,  in  a  looser 
confederation  of  the  kind  here  proposed,  the  fewer 
these  limitations  are,  consistent  with  a  suitable  degree 
of  power  in  the  international  government,  the  safer  the 
constituent  nations  and  the   greater  the  probability 
that  they  may  assent  to  the  experiment.    The  burden 
then  is  on  him  who  maintains  the  necessity  of  a  par- 
ticular  limitation  of  this  sort  to  show  that  the  success 
of  the  union  would  be  jeopardized  by  the  failure  of  the 
component  States  to  surrender  all  right  to  exercise  the 
given  power.    This  should  be  the  one  and  only  test  of 
the  propriety  of  the  limitation. 

The  reader  must  also  remember  that  a  mere  grant 
of  power  to  the  international  government  does  not 

190 


^ 


't! 


LIMITATIONS  ON  COMPONENT  STATES  ,„ 

necessarily  imply  the  exrln^mr,  ^(  *u 

fro.  .He  e  J.L  oi^rr  ^t^Trefr 

the  States  be  thus  exchiHeH    :.  •  ^ 

fi,«    k  ..        ^''^'"^ed,  It  IS  neccs.  iry  e  ther  that 

they  be  actually  prohibited  hv  th. 

Our  model,  the  Constitution  of  the  United  S..^ 
contams  a  considerable  number  of  Li.  ?  ' 

by  certain  others  to  be  found  in  the  Thir  L  "rp 
•eenth,  and  Fifteenth  A.end.cn,    ^a     das  a  Z 
s~  of  the  gtcat  conflict  of, ^„tr„X- 

--■;  H^ie^tdrflt  :;r  tTtesttt'-  'r 

tions  to  their  nv^n  .v  states,  or  their  rela- 

tending    n    heir  on  "  "'"  "  ^^  °^^-  P"-"^. 

and  thd    peol  Z  ,'°  """''^^^^  ^'^^   State 

or  no  b    HnT    onThat'^h     "''°"'  '"^  '^^''"^  ''«'^ 
eral  union   and^he    h    .  ^''''  ^"^P^^^  °^  '  ^^d- 

consider!!!^    eJirn      r''7^  °'  ^'^  ""'^^  -^  -^ 
"ons.     J  o  the  extent  that  they  do  not  aid 


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192  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

this  chief  design  of  our  international  compact,  they 

ought  to  be  ehminated  from  the  discussion. 

Thus  the  Thirteenth  Amendment  abolishes  slavery 
Within  the  United  States  and  all  places  subject  to  their 
junsd.ction.     It  is  obvious  that  this  provision  deals 
with  an  mstitution  of  an  internal  or  domestic  charac- 
ter which,  while  now  obsolete  in  the  most  progressive 
countries,  still  prevails  in  one  form  or  another  in  som^ 
countries  less  advanced.    And  though  the  majority  of 
the  nations  would  doubtless  welcome  the  abolition  of 
such   institutions   throughout   the   world,   it  must  be 
remembered  that  this  is  one  of  those  internal  reforms 
that  of  Itself  has   no   bearing   upon   war   or  peace. 
and  hence  should  theoretically  have  no  p!,ce  among 
the    powers    to    be    surrendered    by    the    component 
nations. 

But  with  respect  to  the  slave  trade,  so  far  as  it 
might  be  carried  on  between  the  component  nations  a 
different  result  would  follow  because  of  the  grant  to 
the  Congress  of  the  power  to  regulate  international 
commerce.    True,  the  Congress  is  forbidden  under  this 
clause  to  meddle  with  "  immigration,  emigration,  or  the 
migration  of  citizens  of  a  component  State  from  one 
such  State  to  another."     Slaves,  however,  would  not 
be  citizens  of  a  State,  though  resident  therein,  but,  as 
mere  articles  of  merchandise,  would  fall  within  the 
power  of  the  Congress  to  control  international  com- 
merce.   That  body  therefore  might  constitutionally  en- 
act laws  making  international  traffic  in  slaves  illegal 
as  between  the  component  nations  or  as  between  them 


LIMITATIONS  ON  COMPONENT  STATES  ,93 
and  nation,  not  members  of  the  union.  Such  laws,  how- 
ever,  could  not  properly  be  extended  into  the  borders 
of  a  component  State,  and  made  to  apply  either  ,0 
the  domestic  mstitution  of  slavery  or  peonage  existing 
ehere  or  to  the  dome3tic  traffic  in  slaves.  Such  m  t"! 
must  e  left  as  they  now  are,  subject  to  the  e«  us  v 
control  of  the  several  States. 

The  success  of  an  international  union  such  as  we  are 
cons,der,ng  will  depend  upon  the  absolute  o    e7va 
0    the  pnncple  that  the  proposed  government  sh^ 
possess  no  power  to  mterfere  in  the  local  and  domestic 
concerns  of  any  nation  except  ,0  the  extent  nec«      y 
0  prevent  war  (or  possibly  i„  those  cases  wh  re  n 
the  general  convenience  of  all  nations  would  be  gr      v 
subserved  by  the  exercise  of  a  central  authority,  a   p   ! 
haps  , urease  of  international  coinage,  curren^^,  'c^p". 

Mates  by  the  American  Constitufio     have  for  their 

si  !;•; ' ;  rr""™  t  ■•-""''^-'^  ^gam^'^e ;':: 

sibihty  of  aggression   by  the  States.     This  is  true 
even  of  a  few  of  the  limitations  contained    nh 
ongmal  Constitution,  and  is  eminently  true  of  tht 
-.ained  in  the   Fourteenth  and   Fiflenth  imen:! 

-ior;t;rtti'niit:r'-'''^-"-'^-- 

iaw.tKim7air;Lle'"ht''^^  "Z"^'  '••«'' 
or  grant  a^y'tToflwilt;.'' «"'™  "'  '°"'"^"- 


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194  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  declares  that 

Stale1'L?5"uEjea  trthe"?"'^^'-'"-'^  '"  '^'  ^^'^^ 

depri."e  any  %^sl'1^^  ^^^"  ^"^  Stat^ 

without  due  p^rocesso/l  I'         7^'  "^  P'^^P^'^^V 

And  the  Fifteenth  Amendment  provides  that 

of  ^hl'V,""'"  'u  '"  "■"'  '™''»"°"^  "PO"  'he  powers 
of  the  States,  the  general  observation  may  be  made 

powers   (the  e.Nerc,se  of  which  by  the  States  miclu 
mper,l  the  union's  existence  or  interfere  with  ts  pi 

'o  levy  du fes  on  .mports  or  to  declare  war     Thev 

l°TT-  ""'""■°"'  "P™  "•»  P"*"  of  the  Su 
to  deal  „,th  individuals  within  their  boundarie   ww" 
however  essential  in  a  constitution,  one  of  the  pH^e 
purposes  of  which  is  to  create  of  the  compos, t    S^e 
a  s,ngle  nation-would  be  inappropriate  i'a  cont' 
"on  creatmg  a  looser  confederation  between  indepe    . 


.**.«#  i^ 


w 


»! 


i 


LIMITATIONS  ON  COMPONENT  STATES  .95 

ene  nations,  the  main  design  of  which  is  the  suppression 
of  wars  between  them. 

It  may  also  be  remarlced  that  the  experience  of  the 
Un„ed  S  ates  proves  that  certain  of  these  clauses  - 
notably  those  prohibiting  the  States  to  pass  laws   m 

ToT ,;  t''"'™ "'  ^°'"™"^'  -  "'P-e  ZZ- 

law  0  ';„  h"''-  "  P'"""'^  "''"-'  due  pro  ess 
tlT  ,       ''  •"  "">■  P"^°"  "i">i"  'heir  jurisdic 

t.on  the  equal  protection  of  the  laws,-have  furnish  d 
perhaps  more  grounds  of  litigation  in  the  federal  courts 

7T^."  ''"""  '"  "•'  institution,,  and  ha'e 
us  afforded  greater  opportunities  to  the  federafau 
or,.,es  to  .nterfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  thfs    ! 

of  h,      . '  ?     '°  "'""''  ""^  P"''"  ^"d  influence 

ere  Itv      ;     ^''"""""'  "  ""^  "P-«  "'  *=  -v! 
ere^ty  and  reserved  powers  of  the  States.    It  is  open 

0  doubt  whether  a  strong  tendenc,-  in  this  dire   ion  is 

<les,rable  even  in  the  United  States;  it  is  very  c  "tain 

4«  .t  would  be   -isastrous  in  the  international  fed"" 

UB^'T  """  ""1'""'  ""°"'  "•■'>'  'hese  limitations 

po    the  powers  of  the  component  nations  should  b 

cm  td  from  our  compact,  and  the  several  nations  be 

»'thm  their  borders  as  their  own  constitutions    laws 

.hn  rchT'  f "  ''"'"■  ^-^  ■'•  •>»■ ""  -- "oil : 

npo     i  un"    r'"  "  r  "^  *^™"'"«  should  not  be 
rne  citizens  of  other  States. 
On  the  contrary,  when  it  is  remembered  that  each 


<  ii 


Mi 


h\ 


i   3 


'i- 


i1 

■'■I 


'4i 


*  : 


>9«  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

component  naeion  will  have  surrendered  its  rights  to 
use  force  aga,„st  its  sister  nations,  it  is  no  n,o„  ha^ 
fa.r  and  just,  and  indeed  it  would  be  necessarl   th,? 

the    nternafonal  consftution,  to  be  enforced  bv  the 
courts  both  national  and  international,  that  its  citiz  „ 
when  ,„  other  States  shall  be  treated  vith  proper    " 
s.derat,o„;  that  their  hves  and  liberty  shall  lot  h, 

airfi'^eh'" "'  r-'" "'  -  p- ^""oCs.:; 

taken  from  them  w.thout  due  process  of  law  and  that 

oirrr/th ''■" ''-' "°'  "^ ""-  -'--  '^ 
iU":'o7co^nttrarrnir'^''"^^'"-'''^°^- 

This  puint,  however,  belongs  more  appropriatelv 
under  anotner  head,  and  will  be  examined  aga?„:t 
vye  come  to  consider  the  relations  of  the  comZenT  „? 
«.ons  to  each  other  in  a  subsequent  chapter  " 


II 
Political  Powers  Having  No  Bearing  on  Wak 

Krated'to  7h"°"'  '"'""K^"'™  "'  ">=  Powers  to  be 
granted  to  the  mternational  congress,  the  conclusi 

v"-::""""',:; t'-' "" ^-'-''^y '"-ma."  ^ „ 

vemence  would  be  so  greatly  subserved  by  a  gran, 

e  cv    rerr;    "^  '°T"  '°  "'•"  '"°-''  i--  ^r- 
rency,   regu  ate  copyrights  and  patent  rights  of   ,„ 

■nternational  character,  and  fix  standards  of  well , 

and  measures  for  purposes  of  international  trldf 


on 


to 


TREATIES  BY  COMPONENT  STATES    ,97 
to  demand  their  inclusion  amongs,  the  powers  granted 
despue  the  fact  that  it  wou>d  constitute      departure' 
fron.  the  pnnciple  .hat  only  such  powers  oug  fto  be 

tw:"l"  "°""  '•'  '"  "'  ^""P^"^'-  <"  -r  be! 
tween  the  component  nations. 

It  is  now  to  be  observed  that  even  should  these  now 
ers  or  some  o  them,  be  granted  to  the  Congress  thU 
ll  ""'  '-olve  the  necessity  of  the  surrend  b  th, 
nat  o„s  of  the  concurrent  powers  to  control  and  reg^^ 

III 

Tmaties,  Alliances,  and  Confederations 

We  next  turn  ,0  those  powers,  essentially  of  a  po- 

i  .cal  character,  the  exercise  of  which  by  .L    omno 

en    n  t,o„s  would  jeopardize  the  existence  0  7u„c- 

ons  of  the  international  government.     Here  aZ 

he  subject  may  be  best  developed  by  referVn"  ,0  the 

.n.,tat,o„s  imposed  by  the  Cons.itutL  of   h    Um'tL 

"tranta^r"^  "  ^^  -""-  -"  ^ 

«"ct^:rp:^:irr^'""-"'^--- 

or'^n^edemit"'  ""'"  '"'"  ""^  """y-  '"-"ce, 


.V-  ' 


in* 


1 1 

if 


M 


i'lli' 


■98  A  RKPUBt.IC  OF  NATIONS 

Tha,  the  word  ••  treaty,"  as  here  used,  means  treaty 
lion  th",  "  "  ''""'"  ^'  "•'  '""'■er  provi! 

Rress^entr'int'o"^  ^'"'"""  ""'  ™"'"«  "f  Con. 

It  thus  appears  that  a  State  is  absolutely  prohibited 
to  enter  mto  any  ■•  treaty,  alliance,  or  confederation 
«.th  or  without  the  consent  of  Congress,  while  it  L 
permitted,  with  such  consent,  to  enter  into  "  agr  eme„ 
and  compacts;  other  than  those  just  mentioned 

tat,ons.  The  Const.tut.on  had  elsewhere  bestowed  the 
ent,re  treaty-making  power  -pon  the  federal  govern! 
men,,  as  representing  with  respect  to  foreign  relatior< 
a  smgle  „at,on.     Had  the  States  been  permi  ted t 

racnts  m  ght  result  to  the  federal  and  State  govc-- 

And  should  these  State  treaties  take  the  Lm  o":-: 

.ances  or  confederations  with  foreign  countHes    t"^' 

confl.t  of  dut,es  might  be  even  sharpTr  and  graver    ' 

On  the  other  hand,  since  it  was  the  aim  of  the  Cc- 

s mufon  to  grant  to  the  United  States  the  gener  1  c  :. 

ol  of  mterstate  relations,   the   making  of  trea r. 

alhances,  or  confederations  between  the  Lera    S  '• '. 

un  o  :rfT''-  ""  "  instrumentalities  ^Z 
un.on;  and  ,f,  by  reason  of  omissions  in  the  Cor>-  -  . 
t.on.  a  question  should  arise  between  the  States  or  v,  :r. 


''As, 


TREATIES  BY  COMPONENT  STATES  ,99 
foragn  cou„,ri«  for  the  sel.lemen,  of  which  some 
agrccmen  between  them  might  become  necessarv  li! 
was  provtded  for  b,  the  rec„g„i,i„„  „f  t     r  ^w 

gr«      Th iTa    ""T"'  "'"■  "■=  ^°"""'  '"^°" 

i;ei„^:t-b::-r.T;:r:he^z:: ■ 

agreements  for  the  settlement  of  bound. rrd'ptes' 

amp,::" '" """ """""''"« '"'  --  ™p-ant ::: 

onaEE  ticir  compact.  i-reatea 

-e^eJ^  '^"""■'  '"  «""'  '"  ">e  United  States 

—     -Si„v„rf' '  ""^  '^""^  e-atymaking 
c-t=:^^f  ^°'"  *°  "■='''  '-«-,  alliances  of 


r.ii; 


■r 

1 


iflK 


Wf 


1.  !>    I  >°ll 


\h 


I 


200  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

The  international  union,  however,  would  be  of  nar- 
rower  scope,  so  far  as  its  powers  are  concerned.  It 
must  be  recognized  that  some  nations  might  not  be- 
come  members  of  it,  and  as  to  these  it  would  be  neces- 
sary  to  confer  upon  the  international  government  a  cer. 
tarn  treaty-makmg  power  commensurate  with  its  war 
powers,  us  control  of  international  commerce  and  com- 
munication and  the  other  powers  granted  to  it. 

But  to  go  beyond  this,  and  grant  to  it  the  complete 
and  plenary  power  to  make  treaties  of  all  sorts  with 
nations  not  members  of  the  union,  would  necessarily 
involve  a  total  surrender  by  the  component  nations  of 
the  treaty-making  power  even  in  respect  to  matters 
over  which  the  international  government  would  have 
and  ought  to  have,  no  control.     Moreover,  if  the' 
United  Nations  were  given  this  general  treaty-making 
power,  these  treaties  must  be  regarded  as  laws  of  a 
d.gnity  superior  to  the  laws  and  policies  of  the  sev- 
eral  nations,  thus  Involving  a  surrender  of  internal  sov- 
ereignty  which  few  nations  would  consent  to  make,  and 
which,  .t  IS  believed,  would  be  unnecessary 

It  would  seem  sufficient  to  grant  to  the  international 
government  the  exclusive  power  to  make  all  treaties 
with  nations  not  members  of  the  union  which  are 
proper  and  necessary  to  carry  out  the  powers  granted 
It,  making  ,t  plenary  and  complete  so  far  as  relates  to 
tnose  powers. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  the  component  nations,  like 
the  American  States,  ought  to  surrender  absolutely  th. 
right  to  enter  into  alliances  and  confederations  with 


TAXATION  OF  COMMERCE  BY  STATES  jo. 
othtr  nations  and  into  treaties  dealing  with  subjects 
committed  to  the  control  of  the  internltional  gover" 
ment  there  would  seem  ,„  be  no  good  reason  why  they 
should  not  retam  the  power  to  enter  into  treatfes  of 
other  sores   provided  the  consent  of  the  Congress  be 
rst  ohtamed,  and  provided  that  it  be  made  Le  tia 
0  the  val,d,ty  of  treaties  between  component  nation 
d  those  no.  members  of  the  union  that  they  contain 
provisions  for  the  peaceable  settlement  of  all  disput  s 
ar.s,ng  under  them     The  latter  proviso  would    f 
necessary  m  case  of  treaties  between  two  or  more  com- 
ponent  nations  because  the  constitution  itself  provides 
^r  the  settlement  of  all  disputes  between  them  by  the 
international  courts.*  ^ 

IV 
Taxation  of  International  Commerce 
The  student  of  history  needs  no  reminder  that  per- 

t'r LT    T:  T°'""  ""^  ''''  ^-'^  devastatedTe 

vorld  have  had  their  roots  in  the  desire  to  extend  the 

.rnerce  of  one  nation  at  the  unfair  expense  of  others 

one  ot  the  favorite  instrumentalities  of  this  extension 
n    therefore  one  of  the  great  destroyers  :f  goo^ni 

1  tTn7'  r  ^''\''  °"^  ^'  '''  ^^"^  ''^'^^^ 

t     ff  ,  ^"'""'^'  ^'^^^^"  "=^^''°"^  '^  fo  be  found  in 

'  See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  V.  Sec.  ,. 


i;! 


"•H 

i 


1 


fc 


'C' 


*»f 


202  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

It  is  a  prime  essential  to  any  union  formed  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  and  preserving  mutual  concord 
among  its  component  nations,  that  there  should  be 
freedom  of  trade  among  them.  This  principle  has  been 
recognized  m  the  constitution  of  every  federal  union 
thus  far  created,  and  is  supported  by  every  considera- 
tion  of  theory  as  well  as  of  practical  experience.* 

The  same  general  principle  has  been  applied  in  the 
previous  pages  of  this  study  to  the  international  gov- 
ernment Itself  not  only  by  the  grant  to  that  govern- 
ment  of  the  control  of  international  commerce,  but 
also  by  the  restriction  of  it  to  a  single  form  of  taxa- 

it  "IV^K  ^"''f.^^^'"  be  adduced  .,  an  instance  to  the  contrarv 
«  may   be   replied   that,   while   it  i,   true   the   British   Colonies       J 
Dom.„.ons  have  possessed  and  exercised  the  right  to  levy  Ur"i  du  i" 
even  on  imports  from  the  British  Isle,,  yet  none  of  those    olonies 

goods  through  the  ports  and  custom  house,  of  independent  colX 
foreign  ^countries,  dependent  upon  their  good  will  L  the  conla  If 

Where  such  possibilities  have  existed,  a,  in  the  case  of  the  interior 

Sent  of  aTerV'  ''"'""'  ""'^  ''"^^  '^"'  "«  "^  '^'"     ■ 
Iishment  of  a  federal  constitution  and  the  adoption,  a,  between  the 

colonie,  concerned,  of  absolute  free  trade 

Tor  the  [irT    \  '"  "  """"'''"•  "P°"  "^  ""»"«'«  «"•'"   - 

Poland    H      ^^  of  '«»  commerce,  while  other  countries  like  Ru-.  a 

Gnomic  f^;"'."''  k"'''"'  """  '*"'"•"'»  '"^'  «-''  -o"  -  '"^  -o 
economic  bondage  because  of  the  want  of  such  acces, 

,a\^Vl"  ""l  '"  '•""'  '""•"  '•>"  *'"«*<""  o'  '"de  would  ««rr 
^ons  im  '"Vk""'"'  "?  «~""  "'  '«"  'he  certain  fruit,  of  rcric- 
DointVd      r  '^*""'"   '^"P'''*    •'y   "«   B"'i»»'    Empire,    a-    u.; 

urra.itt::it:p;;..' ''-'''  '""'•'-«  '-^  '^^  "-p-^"-  ^^^ 


> 


■--.  '* 

It- .  .  ; 


?      W 


■'It 


TAXATION  OF  COMMERCE  BY  STATES  203 

3"    of  the  power  ,0  regulate  In.crna.ional  fZ- 
raerce,  as  a  preventive  of  discord  between  the  comoo 
nent  „a.,ons  would  be  idle  and  useless,  if  ir^ere Tot' 

con,pan,ed  by  a  corresponding  surrender  onTh    par 
of  the  nations  of  the  right  to  burden  and  restrict 
through  the  exerrkp  of  »»,»  *     •  restrict  it 

e    "ic  exercise  ot  the  taxing  power     Rv  th>>  «^« 

:rrd:tghrh:^d:Lr"^"n"'-^^^^ 

with  little  or  none  "'^^  "  ""^'■''°^''*8  """"' 

But  it  may  be  asked,  How  then  shall  the  nations  se- 

r"e:;ri:::x.:r"-— -'h; 
-:;:t'rr::e?„esr„Vfrt:::-:^'-^ 

ing  .0  meet  i„  h  '""'  ""''^  "-^  ''"^''=''  <>'  h"- 

JZrtl    t^u""""""  "■=  '■'S''  •"!«»  of  other 
n«|ons.    Yet  she  has  survived  and  prospered  exceed. 

Ae°xili„'^'f  i  "T  '"  •'■^  ""-P""'"'  State,  of  any  of 

or  P  ospeX 7:?;  r  "f  ."""'"I  '"  'he  existence 

of  .errfto;'^oLptrbv  a  Td  '",  "''"  '"'  «'"' 
greater  -he  scope  o, he  freed  ""'""•    '"<"  "■= 

"n-ponent  Stated  "he  g  e       Inh"'  '""'  """"'  '» 
'Wngs  being  equal  ^"  """f""^'  ""■" 


Um 


. 


Pi 


i 


the  tariffs  do 


not 


!'^Si' 


204  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

more  than  suffice  to  pay  the  great  expenditures  for  the 
armaments  which  the  constant  dread  of  war  makes 
necessary.  Let  each  nation  set  off  against  the  loss 
of  revenue  through  its  surrender  of  the  right  to  levy 
duties  on  imports  or  exports  the  gain  in  the  saving  of 
armaments  no  longer  needed,  and  the  balance  in  most 
cases  would  be  on  the  credit  side  of  the  account. 

Furthermore,  one  must  not  overlook  the  great  finan- 
cial gam  to  the  people  of  each  State  because  of  econ- 
om.es  of  expenditure  that  would  be  forced  upon 
governments  dependent  for  their  revenue  upon  pay 
ments  of  taxes  directly  by  the  people. 

The  proposition  uould  doubtless  be  antagonized  hv 
the  privileged  classes  in  every  State,  whose  business  is 
protected  by  the  high  tariffs,   and  many  prophecic 


ICb 


and  threats  of  dire  disaster  would  be  heard.    It  wou'J 
be  argued  that  freedom  of  trade  would  be  followcJ 
by  the  gravitation  of  manufactures  to  tlie  point  of 
cheapest  production,  and  that  thus  each  country  would 
become  less  independent  and  self-sufficient.    In  repl>  ir 
may  be  said  that  it  is  now  considered  desirable  that  a 
country  produce  all  it  needs  chiefly  because  of  the  po- 
sibihties  of  war  in  cutting  off  its  supplies  from  ot'^.r 
countries.    Once  eliminate  the  chance  of  war,  and  ^h 
question  would  soon  solve  itself,  and  trade  would  h  i- 
low  the  freer  lines  of  least  resistance. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  all  such  argumenr^ 

have  been  pressed  with  great  vigor  against  the  e^:,:S 

ishment  of  every  federal  union  now  extant,  from  th: 

Lnited  States  of  America  to  the  German  Empire:  vet 


TAXATION  OF  COMMERCE  BY  STATES  205 
as  between  the  component  States  of  each  union  the  free- 
dom  of  trade  established  has  never  resulted  disas- 
trously  ,0  the  States  concerned,  but  on  the  contrary 

dtCe/e"  ''"^'■"''  '"""'"^  '"  '"-  '""-"^ 

on^mnlf  '"f "  ""''  ''"'''"  "■=  '^y'"8  "'  duties 
on  .mports  and  exports,  wherein  the  component  na- 

t.ons,  ,    unrestncted,  might  impose  taxes  upon  inter- 
oTl     "rr"',"""  '"•  ''^  '"^'"8  duties  on  vessels 

their  carr"  "'■"''''  """""«  '"  P^P""-"  " 

he,r  carrymg  capacty,  not  in  proportion  merely  to 

he,r  value  as  property.     Through  tonnage  taxes  of 

anon,  ,f  so  d.sposed,  ,„  lay  very  considerable  bur- 

.a   leg  »lat,on  ,n  favor  of  or  against  the  commerce  of 

to  b   „    .".'"Tu     ^'•'^  '""  "'  '^S'^'^'-"  »1-  ought 
f  be  proh.bued  by  the  international  compact. 

These  do  not  exhaust  the  means  that  might  be  used 

mer'ceTtT       f  "'  '"'""^  "'  ''''"^  '"  "-   "- 
me    e  at  the  unfa.r  expense  of  other  nations,  but  they 

»odd  consftute  the  most  usual  means.    Should  other 
granted  to  the  Congress  to  regulate  international  com- 

rrevXr^c™""^"-'^-*"'''''--"^''' 

■See  Appendix.  Consfn  V.  S.,  Art.  V,  Sec  a. 


Uil 


)$ 


i 

i 


I 


m 


'J 


'Ml 


Mt 


206  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

V 
The  War  Powers  of  the  Component  Nation. 

It  has  already  been  indicated  that  the  success  of  an 
mternatjonal  union  such  as  is  here  contemplated  would 
be  hopeless  w.thout  a  surrender  by  the  component  n,. 
tions  of  the  pnncpal  part  of  their  war  powers.    Nor 
would  „  ,„ffi„  f„,  ,his  purpose  merely  to  grant  to  ,h 
federal  government  the  power  to  keep  troops  and  bat. 
tlesh,ps  and  to  declare  war.    There  must  also  be  an 
actual  surrender  by  the  component  nations  of  a  large 
portion  of  these  powers.  ^ 

.„.?"'  V"  'I"'"''  •"  '"PP""''  "■«  ">=  ""ions,  ac 

ms'to  e",       '  t"  '°  "''  "P°"  "•-  o™  «™"8 
aTiL    a„        "      "'  "«'■"  """^  '•'f^-d  themselve; 

bound  hand  and  foot  to  the  mercies  of  a  federal  gov. 
ernment  wherem  other  nations  would  have  as  great  a 
voice  as  themselves,  or  even  greater 

tarl  fo  ^  •r..'""V°''''"^'  "<"  ""'y  because  mil.. 
tary  force  of  th.s  kmd  will  sometimes  be  needed  ,. 
quell  mternal  disorders,  but  because  it  is  possiHe  ,h 

from":-th™^  "  """  ■"'°"  •"  ^^P^'  -'"ks  upo  ' 

roln      ,  government  would  be  bound  to  aij  a 

component  nat.on  against  such  attacks,  its  aid  c„„U 
be  g,.en   only  after  an   appreciable   interval  during 


WAR  POWERS  OF  STATES  ,07 

Jm  '"'  '""V"  ""•''''">•"  'he  component  nations 
should  reserve  .he  r,gh.  ,0  o.gani.c  and  train  militia 
bu,  whether  they  ought  not  ,lso  ,0  reserve  the  right  to 
W  a  certam  proportion  of  trained  troops  and  ship, 

tl™!*!!/""""", '^''""''•""™  '"■•'''''»  'he  States  in 
t.me  of  peace  to  keep  troops  (other  than  militia)  or 
w  r  vesse  s.  But  there  is  one  very  important  difference 
between  the  present  conditions  in  which  the  nations  find 
themse  ves  and  those  confronting  the  American  States 

.le  St  t^'r."'  ""'  ^"""'""'O"-     Then  none  o" 

the  Mates  had  been  accustomed  to  act  independentiv 

s  sovere,g„  nations,  waging  war  and  makinTpea  e 

a,::    an!  '""  '"'/T''""^'  '^'^''""^  -">  '-i^' 
a  It;  „."""%      "■""  P""""''  =«her  standing 
arm.es  or  sh.ps  of  war.     Thus  they  were  not  called 
upon  to  res,g„  costly  and  much  prizL  possesl     ' 
'>ould  he  many  of  the  nations  of  today  were  thev 

.on  hat  they  a  once  surrender  their  armies  and 
"»ie  .  International  distrust  and  jealousy  would 
^^..ess    forbid    any    sudden    holocaust    of    Zl'. 

Not  only  then  would  it  seem  essential  .0  provide  in 

raZtTf'  the"''"""""  '"  --  P'-  °'  «""-> 
DrnKok/t       /         component  nations,  but  it  is  im- 

not  permit  them  to  keep  a  certain  proportion  of 


' 


•    »    (    J 


J 


li- 


,1 


liMi 


208 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


II 


m-r- 


I 

11' '  • 


J 

'i  <■ 


Mt 


regular  troops  and  war  vessels,  say,  ten  per  centum  of 
the  number  kept  by  the  United  Nations. 

These  would  serve  as  a  nucleus  for  a  regular  army 
and  navy,  should  a  State  find  it  needful  to  defend  itself 
against  unjust  aggression,  and  yet  would  not  suffice 
to  encourage  aggression  on  its  part,  especially  towards 
p^iothcr  component  nation  aided  in  its  work  of  self- 
defense  not  only  by  the  tenfold  regular  forces  of  the 
union  itself,  but  also  by  the  forces  of  the  majority  of 
the  States  composing  the  union.* 

But  even  yet  the  component  nations  might  not  regard 
themselves  as  absolutely  secured  by  these  provisions, 
since  it  would  be  possible  that  the  international  govern- 
ment, lulled  into  inaction  or  neglect  by  a  sense  of 
false  security,  might  not  itself  keep  a  sufficient  force  of 
troops  or  ships  of  war  to  justify  the  nations  with  great 
territories  and  large  subject  or  backward  populations 
in  regarding  ten  per  centum  of  such  force  as  sufficient 
to  preserve  internal  order  and  peace  within  their  limits. 

Under  the  ten  per  centum  rule  the  international 
government  must  keep  an  army  of  one  million  men  in 
order  that  a  component  nation  might  possess  one  of 
one  hundred  thousand.  An  army  of  one  hundred  thou- 
sand would  hardly  suffice  to  police  adequately  th^  great 
territories  of  the  Russian  or  British  Empires,  or  even 
the  United  States. 

But  it  is  very  doubtful  if  the  international  govern- 
ment, especially  if  it  were  to  embrace  among  its  mem- 
bers most  or  all  of  the  Great  Powers,  would  keep  an 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec.  3,  cl.  i,  z. 


f^ 


ACQUISITIONS  BY  STATES  209 

army  of  a  million  men.  More  probably  it  would  reduce 
the  number  by  half  or  perhaps  more.  A  correspond- 
ing compulsory  reduction  on  the  ten  per  centum  basis 
of  the  domestic  armies  of  the  component  nations  might 
in  some  cases  reduce  their  forces  below  the  safety 
point  in  the  control  of  their  internal  affairs,  ' 

It  would  seem  prudent  therefore  to  name  a  minimum 
below  which  no  nation  might  be  compelled  to  reduce 
its  armies  or  navies.  The  minimum  of  troops  ought 
to  be  expressed  in  terms  of  percentage  of  population 
since  the  main  purpose  of  the  domestic  armies  of  each 
State  would  be  to  preserve  peace  and  order  among  its 
population,  while  the  minimum  of  ships  of  war  ought 
to  be  expressed  in  terms  of  percentage  of  the  merchant 
marine  tonnage  of  each  nation,  since  the  main  function 
of  the  naval  force  of  each  State  would  be  to  safeguard 
its  ocean  carried  commerce. 

The  minimum  percentage  of  troops  has  tentatively 
been  placed  at  one-tenth  of  one  per  centum  of  the  popu- 
lation in  each  State,  and  the  minimum  percentage  of 
ships  of  war  of  each  nation  at  a  tonnage  of  one  per 
centum  of  the  tonnage  of  its  merchant  marine.^ 


^?  .1 


m 


*     i 

i  =1 

1 

ll 

'■>  ii' 

.  =  !;'' 

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'III? 

nvi 

■  i 

ill 


VI 

Territorial  Acquisitions  by  Component  Nations 


With  freedom  of  trade  established  between  the  com- 
ponent nations,  with  the  surrender  by  them  of  the  right 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec.  3.  cl.  3. 


^!i' 


2IO  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  impose  burdensome  taxes  or  other  restrictions  upon 
international  commerce,  and  with  the  passing  of  the 
need  for  great  armies,  navies,  military  bases  and  coal- 
ing stations,  many  of  the  reasons  for  the  national  desire 
to  acquire  territory  would  also  disappear. 

But  If  we  would  abolish  war  it  is  necessary  to  re- 
move all  temptations  to  acquire  territory  at  the  expense 
of  other  nations.    Occasionally  the  acquisition  is  actu- 
ated by  a  blind  and  unintelligent  desire  for  increased 
possessions,  there  being  no  particular  national  design 
in  view.    Mere  pride  of  possession  is  the  ruling  motive. 
Much  more  usually,  however,  there  is  a  definite  purpose 
in  such  territorial  acquisitions.    This  motive  is  one  of 
three :— either  national  sympathy  with  the  people  occu- 
pying  the  territory,  resulting  in  a  desire  to  make  them 
independent  or  in  a  mutual  desire  to  blend  into  a 
single  nation;  or  the  wish  to  expand  the  national  com- 
merce  by  unfair  or  forcible  means;  or  to  secure  by 
like  means  military  or  political  advantages.    Of  these 
only  the  first  mentioned  is  ever  justifiable,  and  that  is 
often  used  as  a  cloak  to  conceal  one  of  the  others. 
Without  one  or  the  other  of  these  motives  there  would 
be  little  or  no  temptation  to  any  State  to  acquire  the 
territory  of  another. 

It  ought,  then,  to  be  the  aim  of  our  international 
constitution  so  to  limit  the  powers  of  the  component 
nations  in  this  matter  as  to  eliminate  the  temptations 
to  the  unjust  and  forcible  acquisition  of  a  neighbor's 
territory. 

A  long  step  in  this  direction  will  have  been  taken 


P'Wfc  ■' 


mf 


'■•^fe^ 


ACQUISITIONS  BY  STATES  211 

when  the  component  nations  agree  to  surrender  their 
control  of,  and  their  right  to  burden,  international  com- 
merce; and  another,  when  they  give  up  their  general 
war  powers.  But  the  surrender  of  these  does  not 
exclude  all  possibility  of  an  acquisition  of  territory  in 
war  or  in  peace  that  may  cause  the  old  fires  of  jealousy 
and  suspicion  to  break  out  afresh  among  them. 

There  ought  therefore  to  be  additional  limitations 
prohibiting  them  to  acquire  territory  belonging  to  an- 
other  nation  except,  first,  in  time  of  pea«e,  with  the 
consent  of  the  nations  concerned,  and,  second,  in  time 
of  peace  or  war,  only  with  the  consent  of  such  a  ma- 
jority  of  the  international  congress  as  may  suffice  to 
convince  all  the  component  nations  that  there  can  be 
no  ulterior  harmful  design  lurking  behind  the  acquisi- 
tion. That  majority  has  been  placed  tentatively  at 
three-fourths  of  the  members  of  each  house  of  the 
Congress,  upon  the  theory  that  such  an  alteration  of  the 
territorial  boundaries  of  a  component  State  may  consti- 
tute as  important  a  change  in  the  relative  status  of  the 
nations  as  would  the  passage  of  a  constitutional  amend- 
ment, and  should  therefore  require  the  assent  of  the 
same  majority  of  the  nations  represented  in  the  Con- 
gress.^ 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  V,  Sec  4. 


fM, 


I'm  I , 


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&<' 


Iw 


.1 


CHAPTER  XIV 

RELATIONS  OF  COMPONENT  NATIONS  TO 
EACH  OTHER  AND  TO  THE  UNION 

We  are  next  to  examine  the  provisions  to  be  inserted 
m  the  proposed  constitution  with  reference  to  the  rela- 
tions  between  the  component  nations  themselves  on 
the  one  side  and  between  them  and  the  union  on  the 
other. 

The  right  of  the  nations  to  make  treaties  with  one 
another  touching  all  matters  not  surrendered  to  the  con- 
trol  of  the  international  government  has  been  already 
considered,  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  this  power, 
so  limited,  should  be  reserved  by  them.  Thus,  such 
matters  as  the  extradition  of  criminals,  or  the  personal 
or  civil  rights  of  the  citizens  of  one  State  in  another, 
might  always  be  adequately  provided  for  by  trean- 
between  the  respective  nations,  as  their  wishes  or  policy 
might  dictate. 

The  topic  now  to  be  discussed  relates  to  matters 
more  fundamental  and  far-reaching. 

I 

Protection  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  of  the 
Citizens  of  One  State  While  in  Another 
Reference  has  just  been  made  to  the  fact  tha:  by 

treaty  one  nation  within  or  without  the  union  may  se- 

3>2 


M.^  1 


CITIZENS  OF  ONE  STATE  IN  ANOTHER  213 

cure  to  its  citizens  in  any  component  State  such  personal 
or  civil  rights  as  may  be  agreed  upon. 

But  there  are  certain  fundamental  rights  of  which 
the  citizens  of  a  State,  even  in  the  absence  of  treaty, 
could  not  be  deprived  by  a  component  nation  without 
the  gravest  danger  of  resulting  discord  and  retaliation, 
leading  direct  to  disunion  or  to  war. 

The  violation  of  such  rights  is  always  caused  by 
intentional  or  unintentional  acts  of  gross  injustice  to 
the  citizens  of  other  States,  and  can  never  be  justified 
by  any  proper  view  of  necessary  public  policy.  The 
component  nations  ought  to  find  no  difficulty  in  sur- 
rendering  the  right  to  enact  such  unjust  laws  or  to 
commit  such  acts  against  citizens  of  another  State, 
whatever  attitude  they  may  assume  with  respect  to  the 
sort  of  treatment  they  have  the  right  to  accord  to  their 
own  citizens. 

Thus  if  a  nation,  by  means  of  legislative  convictions 
of  crime  (bills  of  attainder) ,  or  the  enactment  of  retro- 
active  laws  punishing  crime  (ex  post  facto  Jaws),  or 
laws  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  all  of  which 
are  oppressive  and  unjustifiable,  should  deprive  the 
citizen  of  another  State  of  his  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
such  action  would  at  once  give  rise  to  serious  grounds 
of  complaint  on  the  part  of  the  State  whose  citizen  has 
been  so  treated,  and  would  lead  to  grave  dissensions, 
If  nothing  worse.    How  much  better  to  check  such  ten- 
dencies in  their  inception  by  prohibit,  g  the  sort  of  ac- 
tion  that  would  give  cause  for  the  complaint,  and  to 
allow  the  foreigner  thus  threatened  the  opportunitj-  of 


♦  I' 


I  if 


llrlll 
llli 

s '  1 .     f 


m 


U^^^iil 


*»f 


W' 


214  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

testing  the  validity  of  the  law,  if  necessary,  in  the  in- 
ternational courts.  Such  a  course  would  give  the  ag. 
grieved  party  a  sure  judicial  investigation  of  the 
grounds  of  his  complaint  and  an  impartial  judicial 
remedy  against  such  invasions  of  his  rights,  so  that 
his  own  country  would  be  relieved  of  all  responsibility 
tor  the  enforcement  or  recognition  of  his  claims. 

The  same  result  would  follow,  were  a  like  judicial  in- 
qu.ry  and  remedy  afforded,  if  needed,  by  the  interna- 
tional courts  in  cases  wherein  a  component  nation  is  al- 
leged to  have  attempted  unjustly  to  deprive  a  citizen  of 
another  State  (within  or  without  the  union)  by  legisla- 
tive, executive,  or  judicial  action  of  his  life,  liberty,  or 
property  without  giving  him  opportunity  to  be  heard 
.n  his  own  defense,  or  where  it  is  alleged  to  have  been 
guilty  of  unjust  discriminations  against  such  foreigner 
with  regard  to  his  personal  or  property  rights:  or 
where  it  is  alleged  that  the  treaty  rights  of  the  for- 
cigner  have  been  violated. 

The  component  nations,  whatever  their  jealousy  of 
an  inquiry  into  the  customary  treatment  of  their  own 
citizens,  ought  to  be  willing  to  unite  in  a  compact  pro- 
h.biting  them  to  engage  in  such  conduct  towards  the 
atizen,  of  other  countries.  And  this  being  done,  the 
Congress  should  see  to  it  that,  in  case  of  alleged  viola- 
t.ons  of  these  provisions,  the  complaining  party  be 
g-ven  the  r.ght  to  have  the  validity  of  th.  law.  or  other 

ZlZT'u    ""'  ^"""P'^'"^^  «f'  investigated  and  ad- 
judged  by  the  international  courts.' 

'  See  Appendix,  Con.fn  U.  N,  Art.  VI.  Sec.  i. 


CITIZENS  IN  FOREIGN  STATES 
II 


•1(1 


215 


Protection  Afforded  by  the  United  Nations  to 

Citizens  of  Component  States  While  in 

Foreign  Countries 

The  clause  just  examined  would  adequately  protect 
the  citizens  of  a  State  (either  a  member  or  not  a 
member  of  the  union)  while  in  another  State  which  is 
a  member  of  the  union.  But  it  would  have  no  appli- 
cation  to  •  tances  of  oppressive  conduct  by  a  State 
not  a  member  of  the  union  towards  citizens  of  compo- 
nent States  who  might  be  within  its  limits. 

All  existing  federal  unions,  as  has  been  indicated 
more  than  once,  have  been  formed  with  the  design  not 
only  to  avert  war  between  its  members,  but  to  create  in 
many  respects  one  single  new  nation,  with  the  rights 
and  privileges  of  a  distinct  member  of  the  family  of 
nations;  a.d  to  that  end  the  individual  States  compos- 
•ng  the  union  have  invariably  surrendered  their  right 
to  deal  with  foreign  countries  except  through  the  union 
Itself.    This  creation  of  a  single  nation  possessing  the 
right  to  engage  in  international  relations  and  in  war, 
involves  the  consequence  that  each  citizen  of  a  compo- 
nent State  shall  also  be  a  citizen  of  the  union,  and  as 
such  shall  look  to  the  federal  government,  not  to  his 
State  government,   for  that  protection  when  abroad 
that  each  nation  is  bound  to  afford  to  its  citizens. 

But  with   respect  to   our  international   union   the 
conditions  arc  materially  different.    It  is  not  the  intent 


ii 

ill 


Urn , 

1- 


n 


l^ 


2i6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

in  this  case  to  create  a  new  State  except  in  a  very 
limited  sense  and  for  very  limited  purposes;  nor  is  it 
proposed  that  the  component  nations  surrender  their 
right,  save  to  a  limited  extent,  to  enter  into  relations 
with  other  nations.  The  international  union  would 
he  a  purely  political  conception,  would  possess  no  ter- 
ritory of  its  own  (except  the  seat  of  government)  and 
would  have  no  citizens  of  its  own  (except  citizens  of 
the  seat  of  government).  If,  however,  the  component 
nations  shall  have  surrendered  their  war  powers,  the 
relinquishment  implies  a  guarantee  that  the  interna- 
tional government  will  take  upon  itself  the  duty  of 
granting  that  protection  in  foreign  countries  to  the 
citizens  of  each  nation  which,  by  reason  of  such  sur- 
render, the  nation  itself  can  no  longer  give. 

While  this  responsibility  of  the  federal  government 
would  perhaps  be  implied  from  the  context  of  the  pro- 
posed constitution,  the  matter  is  of  too  great  impor- 
tance to  be  left  to  implication;  a  guarantee  should  be 
expressly  inserted  to  the  effect  that  the  international 
government  shall  protect  the  citizens  of  each  compo- 
nent nation,  when  in  foreign  countries,  in  all  such 
rights  and  privileges  as  they  may  there  claim  under  the 
Law  of  Nations  or  under  particular  treaties.* 
*  See  Appendix,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  a. 


&'■  '   t 


INTERNAL  DISSENSIONS  217 

III 

Protection  of  Component  Nations  Against 

Invasion 

It  is  evident  that  a  guarantee  that  the  international 
government  will  protect  each  component  nation  against 
the  hostile  invasion  of  its  territories  is  a  condition  sine 
qua  non  to  the  surrender  by  the  nations  of  their  war 
powers,  indeed  the  condition  of  the  estaolishment  of 
the  union.  No  existing  federal  constitution  is  without 
such  a  guarantee.* 

IV 

Internal  Dissensions  in  Component  States 

The  American  Constitution  guarantees  that  the 
United  States  will  afford  protection  to  the  several 
States  not  only  against  invasion,  but  also  against  do- 
mestic  violence  on  application  of  the  State  authorities. 

To  a  proper  understanding  of  the  conditions  under 
which  this  clause  was  inserted  in  the  American  Consti- 
tution, it  must  be  remembered  that  the  several  States 
had  surrendered  all  their  war  powers  (except  the 
keeping  of  militia),  that  the  State  governments  were 
all  republican  in  character,  and  that  the  Constitution 
had  guaranteed  that  they  should  ever  so  remain.  The 
State  governments  being  already  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  ihe  people,  internal  dissensions  and  armed  resistance 

'  See  Appendix,  Con.fn  U.  N..  Art.  VI,  Sec.  j. 


I   ! 


ill 


4''. 


K^ikfcis— ^ 


!!«l 


i|i' 


2i8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

to  authority  could  never  assume  the  form  of  a  strug- 
gle by  the  people  against  an  oppressive  or  tyrannical 
government  for  political  freedom,  but  would  always 
represent  the  .iforts  of  a  factious  minority  to  over- 
come by  force  of  arms  the  will  of  the  majority. 

There  would  be  no  reason  in  principle  therefore  why 
the  majority,  as  represented  by  their  chosen  legislatures 
or  executives,  should  not  call  to  their  aid  the  forces  of 
the  United  States,  in  the  absence  of  a  sufficient  militia 
force  to  quell  the  disturbances,— especially  since  by 
reason  of  the  lack  of  such  aid  the  factious  minority 
might  obtain  control,  and  thus  the  republican  and  popu- 
lar character  of  ^he  State  government  be  overthrown, 
contrary  to  the  express  guarantee  of  the  Constitution. 
But  a  far  different  situation  confronts  the  nations  in 
the  establishment  of  our  international  union.    Each  of 
them  has  its  own  form  of  government;  some  monarchi- 
cal, some  republican,  some  federal;  some  under  popular 
control,  some  with  governments  more  or  less  arbitrary. 
Should  internal  dissensions  occur, — and  especially 
should  they  advance  so  far  that  several  governments 
are  established  within  a  State,  each  claiming  to  be 
the  de  facto  government  and  each  calling  upon  the 
international  government  for  aid  in  suppressing  the 
other,— questions    of    great    delicacy    would    arise. 
fraught  with  danger  to  the  entire  union,  according 
as  the  sympathies  of  the  component  nations  woulJ  he 
severally  extended  to  the  one  or  the  other  party. 

If.  in  a  particular  State,  the  civil  war  wouKl  t.ikc 
the  form  of  an  uprising  of  the  people  against  an  :irbi- 


INTERNAL  DISSENSIONS  219 

trary  government,  those  component  nations  possessing 
republican  forms  of  government  and  popular  institu- 
tions  would  vigorously  object  to  the  use  of  the  forces 
of  the  United  Nations  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing 
the  political  aspirations  of  the  people  in  the  distracted 
btate,  while  those  possessing  monarchical  institutions 
might  be  no  less  vigorous  in  their  demand  for  the  sup- 
pression  of  such  popular  aspirations. 

Such  conditions  would  make  for  a  rapid  and  luxu- 
riant  growth  of  discord  and  jealousy  among  the  com- 
ponent  nations,  if  not  for  a  speedy  disintegration  of  the 
union  Itself.  Yet  they  would  seem  to  be  sooner  or 
later  the  certain  consequences  of  any  guarantee  on 
the  part  of  the  international  government  to  render  aid 
to  the  governments  of  the  several  component  nations 
m  quelling  domestic  disturbances. 

If  we  are  to  consider  the  preservation  and  continued 
usefulness  of  the  union,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
It  ought  to  leave  such  domestic  dissensions  severely 
alone,  and  that  both  the  international  government  and 
the  governments  of  the  other  component  nations  ought 
to  preserve  an  attitude  of  strict  neutrality  between  the 
contending  factions  until  the  contest  is  settled  by  the 
final  overthrow  of  one  or  the  other  party  or  by  the 
establishment  of  part  of  the  original  territory  as  a  new 
and  independent  State. 

In  the  meanwhile,  however,  as  both  parties  obviously 
cannot  be  represented  in  the  international  congress  or 
appoint  judges  to  the  international  courts,  and  as  it 
v^ould  be  eminently  undesirable  for  the  reasons  above 


111 


1  i 


m 


mait^fi'ss 


-1^^444* 


|><   '  V 


.^' 


220  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

mentioned  that  the  international  government  be  given  a 
discretion  as  to  which  faction  it  may  recognize  as  the 
lawful  government,  the  constitution  ought  to  provide 
for  the  continued  recognition  of  the  original  govern- 
ment,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  national  rights  and  func 
tions  under  the  international  compact,  until  such  gov- 
cmment  is  completely  overthrown  and  a  new  one  sub- 
stituted  therefor,  in  which  event  the  latter  should  at 
once  become  entitled  to  enjoy  such  rights  and  functions. 
These  are  merely  applications  to  political  conditions 
of  the  two  equitable  maxims,  "  first  in  time,  first  in 
right,"  and  "  as  between  equal  equities  the  legal  title 
shall  prevail."    They  preserve  the  strict  attitude  of 
neutral.ty  that  should  be  assumed  by  the  internatioml 
government  and  by  the  other  component  nations,  and 
neither  faction  would  have  any  just  cause  of  complaint 
Thus  only  can  the  union  be  secured  against  the  disin. 
tegrating  forces  that  would  lurk  in  the  internal  dis- 
sensions  that  may  be  expected  to  arise  from  time  ro 
time  within  the  several  States. 

Should  such  a  civil  war  as  we  have  supposed  result 
m  the  dismemberment  of  the  State,  so  that  the  original 
government  would  continue  to  control  part  of  it  while 
the  remainder  is  erected  into  a  new  and  independent 
State,  the  latter  would  of  course  at  once  drop  out  of 
the  union,  and  could  only  be  admitted  thereto  on  the 
same  terms  as  other  outside  nations,— terms  to  be 
presently  examined.  But  that  portion  of  the  State  left 
under  its  original  government  would  remain  in  the 
union,  though,  since  its  population  would  be  reduced 


"^ifl"!*'^' 


ADMISSION  OF  NEW  STATES  221 
by  the  dismemberment,  it  would  become  necessary  to 
readjust  its  proportion  of  representation  in  the  House 
of  Delegates.* 

V 

Admission  of  New  States  Into  the  Union 

The  international  union  once  organized,  the  admis- 
sion of  new  States  to  it  from  time  to  time  might  some- 
times present  important  questions  to  the  consideration 
of  the  component  nations,  for  it  would  be  possible 
that  the  admission  of  a  particular  State  might,  under 
certain  circumstances,  be  distasteful  to  some  of  the 
nations  concerned,  might  be  more  likely  to  create  dis- 
cord than  harmony  among  them,  and  hence  might  be 
more  apt  to  weaken  than  to  strengthen  the  union. 

The  admission  of  a  new  State  might  materially 
alter  the  existing  relations  of  every  nation  in  the 
union,— as  much  as  would  many  an  amendment  to 
the  constitution,-and,  if  capable  of  accomplishment 
by  the  consent  of  a  bare  majority  of  the  component 
btates  through  their  representatives  in  the  Congress,  it 
might  easily  do  the  cause  of  peace  more  harm  than 
good. 

It  would  appear  to  be  reasonable  to  demand  for  such 
admission  the  consent  of  the  same  number  of  compo- 
nent  nations  as  would  be  required  to  pass  an  amend- 
ment to  the  constitution  itself,  that  is,  three-fourths  of 
each  house  of  the  Congress.-^ 

;S«  Appendu,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  VI.  Sec.  4. 
S"**  Appendix,  Conit'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VI,  Sec.  5, 


vm 


4m 


,s:,«f 


li 


CHAPTER  XV 

RESERVED  RIGHTS  OF  THE  COMPONENT 

NATIONS 


General  Reservation  of  All  Powers  Not 
Surrendered 

While  it  might  readily  be  imphed  from  the  general 
tenor  of  our  supposed  international  compact,  and  from 
the  fact  that  the  proposed  federal  government  is  one 
of  enumerated  powers  only,  that  the  component  na- 
tions  have  reserved  all  powers  not  granted  to  that 
government  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  tlie  nations  them- 
selves,  yet,  as  in  other  cases  of  important  rights,  it 
would  be  unwise  to  leave  the  matter  to  conjecture  and 
implication. 

A  clause  is  therefore  inserted  expressly  declaring 
that  the  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  Nations  bv 
the  constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  component 
nations,  :s  well  as  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of 
the  latter,  are  reserved  to  those  nations,  respectively/ 

•  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art  VII,  Sec.  x. 


2M 


!#?' 


RIGHT  OF  SECESSION 
II 


223 


Right  of  a  Component  Nation  to  Withdraw 
From  the  Union 

Here  we  are  confronted  with  a  difficult  problem,  the 
importance  of  which  will  be  realized  when  it  is  recalled 
that  this  IS  the  identical  question  over  which  the  great 
American  War  of  1861  was  fought. 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  had  not  ex- 
pressly  determined  in  one  way  or  the  other  the  right 
of  a  State  to  secede  from  the  Union  after  it  had  once 
acceded  to  the  Constitution. 

Without  undertaking  to  discuss  the  merits  of  that 
great  controversy,  suffice  it  to  remind  the  reader  that 
certain  of  the  Southern  States,  convinced  that  their  re- 

wh7  .h"^  k','"^  ^'^"*'"  ""^  endangered,  exercised 
nha  they  beheved  to  be  their  constitutional  right  to 
secede  and  establish  a  new  union  of  their  own.  This 
nght  the  Northern  and  Western  States,  which  consti- 
uted  he  majority  of  the  States  and  controlled  the 
federal  government,  declined  to  recognize.  In  the 
absence  of  any  clause  in  the  Constitution  providing 

respect  to  the  proper  interpretation  of  that  instrument 
led  directly  to  the  war. 

The  one  lesson  to  be  learned  from  this  chapter  of 
Am  neon  history  is  that,  whatever  other  provisions  the 

.ons  may  make  in  contemplation  of  an  international 
union,  they  ought  not  to  leave  this  point  ambiguous  or 


$\ 


1 .1  f  > 


ip 

! 

-if- 
r 

.t 

U  I 


-♦»'■ 


224  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

undetermined.  Their  league  or  compact  must  declan 
either  for  or  against  a  reservation  of  the  right  of  th( 
several  States  to  secede. 

Should  this  declaration  be  opposed  to  a  right  of  se 
cession,  it  would  be  difficult  to  secure  the  assent  ol 
any  nation  to  surrender  irrevocably  some  of  its  high 
sovereign  rights  merely  for  the  sake  of  an  untried 
experiment,  which  might  possibly  operate  injuriously 
to  the  hberties  of  some  at  least  of  the  nations  con- 
cerned,  however  carefully  those  liberties  may  have  been 
safeguarded.  Experience  alone  can  disclose  the  ulti- 
m?te  success  or  failure  of  so  grand  an  experiment. 

Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  if  secession  were  for- 
bidden  and  yet  a  nation  or  a  combination  of  nations 
were  resolved  to  withdraw  despite  their  agreements 
nothing  but  force  could  restrain  them;  but  the  use  of 
force  is  the  very  thing  the  union  would  be  established 
to  prevent.  A  union  formed  to  eliminate  war,  yet  held 
together  permanently  only  by  force,  would  savor 
strongly  of  absurdity. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  right  be  reserved  to  each 
nation  to  withdraw  at  will,  there  would  be  grave  danger 
of  the  total  failure  of  the  experiment  and  the  speedy 
dissolution  of  the  union,  due  to  the  unwillingness  of  the 
several  nations  to  make  concessions  of  their  own  selfish 
mterests  for  the  common  good  of  all.  This  danger 
would  be  hkely  to  arise  especially  in  the  earlier  years 
of  the  new  government's  existence,  before  the  nations 
had  begun  to  realize  fully  its  advantages,  or  before 
they  had  rid  themselves  of  their  old  attitudes  of  mutual 


ItCf' 


,/' 


RIGHT  OF  SECESSION  225 

suspicion  and  jealousy  and  had  substituted  therefor  the 
spirit  of  good  will  and  concord  that  would  follow  upon 
continued  Co-operation  and  the  successful  results  of 
their  joint  labors. 

A  just  and  proper  compromise  between  these  ex- 
tremes would  seem  to  be  to  reserve  to  each  component 
nation  the  right  to  withdraw  from  the  union  after 
(say)  twenty-five  years  from  the  date  of  its  accession. 

This,  coupled  with  the  checks  afforded  by  the  power 
of  a  State  to  veto  the  legislation  of  the  Congress,  the 
power  of  the  international  Supreme  Court  to  pass  upon 
the  constitutionality  of  such  legislation,  the  division 
of  power  between  the  two  houses  of  the  Congress  rep- 
resentmg  respectively  the  equal  rights  and  the  unequal 
populations  of  the  component  States,  and  the  limited 
scope  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  international 
government,  would  seem  to  constitute  sufficient  guaran- 
tees of  the  reserved  rights  of  the  component  nations. 

At  the  same  time  such  a  provision  would  obviate 
the  danger  of  the  hasty  or  passionate  withdrawal  of  a 
State  from  the  union  merely  upon  vague  suspicion  of 
unjust  aggression  on  the  part  of  sister  nations,— a 
course  which  might  result  in  a  speedy  destruction  of 
the  entire  edifice. 

After  a  nation  has  been  a  member  of  the  union  for 
twenty-five  years  a  new  generation  will  have  come  upon 
the  scene  better  able  to  weigh  the  relative  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  the  union,  and  having  forgotten 
the  political  rancors  that  might  be  engendered  by  the 
enactment  of  the  first  measures  of  general  relief.    The 


I  HI 


=  t|i 


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I  I  ! 


n  : 


if  ill 

i,  ■  "■ 

J:' 

■■-,  its 


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«6  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

.T,  burden,  "''  "'  *'  ""'""  ™'"''  "<«  -'"-•g' 

Even  during  the  first  twenty-five  years  the  fact  th„ 
any  „at,on  at  the  end  of  thaTperiod  wo  Id  have    h 
nght  peaceably  to  withdraw  if  its  interests  weJc  Z 
be,ng  protected  by  the  union  would  operate  as  a  co^ 

:5::;T4;trTL\rorcr'--^^^^^^^^ 

e:^      .-       r  P   '"^  °'  compromise  and  cnn 

sideration  for  the  rights  of  all  In  tul  /  »"a  con- 
Inf/Tnof.-^     I  '"  *"^  conduct  of  the 

mternafonal  government  would  take  the  place  of  he 
o  st.„a,e  ^.regard  of  the  majority  for  the  minoHr^ 
of  the  nations  that  would  be  more  likely  to  characteZ 

o  comity  and  to  the  rights  of  the  union  and  the  oThJ 
component  nations,  which  might  suffer  by  the  h  s 
execution  of  such  a  purpose,  but  it  would  gL  t Le  f 
sober  reflection  on  all  sides  anrl  ,„  • 

each  hv  mnf.,  1  °  ^"  opportunity  for 

each  by  mutual  concessions  so  to  modify  the  genera! 
conditions  as  to  make  it  possible  for  the  seceding  a ^ 
to  reconsider  its  decision.*  ^Lcuing  :)tate 

•  See  Appendix,  Const' n  U.  N..  Art.  VII.  Sec  a,  cl.  ,. 


M' 


-^i^-K-i 


RIGHT  OF  SECESSION  227 

III 

Rights  of  Seceding  State  in  the  Common 
Property  of  -  1    ^^nion 

One  more  question  rer.>.  ns  to  h-   ois.M.,.^d  in  this 
connection.     That  que.t  ..  •    .u,,.   ,,  ,„  J^^ 

rights  of  seceding  and;:.,,     a  '..,  'V,es   ,  'h^  com- 

monpropertyoftheu:.;...::  ,  he  '  ips  .f  war,  the 
money  . n  the  treasury.  ...fo, ..,.,;,,  ^.^„j^l,^.,j_ 

mgs.  and  other  improvements  .cJong  .,  :.  the  federal 
government,  the  benefits  of  ....  .f  .hKh  would  be 
lost  by  a  seceding  State,  though  paid  for  by  it  in  pro- 
portion  to  its  wealth.  ^ 

Should  the  seceding  nation  be  entitled  to  its  propor- 
donate  share  of  the  common  property  in  kind  or  in 
money  commutation  therefor,  and  if  so  how  should 
that  proportion  be  ascertained?    Or  ought  the  rule  to 

don  tha^  ";t  nT''"^  '^'  ""'°"  ^°"  ^°  "P°"  condi- 
tion that  It  shall  lay  no  claim  to  the  common  property- 

(outsule  the  limits  of  its  own  territory)    i,'ca      I 
should  later  determine  to  withdraw? 
is  aTfn?^.  ''"  ^'  "'"'  ''°°'"  '°  ^^"^^  '^^'  '^'  iu^^ter 
nation  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  share  of  the  partner 
IP  property  acquired  by  joint  expenditure  of  treaL 
und  labor,  except  such  as  may  happen  to  be  looted 

Tn  tin '  T  ""u^"'"'  "°"'^  p^°^^b'y  ^^p^i  "'-y 


^ould  be  likely  to  inspire  the  seced 


■  s 


in 


ill! 


lli 


il 


lingn  iun  or  nations 


II 


"8  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

with  sentirnents  of  ill  will  and  resentment  that  might 
forebode  evil  to  the  general  peace. 

True,  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  fair  adjustment 

valueVfTT  "f ''  "°"^^  °^^^"  ^'  2^"^'  but  the 
V  lue  of  the  share  of  a  seceding  nation  in  the  common 
property  after  deducting  its  share  of  the  common 
debts  and  the  value  of  forts,  arsenals,  and  other  pub  i 
bmldrngs  erected  by  the  federal  government  within  its 
territory,  may  be  determined,  approximately  at  least 
upon  equitable  principles  by  the  Supreme  Court,  whosj 

toriT^H-'"''"^  ^°"^^'^"^^  ''^  --^  «^''^- 
tory  mode  of  disposing  of  the  matter.' 

•See  Appendix.  Con.fn  U.  N..  Art.  VII.  Sec  a.  cl.  a. 


.^^^ 


CHAPTEP  XVI 

SUPREMACY  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL 

CONSTITUTION,  LAWS,  AND 

TREATIES 


ill 


u 


H 


If!  'H 


If 


fi 


M 


The  Declaration  of  Supremacy 

Although  it  is  proposed  to  grant  to  the  interna- 
fonal  government  only  very  hmited  powers,  it  is  yet 

conflicting  exercsc  of  similar  powers  by  ^he  several 
mponent   nat.ons.     Otherwise   there   u.uld    follow 
narchy,  confus.on  and  possibly  the  very  evils  the  fed- 
eral government  would  be  organized  to  avert 
5o  manifest  is  this  conclusion  that  it  might  almost  be 

-th  safety  to  be  implied  from  the  nature  and  con- 

t  of  the  const.tut.o..     But  in  a  matter  of  such  pro- 

^^'und  .mportance  it  would  be  imprudent  to  leave  to 

:r  ^T  ::^r  -^^^  '^  -^"^  -'  ^^-^y  - 

I '';  Pnnciple  of  supremacy  would  applv  not  onlv 
law    and    "     ""      '""'^"'""  ''''^'^  ''"^  ^'^  '^^  ^^e 


treaties  made  by  the  inte 


rnational  govern- 


tli^ 


2tq 


(  ;• 


lli'- 


230  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ment  in  pursuance  of  that  constitution.  But  it  would 
have  no  application  to  such  of  the  laws  or  treaties 
of  the  international  government  as  might  be  in  viola- 
tion  of  that  instrument;  they  would  be  mere  exercises 
of  usurped  powers,  void  and  of  no  effect. 

It  must  follow  therefore  that  in  any  matter  of  judi- 
cial  cognizance  arising  within  any  component  State  or 
in  the  seat  of  the  government,  it  would  be  the  duty 
of  any  judge,  whether  of  a  national  or  an  international 
court,  ,n  choosing  between  conflicting  national  and  in- 
ternational  laws  or  treaties  as  controlling  the  case  be- 
fore him,  to  select  and  enforce  that  law  which  his 
own  country  has  itself  in  the  most  solemn  manner  pos- 
s.ble  declared  to  be  supreme  within  its  borders,-the 
constitution  of  the  United  Nations,  and  the  laws  and 
treaties  of  the  international  government  made  in  pur- 
suance  thereof." 

II 


Official   Oath  to   Si  pport   the   Constitutk 


i\ 


It  would  of  course  be  prop  -r  and  necessary  that  ;.I! 
officials  of  the  mternational  government  be  required  t„ 
make  oath  or  affirmation  that  they  will  support  th- 
international  constitution. 

But  it  is  necessary  to  go  further  than  this.  In  mdcr 
that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  officers  f 
the  several  component  nations  may  feel  and  reali/.  .r 
all  times  the  obligation  resting  upon  them  also  to 

•  Sff  Appendix,  Con«  n  l     N..  Art.  VHI.  Srr    , 


rcc- 


«i 


3  |^(. 


'  -^^^ 


fm*' 


OFFICIAL  OATH  231 

ognize  and  uphold  the  international  compact  as  the  su- 
preme  law  and  as  part  of  their  own  constitution  and 
laws,  .t  would  be  right  and  proper  to  require  of  them 
upon  their  assumption  of  office,  an  oath  or  affirmation 
that  they  will  support  the  constitution  of  the  United  Na- 
tions.* 

•  See  Appendix,  Con«'n  U.  N.,  Art.  VIII,  Sec.  2. 


Mil 


!« 


[Jf 


» 


i 


CHAPTER  XVII 
AMENDMENTS    TO    THE    CONSTITUTION 

I 

General  Considerations 

That  nc  plan  of  government  devised  by  the  wit  of 
man  can  escape  the  need  of  amendment  from  time  to 
time,  as  defects  in  its  organization  or  powers  develop, 
IS  too  plain  for  argument;  and  prudence  dictates  that 
any  plan  proposed  should  contain  a  prcarranj^ci 
method  of  amending  it.  Fspccially  would  this ''he 
true  in  case  of  an  experiment  in  government  on  a  scale 
so  vast  as  that  here  contemplated. 

Much  might  be  said  for  the  proposition  that  no 
power  of  amendment  should  be  given  save  by  the  unani- 
mous  consent  of  all  the  component  nations.  So  f.r 
as  the  original  compact  is  concerned,  the  nations  uouki 
kn..w  exactly  what  they  are  assenting  to,  and  it  n.mhr 
be  plausibly  argued  that  the  same  principle  ought  to 
apply  to  the  subsequent  insertion  of  new  matter  into 
the  constitution  by  means  of  amendments. 

But  when  we  consulcr  the  experimental  nature  .,1  the 
compact,  and  that  experience  may  prove  that  too  muJi, 
as  well  as  too  little,  power  has  been  surrendered  by  the 

233 


AMENDMENTS 


233 

component  nations,--when  we  recall  the  extreme  diffi- 
culty of  securing  unanimous  assent  to  the  adoption  of 
any  measures,  especially  of  such  complex  character 
as  would  be  here  involved,-and  when  we  consider 
that  a  requirement  of  the  assent  of  a  large  majority 
of  the  nations  to  any  amendment  would  be  nearly  as 
secure  a  guarantee  that  the  reserved  sovereign  rights 
of  each  will  be  protected  against  invasion,  while  yet 
making  ,t  more  possible  to  secure  desirable  amend- 
ments,—it  would  seem  the  more  prudent  part  to  make 
provision  for  amendments  through  the  assent  of  less 
than  the  entire  membership  ..f  the  union,  but  neverthe- 
less requiring  the  consent  of  so  large  a  majority  as  in 
eHect  to  protect  the  minority  against  changes  adopted 
merely  for  the  political  advantage  of  the  majority. 

Much  the  same  problem  presented  itself  to  the  fram- 
ers  of  the  American  Constitution,  who  solved  it  by 
requ.rmg  the  assent     f  three-fourths  of  the  States  for 
the  adoption  of  an  amendment.     In  actual  practice  in 
the  Lnitcd  States  this  requirement  has  been  found  to 
work  well.     It  has  prevented  from  time  to  tin  e  the 
passage   of  many   ill-considered    and   unwise   amend- 
'ncn.s  urged  by  zealous  reformers,  and  yet  has  admit- 
ted of  sufficient  freedom  to  permit  the  enactment  of 
seventeen  amendments  within  the  period  of  one  hun- 
ured  and  thirty-five  years. 

Twelve  of  these  received  the  assent  of  the  requisite 
'najor.ty  of  the  States  within  the  first  twenty-five  years 
0  our  constitutional  history:  .ndo.d.  the' enactment 
Of  the  first  ten  practically  constituted  the  condition  upon 


til 


hi 


m 

i 

hi  i 
i  5  I 

Jl 
'lit! 

•    ?H 

.;■  I 
If. 


I 


Il 


■^H- 


Hi 


1 


234  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

which  many  of  the  States  ratified  the  Constitution. 

rhe  Thirteenth,  Fourteenth,  and  Fifteenth  were  passed 

in  consequence  of  the  War  of  186 1 ;  and  within  the  last 

few  years  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  have  been  en- 

acted. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  claim  that  the  American  system 
ot  constitutional  amendment  has  well  fulfilled  its  func 
tions  of  making  possible  such  changes  in  the  Constitu- 
tion as  are  desirable  and  earnestly  desired  by  the 
otates.  ' 

It  may  also  be  remarked  that,  with  the  exception  of 
the  three     war  amendments  "  which  were  passed  un- 
der abnormal  and  peculiar  circumstances,  the  almost 
universal  tendency  of  the  amendments  has  been  to  cur- 
tail  the  powers  of  the  federal  government,  not  to  dimin- 
ish the  powers  of  the  States.    Most  of  the  curtailment 
of  the  latter  powers  that  has  occurred  has  been  effected 
thr  >ugh  construction  of  the  Constitution  by  the  judicial 
an    executive  departments  of  the  federal  government 
^  t  .  y  actual  constitutional  amendment. 

Experience  in  the  United  States  therefore  would 
>eem  to  teach  the  lesson  that  members  of  our  inter- 
national  union  would  have  more  to  fear,  so  far  as  con- 
cerns  the  protection  of  their  reserved  rights,   fror. 
the  departmental  constructions  of  the  proposed  consti- 
tution than  from  any  actual  amendments  receiving  tlu 
assent  of  a  large  majority  of  the  component  nation.. 
«ut   even   the  dangers  arising   from   departmental 
constructions,  usages  ,nd  practices  have  been  met  in 
the  proposed  international  compact  by  checks  and  bd- 


M^ 


lii. 


li 


AMENDMENTS  ,3, 

ancc,  u„kj,„wn  ,0  the  American  Cons.ieueion,  which 
would  suffice,  .  „„.  ,„  e|i„,i„«e,  a,  le„t  to  disa^ 
them  of  most  of  their  power  to  hurt 

Thus  the  members  of  the  international  congress  are 
made  the  d.rcct  agents  and  servant,  of  their  resp'c."' 
na,,ons,  appointed  as  they  see  fit  and  subject  ,0  recall 
by  them  at  the.r  pleasure;  each  componen  nation  m" 
veto  any  law  of  the  Congress  on  the  ground  that  itta' 
pa.rs  the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations,  in  which  cTe 
ehe  law  can  be  passed  only  by  the  assent  of  such  a 
-,or,ty  ,n  each  house  of  the  Congress  as  wou  d  suf 

.0  amend  the  constitution;  each  State,  after  twenj. 

peace  from  the  un.on;  the  executive  department  is  en 
rely  responsible  ,0  the  Congress,  and  subjea  to     c"l' 
he  w,.l  oCther  house,  the  members'of  whicl     ' 
t"rn  are  made   sensrtively  responsive  to  the   wishes 
0.  he,r  respective  nations;  the  international  judge    ar 
to  be  appomtcd  by  the  executive  heads  of  tie  fevera 

u  a  three-fourths  majority  of  the  Supreme  Cour 
"r  of  any  section  thereof  is  required  to  declare  anv 

?;f' .">"  -  '--y  "<  a  component  nation         at 
"'the  international  constitution  or  laws 

Ihese  governmental  checks  and  balances  appear  to 
.  .  fficent  guarantees  that  the  reserved  rights'^    th^ 

P  t™„,a  constructions;  while  actual  experience  in 
;^U,,ed  States,  „„  ,„,  ,h,„  theoretical  consider  " 
"»"-  'vould  attest  that  little  danger  ,0  the  reserved 


Ifi 

-'it 


Mt 


Ik 


236  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

powers  is  likely  to  arise  from  actual  amendments  for 
the  passage  of  which  the  assent  of  a  sufficiently  large 
majority  of  the  component  nations  is  required  The 
three-fourths  majority  of  the  States  demanded  for  this 
purpose  by  the  American  Constitution  has  worked 
admirably  m  practice,  and  the  nations  could  scarcely 
do  better  than  follow  this  example.' 


if 


III. 


II 

Proposal  of  Amendments 

The  clause  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  State. 
deahng  w.th  the  modes  of  proposing  amendments, 
reads  as  follows: 

hn!J^^  ^n"^."''  '*^'*'e"ever  two-thirds  of  both 
houses   shall   deem    .t   necessary,    shall    propose 

plication  of  the  legislatures  of  two-thirds  of  the 

sX"  f^'''"'   '^'"  ""  *  convention    [of    h 
States]  for  proposing  amendments." 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  clause  provides  for  two 
methods  of  proposing  amendments  (i)  by  a  two-thirds 
vote  of  both  houses  of  the  Congress;  (2)  by  a  conven- 
tion of  the  States,  upon  the  application  of  the  legisla. 
tures  of  two-thirds  of  the  States.  In  practice  no 
amendment  has  ever  been  proposed  by  the  second 
method. 

Under  our  inter,     ional  constitution,  with  its  organi- 

'  See  Append!*,  Const'n  L .  N.,  Art.  IX. 


Is 


AMENDMENTS  237 

zation  of  the  Congress  composed  of  members  appointed 
and  removable  by  the  several  States  at  their  pleacyre 
these  two  methods  would  become  practically  identical' 
since  two-thirds  of  the  component  nations  might  at 
any  time  instruct  their  delegates  in  both  houses  of  the 
Congress  to  propose  or  support  a  given  amendment. 

That  a  two-thirds  majority  in  each  house  of  the 
Congress,  rather  than  a  bare  majority,  ought  to  be  re- 
quired  for  this  purpose  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  if  a 
two-thirds  majority  of  the  component  nations  cannot 
be  secured  for  the  proposal  of  an  amendment,  it  would 
be  Idle  and  useless  to  attempt  to  obtain  a  three-fourths 
majority  for  its  final  passage. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  possibility  of  the  later  conver- 
sK)n  of  some  of  the  nations  to  the  amendment  would 
dictate  that  the  majority  required  for  the  proposal  of 
It  be  not  so  large  as  that  demanded  for  its  ultimate 
enactment' 

III 

Enactment  of  Amendments 

After  providing  for  the  two  methods  of  proposing 
amendments,  as  above  described,  the  American  Consti- 
tution declares  that  when  an  amendment  has  been  duly 
proposed,  it  shall  ' 

"be  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  part  of 

this  Constitution,  when  ratified  by  the  legislatures 

_     of  three-tourths  at  the  scNeral  States,  or  by  con- 


it* 


♦I] 

III 


5    r  1 


■  f '  'I 

ilfil 


II 


% 


\i  m 


hr 


El  J 


238  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

ventions  [of  the  people]  in  three-fourths  thereof, 
as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of  ratification  may 
be  proposed  by  the  Congress."  ^ 

The  American  States  being  republican  in  form  and 
the  ultimate  sovereignty  resting  in  the  people  thereof, 
It  IS  eminently  proper  that  such  fundamental  legislation 
as  would  be  comprised  in  an  amendment  to  the  federal 
Constitution  should  receive,  as  essential  to  its  validity, 
the  assent  of  the  people  themselves  in  each  State,  either 
through  their  chosen  representatives  in  the  respective 
State  legislatures,  or  through  their  still  more  specially 
chosen  representatives  in  conventions  of  the  people 
held  in  each  State  and  called  for  the  purpose. 

To  have  left  the  enactment  of  an  amendment  to 
Congress  would  not  have  been  in  the  least  consistent 
either  m  theory  or  practice  with  the  real  foundation 
upon  which  the  American  Constitution  rests,— the  free 
consent  of  the  people  of  the  several  States. 

But  in  the  case  of  our  international  compact  the  cir- 
cumstances  are  very  different.    The  constitution  of  the 
United  Nations  would  not  necessarily  rest  upon  the  con- 
sent of  the  people  of  the  several  nations  or  their  reprc- 
sentatives,-whether  it  would  or  not  in  case  of  a  par- 
ticular  nation  would  depend  on  the  form  of  its  own 
constitution.     Theoretically  in   each   case,   since   the 
constitution    would    be    an    international    compact    or 
treaty,  its  validity  would  depend  upon  the  valid  excr- 
cise  of  the  constitutional  treaty-making  power  by  the 
government  of  each  component  nation;  or  if  the  treary- 
making  power  has  not  the  constitutional  right  to  make 


^W**" 


AMENDMENTS  230 

such  a  treaty,  then  by  an  appeal  to  the  constitution- 
making  power. 

In  our  case  therefore  it  would  be  impracticable  to 
insert  a  clause  such  as  that  in  the  American  Constitu- 
tion  providing  that  amendments  receive  the  assent  of 
the  people  of  the  several  component  nations.  Indeed 
It  would  be  needless  to  refer  the  matter  formally  to 
the  component  nations  at  all,  the  assent  of  their  repre- 
sentatives  in  the  Congress  (who  would  be  entirely  sub- 
ject to  the  will  of  their  governments)  being  a  sufficient 
guarantee  of  the  assent  of  each  nation  to  the  proposed 
amendment. 

But  a  certain  period  of  notice  ought  to  be  required 
after  the  proposal  of  an  amendment  by  the  Congress 
before  its  final  passage  by  that  body,  so  that  ample 
time  may  be  given  the  several  national  govern- 
ments  to  determine  the  position  they  ought  to  take  with 
respect  to  it,  or,  if  the  national  constitution  so  re- 
quires,  to  obtain  the  desires  of  their  people  on  the  sub- 
ject. 

For  instance,  if  the  United  States  were  one  of  the 
component  nations,  no  amendment  to  the  international 
constitution  could  probably  be  assented  to  by  it  with- 
out  some  corresponding  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  to  which  the  assent  of  three- 
fourths  of  the  States  would  be  necessary.  It  would 
take  several  years  to  obtain  this  assent  if  it  were  ob- 
tamed  at  all. 

While  therefore  a  three-fourths  vote  of  each  house 
ot  the  Congress  would  sufHce  to  enact  an  amendment 


i 


i'H 


W\ 


MKtOCOrV  RESOUITION  TBT  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


APPLIED    IM/1GE      Inc 

1653  Eoit   Moin   Slrwt 

Rocht«t«t.   N*»   York        U609       USA 

(716)  482  -  0300  -  Phon« 

(716)  288  -  5989  -  ro» 


m 


240 


A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 


to  the  international  constitution,  it  would  also  be  im- 
portant to  provide  that  no  vote  upon  the  passage  of  an 
amendment  be  taken  in  either  house  of  the  Congress 
until  a  reasonable  time  (say,  four  years)  after  the 
formal  proposal  of  it.  This  would  give  the  several 
national  governments  adequate  opportunity  to  con- 
sider the  subject  in  all  its  bearings  and  would  also 
answer  the  requirements  of  nations  situated  like  the 
United  States  whose  governments  are  responsive  to 
the  will  of  the  people.^ 

IV 
Limitations  Upon  the  Power  of  Amendment 


ill 


I 


./rt 


The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  declares  that 
no  State  shall  by  any  amendment  be  deprived  of  its 
equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate.  The  reason  for  this  limi- 
tation is  obvious.  It  was  inserted  in  order  to  prevent 
the  passage  of  any  amendment  which  would  destroy 
the  constitutional  balance  between  the  smaller  and  the 
larger  States  through  the  equality  of  representation 
in  the  Senate. 

Without  question  our  international  constitution 
ought  to  contain  a  similar  limitation,  since  the  balance 
of  the  equal  representation  of  sovereignty  in  the  upper 
house  against  the  unequal  representation  according  to 
population  in  the  lower  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
conditions  of  the  union. 

But  this  is  not  the  only  basic  condition  of  the  com- 

'  See  Appendix,  Comt'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IX,  Sees,  i,  a. 


AMENDMENT— LIMITATIONS        241 

pact  as  proposed.  Others  are  the  right  of  the  more 
populous  States  to  be  represented  in  the  lower  house 
of  the  Congress  in  proportion  to  federal  population; 
the  right  of  each  component  nation  to  veto  the  legis- 
lation of  the  Congress  which  it  believes  subversive  of 
the  reserved  rights  of  the  nations;  the  right  of  a  na- 
tion to  withdraw  from  the  union  after  a  designated 
term  of  membership;  the  right  of  each  nation  to  its 
equal  representation  upon  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  Nations ;  and  the  exemption  of  the  sovereign  or 
chief  executive  of  each  nation  from  the  operation  of  the 
judicial  power  of  the  United  Nations. 

These  are  all  fundamental  conditions  of  our  inter- 
national compact,  without  the  existence  and  guaranteed 
continuance  of  which  no  nation  would  probably  be  will- 
ing to  assent  to  it.  An  express  provision  therefore 
should  be  inserted  to  the  effect  that  no  amendment  shall 
be  passed  which  shall  affect  them,  except  by  unanimous 
consent.* 

'  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  IX,  Sec.  a. 


ill 


ji 


i  ! 


-'18 

11 


ii'tei 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
DISCIPLINE  OF  A  COMPONENT  NATION 


^ 

S".'/^" 


I 

Violations  of  Constitutional  Obligations  by  a 
Component  Nation 

The  checks  and  balances  already  suggested  for  our 
proposed  constitution  would  seem  suficient  to  prevent 
the  international  government  itself  from  violating  the 
compact  by  unjustifiable  encroachments  upon  the  re- 
served powers  of  the  component  nations. 

That  each  nation  would  possess  a  right  of  qualified 
veto  upon  international  legislation,  would  have  an 
equal  voice  upon  the  Supreme  Court,— the  final  inter- 
preter of  the  international  constitution,  laws,  and 
treaties,— and  in  the  last  resort  would  have  the  right 
to  withdraw  in  peace  from  the  union,  would  appear  to 
constitute  sufficient  safeguards  against  any  permanent 
violations  on  the  part  of  the  international  government 
or  any  majority  of  its  sister  nations  of  the  obligations 
towards  it  imposed  upon  them  by  the  constitution. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  while  our  plan  as  thus 
far  developed  has  imposed  upon  each  component  na- 
tion certain  obligations  and  duties  toward  the  interna- 

34a 


|lj- 


DISCIPLINE  OF  COMPONENT  STATE    243 

tional  government  as  a  whole  and  toward  its  sister  na- 
tions, no  check  has  as  yet  been  suggested  whereby,  if  a 
component  nation  radically  or  persistently  violates 
these  obligations,  pressure  may  be  brought  to  bear 
upon  it  to  compel  it  to  observe  them. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  a  component  State  so 
indifferent  to  its  duties  as  to  fail  to  send  delegations 
to  the  Congress  or  to  fail  to  appoint  its  delegates  to  the 
Supreme  Court  or  to  other  international  courts  within 
its  boundaries,  thus  embarrassing  the  operations  and 
functions  of  the  international  government.  No  com- 
ponent nation  would  be  likely  to  act  thus,  since  it  would 
thereby  merely  lose  its  voice  and  influence  in  interna- 
tional  affairs  while  yet,  so  long  as  it  might  remain  in 
the  union,  it  would  be  bound  by  the  laws  and  decisions 
passed.  Should  a  nation  ever  reach  such  a  stage  of 
indifference  it  would  be  far  more  likely  to  withdraw 
at  once  from  the  union,  as  it  would  have  the  right  to 
do. 

The  cases  chiefly  to  be  guarded  against  would  be 
those  wherein  a  nation,  while  willing  and  anxious  in 
general  to  avail  itself  of  the  advantages  of  the  union, 
would  yet  be  slow  and  unwilling  to  pay  the  price  in 
cheerfully  and  loyally  yielding  to  the  constitutional 
wishes  of  the  majority  of  its  fellows. 

Suppose  for  example  a  component  nation  to  refuse  to 
give  up  an  excessive  proportion  of  armed  troops  or 
ships  of  war,  paying  no  regard  to  the  action  of  the 
Congress  in  that  regard;  or  to  decline  to  obey  an  ad- 
verse judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  a  suit  insti- 


■     ;3 


■  t  t  i 
-5  3  1 


m 


*^-  I 
i».  I 
v.'-  '• 

V    •      * 


! 

,     i 


s  I 


;  7p 


''\  1:^ 


^ 


!■■ 


/•"•v 


/T" 


244  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

tuted  against  it  by  a  sister  State;  or  to  refuse  to  recog- 
nize  within  its  limits  those  privileges  and  immunities 
of  the  citizens  of  its  sister  States  guaranteed  by  the 
constitution;  or  to  insist  upon  levying  tariff  duties  on 
goods  imported  into  its  borders  from  other  States  in 
violation  of  the  constitution  or  enforcing  within  its 
limits  other  laws  declared  by  the  Supreme  Court  to 
be  violative   of  the   constitution;   or  to   insist  upon 
waging  war  against  other  States,  either  members  or 
not  members  of  the  union,  or  persistently  threatening 
to  do  so  or  deliberately  engaging  in  conduct  that  would 
provoke  another  State  to  make  war  upon  it;  or,  in  case 
of  a  civil  war  within  the  boundaries  of  a  sister  State,  to 
insist,  contrary  to  its  constitutional  duty,  upon  interfer- 
ing in  the  contest  and  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  one 
side  or  the  other;  or  to  acquire  unconstitutionally  terri- 
tory which  it  refuses  to  surrender. 

The  presence  of  such  a  disturbing  influence,  if  per- 
manent, instead  of  strengthening  our  union,  would 
merely  weaken  it,  converting  it  from  an  institution  es- 
tablished  to  insure  peace  into  a  breeder  of  discord 
and  violence. 

Of  course  it  would  be  possible  for  the  other  nations 
composing  the  union  to  use  force  under  such  circum- 
stances and  by  war,  if  necessary,  to  compel  the  recalci- 
trant State  to  observe  its  constitutional  obligations. 
But  to  adopt  such  a  remedy  would  be  a  direct  contra- 
diction of  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which  our 
union  would  be  founded,— the  preservation  of  peace. 
Assuming  that  the  disturbing  element  would  desire 


»V  ', 


METHODS  OF  DISCIPLINE  245 

to  remain  in  the  union  and  enjoy  its  advantages  (for 
otherwise  it  would  substitute,  in  the  place  of  disturbing 
the  peace  of  the  union,  the  simpler  and  more  satisfac- 
tory  procedure  of  withdrawing  therefrom),  it  is  pos- 
sible to  conceive  of  more  consistent  and  law  abiding 
remedies  than  the  use  of  violence,  and  yet  equally  effica- 
cious. 

II 

Modes  of  Discipline  Suggested 

Two  methods  of  disciplining  a  recalcitrant  member 
of  the  union  suggest  themselves,  one  economic  in  char- 
acter,  and  the  other  political. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Congress  may  be  authorized 
to  declare  an  embargo  upon  part  or  all  of  the  trade 
carried  on  between  the  offending  nation  and  the  other 
component  nations  of  the  union,  to  remain  in  force  so 
long  as  in  the  judgment  of  the  Congress  might  be  neces- 
sary. 

Such  a  measure  would  of  course  impose  some  degree 
of  hardship  upon  the  innocent  States  whose  trade  would 
thus  be  affected,  but  the  burden  would,  theoretically 
at  least,  fall  upon  all  alike  since  the  embargo  would 
apply  alike  to  all,  and  even  though  unevenly  distri- 
buted, the  loss  and  inconvenience  to  none  could  be 
greater  than  the  use  of  force  and  war  as  a  remedy 
since  the  very  first  measure  in  case  of  war  would  be 
the  cessation  of  all  trade  with  the  offending  State. 

The  Congress  might  not  in  some  cases  find  it  neces- 


,  -  3 

iff 

list 


h-i 


-t  is. 

Ml 


i «. 


'  X 


\ 


„.&iir 


II 


<",l  *,fl 


I 


h 

•'^        /'*^ 

,{>,^^'' 


246  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

sary  to  lay  an  embargo  upon  all  of  the  trade  between 
the  several  States;  the  disciplinary  measure  might 
prove  successful  when  applied  to  only  a  portion  of  it. 
And  the  Congress  ought  probably  to  be  given  a  discre- 
tion  in  this  respect.  But  whether  the  embargo  be  laid 
on  some  or  all  of  the  trade,  so  much  of  the  trade 
as  is  prohibited  ought  to  be  prohibited  to  all  the  States 
alike.  If  State  A  is  the  offender  and  States  B  and  C 
are  two  of  the  component  nations,  the  Congress  ought 
not  to  be  permitted  to  prohibit  all  trade  between  A  and 
B  in  certain  articles,  while  allowing  C  to  trade  with  A 
in  the  same  articles. 

In  the  second  place,  if  the  application  of  the  em- 
bargo prove  insufficient  to  deter  the  offending  State, 
the  Congress  ought  to  be  authorized  to  take  the  further 
step  of  expelling  the  offender  from  the  union  alto- 
gether. Indeed  cases  might  be  imagined  in  which  it 
might  be  best  to  adopt  this  course  in  the  first  instance 
without  waiting  to  apply  the  milder  remedy  of  the  em- 
bargo. On  the  whole  it  would  appear  to  be  wise  to 
leave  with  the  Congress  a  discretion  as  to  which  remedy 
shall  be  applied. 

But  upon  the  expulsion  of  a  State,  it  would  be  fair 
and  just  and  tend  toward  future  peace  to  treat  the 
State  thus  expelled,  so  far  as  its  rights  in  the  common 
property  are  concerned,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  State 
which  voluntarily  st-  'es  is  treated,  that  is,  to  restore 
to  it  such  territory  (outside  the  seat  of  government)  as 
It  may  have  ceded  to  the  union,  and  upon  an  accounting 
of  the  common  assets  and  liabilities  before  the  Su- 


i    <:i 


CHECK  ON  POWER  TO  DISCIPLINE 


preme  Court,  to  turn  over  to  it  such  balance 
prove  to  be  due.^ 


247 


as  may 


III 

Check  Upon  Disciplinary  Power  of  the 
Congress 

Even  though  it  be  conceded  that  the  Congress  ought 
to  possess  the  disciplinary  powers  mentioned,  yet  we 
might  well  hesitate  to  place  so  dangerous  a  power  in 
the  hands  of  a  bare  majority  of  either  house.  The 
power  might  easily  be  diverted  into  an  engine  of  op- 
pression  and  a  means  of  obtaining  trade  advantages  at 
the  expense  of  a  powerful  competing  rival. 

It  would  seem  therefore  to  be  a  proper  precaution 
to  demand  that  such  action  may  be  taken  by  the  Con- 
gress  only  with  the  assent  of  a  very  considerable  ma- 
jority  of  the  votes  in  each  house. 

Since  such  disciplinary  action  is  in  a  sense  extra- 
constitutional  and  (if  it  should  result  in  the  expulsion 
of  a  component  nation)  would  really  effect  an  essen- 
tial  change  in  'he  constitution  of  the  government,  if 
not  in  '•  the  constitution,"  and  since  it  has  been  pro- 
vided that  no  nation  shall  be  permitted  to  become  a 
member  of  the  union  except  upon  a  three-fourths  vote 
in  each  house,  it  would  seem  appropriate  to  fix  the 
same  majority  as  necessary  to  pass  either  of  the  dis- 
ciphnary  measures  suggested." 

;See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  X.  Sees,  i,  a.  4. 
See  Appendix,  Consfn  U.  N.,  Art.  X,  Sec.  3. 


'»'tN 


J] 

i 


IH 


±\ 


i 


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!  |:     '■  ft  =1; 
S  V    ■  I?  I, 


CHAPTER  XIX 
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION 


lis  ' 


Number  of  Assenting  Nations  Necessary  to 
Establish  the  Constitution 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  required  for  its 
establishment  the  assent  of  nine,  that  is,  three-fourths, 
of  the  thirteen  then  existing  States,  the  same*  proportion 
required  for  the  valid  enactment  of  an  amendment. 

The  conditions  confronting  the  framers  of  the  great 
American  document  differed  radically  from  those 
which  the  nations  of  the  world  are  facing  today. 

During  some  ten  years  previous  to  the  adoption  of 
the  American  Constitution,  the  thirteen  States  had 
been  united  politically  under  a  league  or  alliance  known 
as  "  the  Articles  of  Confederation  and  Perpetual 
Union,"  which  had  definitely  proved  itself  a  failure  as 
an  instrument  of  government,  but  which  nevertheless 
had  united  the  States  by  a  common  bond.  Those  Ar- 
ticles expressly  declared  that  no  amendments  thereto 
or  changes  therein  should  be  effected  without  the  unani- 
mous  consent  of  all  the  States.  Changes  had  become 
absolutely  essential,  but  it  was  feared  with  reason  that 

348 


/*r* 


CONSTITUTION  ESTABLISHED       249 

unanimous  consent  could  not  be  obtained  to  make  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  believed  that  unless  the  as- 
sent of  more  than  a  bare  majority  of  the  States  was 
obtained,  it  would  not  only  be  dangerous  to  break  up 
the  existing  union,  but  the  success  of  the  new  one  would 
be  in  peril.  Hence  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  fixed 
upon  the  proportion  of  three-fourths  of  the  States  as 
being  sufficient  to  insure  its  probable  success. 

In  the  case  of  our  international  constitution,  however, 
the  component  nations  have  never  been  in  union,  save 
through  temporary  alliances  betwe.  .  certain  of  them; 
and  they  are  by  no  means  so  nearly  on  the  same  footing 
of  equality  as  to  wealth,  popula  .on,  or  political  or  mill- 
tary  strength,  as  were  the  American  States  at  the  adop- 
tion  of  their  Constitution. 

The  questions,— which  are  the  nations,  and  how 
many,  whose  assent  ought  to  be  regarded  as  necessary 
to  the  practical  success  of  the  union,— are  questions  of 
practical  statesmanship,  which  must  be  left  '  the  f^  I- 
sion  of  our  supposed  conference  of  nations  call 
discuss  the  feasibility  of  some  such  plan  of  union 
that  advocated  in  these  pages. 

But  for  the  sake  of  placing  a  complete  scheme  b 
the  reader,  it  is  suggested  that  no  such  union 
meet  with  success  if  it  do  not  include  at  least  fivt     t 
the  eight  existing  "  Great  Powers,"  that  is,  Austri. 
Hungary,    France,    Germany,    Great    Britain,    ItaH 
Japan,  Russia,  and  the  United  States.    Without  thc^i- 
or  a  majority  of  them,  the  union  would  be  of  little 
service  in  preventing  wars,  and  other  nations  would  be 


to 
as 


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.-^v 


250  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

apt,  and  indeed  ought,  to  decline  to  surrender  imp 
tant  sovereign  rights  in  the  creation  of  a  federal  g( 
ernmcnt  which  would  be  unable  to  guarantee  peace 
them  or  the  rest  of  the  world. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  accession  of  these  nations 
a  majority  of  them,  would  secure  also  the  assent' 
many  others,  since  they  would  find  within  the  union 
protection  against  unjust  aggressions  they  could  n 
hope  to  find  outside.     Wars  between  nations,  if  n 
eliminated  altogether,   would  be  then  reduced  to 
minimum    and  the  burdens  of  war  taxes,  armament 
national  ill  will,  and  human  woe  greatly  alleviated 

Since  there  are  eight  of  the  "  Great  Powers,"  ar 
the  assent  of  five  of  these  would  suffice  to  insure  tY 
success  of  the  union  and  to  induce  other  nations  t 
join  It,  the  number  of  nations  whose  assent  would  b 
sufficient  to  establish  the  constitution  between  ther 
has  been  tentatively  fixed  at  eight,  of  which  at  leas 
hve  must  belong  to  the  group  of  "  Great  Powers." 

II 
Method  of  Ratification  of  the  Constitution 

The   Constitution  of  the   United  States   provided 
that 

n.lTV  '■/^'l^'^afi?"  °^  *^^  conventions  [of  the 
estaWii^  "'ne  States  shall  be  sufficient  for  the 
establishment  of  this  Constitution  between  the 
States  so  ratifying  the  same." 

•  See  Appendix,  Const'n  U.  N.,  Art.  XI,  Sec.  x. 


Iff 
III   , 


I, 


CONSTITUTION  ESTABLISHED  251 
In  the  political  vocabulary  of  the  United  States,  the 
term,  conventions  of  nine  States,"  signifies  that  in 
each  State  there  be  called  by  the  proper  government  I 
a  thonty  a  "convention  of  the  people,"  the  numbe 
of  members  of  which,  as  «11  as  their  distribution  and 
apport,onment  among  the  people  and  the  rules  govern- 
mg  the.r  select.on  by  the  people,  would  be  previ- 
ously  determmed  by  law.  The  membership  would 
usual  y  consist  of   several   hundred,   elected   by   "he 

Zrk""  "'""''"  "  "  -"^"^  '"""""^^  -"con. 
In  the  American  political  theory,  in  the  absence 
of  a  requirement  that  its  work  be  submitted  by  a 
referendum  to  a  vote  of  the  people,  the  "convention 
0  the  people  "is  clothed  with  the  ultimate  sover  ^ 
of  ,h  State  and  ,ts  people,  and  is  superior  to  the  oTdl 
nary  legislative  assembly  which  possesses  merely  a  de- 
nva tive  or  secondaiy  sovereignty,  or  certain  govern. 
mental  powers.  K"vern 

for^r^  -''™.'''=.  American  Constitution  provided 

Its  own  ratification  by  "conventions"  in  the  sev. 

ral  States,   It  was  building  its  authority  upon  the 

.ronges,  and  deepest  foundations  known  to  Ameril 

olitical  sc,ence,-the  ultimate  sovereign  will  of  *" 

"..uted  the  most  solemn  of  all  treaties,-a  treaty  not 
">ade   through    the    ordinary    or    "  derivative  "sov 
:r "'  of  the  States  as  represented  in  ther  rdinar" 

"-Sn  will  of  .he  people  themselves,  rising  suprene 


\ 


I' 


^f 


-n 


252  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

over  the  "derivative"  sovereignty  or  mere  govern- 
mental  agencies. 

But  amid  few  of  the  nations  of  the  world  do  these 
pohtical  theories  of  the  United  States  prevail.  I„ 
Oreat  Bntam,  for  example,  the  theory  is  that  the  "  ulti- 
mate sovereignty  rests  not  in  the  people  as  such,  but 
in  the  Parliament,  the  most  powerful  and  influential 
branch  of  which  is  the  House  of  Commons,  composed 
of  representatives  of  the  people.  And  in  still  other 
countries  .he  theory  is  that  the  "  ultimate  "  sovereignty 
is  vested  m  the  person  of  the  sovereign. 

It  cannot  be  supposed  therefore  that  our  interna- 
tional  compact  could  be  made  to  depend  upon  actual 
ratification  by  the  people  of  the  several  nations  acced- 
ing to  ,t,  even  though  this  were  the  strongest  founda- 
tion  on  \»'hich  to  rest  it. 

It  would  nevertheless  be  desirable,  if  possible,  to 
place  the  status  of  this  solemn  compact,-partaking. 
as  It  does,  of  the  nature  of  a  fundamental  law  involv- 
ing  profound  changes  in  the  existing  constitution  of 
each  component  State,-upon  a  distinctly  higher  plane 
than  that  occupied  by  ordinary  treaties.  Hence  it  be- 
comes  necessary  to  seek  out  the  foundation  for  it  that 
would  be  recognized  by  all  nations  in  common  as  the 
strongest  and  deepest. 

It  must  of  course  be  assented  to  by  the  constitutional 
treaty.mak.ng  power  of  each  nation  (after  such 
changes  in  its  existing  constitution  as  might  be  rendered 
needful  by  the  adoption  of  this  international  compnct) ; 
but  its  binding  and  supreme  obligation  ought  to  be 


CONSTITUTION  ESTABLISHED       253 

recognized  and  emphasized  by  making  it  a  condition 
of  ratification  that,  besides  the  assent  of  the  ordinary 
treaty-maJcmg  power  of  each  component  nation,  the 
sovereign  or  chief  executive  of  each  shall  solemnly 
P  edge  in  writing  the  honor  of  his  nation  as  well  as 
ot  ..mself  and  his  successors  to  the  faithful  and  hon- 
est  observance  of  the  compact  in  all  its  parts  so  long 
as  the  nation  remains  in  the  union,  leaving  all  dis 

therein"        ''"^'"^  ^'"''"^^^  '"  '^'  '"°'^"  '"^'"^^^^ 
If  it  be  argued  that  such  a  pledge  is  implied  in  the 
making  of  every  treaty,  and  that  it  would  add  nothing 
to  the  sanctity  of  this  compact,  it  may  be  replied  that 
whde  this  is  true  in  theory  and  viewing  treaties  from 
a  high  moral  plane  unaffected  by  pressing  personal  or 
public  interests  it  is  also  true  that  in  practice  national 
governments  have  frequently  violated  treaties  most 
flagrantly  when  they  have  conflicted  with  supposed  na- 
.onal  interests,  and  have  not  regarded  either  their  own 
or  their  nation  s  honor  as  sullied  thereby.    The  mere 
unphcation  of  the  pledge  has  proved  insufficient  to 
deter  in  many  cases. 

a  J  ,r  ,  '"'="'"  P'^dge  of  ,he  honor  of  the  nation 

nd  „s  rukrs  would  prove  a  very  considerable  obstacle 

d  stumbhng  block  to  the  violation  of  this  compact 

tjiT  "'™"'^"  »"  "  -"l"'»'J  national  profit 
'"  volafng  ,t,  the  people  feeling  thcir  own  honor  pub- 


11 


m 


i:ri 


li 


«»! 


254  A  REPUBLIC  OF  NATIONS 

lidy  pledged,  would  be  more  likely  to  condemn  and 
oppose  the  violation?  It  would  thus  cease  to  be  a 
mere  governmental  agreement  and  would  become  a  na- 
tional  one  in  the  fullest  sense.* 

•  See  Appendix,  Const-n  U.  N.,  Art.  XI,  Sec.  a. 


■'  I 


nn  and 
:o  be  a 
le  a  na- 


m 


APPENDIX 

Constitution  of  the  United  States 

and 

Tentative  Const.tut.on  of  the  United  Nations 

IN 

Parallel  Columns 


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if 


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APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

We  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  in  order  to  form  a  more 
perfect  Union,  establish  justice, 
insure  domestic  tranquillity,  pro- 
vide for  the  common  defense, 
promote  the  general  welfare,  and 
secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to 
ourselves  and  our  posterity,  do 
ordain  and  establish  this  Consti- 
tution for  the  United  States  of 
America. 

ARTICLE  1 

Section  i.  All  legislative  pow- 
ers herein  granted  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  which  shall  consist  of  a 
Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives. 


Section  a.  The  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives shall  be  composed  of 
members  chosen  every  second 
year  by  the  people  of  the  several 
States,  and  the  electors  in  each 
State  shall  have  the  qualifications 
requisite  for  electors  of  the  most 
numerous  branch  of  the  State 
legislature. 

Representatives  and  direct  taxes 
shall  be  apportioned  among  the 
several  States  which  may  be  in- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


357 


ARTICLE  I 

Legislative  Department,  Its  Or- 
ganization AND  Powers 

Section  r.    All  legislative  pow- 
ers herein  granted  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Congress  of  the  United  Na- 
tions,   which    shall    consist   of    a 
Senate  and   House  of  Delegates. 
[Ante,  pp.  32  et  seq.] 
Section  2.      ,.    The    House    of 
Delegates  shall   be   composed   of 
delegations  represer  :ng  the  sev- 
eral   component    nations,    chosen 
as  the  laws  of  each  nation  shall 
direct. 

[Ante,  pp.  50  et  seq.] 


2-  Each  nation  shall  be  repre- 
sented in  the  House  of  Delegates 
by  votes  in  proporlion  to  the  pop- 


V'.li 


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258 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

eluded  within  this  Union,  accord- 
ing to  their  respective   numbers, 
which    shall    be    determined    by 
adding  to  the  whole  number  of 
free     persons,     including     those 
bound  to  service  for  a  term  of 
years,  and  excluding  Indians  not 
taxed,    three-fifths    of    all    other 
persons.        [Now     modified      by 
Amendment  XIV,  Sec.  2.]     The 
actual  enumeration  shall  be  made 
within  three  years  after  the  first 
meeting  of  the   Congress  of  the 
United  States,  and  within  every 
subsequent  term  of  ten  years,  in 
such  manner  as  they  shall  by  law 
direct.    The  number  of  Represen- 
tatives shall  not  exceed  one  for 
every   thirty  thousand,    but   each 
State  shall  have  at  least  one  Rep- 
resentative,  and  until  such  enu- 
meration shall  be  made,  the  State 
of  New  Hampshire  shall  be  en- 
titled to  choose  three,  Massachu- 
setts   eight,    Rhode    Island    and 
Providence  Plantations  one,  Con- 
necticut five.  New  York  six.  New 
Jersey   four,  Pennsylvania   eight, 
Delaware  one,  Maryland  six,  Vir- 
Rinia    ten,    North    Carolina    five. 
South  Carolina  five,  and  Georgia 
three. 


The  House  of  Representatives 
shall  choose  their  speaker  and 
other  officers;  and  shall  have  the 
sole  power  of  impeachment. 

fThe  President,  Vice-President, 
and  all  civil  officers  of  the  United 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

ulation  of  all  its  tern.ories,  which 
shall  be  determined  by  adding  to 
the  whole  number  of  white  per- 
sons one-third  of  all  other   per- 
sons:— provided    that    persons   of 
full  Japanese  blood  shall,  for  the 
purposes     of     this     section,     be 
counted   as  white  persons.     The 
actual  enumeration  shall  be  made 
within  five  years  after  the  first 
meeting  of  the  Congress  of  the 
United  Nations,  and  within  every 
subsequent  term  of  ten  years,  in 
such  manner  as  they  shall  by  law 
direct.     The  number  of  votes  to 
which   each   nation   shall   be   en- 
titled in  the  House  of  Delegates 
shall    not   exceed   one    for   every 
four    millions   of    population,    or 
fraction  thereof  in  excess  of  fifty 
per    centum,    estimated    in    the 
manner    before     mentioned,     but 
each  nation  shall  have   at  least 
one   vote.     Until   such   enumera- 
tion   shall    be    made,    each    na- 
tion shall  be  entitled  to  votes  on 
the    basis    mentioned,    in    accord- 
ance with  the  last  official  census 
taken  by  such  nation  prior  to  its 
ratification    of    this    constitution. 
Each    delegation    shall    cast    the 
votes  of  its  nation  aj  a  whole  or 
in  such  other  manner  as  the  na- 
tion may  by  its  laws  direct. 
[Ante,  pp.  33   et  seq.] 
3-    The     House    of    Delegates 
shall    choose    its    presiding    and 
other  officers. 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 
States  shall  be  removed  from  of- 
fice on  impeachment  for,  and  con- 
viction of,  treason,  bribery,  or 
other  high  crimes  and  misde- 
meanors.—Article  II,  Sec.  4.] 

Section  3.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  composed 
of  two  Senators  from  each  State 
elected  by  the  people  thereof  for 
six  years;  and  each  Senator  shall 
have  one  vote. 


The  electors  in  each  State  shall 
have  the  qualifications  requisite 
for  electors  of  the  most  nu- 
merous branch  of  the  State  legis- 
lature.    [Amendment  XVII.] 

Immediately  after  they  shall 
be  assembled  in  consequence  of 
the  first  election,  they  shall  be  di- 
vided as  equally  as  may  be  into 
three  classes.  The  seats  of  the 
Senators  of  the  first  class  shall  be 
vacated  at  the  expiration  of  the 
second  year,  of  the  second  class  at 
the  expiration  of  the  fourth  year, 
and  of  the  third  class  at  the  ex- 
piration of  the  sixth  year,  so  that 
one-third  may  be  chosen  every 
second  year.  .   .   . 

The  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States  shall  be  President 
of  the  Senate,  but  shall  have  no 
vote  unless  they  be  equally  di- 
vided. 

The  Senate  shall  choose  their 
other  officers;  and  also  a  Presi- 
dent fro  tempore,  in  the  absence 


259 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 
[See  Article  III,  Sec.  2,  cl.  a.'\ 


Section  3.  I.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  Nations  shall  be  composed 
of  delegations  from  each  compo- 
nent nation  chosen  as  the  laws  of 
each  nation  shall  direct.  Each 
delegation  shall  have  two  votes, 
which  shall  be  cast  as  a  whole  or 
in  such  other  manner  as  each  na- 
tion may  by  its  laws  direct. 
[Ante,  pp.  46  et  seq.] 


2. 


The  Senate  shall  choose  its 
presiding  and  other  officers. 


1!   SI 


-if 


--\ 


4     ! 


m 


26o 


APPENDIX 


I  t 


.-li 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  Vice-President,  or  when  he 
shall  exercise  the  office  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States. 

The  Senate  shall  have  the  sole 
power  to  try  ail  impeachments. 
When  sitting  for  the  purpose, 
they  shall  be  on  oath  or  affirma- 
tion. When  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  tried,  the  Chief 
Justice  shall  preside;  and  no  per- 
son shall  be  convicted  without 
the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of 
the  members  present. 

Judgment  in  cases  of  impeach- 
ment shall  not  extend  further 
than  to  removal  from  office,  and 
disqualification  to  hold  and  en- 
joy any  office  of  honor,  trust  or 
profit  under  the  United  States; 
but  the  party  convicted  shall 
nevertheless  be  liable  and  sub- 
ject to  indictment,  triil,  judgment, 
iind  punishment,  according  to 
law. 

[For  terms  of  office  of  Repre- 
sentatives, see  Article  /,  Sec.  2, 
cl.  I,  and  of  Senators,  see  Article 
I,  Sec.  J,  cl.  i;  Amendment 
XFII.] 

[For  eligibility  of  representa- 
tives, see  Article  I,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2, 
and  of  Senators,  see  Article  I, 
Sec.  s,  cl.  J.] 


[When  vacancies  shall  happen 
in  the  representation  {i.e.,  in  the 
lower  House,  and  now,  by  the 
Seventeenth  Amendment  in  the 
Senate  also)  from  any  State,  the 
executive  authority  thereof  shall 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


[See  ante,  pp.  6o  et  seq.] 


Section  4.  i.  The  terms  of  of- 
fice and  the  number  of  the  mem- 
bers, of  the  delegations  in  each 
house  shall  be  at  the  will  of  the 
respective  nations  they  represent, 
as  directed  by  its  laws.  Each  na- 
tion shall  also  regulate  by  its 
own  laws  the  eligibility  of  its 
delegates  in  either  house  and  the 
recall  of  each  or  all  of  them. 
[Ante,  pp.  so  et  seq.] 


,ni 


APPENDIX  26, 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  ^.  CONSTITUTION 

issue  writs  of  election  to  fill  such 
vacancies.— Article   I,  Sec.  2,  d. 

[The  Congress  shall  assemble 
at  least  once  in  every  year,  and 
such  meeting  shall  be  on  the  first 
Monday  in  December,  unless  they 
shall  by  law  appoint  a  different 
day.-Articlc  I,  Sec.  4,  cl.  2.] 


in 


[Neither  House,  during  the  ses- 
sion of  Congress,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  other,  adjourn 
for  more  than  three  days,  nor  to 
any  other  place  than  that  i„ 
which  the  two  houses  shall  be  sit- 
ting._Article  I,  Sec.  5,  d.  4.] 

Sections.  Each  House  shall  be 
the  judge  of  the  elections,  returns, 
and    qualifications    of    its    own 

members;  and  a  majority  of  each 
shall  constitute  a  quorum  to  do 
business;  but  a  small  number 
may  adjourn  from  day  to  day 
and  may  be  authorized  to  compel 
the  attendance  of  absent  mem- 
bers, m  such  manner  and  under 
such  penalties  as  each  House  may 
provide. 

Each  House  may  determine  the 
rules  of  its  proceedings,  punish  its 
members  for  disorderly  behavior, 
and,  with  the  concurrence  of  two- 
thirds,  expel  a  member. 


2-  The  Congress  shall  remain 
perpetual    session,    subject    to 

such  recess,  not  exceeding  four 
months  at  one  time,  as  the  two 
houses  shall  from  time  to  time 
agree  upon. 

[Ante,   p.   53.] 

3-  Neither  house  shall,  with^ 
out  the  consent  of  the  other,  ad- 
journ for  more  than  one  week 
nor  to  any  other  place  than  that 
in  which  the  two  houses  shall  be 
sitting. 

[Ante,  p.  53.] 
Section  5.  I.  A  majority  of  the 
votes  in  each  house  shall  consti- 
tute a  quorum  to  do  business;  but 
a  smaller  number  may  adjourn 
irom  day  to  day. 


Each  House  shall  keep  a  jour- 
nal of  Its  proceedings,  and  from 
"me  to  time  publish  the  same  ex- 
cepting such  parts  as  may  require 


2.  Each  houce  may  determine 
the  rules  of  its  proceedings,  pun- 
ish delegates  for  disorderly  be- 
havior, and,  with  the  concurrence 
of  two-thirds  of  the  votes,  expel  a 
delegate. 

[^nte,   p.  6s.] 

3.    Each    house    shall    keep    a 

journal    of   .       proceedings,    and 

from    time    to    time    publish    the 

same   m   such   language   or   Ian- 


4 
•  1 


f  !$ 


'■i-ii'^?!' 


gi^'A 


262 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

secrecy;  and  the  yeas  and  nays 
of  the  members  of  either  House 
on  any  question  shall,  at  the  de- 
sire of  one-fifth  of  those  present, 
be  entered  on  the  journal. 


Section  6.  The  Senators  and 
Representatives  shall  receive  a 
compensation  for  their  services  to 
be  ascertained  by  law,  and  paid 
out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United 
States. 


They  shall  in  all  cases,  except 
treason,  felony,  and  breach  of  the 
peace,  be  privileged  from  arrest 
during  their  attendance  at  the  ses- 
sion of  their  respective  Houses, 
and  in  going  to  and  returning 
from  the  same;  and  for  any 
speech  or  debate  in  either  Hou<ie, 
they  shall  not  be  quesiioned  in 
any  other  place. 


No  Senator  or  Representative 
ahall,  during  the  time  for  which 
he  was  elected,  be  appointed  to 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

guages  as  the  Congress  may  by 
law  direct,  excepting  such  parts 
as  may  require  secrecy;  and  the 
votes  of  the  delegations  in  either 
house  on  every  question  (save  on 
a  question  of  adjournment)  shall 
be  entered  on  the  journal,  unless 
the  Congress  shall  by  law  other- 
wise direct. 

(Ante,  p.  65.] 
Section  6.  i.  The  delegations 
in  either  house  shall  receive,  in 
proportion  to  the  number  of  votes 
each  delegation  is  entitled  to  cast, 
compensation  for  their  services  to 
be  ascertained  by  law,  and  paid 
out  of  the  treasury  of  the  United 
Nations. 

[Ante,  pp.  S3  et  seq.] 
2.    The  members  of  each  dele- 
gation shall  have   the  privileges 
and  immunities  of  ambassadors  to 
a    foreign    State,    while    passinc; 
through    the   territories   of   other 
component  nations.    They  shall  in 
all     cases,     except     felony     and 
breach  of  the  peace,  be  privileged 
from  arrest  during  their  attend- 
ance at  the   session  of  their   re- 
spective houses,  and  in  going  to 
and    returning    from    the    same; 
and  for  any  speech  or  debate  in 
either    house,    they    shall    not   be 
questioned    in    any    other    place 
than   the   State   they   respectively 
represent,  in  accordance  with  its 
laws. 

[Ante,  pp.  54,  55.] 


APPENDIX  263 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

«ny  C.V.1  office  under  the  author- 
ity of  the  United  States,  which 
shall  have  been  created,  or  the 
emoluments   whereof   shall    have 

been  increased,  during  such  time; 
and  no  person  holding  any  office 
under  the  United  States  shall  be 
a  member  of  either  House  during 
nis  continuance  in  office 

Section  7.  All  bills  for  raising 
revenue  shall  originate  in  the 
House  of  Representatives;  but  the 
with    aniendments    as    on    other 

Every    hi-    which    shall    have 
P"''^d  tl  use  of  Representa- 

•ves   and  Senate,   shall,   be- 

fore It  becomes  a   law.   be  pre- 
sented   to    the    President    of    the 
United  States.     If  he  approve  he 
shall  sign  It.  but  if  not  he  shall 
"turn  It.  with  his  objections,  to 
that  House  in  which  it  shall  have 
originated,    who   shall    enter   the 
objections  at  large  on  their  jour- 
nal, and  proceed  to  reconsiJer  it 
If  after  such  reconsideration  two- 
thirds  of  that  House  shall  agree 

to  pass  the  bill,  it  shall  be  sent, 
together  with  the  objections,  to 
he  other  House,  by  which  it  shall 
likewise  be  reconsidered,  and  if 
approved  by  two-thirds  of  that 
House,    It    shall    become    a    law 

But  .nail  such  cases  the  votes  of 
both  Houses  shall  be  determined 
by  yeas  and  nays,  and  the  names 
ot  the  persons  voting  for  and 
against  the  bill  shall  be  entered 
on  the  journal  of  each  House  re- 


Section  7.  No  law  for  raising 
revenue  or  for  the  regulation  o. 
commerce  shall  continue  in  force 
for  a  longer  term  than  ten  years 
from  its  passage. 

[Ante,    pp.    55   ,»    g^q^j 
Sections.    1.    In  order  that  any 
measure  proposed  in  either  house 
shall    be        .ting    on    the    com- 
ponent    ,M  :,     ,h3„     g^^^ 
have  passed  ea.         use  by  a  ma- 
jority of  the  votes  present.     But 
«f  any  component  nation  shall  en- 
tertain a  doubt  as  to  the  constitu- 
tionality of  a  measure  thus  passed 
on  the  ground  that  it  impairs  the 
reserved    powers   of   the   compo- 
nent nations,  such  nation,  through 
Its  delegation  in    ach  house,  may 
within    thirty   ( ,ys    after    it   has 
been  so  passed,  ^^ive  notice  to  the 
Congress   that   it   is   deliberating 
whether  it  shall  veto  the  measure. 
If,  within  the  time  mentioned,  no 
nation  shall  have  given  such  no- 
tice, or  if,  within  one  year  from 
such   passage,  the  nation  or  na- 
tions giving  such  notice  shall  not 
have  vetoed  it  by  a  statement  to 
that  effect  entered  on  the  journal 
of  each  house,  the  measure  shall 
become  binding. 


r't-r* 


iri 


PI 


M- 


uf 


264  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

gpectively.    If  any  bill  shall  not 


be  returned  by  the  Presioent 
within  ten  days  (Sundays  ex- 
cepted) after  it  shall  have  been 
presented  to  him,  the  same  shall 
be  a  law,  in  like  manner  as  if  he 
had  signed  it,  unless  the  Congress 
by  their  adjournment  prevent  its 
return,  in  which  case  it  shall  not 
be  a  law. 


Every  order,  resolution,  or  vote 
to  which  the  concurrence  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives may  be  necessary  (except  on 
a  question  of  adjournment)  shall 
be  presented  to  the  President  o' 
the  United  States;  and  before  the 
same  shall  take  effect,   shall   be 
approved  by  him,  or  being  dis- 
approved  by   him,   shall   be   re- 
passed by  two-thirds  of  the  Sen- 
ate and  House  of  Representatives, 
according  to  the  rules  and  limi- 
tations prescribed  in  the  case  of  a 

bill. 
Section  8.   The  Congress  shall 

have  power 

To  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties. 
Imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the 
debts  and  provide  for  the  com- 
mon defense  and  general  welfare 
of  the  United  States;  but  all 
duties,  imposts  and  excises  shall 
be  uniform  throughout  the  United 
States; 


2.  If,  afrer  such  notice  and 
within  one  year  from  such  pas- 
sage, a  nation  shall  veto  the 
measure  on  the  ground  mentioned, 
it  may  be  voted  on  again  in  each 
house  and  if  three-fourths  of  all 
the  votes  of  each  house  shall 
be  cast  therefor,  it  shall  be- 
come binding,  notwithstanding  the 
veto;  if  not,  it  shall  not  be  bind- 
ing. Periods  of  Congressional 
recess  shall  not  be  estimated  in 
the  thirty  days  or  in  the  year 
herein  referred  to. 

[Ante,  pp.  57  «*  - 


Section  9.  The  Congress  shall 
have  power 

I.  To  lay  and  collect  taxes 
upon  land,  in  order  to  pay  th; 
debts  of  the  United  Nations,  pro- 
vide for  their  common  defense, 
and  execute  the  powers  herein 
granted  to  them.  All  taxes  upon 
land  shall  be  uniform  throuKlwu* 
the  territories  of  the  several  com- 
ponent nations; 

[Ante,  pp.  69  et  seq.] 


'.*; 


APPENDIX 


265 


if 


U.  8.  CONSTITUTION 

To     borrow     money     on     the 
credit  of  the  United  States; 


To  coin  money,  regulate  the 
value  thereof  and  of  foreign  coin, 
and  fix  the  standard  of  weights 
and  measures; 

To  provide  for  the  punishment 
of  counterfeiting  the  securities 
and  current  coin  of  the  United 
States; 

To  regulate  commerce  with 
foreign  liations,  and  among  the 
several  States,  and  with  the  In- 
dian tribes; 

[The  migration  or  importation 
of  such  persons  as  any  of  the 
States  now  existing  shall  think 
proper  to  admit,  shall  not  be  pro- 
hibited by  the  Congress  prior  to 
the  year  1808,  but  a  tax  or  duty 
may  be  imposed  on  such  importa- 
tion, not  exceeding  ten  dollars  for 
each  person. — Article  I,  Sec.  9, 
cl.  1.] 

To  establish  an  uniform  rule 
of  naturalization  and  uniform 
laws  on  the  subject  of  bankrupt- 
cies throughout  the  United  States; 

To  establish  post  offices  and 
post  roads; 


To  promote  the  progress  of  sci- 
ence, and  useful  arts,  by  securing 
for  limited  times  to  authors  and 
inventors   the   exclusive   right   to 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

2.  To  borrow  money  on  the 
credit  of  the  United  Nations, 
through  the  issuance  of  bonds 
[and  to  provide  by  law  for  the 
issuance  of  paper  currency] ; 
[Ante,  pp.  74  et  seq.j 

[3.  To  coin  money,  regulate  the 
value  I'hereof  and  of  foreign  coin, 
and  fie  the  standard  of  weights 
and  r.ieasures] ; 

[Ante,   pp.  76,  78.] 

4.  To  provide  for  the  punish- 
ment of  counterfeiting  the  securi- 
ties, [coin  and  paper  currency] 
of  the  United  Nations; 

[Ante,  pp.  77,  78.] 

5.  To  regulate  international 
commerce  by  uniform  laws;  but 
nothing  herein  shall  be  construed 
to  give  to  the  Congress  the  power 
to  regulate  immigration,  emigra- 
tion, or  the  migration  of  persons 
to  or  from  a  component  State ; 

[Ante,  pp.  79  et  seq.] 


[See  ante,  pp.  97  et  seq.,  159 
et  seq.] 

[See  Article  IV,  Sec.  i,  cl.  2.] 

6.  To  regulate  international 
f  stal  and  other  communication 
by  uniform  laws; 

[Ante,  pp.  85   et  seq.] 
[7.   To    provide    for    interna- 
tional     copyrights      and      patent 
rights] ; 

[Ante,  pp.  87,  88.] 


,S        I 


!??  I 


.0 


■    ir 


266 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

their  respective  writings  and  di«- 
coveries ; 

To  constitute  tribunals  inferior 
to  the  Supreme  Court; 

To  define  and  punish  piracies 
and  felonies  committed  on  the 
high  seas,  and  offenses  against 
the  Law  of  Nations; 


To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of 
marque  and  reprisal,  and  make 
rules  concerning  captures  on  land 
and  water; 

To  raise  and  support  armies, 
but  no  appropriation  of  money  to 
that  use  shall  be  for  a  longer 
term  than  two  years; 

To  provide  and  maintain  a 
navy ; 

To  make  rules  for  the  govern- 
ment and  regulation  of  the  land 
and  naval  forces; 


To  provide  for  calling  forth 
the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of 
the  Union,  suppress  insurrections, 
and  repel  invasions; 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


8.  To  constitute  tribunals  infe- 
rior to  the  Supreme  Court; 

[Ante,  pp.  88  et  seq] 

9.  To  define  and  provide  for 
the  punishment  and  redress  of  of- 
fenses and  private  wrongs  (other 
than  breaches  of  contract)  com- 
mitted on  the  high  s;as,  and  of- 
fenses against  the  Law  of  Na- 
tions ; 

[Ante,  pp.  9».  93-] 

10.  To  declare  war,  and  make 
rules  concerning  captures  on  land 
and  water; 

[Ante,  pp.  93  «»  sell 

11.  To  raise  and  support  arm- 
ies; but  no  appropriation  of 
money  to  that  use  shall  be  for  a 
longer  term  than  two  years; 

12.  To  provide  and  maintain  a 

navy. 

13.  To  make  ;-les  for  the  gov- 
ernment and  regulation  of  the 
land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United   Nations; 

[Ante,  pp.  93  «»  »eq.l 
14.  To  provide  for  calling 
forth  the  ar  ned  forces  (inclid- 
ing  the  militia)  of  the  several 
component  nations,  in  order  to  ex- 
ecute the  la»'s  of  the  union,  sup- 
press insurr-ctions  against  the 
government  of  the  United  Ni- 
lions,  and   repel  invasions; 


To     provide     for     organizing,  .5-   To  prov.de  for  govern. 

arming,  and  disciplining  the  mill-  -.ch  par'  of  the  armed  force> 

"aand  for  governing  .uch  part  th.  r...r,onen,  nations  as  rnav  b 

If  them  as  may  be  employed  in  employed    in   the   serv.ce   of   th. 


■h\ 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

the  service  of  the  United  States, 
reserving   to   the    States,    respec- 
tively, the  appointment  of  the  of- 
ficers, and  the  authority  of  train- 
'  ing  the  militia   according  to  the 
discipline  prescribed  by  Congress; 
To   exercise   exclusive    legisla- 
tion in  all  cases  whatsoever,  over 
such   district    (not  exceeding  ten 
miles  square)   as  may,  by  cession 
of  particular  States  and   the  ac- 
ceptance of  Congress,  become  the 
seat   of   the   government   of   the 
United  States,  and  to  exercise  like 
authority    over    all    places    pur- 
chased by  the  consent  of  the  leg- 
islature of  the  State  in  which  the 
same  shall  be  for  the  erection  of 
forts,    magazines,    arsenals,    dock 
yards,   and  other  needful   build- 
ings; 

To  make  all  laws  which  shall 
be  necessary  and  proper  for  car- 
rying into  execution  the  foregoing 
powers,  and  all  other  powers 
vested  by  this  Constitution  in  the 
government  of  the  United  States, 
or  in  any  department  or  officer 
thereof. 


APPENDIX  267 

U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 
United  Nations,  reserving  to  the 


ARTICLE  II 


Section  t.  The  executive  power 
shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America. 


nations,  respectively,  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  officers  and  the  au- 
thority of  training  th"  forces; 
[Ante,  pp.  93  et  seq.] 

»6.    To  exercise  exclusive  legis- 
lation   in    all    cases    whatsoever, 
over  such  district  (not  exceeding 
fifty   square    miles)    as    may,    by 
cession  of  particular  nations  and 
the   acceptance   of   the    Congress, 
become  the    seat   of   the   govern- 
ment of  the  United  Nations,  and 
to  exercise  like  authority  over  all 
places  purchased  by  the  consent 
of  the  State   in   which   the  same 
shall     be,     for    the     erection    of 
forts,    magazines,    arsenals,    dock 
yards,   and   other   needful   build- 
ings;  and 

[Ante,  pp.  95,  96.] 
X7-  To  make  all  laws  which 
shall  be  reasonably  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  into  execution 
the  foregoing  powers,  and  all 
other  powers  vested  by  this  con- 
stitution in  the  government  of  the 
United  Nations,  or  in  any  depart- 
ment or  officer  thereof. 

[Ante,  pp.  96,  97.] 

ARTICLE  II 

Execi;tive  Department,  Its  Or- 
canizatiok  amd  p0wer8 

Section  i.  i.  The  executive 
power  of  the  Unite!  Nations 
sh.TlJ  be  vested  in  a  Council  of 
Ministers,  composed  of   members 


268 


APPENDIX 


I   :'■ 


i 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


He  shall  hold  his  oflice  during 
the  term  of  four  years,  and,  to- 
gether with  the  Vice-President, 
chosen  for  the  same  term,  be 
elected,  as  follows: 


Each  State  shall  appoint  in 
such  manner  as  the  legislature 
thereof  may  direct,  a  number  of 
electors,  equal  to  the  whole  num- 
ber of  Senators  and  Representa- 
tives to  which  the  State  may  be 
entitled  in  the  Congress,  but  no 
Senator  or  Representative,  or  per- 
son holding  en  office  of  trust  or 
profit  under  tie  United  States, 
shall  be  appointed  an  elector. 

[The  electors  shall  meet  in 
their  respective  States,  and  vote 
by  ballot  for  President  and  Vice- 
President,  one  of  whom,  at  least, 
shall  not  be  an  inhabitant  of  the 
same  State  with  themselves;  they 
shall  name  in  their  ballots  the 
person  voted  for  as  President,  and 
in  dis;inct  ballots  the  person 
voted  for  as  Vice-President,  and 
they   shall  make   distinct   lists  of 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  Congress,  and  consisting  of 
a  prime  minister  and  such  others, 
appointed  by  him  and  removable 
at  his  pleasure,  as  the  Congress 
shall  by  law  direct,  provided  that 
not  more  than  two  of  the  council 
shall  be  of  the  same  nation. 
[Ante,  pp.  TOO  et  seq.] 
2.    The    prime    minister    shall 
ho'd  his  office  until  he  be  recalled 
a  resolution  passed  by  a  ma- 
jority of   all  the  votes  of  either 
house  of  the  Congress,  unless  the 
position  fall  vacant  by  his  death, 
resignation,    or    recall    from   the 
Congress,  by  the  nation  he  repre- 
sents.   He  shall  be  chosen  as  fol- 
lows: 

[Ante,  pp.  I",  I"] 
3.   A     nominating     committee, 
composed  of  eight   Senators   and 
eight  Delegates,  elected  by  their 
respective    houses    in    accordance 
with  the  rules  of  each  house,  who 
shall  choose  their  own  chairman 
and     prescribe     the     times     and 
places    of    their    own    meeting!, 
shall    nominate    to    each    house 
three    mttibers    of    the    Congress 
for  the  office  of   prime   minister. 
Upon  the  receipt  of  ruch  nomina- 
tions,  each   house   shall    vote  hv 
ballot  upon  the  nominees  accnnl- 
ing  to  the  rules  prescribed  by  the 
Congress.   H  none  of  those  named 
shall    receive    a    majority   of   all 
the  votes  in  each  house,   cnntiur 
committee  shall  be  elected  as  la- 
fore,    who    shall    nominate    three 
other    members   of    the    Concres«. 
These  shall  be  voted  for  in  WU 


.ff 


W" 


APPENDIX 


269 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

all   persons   voted   for    as  Presi- 
dent, and  of  all  persons  voted  for 
as    Vice-President,    and    of    the 
number  of  votes  for  each,  which 
lists  they  shall  sign  and  certify, 
and  transmit  sealed  to  the  seat  of 
government  of  the  United  States, 
directed   to  the  President  of  the 
Senate;  the  President  of  the  Sen- 
ate shall,  in  presence  of  the  Sen- 
ate and  House  of  Representatives, 
open  all   the  certificates  and  the 
votes  shall  then  be  counted;  the 
person  having  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  votes  for  President  shall 
be  the  ''resident,  if  such  number 
be  a  major       of  the  whole  num- 
ber of  elect., s  appointed;  and  if 
no    person    have    such    majority, 
then    from    the    persons    having 
the  highest  number  not  exceeding 
three  on  the  list  of  those  voted  for 
as  Piesident,  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives   shall    choose    immedi- 
ately,   by    ballot,    the    President. 
But  in  choosing  the  President,  the 
votes  shall  be  taken  by  States,  the 
representative    from    each    State 
having  one  vott ,   a  quorum   for 
this    purpose    shall    consist    of    a 
member   or   members   from    two- 
thirds  of  the   States,   and   a   ma- 
jority of  all  the  States  shall  be 
necessary  to  a  choice.    And  if  the 
House    of    Representatives    shall 
not  choose  a  President  whenever 
the  ri>rht  of  choice  shall  devolve 
upon  them  before  the  fourth  day 
of    March,    next    following,    then 
the    Vice-President    shall    art    as 
President,  as  in  the  case  of  the 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

manner  and  upon  like  conditions 
as  the  previous  nominees,  and  so 
on  until  a  prime  minister  be 
chosen  by  a  majority  of  all  the 
votes  of  both  houses  of  the  Con- 
gress. 

[Ante,  pp.   106  et  seq.] 


■;■! 


I 


m 


f  ■  w 


M 


\  jl  '!• 


* 


"^ 


^■\ 


270  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

death  or  other  constitutional  dis- 
ability of  the  President.  The  per- 
son having  the  greatest  number  of 
votes  as  Vice-President  shall  be 
the  Vice-President,  if  such  num- 
ber be  a  majority  of  the  whole 
number  of  electors  appointed,  and 
if  no  person  have  a  majority,  then 
from  the  two  highest  numbers  on 
the  list,  the  Senate  shall  choose 
the  Vice-President;  a  quorum  for 
the  purpose  shall  consist  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  wh  ..  number  of 
Senators,  and  a  majority  of  the 
whole  number  shall  be  necessary 
to  a  choice.  But  no  person  con- 
stitutionally ineligible  to  the  of- 
fice of  President  shall  be  eligible 
to  that  of  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States. — Amendment  XII.] 
The  Congress  may  determine 
the  time  of  choosing  the  electors 

and  the  day  on  which  they  shall 
give  their  votes,  which  day  shall 

be     the     same     throughout     the 

United  States. 
No    person    except    a    natural 

born  citizen,  or  a  citizen  of  the 

United  States  at  the  time  of  the 

adoption     of     this     Constitution, 

shall  be  eligible  to  the  office  of 

President;  neither  shall  any  per- 
son be  eligible  to  that  office  who 

shall  not  have  attained  to  the  age 

of    thirty-fi->  e    years,     and    been 

fourteen  years  a  resident  within 

the  United  States. 

In  case  of  the  removal  ot  the 

President   from   office,   or   of   his 

death,  resignation,  or  inability  to 

diKharge  the  powers  and  duties 


i  <: 


APPENDIX 


271 


U,  S.  CONSTITUTION 

of  the  said  office,  the  same  shall 
devolve  on  the  Vice-President, 
and  the  Congress  may  by  law 
provide  for  the  case  of  removal, 
death,  resignation,  or  inability, 
both  of  the  President  and  Vice- 
President,  declaring  what  officer 
shall  then  act  as  President,  and 
such  officer  shall  act  accordingly, 
until  the  disability  be  removed,  or 
a  President  shall  be  elected. 

The  President  shall,  at  stated 
times,  receive  for  his  services,  a 
compensation,  which  shall  neither 
be  increased  nor  diminished  dur- 
ing the  period  for  which  he  shall 
have  been  elerted,  and  he  shall 
not  receive  within  that  period 
any  other  emolument  from  the 
United  States  or  any  of  them. 


Before  he  enter  on  the  execu- 
tion of  his  office,  he  shall  take  the 
following  oath  or  affirmation:  "I 
do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm) 
that  1  will  faithfully  execute  the 
office  of  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  will  to  the  best  of  my 
ability,  preserve,  protect,  and  de- 
fend the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States." 

Section  2.  The  President  shall 
be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United 
States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the 
several  Sf.-es,  when  called  into 
the  actual  service  of  the  United 
States;  he  may  require  the  opin- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


Section  2.  The  prime  minister 
and  the  subordinate  ministers 
shall  receive  from  the  treasury  of 
the  United  Nations  such  compen- 
sation, in  addition  to  that  to 
which  they  may  be  entitled  as 
members  of  their  respective  dele- 
gations, as  shall  be  prescribed  by 
law;  nor  shall  th^y  receive  dur- 
ing the  period  of  their  ministry 
any  other  emolument  from  the 
United  Nations  or  any  of  them. 
[Ante,  pp.  112,  113.] 


[See  Article  Fill,  Sec.  ».] 


Section  3.  The  prime  minister, 
acting  through  the  council  or  the 
appropriate  minister,  yi  the  law 
shall  direct,  shall 

[See   ante,  pp.   114  et  seq.] 


ii 


i  I 


I 


* 


.\ 


■! 


I 


272 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

ion  in  writing  of  the  principal  of- 
ficer in  each  of  the  executive  de- 
partments, upon  any  subject  re- 
lating to  the  duties  of  their  re- 
spective offices,  piid  he  shall  have 
power  to  grant  reprieves  and 
pardons  foi  offenses  against  the 
United  Stat>  3,  except  in  cases  of 
impeachment; 

He  shall  have  power,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  pro- 
vided two-thirds  of  the  Senators 
present  concur,  and  he  shall 
nominate,  and  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other 
public  ministers,  and  consuls, 
judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and 
all  other  officers  of  the  United 
States,  whose  appointments  are 
not  herein  otherwise  provided  for, 
and  which  shall  be  established  by 
law;  but  the  Congress  may  by 
law  vest  the  appointment  of  such 
inferior  officers,  as  they  think 
proper  in  the  President  alone,  in 
the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads 
of  departments. 

The  President  shall  have 
power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies 
that  may  happen  during  the  re- 
cess of  the  Senate,  by  granting 
commissions  which  shall  expire  at 
the  end  of  their  next  session. 

Section  3.  He  shall  from  time 
to  time  give  to  the  Congress  in- 
formation of  the  state  of  the 
union,  and  recommend  to  their 
consideration  such  mea^jres  as 
he  thai!  judge  necessary  and  ex- 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

I.  Grant  reprieves,  commuta- 
tions of  sentence  and  pardons  for 
offenses  against  the  United  Na- 
tions ; 

[Ante,  p.  115.] 


2.  Make  treaties  with  nations 
not  members  of  this  union,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Congress,  concerning  matters  to 
which  the  constitutional  powers 
of  the  United  Nations  shall 
extend,  provided  two-thirds  of 
the  votes  present  in  each  house 
concur. 

[Ante,  pp.  115  et  seq.] 

3.  Appoint  and  remove,  sub- 
ject to  such  regulations  of  the 
civil,  military,  and  naval  service 
as  may  be  prescribed  by  law, 
ambassadors  and  all  other  execu- 
tive officers  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, whose  appointments  are 
not  herein  otherwise  provided 
for,  and  which  shall  be  estib- 
lisbed  by  law;  but  the  Congress 
may  by  law  vest  the  appoint- 
ment of  inferior  court  officers  in 
the  courts  of  law; 

[Ante,  pp.  118  et  seq.] 


[See  ante,  pp.  la,  123.] 


^■• 


,^ 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

pedient;  he  may,  on  extraordi- 
nary occasions,  convene  both 
Houses,  or  either  of  them,  and  in 
case  of  disagreement  between 
them  with  respect  to  the  time  of 
adjournTient,  he  may  adjourn 
them  to  such  time  as  he  shall 
think   proper; 

He   shall    receive   ambassadors 
and  other  public  ministers; 

He   shall    take    care    that    the 
laws  be  faithfully  executed; 

And   shall   commission   all  the 
officers  of  the  United  States. 


273 


Section  4.  The  President,  Vice- 
President,  and  all  civil  officers  of 
the  United  States,  shall  be  re- 
moved from  office  on  impeach- 
ment for,  and  conviction  of,  trea- 
son, bribery,  or  other  high  crimes 
and  misdemeanors. 


U.  N.  C0K3TITUTI0N 


4-  Receive     ambassadors     and 
other  public  ministers; 

[Ante,  pp.   120,   121.] 

5-  Execute     and     enforce     the 
laws  of  the  United   Nations; 

[Ante,  p.  121.] 
6.  Commission  all  the  execu- 
tive officers  of  the  United  Na- 
tions; but  the  judicial  and  legis- 
lative officers  of  the  United  Na- 
tions shall  be  commissioned  as 
the  laws  of  the  States  appoint- 
ing them  shall  direct. 
[Ante,  p.  122.] 


[See  Article  III,  Sec.  2,  cl.  ;>.] 


ARTICLE  III 


Section  i.  The  judicial  power 
of  the  United  States  shall  be 
vested  in  one  Supreme  Court,  and 
'n  such  inferior  courts  as  the  Con- 
gress may  from  time  to  time  or- 
dain and  egtablish. 


ARTICLE  III 

Judiciary   Departmemt,   Its   Or- 
ganization- AND  Powers 

Section  i.  The  judicial  power 
of  the  United  Nations  shall  be 
vested  in  one  Supreme  Court, 
and  in  such  courts  of  the  com- 
ponent nations  or  in  such  infe- 
rior   international    courts    as    the 


i. 


274 


APPENDIX 


lil 


i  «f 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


.-'^; 


The 
preme 


judges,  both  of  the  Su- 
and  inferior  courts  shall 
bold  their  offices  during  good  be- 
havior; and  shall,  at  stated  times, 
receive  for  their  services,  a  com- 
pensation which  shall  not  be  di- 
minished during  their  continu- 
ance in  office. 


[See  Article  II.  Sec.  ^.] 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

Congress  may  provide  or  estab- 
lish. 

[Ante,  pp.  88  et  acq-,  129  et 
seq.] 

Section  2.  i.  The  judges,  bcth 
of  the  Supreme  and  inferior  in- 
ternational courts,  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  executive  author- 
ity of  the  State  they  respectively 
represent,  or  wherein  they  arc 
respectively  to  perform  their  ju- 
dicial functions,  in  such  manner 
as  shall  be  prescribed  by  the  laws 
of  each  State;  shall  hold  their 
offices  during  good  behavior;  and 
shall,  at  stated  times,  receive 
from  the  treasury  of  the  United 
Nations  for  their  services  a  com- 
pensation which  shall  not  be  di- 
minished during  their  continu- 
ance ii    .office. 

[Ante,  pp.  125  et  seq] 

2.  A  judge,  either  of  the  Su- 
preme or  an  inferior  international 
court,  may  be  removed  from  of- 
fice by  the  Congress  for  extortion, 
bribery,  corruption,  or  other  high 
crime  or  misdemeanor. 

[Ante,   pp.   62   et  seq.] 

Section  3.  r.  The  Supreme 
Court  shall  consist  of  such  equal 
number  of  representatives  from 
each  of  the  component  nations  as 
the  Congress  shall  by  law  deter- 
mine. 

[Ante,  pp.  I  JO  et  seq.] 

2.  Immediately  after  they 
shall  be  assembled  in  coni^e- 
quence  of  the  first  appointments, 
they  shall  be  divided  by  lot  as 
equally  as  may  be  into  three  scf- 


APPENDIX  275 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

tions.    The  first  section  shall  hear 
and  finally  determine  all  contro- 
versies   properly    coming    before 
the  court,  which  shall  affect  am- 
bassadors, other  public  ministers, 
or     consuls     accredited     to     the 
United  Nations  or  to  any  of  them; 
or  which  shall  arise  between  com- 
ponent   nations,    or    between    the 
United  Nations  and  one  or  more 
nations,    either    members    or    not 
members  of  this  union ;  or  between 
one   or   more    of   the    component 
nations  and  nations  not  members 
of  this  union;  or  between  nations 
not  members  of  this  union.    The 
second  section  shall  hear  and  fi- 
nally  determine    all    civil    cases, 
properly  coming  before  the  court,' 
wherein  private  persons  are  liti- 
gant on  one  or  both  sides.     The 
third     section     shall     hear     and 
finally     determine     all     criminal 
cases  properly  coming  before  the 
court. 

fAnte,  pp.  132  et  seq.] 
3-    If  a  party  to  the  litigation  is 
dissatisfied   with  the  decision   of 
any  section  that  the  case  is  or  is 
not  triable  therein,   he  may  ap- 
peal   from   such   decision    to   the 
entire  Supreme  Court,  all  the  sec- 
tions sitting  together;  and  a  like 
appeal   shall   lie  in  case  of  con- 
flicting decisions  of  several   sec- 
tions   upon    questions    involving 
the  interpretation  of  this  consti- 
tution, or  of  the  laws  or  treaties 
of  the  United  Nations,  or  of  the 
treaties  of  the  several  component 
nations  made  or  which  shall  be 


i 


in 


I 


■-y- 


276  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

made  with  each  other  or  with  na- 
tions not  members  of  this  union. 
[Ante,  pp.   134  et  «l] 
4.   Immediately   after  the  first 
division    of    the    Supreme    Court 
into  sections,  the  judges  in  each 
section  shall  draw  lots  for  their 
respective   r  ^sitions  or   order   of 
official     seniority     therein.      The 
judge  drawing  the  first  place  in 
his  section  shall  be  the  presiding 
judge   thereof   until    removed   by 
death,   resignation,   action  of  the 
Congress,     or     promotion     to     a 
higher  section,  in  which  case  his 
place  shall  be  taken  by  the  judge 
next  in  order  of  official  seniority. 
The  presiding  judge  of  the  first 
section  shall  be  the  chief  justice 
of  the  Supreme  Court. 

[Ante,  pp.  133.  »34-] 
5.  When  a  vacancy  occurs  in 
any  section,  all  judges  in  that  sec- 
tion holding  positions  below  the 
vacant  place  shall  advance  one 
degree  in  official  seniority,  leav- 
ing the  last  position  in  such  sec- 
tion vacant,  which  vacancy,  in 
case  of  the  first  two  sections, 
shall  be  filled  by  promotion  of 
the  presiding  judge  of  the  section 
next  below;  and,  in  case  of  the 
third  section,  by  the  appointment 
of  another  judge  by  the  executive 
authority  of  that  nation  the  loss 
of  whose  representative  on  the 
court  inaugurated  the  series  ol 
vacancies. 

[Ante,  pp.   133,   *34] 
Section  2.  The  judicial  power  Section  4-    The  judicial  powei 

shall  extend  oi     th.     United     Nations     sha! 

ext     1 


APPENDIX  277 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


To  all  cases,  in  law  and  equity, 
arising  under  this  Constitution, 
the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
and  treaties  made  or  '  ich  shall 
be  made   under  thtir   -jthority; 


To  all  cases  affecting  ambas- 
sadors, other  public  ministers, 
and  consuls; 


To  all  cases  of  admiralty  and 
maritime  jurisdiction; 


I.   To  all  cases  arising  under 
this    constitution,    or    under    the 
laws   or   treaties   of   the    United 
Nations,  or  under  treaties  made 
or  which  f"    ;i  be  made  by  the  re- 
spective  component   nations.     In 
any  justiciable  case  arising  under 
this  clause,  when  such  a  course  is 
necessary   to    a    proper    decision, 
the  court  having  jurisdiction  of 
the  case,  shall  for  the  purposes  of 
its  decision,  disregard   as  uncon- 
stitutional  any   law  or  treaty  of 
the  United  Nations  which  violates 
this  constitution,  and  shall  in  like 
manner    disregard    any    law    or 
treaty    of    a    component    nation 
which  violates  this  constitution  or 
the  laws  or  treaties  of  the  United 
Nations  which  shall  be  made  in 
pursuance  thereof.  Provided,  that 
neither    the    Supreme    Court   nor 
any  section  thereof  shall  thus  dis- 
regard any  law  or  treaty  unless 
three-fourths  of  the  judges  com- 
prising the  court  or  section  shall 
have  so  determined,  but  shall  en- 
force the  same. 

[Ante,  pp.   136  et  seq.] 

2.  To  all  cases  affecting  am- 
bassadors, other  public  ministers 
and  consuls  accredited  to  the 
United  Nations  or  to  any  of 
them; 

[Ante,  pp.   142,  143.] 

3.  To  all  cases  of  offenses  and 
private  wrongs  (other  than 
breaches  of  contract)  committed 
on  the  high  seas; 

[Ante,  pp.  143  et  seq.] 


;f 


I: 


.,  'i 


ill 


278 


APPENDIX 


If' 


;i'  . 


# 


\t'* 


y 


.,»'*'\ 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

To  controversies  to  which  the 
United  States  shall  be  a  party; 


To  controversies  between  two 
■nore  States;  between  a  State 
and  citizens  of  another  State;  be- 
tween citizens  of  different  States; 
between  citizens  of  the  same 
State  claiming  lands  under  grants 
of  different  States;  and  between 
a  State,  or  the  citizens  thereof, 
and  foreign  States,  citizens  or 
subjects. 


In  all  cases  affecting  ambassa- 
dors, other  public  ministers,  and 
consuls,  and  those  in  which  a 
State  shall  be  party,  the  Supreme 
Court  shall  have  original  juris- 
diction. 


In  all  the  other  cases  before 
mentioned,  the  Supreme  Court 
shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction, 
both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such 
exceptions,  and  under  such  regu- 
lations as  the  Congress  shall 
make. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

4.  To  controversies  to  which 
the  United  Nations  shall  be  a 
party; 

[Ante,  pp.  14s,  J46] 

5.  To  controversies  between 
two  or  more  component  nations; 

[Ante,  p.  146.] 

[See  ante,  pp.  147  et  seq.] 

6.  To  controversies  between 
component  nations  and  nations 
not  members  of  this  union;   and 

[Ante,  p.  X47-] 

7.  To  controversies  between 
two  or  more  nations  not  members 
of  this  union,  but  consenting  to 
the  exercis?  of  such  jurisdiction, 
provided,  that  no  department  of 
the  government  of  the  United  Na- 
tions shall  undertake  to  enforce  a 
decision  rendered  in  such  cirrum- 
stances. 

[Ante,  pp.  147.  148] 
Section  5.  i.  In  all  cases  af- 
fecting ambassadors,  other  public 
ministers,  and  consuls  accredited 
to  the  United  Nations,  or  to  any 
of  them,  and  those  in  which  an> 
nation  shall  be  party,  the  Su- 
preme Court  shall  have  original 
jurisdiction. 

[Ante,  pp.  150  et  seq.] 
2.  In  all  the  other  cases  be- 
fore mentioned  the  Supreme  Court 
shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction, 
both  as  to  law  and  fact,  upon  ap- 
peal from  inferior  international 
courts,  and  from  the  courts  of  the 
component  nations  when  exercis- 
ing   the    judicial    power    of    the 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except 
in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be 
by  jury;  and  such  trial  shall  be 
held  in  the  State  where  the  said 
crimes  shall  have  been  commit- 
ted; but  when  not  committed 
within  any  State,  the  trial  shall 
be  at  such  place  or  places  as  the 
Congress  may  by  law  have  di- 
rected. 

Section  3.  Treason  against  the 
United  States  shall  consist  only  in 
levying  war  against  them,  or  in 
adhering  to  their  en-Tnies,  giving 
them  aid  and  comfort.  No  person 
shall  be  convicted  of  treason  un- 
less on  the  testimony  of  two  wit- 
nesses to  the  same  overt  act,  or 
on  confession  in  open  court. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  declare  the  punishment  of  trea- 
son, but  no  attainder  of  treason 
shall  work  corruption  of  blood  or 
forfeiture  except  during  the  life 
of  the  person  attainted. 

[The  judicial  power  of  the 
United  States  shall  not  be  con- 
strued to  extend  to  any  suit  at 
law  or  equity  commenced  or 
prosecuted  against  one  of  the 
United  States  by  citizens  of  an- 
other State,  or  by  citizens  of  sub- 
jects of  any  foreign  State.— 
Amendment  Xi.j 


279 

U.  N.  C0>  "TITUTION 
United  Nations,  with  such  excep- 
tions and  under  such  regulations 
as  the  Congress  shall  make. 
[Ante,  p.  153.] 


[See  Article  IF,  Sec.  3,  d.  4.] 


[See  Article  IF.  Sec.  /,   d.  3.] 


Section  6.  The  judicial  power 
of  the  United  Nations  shall  not 
extend  to  any  original  suit  insti- 
tuted by  private  persons  against 
a  component  nation;  nor  to  any 
personal  proceeding  against  the 
sovereign,  chief  executive,  or  any 
member  of  the  ministry  or  cabinet 
of  a  component  nation. 

[Ante,  pp.  154,  155,- 


'\ 


280  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

ARTICLE  IV 


m 


i 

i 
I 


fl 

11., 


i 

l4 


The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  dispose  of  and  make  all  need- 
ful rules  and  regulations  respect- 
ing the  territory  or  other  prop- 
erty belonging  to  the  United 
States.— Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


[All  persons  born  or  natural- 
ized in  the  United  States,  and 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof, 
are  citizens  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  Sta»e  wherein  they 
reside. — Amendment  XIV,  Sec.  1. 

The  Con,{rcss  shall  have  power 
to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of 
naturalization.— Article  I,  Sec.  8, 
cl.  4. 


Limitations  Upon  i   i  Powrns  of 
THE  United  ,  at    ns 

Section  i.  x.  No  territory  o'.uci 
than  that  referred  to  in  the  six- 
teenth clause  of  the  ninth  section 
of  the  first  Article  of  this  consti- 
tution shall  be  acquired  in  any 
manner  by  the  United  Nations  in 
time  of  peace;  nor  in  war,  except 
through  temporary  military  cccu- 
pation,  to  be  returned  at  the  end 
of  the  war  to  the  nation  from 
which  it  shall  have  been  taken, 
unless  the  Congress,  three-fourths 
of  all  the  votes  of  each  house 
concurring,  shall  decide  that  the 
general  peace  will  be  subserved 
by  granting  the  occupied  terri- 
tory to  one  or  more  of  the  com- 
ponent nations,  or  to  a  nation 
not  a  member  of  this  union,  or  by 
making  of  it  an  independent 
State. 

[Ante,  pp.  157  et  «q.] 
2.  No  such  status  as  "  citizen- 
ship of  the  United  Nations"  shall 
be  recognized,  except  in  case  of 
persons  born  in  the  seat  of  the 
government  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, who  have  never  been  citi- 
zens of  any  State,  or  citizens  of 
a  component  State  permanently 
domiciled  in  such  district  at  the 
time  of  the  cession  thereof  to  the 
United  Nations. 

[Ante,    pp.    97    «    "I-    '59   «« 

•eql 

3.   No  such  crime  as  "treasoii 


APPENDIX  2gi 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

tSce  Article  III.  Sec.  3.]  against  the  United  Nations  "  shall 

be  recognized. 

No  capitation,  or  other  direct.  ,.    No   u"' of 'an?' J       •    • 

laid  on  articles  exported  from  any 
State.-Article  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  4,  5. 
No  money  shall  be  drawn  from 
the  treasury,  but  in  consequence 
of  appropriations  made  by  law; 
and  a  regular  statement  and  ac- 
count of  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures of  all  public  money  shall  be 
published  from  time  to  time- 
Article  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  7. 


No  preference  shall  be  given 
I'v  any  regulation  of  commerce 
"r  revenue  to  the  ports  of  one 
State  over  those  of  another,  nor 
*hall  vessels  bound  to,  or  from 
"-'^  State  be  obliged  to  enter,' 
c'far,  or  pay  duties  in  another.— 
Article  I,  Sec.  9,  cl.  6. 

No  title  of  nobility  shall  be 
rranted  by  the  [Jnited  Slates  — 
•'Article  I,  Sec.  9.  cl.  8. 


S-  No  money  shall  be  drawn 
from  the  treasury  of  the  United 
Nations  but  in  consequence  of  ap- 
propriations made  by  law;  and  a 
regular  statement  and  account  of 
receipts  and  expenditures  of  all 
public  money  shall  be  published 
from  time  to  time. 

[Ante,  p.  162.] 
6-  No  appropriation  of  public 
money  shall  be  made  for  purposes 
other  than  those  provided  for  in 
this  constitution;  nor  for  bounties 
or  subsidies  other  than  reason- 
able pensions  for  aged  or  in- 
capacitated public  servants  of  the 
United  Nations. 

[Ante,  pp.  162,  163.] 
7-  No  preference  shall  be  given 
by  the  United  Nations  to  the  ports 
or  trading  centers,  to  the  ships  or 
other  vehicles  of  commerce,  to 
the  persons  engaged  therein,  or  to 
the  highways  of  commerce  of  one 
<omponent  nation  over  those  of 
another. 

[Ante,   pp.   163    et   seq.] 

8.    No  title  or  order  of  nobility 

or  of  privilege  shall   be  granted 

or  created  by  the  United  Nations, 

[Ante,  pp.   165,  166.] 


''■'''^m.^m. 


li 


»I 


li 


ill 


282  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

And  no  person  »•.  )lding  any  of 


fice  of  profit  or  trust  under  them 
shall,  without  the  consent  of  the 
Congress,  accept  of  any  present, 
emolument,  office,  or  title,  of  any 
kind  whatever,  from  any  king, 
prince,  or  foreign  State.— Article 
I,  Sec.  9.  cl.  8. 

The  privilege  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  sus- 
pended, unless  when  in  case  of 
rebellion  or  invasion  the  public 
safety  may  require  it.— Article  I, 
Sec.  9.  cl-  *• 


Congress  shall  make  no  law  re- 
specting an  establishment  of  reli- 
gion or  prohibiting  the  free  exer- 
cise thereof.— Amendment  I. 

No  religious  test  shall  ever  be 
required  as  a  qualification  to  any 
office  or  public  trust  under  the 
United  Statet— Article  VI. 


9.  No  person  while  holding 
any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under 
the  United  Nations,  shall,  without 
the  consent  of  the  Congress,  ac- 
cept of  any  present,  emolument, 
office,  or  title,  of  any  kind,  what- 
ever,  from   any   king,   ruler,   or 

State. 

[Ante,  p.  167-] 
Section  2.    1.    It  »s  the  right  of 
any  person  imprisoned  under  or 
by  color  of  the  authority  of  the 
United  Nations,  or  contrary  to  the 
laws  or  treaties  thereof,   or   be- 
cause of  the  alleged  exercise  of 
a  right,  or  omission  or  violation 
of  a  duty,  claimed  to  exist  under 
the  constitution,  laws,  or  treaties 
of  the  United  Nations,  or  under 
a  treaty  of  a  component  nation  or 
under  the  Law  of  Nations,  to  ap- 
ply immediately  to  any  court  au- 
thorized  by  the   Congress  to   in- 
quire of  and  determine  the  legal- 
ity of  the  imprisonment,    and  to 
secure  a  prompt  discharge  if  the 
imprisonment    be    illegal.      This 
right  shall  never  be  suspended  by 
the    Congress    unless    when,    in 
case  of  rebellion  or  invasion,  the 
public  safety  may  require  it. 
[Ante,  pp.   168,  169.] 
a.   The  Congress  shall  make  no 
law    respecting    an   establishment 
of  religion  or  prohibiting  the  free 
exercise  thereof,  or  requiring  any 
religious  test  as  a  qualification  to 
any  office  or   public  trust   undef 
the  United  Nations,  or  imposing 
ci\ril  disabilities  upon  any  person 
because  of  his  religious  belief; 
[Ante,  p.  170] 


APP^ 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 
[Congress  shall  make  no  law] 
abridging  the  freedom  of  speech 
and  of  the  press.— Amendment  I. 
[Congress  shall  make  no  lawj 
abridging  the  right  of  the  people 
peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  pe- 
tition the  government  for  a  re- 
dress of  grievances.  — Amend- 
ment I 


A  vrell  regulated  militia,  being 
necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free 
State,  the  right  of  the  people  to 
keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not  be 
infringed.— Amendment   II. 

No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of 
peace,  be  quarter-^  in  any  house 
without  the  consei  .  the  owner, 
nor  in  time  of  war,  but  in  a  man- 
ner to  be  prescribed  by  law.— 
Amendment  III 


Nor  shall  private  property  be 
taken  for  public  use  without  just 
compensation.— Amendment  V. 


No  person  shall  be  deprived  of 
life,  libc":-,  or  property,  without 
due  process  of  law.-Amend- 
ment  V. 


No  bill  of  attainder  or  ex  poit 


•VDIX  ,83 

U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 
3.  Nor  any  law  abridging  the 
tretdom  of  speech  and  of  the 
press  in  any  component  State  to  a 
greater  exte«.t  than  is  customary 
by  law  or  usage  in  such  State; 
[Ante,  pp.   170,   ,7,.] 

4-  Nor  any  law  abridging  the 
right  of  the  people  peaceably  to 
assemble,  and  to  petition  the  gov- 
ernment for  a  redress  of  griev- 
ances. 

[Ante,  p.  172.] 

5-  The  United  Nations  shall 
not  infringe  the  right  of  the  peo- 
ple to  keep  and   bear  arms. 

[Ante,  pp.   172,  ,7 J.] 

6.  No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of 
peace,  be  quartered  by  the  United 
Nations  in  any  house  without  the 
consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in  time 
of  war,  but  in  a  manner  to  be 
prescribed  by  law. 

[Ante,  pp.   173,  ij.j 

7-  No  person's  private  prop- 
erty  shall  be  taken  by  or  under 
authority  of  the  United  Nations 
for  public  use  without  just  com- 
pensation. 

[Ante,  po.  175  et  seq.) 
8-  No  person  shall  be  deprived 
by  the  United  Nations  of  life,  lib- 
erty, or  property,  but  after  due 
opportunity  to  be  heard  in  a  reg- 
ular,  orderly,  and  appropriate 
proceeding;  nor  be  denied  by 
them  the  equal  protection  of  the 
laws. 

[Ante,  pp.  177  ft  seq.) 
Section  3.    I.   No  Uw  convict- 


hii       «ifl-  = 


284 


APPENDIX 


m 


1 1 


I  ^ 


h 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

facto  law  shall  be  passed. — Ar- 
ticle I,  Sec.  9.  cl.  3- 


The  right  of  the  people  to  be 
secure  in  their  persons,  houses, 
papers,  and  effects,  against  un- 
reasonable searches  and  seizures 
shall  not  be  violated,  and  no  war- 
rants shall  issue,  but  upon  prob- 
able cause,  supported  by  oath  or 
affirmation,  and  particularly  de- 
scribing the  place  to  be  searched 
and  the  persons  or  things  to  be 
seized. — Amendment  IV. 

No  person  shall  be  held  to  an- 
swer for  a  capital  or  otherwise 
infamous  crime,  unless  on  a  pre- 
sentment or  indictment  of  a  grand 
jury,  except  in  cases  arising  in  the 
land  or  naval   forces,  or  in  the 
militia,  when  in  actual  service  in 
time  of  war  or  public  danger,  nor 
shall   any  person  be  subject  for 
the  same  offense  to  be  twice  put 
in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb;  nor 
shall  be  compelled  in  any  crim- 
inal case  to  be  a  witness  against 
himself. — Amendment  V. 

In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right 
to  a  speedy  and  public  trial,  by 
an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  and 
district  wherein  the  crime  shall 
have  been  committed,  which  dis- 
trict shall  have  been  previously 
ascertained  by  law.  ~  Amend- 
ment VI. 
The  trial  of  all  crimes,  except 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

ing  and   punishing  a  person  for 
alleged  offenses,  nor  any  ex  post 
facto  law  punishing  crime,  shall 
be  passed  by  the  Congress. 
[Ante,  pp.  181,  182.] 
2.   The  right  of  the  people  to 
bt  secure  in  their  persons,  houses, 
papers,    and   effects,   against   un- 
reasonable searches  and  seizures 
shall    not    be    violated    by    the 
United  Nations,  and  no  warrants 
of  arrest  or  of  search  shall  issue 
but  upon  probable  cause,  supported 
by  oath  or  affirmation,  and  par- 
ticularly describing  the  place  to 
be  searched   and  the  persons  or 
things  to  be  seized. 

[Ante,  pp.  182,  183.] 
3.  No  person,  acquitted  of 
crime  or  punished  therefor,  shall 
be  punished  again  by  the  United 
Nations  for  the  same  offense;  nor 
shall  any  person  be  compelled  by 
them  in  any  criminal  case  to  be  a 
witness  against  himself. 


[Ante,  pp.  184,  X85.] 

4.  In  all  criminal  proseci-tions 
by  the  United  Nations,  the  ac- 
cused shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a 
speedy  and  public  trial  by  an  im- 
partial jury  of  the  State  and  dis- 
trict wherein  the  crime  shall  have 
been  committed,  which  district 
shall  have  been  previously  ascer- 
tained by  law,  but  where  mt 
committed  within  any  State,  the 


""■x^^"' 


APPENDIX  28c 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 

trial  shall  be  at  such  place  or 
places  as  the  Congress  shall  by 
law  have  directed.  The  number 
°f  jurors,  and  the  majority  of 
them  necessary  to  find  a  verdict. 
Ehall  be  prescribed  by  law. 
[Ante,  pp.  187  et  j^q  j 


in  cases  of  impeachment,  shall  be 
by  jury;  and  such  trial  shall  be 
held  in  the  State  where  the  said 
■:rime  shall  have  been  committed; 
but  when  not  committed  within 
any  State,  the  trial  shall  be  at 
such  place  or  places  as  the  Con- 
gress may  by  law  have  directed. 
—Article  III,  Sec.  2,  d.  3. 

In  suits  at  common  law,  where 
the  value  in  controversy  shall  ex- 
ceed twenty  dollars,  the  right  of 
trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved, 
and  no  fact  tried  by  a  jury  shall 
be  otherwise  re-examined  in  any 
court  of  the  United  States,  than 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  com- 
mon law.— Amendment  VII. 

(In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right] 
to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and 
cause  of  the  accusation;  to  be 
confronted  with  the  witnesses 
agamst  him;  to  have  compulsory 
process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in 
his  favor;  and  to  have  the  assist- 
ance of  counsel  for  his  defense.— 
Amendn.v.nt  VI. 

Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  re- 
quired, nor  excessive  fines  im- 
posed, nor  cruel  and  unusual  pun- 
Hhments     inflicted.  -  Amendment 


[See  ante,  pp.  174,  175] 


5-   In  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
by   the    United    Nations,    the    ac 
cused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  be 
informed  of  the  nature  and  cause 
of    the    accusation;    to    be    con- 
fronted with  the  witnesses  against 
him;  to  have  compulsory  process 
for  obtaining  wit:iesses  in  his  fa- 
vor;   to   have   the    assistance    of 
counsel    for    his    defense;     and, 
under  such  conditions  as  may  be' 
prescribed  by  law.  to  be  admitted 
to  bail.    Excessive  bail  shall  not 
be   required,   nor   excessive   fines 
imposed,   nor  cruel   and   unusual 
punishments  inflicted 

[Ante,  p.  189.] 


286  APPENDIX 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

ARTICLE  V 


Limitations    Upok    the    Powers 
OF  THE  Component  Nations 


u 

\\\ 


i  # 


s 


No  State  shall  enter  into  any 
treaty,  alliance,  or  confederation. 
— Article  I,  Sec.  lo,  cl.  i. 

No  State  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  Congress  .  .  .  enter  into 
any  agreement  or  compact  with 
another  State  or  with  a  foreign 
power.— Article  I,  Sec.  xo,  cl.  3. 


No  State  shall  lay  any  duty  of 
tonnage. — Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  3. 

No  State  shall,  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  Congress,  lay  uny  im- 
posts or  duties  on  imports  or  ex- 
ports, except  what  may  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  executing  its 
inspection  laws,  and  the  net  pro- 
duce of  all  duties  and  imposts 
laid  by  any  State  on  imports  or 
exports,  shall  be  for  the  use  of 
the  treasury  of  the  United  States; 
and  all  such  laws  shall  be  subject 
to  the  revision  and  control  of  the 
Congress. — Article  I,  Sec 
cl.  a. 


10, 


No  State  shall,  without  the  con- 
gent  of  Congress.  .  .  .  keep  troops 


Section    i.   No   component    na- 
tion  shall   enter   into   any  treaty 
concerning  matters  subject  to  the 
control  of  the  United  Nations,  or 
into    any    alliance   or   confedera- 
tion; nor,  without  the  consent  of 
the     Congress,     into     any     other 
treaty,  agreement  or  compact  with 
any    other    nation.     All    treaties 
made    by    a    component    nation 
with  nations  not  members  of  this 
union  shall  contain  provision  for 
the    peaceable    settlement   of    all 
disputes  arising  therefrom. 
[Ante,  pp.  197  et  ««<!■] 
Section   2.   No   component    na- 
tion shall,  without  the  consent  of 
the   Congress,   lay   any  tax  upon 
the  carrying  capacity  of  any  ship 
or  other  vehicle  of  international 
commerce,  or  on  any  person  be- 
cause   engaged    therein;    or    any 
imposts  or  duties  on  imports  or 
exports,  except  what  may  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  executing  its 
inspection  laws,  and  the  net  pro- 
duce  of   all    duties   and    imposts 
laid  by  any  nation  on  imports  or 
exports  shall   be  for  the   use  of 
the  treasury  of  the   United    Na- 
tions, and  all  such  laws  shall  be 
subject  to  the  revision  and  con- 
trol of  the  Congress. 

[Ante,  pp.  act  et  seq.] 
Section     3.    i.    No     component 
nation  shall,  without  the  consent 


APPENDIX  287 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


or  ships  of  war  in  time  of  peace 
...  or  engage  in  war,  unless 
actually  invaded,  or  in  such  im- 
minent danger  as  will  not  admit 
of  delay.— Article  I,  Sec.  lo,  cl.  3. 


No  State  shall  grant  letters  of 
marque  and  reprisal,  coin  money, 
fmit  bills  of  credit,  make  any- 
thing but  gold  and  silver  coin  a 
tender  in  paynent  of  debts,  pass 
any  bin  of  attainder,  ex  post  facto 


of  the  Congress,  in  time  of  peace, 
keep  troops  (exclusive  of  militia) 
or  ships  of  war  in  excess  of  ten 
per  centum  of  the  number  of 
troops  and  war  vessels  kept  by 
the  United  Nations;  or  engage  in 
war  with  other  nations,  unless 
actually  invaded  or  in  such  im- 
mment  danger  as  will  not  admit 
of  delay. 

[Ante,  pp.  205  et  seq.] 
2.   Nothing  herein  shall  be  con- 
strued to  prohibit  a  nation,  which 
•s   keeping   such  troops  or   ships 
when  it  enters  this  union,  to  eflPect 
a  gradual  reduction  of  its  forces 
according  to  a  general  plan  to  be 
determined  by  the  Congress,  until 
the  ten  per  centum  before  men- 
tioned be  attained. 

[Ante,  pp.  205  et  seq.] 
3-    In  no  event  shall  a  compo- 
nent nation  be  required  to  reduce 
the  number  of  its  troops  below  a 
minimum  of  one-tenth  of  one  per 
centum  of  the  population  of  all 
its  territories,   estimated    as   pro- 
vided in  the  second  clause  of  the 
second  section  of  the  first  Article 
of  this  constitution;  nor  the  ton- 
nage of  its  ships  of  war  below  a 
minimum  of  one  per  centum  of 
the  tonnage  of  its  merchant  ma- 
rine. 

[Ante,  pp.  ao8,  209.] 


[See  Article  VI,  Sec.  /.] 


i- 


M' 


I 

If 


! 


!■ 


288 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTI'  UTION 

law,  or  law  impairing  the  obli- 
gation of  contracts,  or  grant  any 
title  of  nobility. — Article  I,  Sec. 
10,  cl.  I. 

No  State  shall  make  or  enforce 
any  law  which  shall  abridge  the 
privileges  or  immunities  of  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States;  nor 
shall  any  State  deprive  any  per- 
son of  life,  liberty,  or  property 
without  due  process  of  law;  nor 
deny  to  any  person  within  its 
jurisdiction  the  equal  protection 
of   the    laws. — Amendment   XIV. 

The  right  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  to  vote  shall  not  be 
denied  or  abridged  by  the  United 
States  or  by  any  State  on  account 
of  race,  color,  or  previous  condi- 
tion of  servitude. — Amendment 
XV. 

Neither  slavery  nor  involun- 
tary servitude,  except  as  a  pun- 
ishment for  crime,  whereof  the 
party  shall  have  been  duly  con- 
victed, shall  exist  within  the 
United  States,  or  any  place  sub- 
j  e c  t  to  their  jurisdiction. — 
Amendment    XIII. 

No  new  State  shall  be  formed 
or  erected  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  any  ether  State;  nor  any  State 
be  fornifd  by  the  junction  of  two 
or  more  States  or  parts  of  States, 
without  the  consent  of  the  legisla- 
tures of  the  States  concerned  as 
well  as  of  the  Congress. — Article 
IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  1. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 


[See  Article  VI,  Sec.  /.] 


[See  ante,  p"   192  et  seq.] 


Section  4.  No  component  na- 
tion shall,  without  the  consent  of 
the  Congress  (  three-fourths  of  all 
the  votes  of  both  houses  concur- 
ring) and  of  the  nations  directly 
concerned,  acquire  in  time  of 
peace  any  sovereignty,  control,  or 
jur'sdiction  over  the  territory  of 
anothe*-  nation,  whether  or  not  it 


APPENDIX  287 

V.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

be  a  member  of  this  union,  nor  in 
time  of  war,  or  is  a  consequence 
thereof,  but  as  provided  in  the 
first  clause  of  the  first  section  of 
the  fourth  Article  of  this  constitu- 
tion. 

[Ante,  pp.  209  et  seq.] 


FuH  faith  and  credit  shall  be 
given  in  each  State  to  the  public 
acts,  records,  and  judicial  pro- 
ceedings of  every  other  State. 
And  the  Congress  may  by  general 
laws  prescribe  the  manner  in 
which  such  acts,  records,  and  pro- 
ceedings shall  be  proved,  and  the 
effect  thereof.— Article  IV,  Sec.  1. 
The  citizens  of  each  State  shall 
be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and 
immunities  of  citizens  in  the  sev- 
eral States.— Article  IV,  Sec.  2. 

No  State  shall  pass  any  bill  of 
attainder,   ex  post  facto  law,  or 
law  impairing  the  obligation  of 
contracts.— Article  I,  Sec.  10,  cl.  1. 
No  State  shall  make  or  enforce 
any  law  which  shall  abridge  the 
privileges  or  immunities  of  citi- 
zens  of   the    United    States;    nor 
shall  any  State  deprive  any  per- 
son  of  life,   liberty,   or   property 
without  due  process  of  law;  nor 
deny    to    any    person    within    its 
jurisdiction    the   equal    protection 
of  the  laws.— Amendment  XIV. 


ARTICLE  VI 

Relations    of    the    Component 
Nations  to  Each  Other,  and 

TO  THE  Union 
Section    i.    No   component    na- 
tion shall  abridge  the  privileges 
and    immunities    of    citizens    of 
other   States,    either   members   or 
not  members  of  this  union,  or  of 
citizens  of  the  United  Nations,  by 
passing  any   law  convicting   and 
punishing   them    for    alleged    of- 
fenses, or  any  ex  post  facto  law 
punishing  crime,  or  any  law  im- 
pairing   the    obligation    of    con- 
tracts; or  by  depriving  such  citi- 
zens of  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
but   after  due  opportunity  to  be 
heard  in  a  regular,  orderly,  and 
appropriate    proceeding;     or    by 
denying  to  such  citizens  the  equal 
security    of    their    persons     and 
property;  or  in  violation  of  any 
treaty  or  agreement,  between  the 
nations  concerned. 

[Ante,  pp.  212  et  seq.] 
Section  2.  The  United  Nations 
guarantee  to  the  citizens  of  each 
component  nation,  as  well  as  to 
the  citizens  of  the  United  Nations, 
while  they  are  within  States  not 
members     of     this     union,     such 


m: 


m 


1 
m 


!-1 

11 


f5     ! 


■■':    I 


■=:.,^ 


!1 

( --1%,'  '.K '"  i ' 


290 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


The  United  States  shall  guar- 
antee to  every  State  in  this  Union 
a  republican  form  of  government, 
and  shall  protect  each  of  them 
against  invasion  .  .  .  and  on  ap- 
plication of  the  legislature,  or  of 
the  executive  (where  the  legisla- 
ture cannot  be  convened)  against 
domestic  violence. — Article  IV, 
Sec.  4. 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

privileges  and  immunities  as  are 
secured  to  aliens  by  the  Law  of 
Nations,  or  by  treaty  between  the 
c.veral  powers  concerned. 
[Ante,  pp.  215,  216.] 

Section  3.  The  United  Nations 
shall  protect  each  component  na- 
tion against  invasion. 

[Ante,  p.  217.] 

Section  4.  i.  In  case  of  inter- 
nal dissensions  within  any  compo- 
nent State,  neither  the  United  Na- 
tions nor  any  other  component  na- 
tion shall  intervene  by  force  be- 
tween the  contending  parties,  but 
the  United  Nations,  acting  on  be- 
half of  all  the  other  component 
nations,  shall  adhere  to  the  rules 
of  the  Law  of  Nations  in  such 
case  made  and  provided,  and 
shall  continue  to  recognize  the  de 
facto  government  of  such  nation 
as  the  existing  government,  which 
shall  exercise  and  enjoy  all  the 
functions,  rights,  and  privileges 
of  the  nation  under  this  constitu- 
tion, until  such  government  be 
overthrown  and  a  new  one  be 
substituted  therefor,  in  which  case 
the  new  government  shall  then 
exercise  and  enjoy  such  functions, 
lights,  and  privileges. 

[Ante,  pp.  217  et  seq.] 

2.  If,  in  consequence  of  such 
dissensions,  a  portion  of  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  Ration  concerned  is 
erected  into  an  independent  State, 
the  Congress  shall  proceed  to  re- 
adjust the  representation  of  the 
original  nation  in  the  House  of 
Delegates;  and  to  admit,  if  it  be 


V 


l«- 


APPENDIX  291 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

desired,  the  newly  created  nation 
into  the  mion  upon  the  terms  and 
conditions  provided  in  the  fifth 
section  of  this  Article. 

[Ante,  pp.  220,  221.] 
Section   5.   Other   nations   may 
be  admitted  to  this  union  by  the 
Congress,  three-fourths  of  all  the 
votes  of  both  houses  concurring 
provided  that  such  nations  comply 
with  the  terms  and  conditions  of 
the  second  section  of  the  eleventh 
Article  of  this  constitution. 
[Ante,  p.  221.] 


New  States  may  be  admitted  by 
the  Congress  into  this  Union.— 
Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  1. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power 
to  dispose  of  and  make  all  need- 
ful rules  and  regulations  respect- 
ing the  territory  or  other  property 
belonging  to  the  United  States; 
and  nothing  in  this  Constitution 
shall  be  so  construed  as  to  preju- 
dice any  claims  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  any  particular  State. 
—Article  IV,  Sec.  3,  cl.  2. 


The 


ARTICLE  VII 

Reserved    Rights    of 
Component  Nations 


THE 


The  enumeration  in  the  Consti- 
tution of  certain  rights  shall  not 
be  construed  to  deny  or  disparage 
others  retained  by  the  people.— 
Amendment  IX. 

The  powers  not  delegated  to 
the  United  States  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, or  prohibited  by  it  to  the 
States,  are  reserved  to  the  States, 
respectively,  or  to  the  people.— 
Amendment  X. 


Section  I.   Each  component  na- 
tion reserves  its  sovereignty  and 
independence;  and  every  jurisdic- 
tion, power,  and  right  not  dele- 
gated  to  the  United   Nations  by 
this  compact,  nor  prohibited  by  it 
to  the  component  nations. 
[Ante,  p.  222.] 
Section  2.    I.   The  right  is  re- 
served to  each  nation  acceding  to 
this  constitution  to  withdraw   in 
peace     from     the     union     after 
twenty-five  years  from  the  time 
of    such    accession.    ha%'ing    pre- 
viously given  one  year's  notice  of 
such  intention  to  the  Congress. 
[Ante,  pp.  223  et  «eq.] 
*.    Upon    withdrawal,    tie    se- 
ceding nation  shall,  by  the  act  of 


I 


\i  t 


I  ' 


I 


it. 


292 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

secession,  regain  complete  sov- 
ereignty, jurisdiction,  and  control 
of  all  land  ceded  by  it  to  the 
United  Nations,  save  such  as  may 
be  included  within  the  seat  of 
government  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, and  shall  be  entitled  to,  and 
bound  by,  such  adjustment  of  its 
share  of  the  common  property 
and  debts  as  the  Supreme  Court, 
or  the  proper  section  thereof,  may 
determine  is  equitably  due. 
[Ante,    pp.   227,   228.] 

ARTICLE  VIII 

Supremacy  of  the  Constitution, 

Laws,  and  Treaties  of  the 

United  Nations 


II 


1.4 


This  Constitution,  and  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  which  shall 
be  made  in  pursuance  thereof, 
and  all  treaties  made,  or  which 
shall  be  made,  under  the  author- 
ity of  the  United  States,  shall  be 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land;  and 
the  judges  in  every  State  shall  ie 
bound  thereby,  anything  in  tar 
Constitution  or  laws  of  any  Staw 
to  the  contrary  notwithstandu^ 
— Article  V'l,  cl.  2. 

The  Senators  anu  Repn-m-tna- 
tives  before  metHioneu,  aoo  dje 
members  of  tut  se*«ra-  sksbc 
legislatures,  anc  al  ErsBmnve 
and  judicial  officrrs,  -mOk  ^  :ae 
United  States  ani.  of  3te  sr=^ra! 
States  shall  be  Himnsi  m  oasc  or 
affirmation,  to  sus^orr  ska^  C 
tution. — Article     I,  &.  3. 


Section  i.  This  constitution 
and  the  laws  and  treaties  of  the 
United  Nations  made  in  pursu- 
ance thereof,  shall  be  the  supreme 
law  in  every  component  State; 
ami  the  judges  in  every  State 
shall  be  bound  thereby,  anything 
;n  the  constitution,  laws,  or 
rreaijes  r  any  State  to  the  con- 
trarv   ncCTSfithstanding. 

[Ante,   pp.   229,   230.] 

'iggawi  2.  All  legislative,  ex- 
^sasxfrc.  2.nd  judsial  officers,  both 
ar  aK  Laited  Nations  and  of  the 
ar^-cral  component  nations,  shall 
ar  oouart  by  oath  or  affirmation  to 
sisptsrz  thih  constitution. 
[Ante,  pp.  230,  231.] 


APPENDIX  293 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

[See  Article  IV,  Sec.  2,  cl.  2.\ 

ARTICLE   IX 

Amendments  to  the  Constitu- 
tion 

Section  I.  The  Congress,  by  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  both  houses, 
may  propose  amendments  to  this 
constitution,  which  shall  be  valid 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  part 
of  this  constitution  when  con- 
curred in  by  three-fourths  of  all 
the  votes  of  both  houses,  subject 
to  the  provisos  contained  in  the 
section  next  following. 

[Ante,  pp.  233  et  seq.] 


But  no  religious  test  shall  ever 
be  required  as  a  qualification  to 
any  office  or  public  trust  under 
the  United  States.— Article  VI, 
cl.  3. 

The  Congress,  whenever  two- 
thirds  of  both  Houses  shall  deem 
it  necessary,  shall  propose  amend- 
ments to  this  Constitution,  or,  on 
the  application  of  the  legislatures 
of  two-thirds  of  the  several 
States,  shall  call  a  convention  [of 
the  States]  for  proposing  amend- 
ments, which,  in  either  case,  shall 
be  valid  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, as  part  of  this  Constitution, 
when  ratified  by  the  legislatures 
of  three-fourths  of  the  several 
States,  or  by  conventions  [of  the 
people]  in  three-fourths  thereof, 
as  the  one  or  the  other  mode  of 
ratification  may  be  proposed  by 
the  Congress.— Article  V. 

Provided  that  no  amendment 
which  may  be  made  prior  to  the 
year  1808  shall  in  any  manner  af- 
fect the  first  and  fourth  clauses  in 
the  ninth  section  of  the  first  Ar- 
ticle; and  that  no  State,  without 
its  consent,  shall  be  deprived  of 
its  equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate. 
—Article  V. 


Section  2.  Unless  passed  by 
unanimous  consent  in  both  houses 
of  the  Congress,  no  amendment 
shall  be  valid  which  is  passed, 
before  the  expiration  of  four 
years  from  the  time  it  is  proposed 
by  the  Congress;  or  which  shall 
deprive  any  nation  of  its  equal 
suffrage  in  the  Senate,  or  of  its 
suffrage  in  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates in  proportion  to  population, 
or  of  its  equal  representation 
upon  the  Supreme  Court;  or 
which  shall  deprive  any  nation 
of  the  right  to  veto  a  measure  of 
the  Congress,  or  which  shall  de- 
prive   any    nation    of    the    right 


294 


APPENDIX 


U.  S.  CONSTITUTION 


n 


I. 


^^H '' 

i 

i 

I 

1 

PIL 

U.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

peaceably  to  withdraw  from  the 
union;  or  which  shall  extend  the 
judicial  power  of  the  United  Na- 
tions to  any  personal  proceeding 
against  the  sovereign  or  chief 
executive  of  any  component 
nation. 

[Ante,  pp.  »40,  241.] 

ARTICLE  X 

DtsciPUNE  OF  A  Component 

Nation 

Section  i.  If  a  component 
State  shall  refuse  or  neglect  to 
fulfill  its  obligations  under  this 
constitution,  or  the  laws  or 
treaties  made  in  pursuance  there- 
of, it  shall  be  subject  to  discip- 
line by  the  Congress  after  due 
warning. 

[Ante,  pp.  34a  et  seq.] 

Section  a.  Discipline  of  a  com- 
ponent State  shall  extend  no  fur- 
ther than  to  an  embargo  of  part 
or  all  of  the  commerce  between 
the  State  to  be  diKipIined  and  all 
the  other  component  States,  or  to 
the  expulsion  of  such  State  from 
the  union. 

[Ante,  pp.  245,  H^l 

Section  3.  No  disciplinary 
measure  shall  be  passed  except 
by  the  assent  of  three-fourths  of 
all  the  votes  in  both  houses  of 
the  Congress. 

[Ante,  p.  247.] 

Section  4.  When  a  State  shall 
have  been  expelled  from  the 
union,  it  shall  have  the  same 
rights  and  incur  the  same  obliga* 


APPENDIX  295 

U.  S.  CONSTITUTION  u.  N.  CONSTITUTION 

tions  with  respect  to  lands  ceded 
to  the  United  Nations  and  with 
respect  to  the  common  property 
and  the  common  debts,  as  if  it 
had  withdrawn  therefrom  under 
the  second  clause  of  the  second 
section  of  the  seventh  Article  of 
this  constitution. 

[Ante,  pp.  246,  247.] 

ARTICLE   XI 


The  ratification  of  the  conven- 
tions [of  the  people]  of  nine 
States,  shall  be  sufficient  for  the 
establishment  of  this  Constitution 
between  the  States  so  ratifying 
the  tame.— Article  VII, 


Establishment  of  the  Constitu- 
tion 

Section  r.  The  agreement  of 
eight  nations,  of  which  at  least 
five  shall  be  from  the  following 
group:  Austria-Hungary,  France, 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  Italy, 
Japan,  Russia,  and  the  United 
States  of  America,  shall  be  suffi- 
cient for  the  establishment  of  this 
constitution  between  the  nations 
agreeing  thereto. 

[Ante,  pp.  248  et  seq.j 
Section  a.  Such  agreement 
•hall  be  evidenced  by  the  assent 
of  the  constitutional  treaty-mak- 
ing power  of  each  nation,  accom- 
panied by  a  solemn  written  affir- 
mation by  the  sovereign  or  other 
chief  executive  authority,  pledg- 
ing the  sacred  honor  of  the  nation 
and  of  himself  and  his  successors 
faithfully  and  honestly  to  observe 
this  compact  in  all  its  parts,  leav- 
ing all  disputes  arising  under  it 
to  be  settled  in  the  modes  indi- 
cated  therein. 

[Ante,  pp.  250  et  seq.] 


INDEX 


M 


I  s 

h 


rr 


!-.   U  ,•■ 


.1^^-     • 


J 


INDEX 


[References  are  to  pages] 


Accounting  of  assets,  by  seced- 
mg  State  aa7-aa8,  292;  by  ex- 
pelled    State.     246-247/294- 

Accused,  arrest  of.  182-183.  284- 
discharge  of,  on  habeas  corpus! 
168-169,   282;   entitled   to  bail, 
»|9,   285;    no   second    jeopardy 
of,  184-185,  284;  not  to  testify 
against  himself,   185-186,   284; 
to  be  confronted  with  adverse 
witnesses    189,  285 ;   to  be  in- 
formed of  charge,  189,  285;  to 
be  tried  by  jury,  187-188,  2(54- 
285 ;    to   compel    attendance   of 
witnesses,    189,    285;    to    have 
aid    of    counsel,    189,    285;    to 
have  due  process  of  law,  181 
2«2-2i4,     283,     289;     to     ha-e 
equal   protection  of  laws,   181 
212-214,  283,  289.    See  Checks. 
Adjournment    of    Congress,     53. 

Admiralty,    jurisdiction    in,    uv 
.  »45.  277.  " 

Admission  of  States  to  league,  in 
case  of  civil  war  in  State,  220, 
290-291;  in  general,  221,  291. 
Aliens,  citizens  abroad  to  have 
rights  of,  215-216,  289;  protec- 
tion of,  in  component  States, 
212-214,  289. 

"^'ii""'.',^*""  "°* '«  "t"  into, 

200,    286. 

Alsace  and  Lorraine,  as  cause  of 
war,  XVI. 

bassadors,  appointment  of, 
I.  272;  delegates  in  Congress 
"Karded  as  55,  ,62;  judicial 
power  extends  to.  142-143,277; 
«»-'ginal     jurisdiction     of     Su- 

299 


preme  Court  embraces,  151-15* 
278;  reception  of  foreign,  120- 
"1,  273. 

Ambitions  of  nations,  as  cause  of 
war,  XIII,  17. 

Amendment    of    constitution,    in 
general,  232-241,  293.294;  ij^i. 
tations   on    power  of,   239-241 
293-294:    proposal   of,    236-237' 
293;     ratification    of,    237-240 
294:   subverts  Supreme  Court'i 
decisions,  141-142.    See  Checks. 
Appeal     from    State   to    interna- 
tional  courts,   89-91,    153    J,, 
278-279;  to  sections  of  Supreme 
Court,    132-134,    2JS,    278;    to 
Supreme    Court,    134-135,    ,„ 
^  275-276,  278.  "•      "' 

Appointment,  of  delegates  in 
Congress,  50-52,  258,  259;  of 
executive  officers.  118-120,  272  • 
of  judges,  ,25-128.  274;  of  mini 
mers  109-110,  268;  of  prime 
minister,  105-106,  268-269;  of 
Supreme  Court  justices  in  sec- 
S"f>/'°"'^^'     ^7*-276-      See 

Appropriations  of  money,  for 
armies  94-95,  266;  for  boun- 
ties, 162-163,  281;  for  general 
purposes,  162  163,  264,281;  for 
pensions,  162-163,  281. 

Arbitration,  courts  of,  ix-xi 

Argentina,     population     of, 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Armies,   appropriations  for, 
ited  to  two  years.  94-95' 
right   of    States    to    keep 
209.,  286287;    right   of    Tnited 
Nqf.on,    to    r.-,Ue    and    support, 
266.     See  Checks.  ' 


42; 

lim- 
266; 
206- 


f  ?i 


300 


INDEX 


'mi 

!  t       ■  a 


Ir 


«t 


Arms,  carrying  and  keeping  of, 
172-173,  283. 

Arrest,  discharge  from  illegal, 
168-169,  282;  freedom  from,  a 
privilege  of  delegates  in  Con- 
gress, 54,  262;  warrants  of, 
182-183,  284. 

Arsenals,  forts,  etc..  Congress  to 
control,  95-96,  267;  surrender 
of,  to  seceding  State,  227- 
228,  292;  surrender  of,  to 
expelled    State,    246-247,    294- 

"95-       ..  .        ,  i 

Arts,  condition  of,  as  measure  of 

State's  influence,  34. 

Assembly,  popular  right  of,  172, 
283. 

Attainder,  bills  of,  general  na- 
ture, 181-182;  not  to  be  passed 
by  Congress,  182,  283-284;  not 
to  be  passed  by  States  against 
citizens  of  other  States,  213- 
214,  289. 

Austria-Hungary,  assent  of,  to 
constitution,  249-250,  295;  pop- 
ulation of,  40;  votes  of,  in  Con- 
gress, 44. 

Backward  populations,  how  esti- 
mated, 37-39.  4'.  258- 

Bail,  grant  of,  to  accused,  189, 
285;  no  excessive,  to  be  re- 
quired, 189,  285. 

Balance  of  power,  as  cause  of 
war,  XV. 

Banking,  control  of,  by  Con- 
gress, 66-67,  74-75.  265- 

Belgium,  population  of,  41;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44,  47- 

Bills  of  attainder,  181-182,  213- 
214,  283-284,  289. 

Bolivia,  population  of,  42. 

Bonds,   Congress   may   issue,    74- 

75.  »65-       .    .        .       ^ 
Bounty    legislation    by    Congress, 

162-163,  281. 

Boycott  of  component  States,  242- 

a47,  294-     .    . 
Brazil,   population  of,  42;    votes 

of,  in  Congress,  44. 
Bribery,    judges    removable    for, 

62-63,  »29,  274- 


British  Empire.     See  Great  Brit- 
ain, 
Bulgaria,  population  of,  41. 

Cable,  control  over,  by  Congress, 
86-87,  265. 

Census  of  populations,  35-48,  258. 

Checks  and  balances  in  constitu- 
tion, demand  for,  xxxii-xxxiii 
25,  26,  27;  (i)  government  con- 
trolled by  component  States: — 
in  legislative  department,  dele- 
gates  in  Congress  appointed 
and   removable  by   States,   52, 

258,  259;  in  executive  depart- 
ment, prime  minister  appointed 
by  Congress,  105-X08,  259;  and 
removable  by  either  house,  iii- 
112,  259;  subordinate  min- 
isters appointed  and  remova- 
ble by  prime  minister,  109-112, 
268;  ministers  removable  by 
their  several  States,  50-52,  258, 

259,  260;  in  judiciary  depart- 
ment, judges  appointed  by 
States,  127-128,  274;  remova- 
ble by  Congress,  63-65,  129, 
274;  treaties  by  ministry  and 
Congress,  117,  272;  constitu- 
tion amended  by  Congress, 
232-241,  293 ;  admission  of  new 
States  by  Congress,  220,  221, 
290-291; — (2)  Great  Poviers 
balanced  against  smaller  na- 
tions: in  legislative  depart- 
ment. Great  Powers  to  pre- 
dominate in  House  of  Dele- 
gates, 35-48,  258;  equal  repre- 
sentation of  States  in  Senate, 
46-48,  259;  no  measures  to  pass 
save  by  consent  of  both  houses, 
46-47,  257,  263;  limited  life  of 
tax  and  commerce  laws,  55-57. 
84,  26?;  Ml  executive  depart- 
ment, ministry  dependent  on 
Congress,  105-112,  268-269;  in 
judiciary  department,  equality 
of  representation  on  Supreme 
Court,  130-132,  274;— (3)  pro- 
tection of  a  minority  of  Stales 
against  a  majority:  powers 
of  Congress  as  limited  as  po<- 


INDEX 


sible,  66-67;   in  legislative  ac- 
tion, Congress  to  tax  land  only 
70-72,    160-161,    264,    281;    tax 
must  be  uniform,  72,  264;  com- 
mercial   laws    -o    be    uniform, 
K^i'/*V'^5,   26s,   281;    lim- 
itea  life  of  tax  and  commercial 
laws    56-57,   263;    veto   power 
of    States,    57-60.    263-264;    in 
executive  action,  dependence  of 
ministry  on  Congress,   105-112 
267-269;     in     judicial     action! 
equality    of    representation    on 
Supreme    Court,    130-132,    274; 
no  personal  proceedings  against 

trl',"   *'^?'='^".    '55.    279;    in 
treaty-making,     treaties     made 
by    ininistry    with    consent    of 
two-thirds    of     Congress,     117 
272;, treaties  to  be  within  con- 
stitutional powers,  H7-118,  272- 
in   amending  constitution,  con- 
sent  of   three-fourths   of    Con- 
gress required,  237-239,  293  I  in 
admission   cf   new   States   con- 
sent  of   three-fourths   of    Con- 
gress  required,   220,  221,   290- 
291;— (4)    protection    of    each 
single    State    in    its    reserved 
rights,  no  needless  powers  to  be 
granted.    75,    77,    195;    express 
reservation  of  sovereignty  and 
rights,   222,   291;    States   right 
to  veto  legislation,  57-59,  263- 
264;    State's    right    to    secede, 
223-228,   291-292;   no  "citizen- 
ship   of    United    Nations,"    97, 
159.  280;   no  "treason  against 
United  Nations."  160,  280-281; 
equality    of    representation    on 
Supreme    Court,    130-132,    274; 
no     amendment     can     deprive 
States    of    most    important    re- 
served    rights,     240-241,     293; 
uniformity    of    legislation,    72. 
83-87,    162-165,    264,   26s.    281; 
neutrality    in    case    of    dissen- 
sions in  a  State,  217,  290;   no 
personal    suits    against    rulers, 
»55.    279;    no    suit    by    private 
person  against  Statr,  154,  279; 
— (s)     protection    ayuinst    un- 


301 


constitutional   acts   of  govern- 
ment: legislative  action,  courts 
may     declare     laws     unconsti- 
tutional,    ,38-141,     277;      ^,to 
power    of    States.    57-60,    263- 
264,   5>tates  right  of  secession, 
223-228,  291-292 ;  executive  ac- 
tion, dependence  of  ministry  on 
Congress,      105-112,      267-269; 
courts  may  declare  acts  illegal 
and  actionable,  157;  appropria- 
tions for  armies  for  two  years 
only,    86-87,   266;    judicial    ac- 
tion,     judges      removable      by 
Congress,  63-65,   129.  264;   Su- 
preme   Court    to   declare    laws 
unconstitutional      only      by     a 
three-fourths  vote,  138-140,  277; 
Congress     may     override     Su- 
preme Court  hy  a  three-fourths 
vote      amending      constitution, 
141-142,  29s;  no  personal  pro- 
ceedings     against      rulers     of 
States,    155,   279;-(6)    protec- 
tion against  <wars  between  com- 
ponent States  or  betvieen  com- 
ponent     States      and     foreign 
itates:  each  State  to  keep  rea- 
sonable numbers  of  troops,  206- 
208,  286-287;  each  Sta-    to  re- 
duce   its    forces    to    reasonable 
limits,  206-208,  286-2S8;  league 
to    raise    and    support    arPiies 
and    navies,    93-95,    266;    each 
state  guaranteed  against  inva- 
sion,   217,    290;    courts   to    ad- 
judge disputes  between  States, 
'46,   278;    no   State   to   tax   or 
burden     commerce     of     other 
States,  201-203,  205,  286;  Con- 
gress   to    control    international 
commerce    and    communication 
by  uniforn-,  laws,  79-85,  87,  265, 
281 ;   no  State  to  acquire  terri- 
tory  of    another    without   con- 
sent, 209-211,  280,  288-289;  no 
btate  to  oppress  citizens  of  an- 
other, 137,  212-214,  289;  league 
to    protect    citizens    of   compo- 
nent States  when  abroad,  215- 
216.  289-290;  disciplinarv  pnw 
ers  of  Congress,  242-247,  294- 


¥>♦! 


'J* 


<  ;"' 


1  f"* 


30i 


INDEX 


295;  league  and  States  to  be 
neutral  in  case  of  internal  dis- 
sensions  in  sister  State,  217, 
290;  States  to  enter  into  no  al- 
liances, 197-200;  States  to  make 
no  treaties  without  consent  of 
Congress,  197-200,  286;  State 
treaties  to  provide  for  peace- 
able settlement  of  disputes,  201, 
286; — (7)  protection  against 
wars  between  league  and  oHt 
or  more  component  States: 
league  not  to  interfere  in  do- 
mestic concerns  of  States,  66, 
190,  193  >  league's  power  to  tax 
confined  to  land  only,  69-74, 
160-161,  264,  281;  league's  tax 
and  commercial  laws  to  be  uni- 
form,  72,   83-84,   163-165,   264, 

265,  281;  limited  life  of 
league's  tax  and  commercial 
laws,  55-57.  263;  league  to 
have  jurisdiction  of  wrongs  on 
high  seas  and  offenses  against 
Law  of  Nations,  92-93,  143-145, 

266,  277;  State's  right  to  veto 
international  legislation,  57-59, 
263-264;  Supreme  Court  to  de- 
clare void  and  illegal  uncon- 
stitutional acts  of  Congress  or 
ministry,  138-141,  277;  su- 
premacy of  international  con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties,  227- 
231,  292 ;  Supreme  Court  to  de- 
cide disputes  between  league 
and  component  States,  145,  146, 
278;  States'  right  to  keep 
armies  and  navies,  206-209, 
286-287 ;  State's  right  to  secede, 
223-228,  291-292;  disciplinary 
powers  of  Congress  and  limits 
thereto,  24  !-247, 294-295 ;  pledge 
upon  ratification  of  constitu- 
tion, 252-254,  295;— (8)  pro- 
tection against  wars  between 
league  and  foreign  Stales: 
league  to  embrace  majority  of 
Great  Powers,  249-250,  295; 
war  powers  of  league,  93-95, 
266-267;  league  to  levy  no 
taxes  on  international  com- 
merce,   160-161,    264,    aSx;    no 


secret  treaties  without  conient 
of  Congress,  117,  201,  272,  286; 
league  to  acquire  no  territory, 
I57-I59>  2S0;  States  to  acquire 
no  territory  without  consent  of 
States  concerned  and  of  Con- 
gress, 209-211,  280,  288-289;  in- 
ternational courts  to  protect 
aliens  while  in  component 
States,  137,  212-214,  289; 
league  to  protect  citizens  of 
component  States  while  abroad, 
215-216,  289-290; — (9)  protec- 
tion of  private  rights  against 
invasion  by  league:  courts  to 
construe  international  constitu- 
tion, laws,  and  treaties,  136- 
^37i  377;  Congress  not  to  tax 
imports,  exports,  business,  or 
trades,  72,  160,  264,  281;  com- 
mercial laws  of  Congress  to  be 
uniform,  83-84,  265,  281 ;  right 
of  discharge  from  illegal  im- 
prisonment, 168-169,  282;  free- 
dom of  press  and  of  speech, 
170-171,  283;  freedom  of  re- 
ligion, 170,  282;  right  of  as- 
sembly, 172,  283;  right  of  peti- 
tion, 172,  283;  right  to  carry 
and  keep  arms,  172-173,  283; 
quartering  of  soldiers,  173,  283 ; 
eminent  domain,  175-176,  283; 
due  process  of  law,  177-179, 
181,  283;  equal  protection  of 
the  laws,  179-180,  181,  283; 
jury  not  required  in  civil  cases, 
174-175;  no  grand  jury  re- 
quired, 186;  trial  by  jury  in 
criminal  cases,  187-188,  284- 
285;  bills  of  attainder,  181-182, 
283-284;  ex  post  facto  laws, 
181-182,  284;  general  warrants, 
182-183,  284;  security  of  dwell- 
ings and  effects,  182-183,  284; 
double  jeopardy,  184-185,  284; 
self-incrimination,  185-186,  284; 
other  guarantees,  189,  284-285; 
— (10)  protection  of  private 
rights  against  invasion  by  com- 
ponent States:  in  case  of  citi- 
zens of  other  component  States 
or  of  United  Nations,  212-214, 


t,  >> 


INDEX 


lit      ".  "x"*  °'  *>'•""'  2"-"4, 
a89,--(,i)    protection    of    pri- 

vate  rtghts  against  invasion  by 

foreign  States:  in  case  of  citi- 

2ens  of  component  States  or  of 

^of^'ln''?-''"'"'*"'  °''  42;  votes 
or,  in  Congress,  44. 

China,  open  door  in,  as  cause  of 
war,  xy;  population  of,  41- 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  41.     *   ' 

Citizen^  mistreatment  of.  bv 
other  States  as  cause  of  war 
xxvi;  not  protected  by  league 
against  acts  of  their  own 
States,      195;     of     component 

I !!!     '\    °*'J"'     component 
States,  rights  of,  812-214,  280- 

of    component    States    abroad 

rights  of    215-216,  289-290;  of 

different  States,  judicial  power 

does   not   extend    to   cases   be- 

tween,     148-150;     of     foreign 

atates     m     component     States. 

rights  of,  195-19(5,  212-216,  289; 

of    foreign    States,    rights    of, 

regulated   by  treaties,  215-216 

289-290;     of    United     Nations 

United  Nations,  no  naturalized. 
97-99,  159.  280;  of  United  Na- 
tions protected  in  component 
^tates,  212-214,  289;  of  United 
Nations  protected  in  foreign 
'check?^  *»S-2i6,  289-290.    See 

Civil  rights,  guarantees  of,  168- 

,180,  282-285. 
Civil    war    in    component    State. 

neutrality  in  case  of,  217-221 

290-291.  ' 

Civilization,      as      measure      of 

state  s  influence,  34. 
Class    legislation,    invalidity    of 

72,   83-84,   85-87,   163-165,   179^ 

180,  264,  265,  283,  289. 
Coinage,  control  of,  by  Congress, 

«6-67,  76-77,  265. 
Colombia,  population  of,  43. 


303 


Colored  populations  and  white 
37-39,  41,  258.  ' 

Commerce,  as  measure  of  State's 
'""""«.  35-36;  control  of,  in 
United    States,    79-81;    coniro" 

r,„H  !I"^"°."^''  *«  be  sur- 
rendered  to  league,  xxv,  xxx- 

26,  i'/''5°"«"r'  79,  82-83, 
IP'J^^'  .*??"«  f«'.  "  cause 
ot   war,   xiii,   xxvi,    14-16    i,. 

distribution,  not  production,  81! 
»3,     domestic,     controlled     bv 
component   States,   82,   192-19, 
201 ;  embargo  of,  to  discipline 
component  States,  245-247  20^- 
emigratio.  or  immigration  nti 
included  in,  84-85,  265:  inter- 
national, made  up  of  interstate 
?5„^°"'g".  82;  limit  f  life  of 
laws  regulating,  55-57,263;  no 
discriminations  in,'  as  betweeS 

286,  no  State  to  tax  or  burden 
201-205.  286;  no  State  tonnage 
duties  upon,  205,  286;  routes 
or  seats  of,  as  cause  of  wa" 
xiii.  See  Checks. 
Commercial  policies,  as  cause  of 
war,  XV. 

Commercial     treaties,     118,    201 

272,  286.  '  • 

Commissions,    issuance    of.    122 

273.  '        •» 

Communication  by  cable,  wire- 
less  etc  Congress  to  control, 
''5-»7,  265.  • 

Commutation  of  sentence,  115,  272 

Compensation,  for  property  taken 
under  eminent  domain,  17c. 
»76,  283;  of  delegations  in 
Congress,  53-54.  262;  of  judges, 
128-129,  274;  of  ministers,  112- 
"3,  271. 

Component  States.    See  States. 

Conciliation  between  nations,  ix- 

Congress,  composed  of  two  houses 
32-47,    48-50.    257;    House    of 
Delegates    with    votes    propor- 
tinned     to     population,     35-48 
HO,   258;    Senate   representing 


^<l 


!i 


'I 


Hi' 


304 


INDEX 


equality  of  sovereignty,  46-48, 
240,  259;  delegations  to  both 
houses  appointed  and  remova- 
ble by  States,  50-52,  258,  259; 
terms  of  office  of  delegates, 
50-52,  258,  259;  sessions,  re- 
cesses, and  adjournments  of, 
53,  261 ;  compensation  of  dele- 
gates to,  53-54,  262;  privi- 
leges of  delegates  to,  54-55, 
262;  summoning  and  proroga- 
tion of,  124,  261 ;  State  veto 
upon  action  of,  57-60,  263-264; 
appointment  and  removal  of 
ministry  by,  105-109,  267-268; 
interpellations  in,  122-123;  no 
power  of  impeachment  in,  60- 
63;  removal  of  judges  by,  62- 
63,  129,  274;  powers  of,  con- 
current or  exclusive,  68-69, 
197,  291;  powers  of,  express 
and  not  to  be  implied,  68-69; 
power  of,  to  tax  land,  69-74, 
264,  281 ;  tax  laws  of,  limited 
to  ten  years,  ,55:57.  84.  263; 
taxation  by,  limited  to  land, 
160-161,  264,  281;  taxation  by, 
for  what  purposes,  72-74,  264; 
to  borrow  money,  74-75,  265; 
to  issue  paper  currency,  75-76, 
265;  to  coin  money,  76-77,  265; 
to  punish  counterfeiting,  77- 
78,  265 ;  to  fix  standards  of 
weights  and  measures,  78-79, 
265;  to  regulate  international 
commerce  and  communication, 
79-85,  85-87,  265;  regulations 
of  commerce  and  communica- 
tion by,  to  be  uniform,  83-87, 
162-165,  265-266,  281;  regula- 
tions of  commerce  by,  limited 
to  ten  years,  55-57.  263;  to 
provide  for  international  copy- 
rights and  patents,  87-88,  265; 
to  establish  inferior  interna- 
tional courts,  88-92,  129-130, 
266;  to  define  and  punish 
wrongs  on  high  seas,  92-93, 
266;  to  define  and  punish  of- 
fenses against  Law  of  Nations, 
92-93,  266;  war  powers  of,  93- 
95,  266-267;  to  control  seat  of 


gOTcrnment,  arsenals,  etc.,  95- 
96,  267;  ancillary  powers  of, 
96-97,  267;  no  power  in,  to 
naturalize,  97-99,  159,  280;  ap- 
propriations of  money  by,  for 
support  of  armies  limited  to 
two  years,  94-95,  266;  appro- 
priations of  money  by,  in  gen- 
eral, 162-163,  264,  281 ;  bounty 
and  pension  legislation  by,  162- 
163,  281 ;  not  to  create  com- 
mercial preferences  as  between 
States,  163-165,  265,  281 ;  not 
to  establish  titles  or  privi- 
leged orders,  165-166,  281;  to 
suspend  habeas  corpus,  when, 
168-169,  282;  to  recognize  re- 
ligious liberty,  170,  282;  to  rec- 
ognize freedom  of  speech  and 
press,  170-171,  283;  not  to  pass 
bills  of  attainder  or  ex  post 
facto  laws,  181-183,  283-284; 
to  fix  number  of  jury,  187-189, 
284-285;  treaties  to  be  ratified 
by  two-thirds  of,  117,  272; 
States  to  make  treaties  only 
with  consent  of,  201,  286; 
States  to  acquire  territory  only 
with  consent  of  three-fourths 
of,  209-211,  286;  to  admit  new 
States  to  league,  220-221,  290- 
291 ;  to  readjust  representation 
of  States  in,  in  case  of  civil 
war,  218-219,  290-291 ;  notice 
to,  necessary  in  case  of  State 
veto,  57-60,  263-264;  notice  to, 
necessary  in  case  of  secession 
by  State,  226,  291 ;  acts  of,  the 
supreme  law,  229,  230,  292; 
amendments  to  constitution  pro- 
posed by  two-thirds  of,  236- 
237.  293 ;  amendments  enacted 
by  three-fourths  of,  237-240, 
293 ;  limitations  on  power  of, 
to  amend  constitution,  240-241, 
293 ;  power  of,  to  discipline 
component  States,  242-246,  294- 
295 ;  power  of,  to  regulate 
slave  trade,  192-193  ;  not  to  con- 
trol emigration  or  immigra- 
tion, 84-85,  192-193,  265.  See 
Checks. 


INDEX 


Constitution    of   United    Nations 
amendment    of,    236-241,    393  • 
interpretation   of,    by   Supreme 
Court,    132-133,    136-140,    277; 
number    of    nations    to    adopt 
248-250,  295 ;  oath  of  State  of- 
ficials to  support,  230-231,  292: 
outlme    of    articles   of,    28-29- 
ratification    of,    250-254,    295' 
supremacy     of,     229-231,     277! 
292;    contrasted    with    that   of 
United  States,  8,  257-J95. 
Consuls,   judicial   power  extends 

to,  142-143,  277, 
Contracts,   laws  affecting  obliga- 

tion  of,  213-214,  289. 
Copyrights,   control   of,   by   Con- 
gress, 66-67,  87-88,  265. 
Costa  Rica,  population  of,  43. 
Council    of    ministers.      See    Ex- 
ecutive Department;  Ministry. 
Counsel,  aid  of,  in  criminal  cases. 
189,  285. 

Counterfeiting,  Congress  to  pun- 

ish,  77-78,  265. 
Court,     supreme.      See    Supreme 

Court. 
Courts,   distinguished   from   arbi- 
tral tribunals,  ix,  x;  establish- 
ment of  inferior,  bv  Congress. 
88-92,    266;    establishment    of, 
would   not  of  itself  end  war! 
xi-xxiii;  judicial  power  vested 
in   136-150,  273;  jurisdiction  of, 
136-150.   150-152,   153,   227-228, 
•    ;•  .^^=79,    .292,     294-295; 
justiciable  questions  triable  by, 
XII,  xiii;  political  questions  not 
triable  by,  xii,  xiii;   power  of, 
to  appoint  clerics,  etc.,  120,  272. 
»ee  Judge:;  Judiciary. 
Crimes,  against  Law  of  Nations. 
Congress  to  define  and  punish 
??-?;•.  '44-.145,    266;     against 
United  Nations,  punishment  of, 
i45-»46;     ex    post    facto    laws 
punishing,      181-182,     212-214, 
283-284,    289;     guarantees    in 
trials    for,     177-189,    284-285; 
judges    removable    for,    62-63, 
^29.    274;     legislative    convic- 
tions of,  181-182,  212-214,  28j- 


305 


284.  289;  on  high  teas,  control 
of  Congress  over,  92-93,  266; 
on  high  seas,  judicial  power 
extends  to,  143-145,  277;  par- 
dons for,  11 5,  272;  reprieves 
lor,  115,  372;  retroactive  legis- 
lation punishing,  181-182,  213- 
214,  283-284,  289;  treaties  of 
extradition  for,  118.  201.  272 
286.     S,,  Accused; 'Arre'st!^^' 

Cuba,  population  of,  42. 

Cupidity  of  nations  as  cause  of 
war,  xui,  14-16, 

Currency,    control    of    Congress 
over,  66-67,  74-75.  265. 

Debates    in    Congress,    freedom 
trom  responsibility  for.   «4-<c 
262.  " ''' 

Delegated,    power    not,    reserved 
to  States,  222,  291;  powers  of 
United  Nations  are,  66-69,  291. 
Delegates.    See  Congress;  Repre- 
sentatives. 
Delegates,   House  of.     See   Con- 
gress; House  of  Delegates. 
Delicts.    See  Crimes;  Wrongs. 
Uepartments  of  government,  pow- 
ers  distributed    among,   30-31; 
executive   department,   100-124', 
267-273;  judiciary  department, 
"5-I5S.  273-279;  legislative  de- 
partment,  32-99,   257-267,   280- 
285.     See    Checks;    Congress; 
Executive    Department;    Min- 
"try;  Judges;  Judiciary. 
Denmark,  population  of,  41. 
Diplomatic  agents.     See  Ambas- 
sadors. 
Discipline    of   component    States, 
m    general,    242-247,    294-295; 
modes    of,    245-246,     294-295; 
safeguards  to,  247,  294-295. 
Discrimination,  commercial  regu- 
lations not  to  show,  as  between 
States,  83-87,  163-165.  265,  281, 
286;  general  laws  of  Congress 
not  to  show,  180-181,  283 ;  laws 
of  States  not  to  show,  212-214, 
289;  tax  laws  of  Congress  not 
to  show,  72,  264. 
District,  ceded  as  seat  of  govern- 


3o6 


INDEX 


.■i;l;» 


i 


■m 


ri'': 


»f 


ment,  Congress  to  control,  95- 

96,  267. 
Dominican    Republic,    population 

of,  43. 
Double  jeopardy,  184-185,  264. 
Due  process  of  law,   in  general, 

i77-»79,    i8i,   283,   289;    rights 

of  citizens  not  to  be  destroyed 

by    other    States   without,    213- 

214,  289. 
Duties.     See  Taxation. 
Dwelling,     protection     of,     from 

search,    183-184,    284;    soldiers 

quartered  in,  when,  173,  283. 
Dynastic   ambitions,   as  cause   of 

war,  xiii. 

Economic  boycott  of  component 
States,  245-247,  294-295. 

Economic  policies,  as  cause  of 
war,  XV. 

Ecuador,  population  of,  43. 

Embargo  of  component  States, 
245-247,  294. 

Emigration,  Congress  not  to  con- 
trol, 84-85,  265. 

Eminent  domain,  175-177,  283. 

England.     See  Great  3ritain. 

Equal  protection  of  laws,  179, 
i8t,  213,  283,  289. 

Equality  of  States,  in  Senate,  46- 
48,  240,  259;  on  Supreme 
Court,  130-132,  241,  274. 

Establishment  of  constitution,  248- 

a54.  295- 

Evidence,  against  oneself,  185- 
i86,  284.    See  Witnesses. 

Executive  department,  appoint- 
ment of,  105-112,  267-268;  ap- 
pointing power  of,  118-120, 
272;  commissioning  power  of, 
122,  273 ;  compensation  of  min- 
isters, 112-113,  271;  distribu- 
tion of  powers  among,  11 3-1 14, 
271-273;  eligibility  of  minis- 
ters, 109,  260,  267-268;  en- 
forcement of  laws  by,  121,  373 ; 
interpellations  of,  in  Congress, 
122-123 ;  number  of  ministers, 
iio-iii,  267-268;  of  European 
States  and  United  Nations, 
104;    of    United    States    with 


United  Nations,  100-104;  or- 
ganization of,  100-114,  267- 
271 ;  pardoning  power  of, 
115,  272;  powers  of,  115- 
124,  271-273;  reception  of  am- 
bassadors by,  120-121,  273;  re- 
moval of  ministers,  111-112, 
268;  removing  power  of,  118- 
120,  272 ;  selection  of  prime 
minister,  105-108,  268-269;  se- 
lection of  subordinate  minis- 
ters, 109-110,  268;  terms  of 
office  of,  111-112,  268;  treaty- 
making  power  of,  115-118,  272. 
See  Checks. 

Executives  of  States,  appoint- 
ment of  international  judges 
by,  126-128,  274;  commissioning 
of  officials  by,  122,  273 ;  judicial 
power  not  to  extend  to,  155, 
279;  oath  of,  to  support  inter- 
national constitution,  230-231, 
292;  ratification  of  constitu- 
tion by,  252-254,  295. 

Exclusive  power  of  Congress,  con- 
trasted with  concurrent  power, 
68-69,  >97;  over  arsenals,  forts, 
etc.,  95-96,  267;  over  seat  of 
government,  95-96,  267. 

Exports,  Congress  not  to  tax,  72, 
160-161,  264,  281 ;  States  not  to 
tax,  201-205,  286. 

Ex  post  facto  laws,  not  to  be 
passed  by  Congress,  181-182, 
283-284;  not  to  be  passed  by 
one  State  against  citizens  of  an- 
other, 213-214,  289. 

Expulsion,  of  component  States 
from  league,  242-247,  294-295; 
of  delegates  from  Congress, 
261. 

Extradition  treaties,  118,  201, 
272,  286. 

Federal  populations,  38-43,  258. 

Federal  Union  of  Nations,  con- 
trasted with  league  for  com- 
pulsory arbitration  and  con- 
ciliation, xxviii-xxx;  need  of, 
xxii,  xxiii;  not  designed  to  cre- 
ate a  single  new  nation,  8 ;  pro- 
posal of  a,  25-29.    See  Checks. 


INDEX 


Federal  unions,  existing,  distin- 
guished from  a  federal  union 
of  nations,  7-9;  wars  between 
component  States  prevented  by, 

_.»-9-  . 

Financial  powers  of  Congress,  74- 
77,  265. 

Former  jeopardy,  184-185.  284. 

Forts,  arsenals,  etc.,  ontrol  of, 
95-96,  227-228,  267. 

France,  assent  of,  to  1  (institution, 
249-250,  295;  popjiation  of, 
39;  votes  of,  in  Congress,  44, 
47- 

Freedom,  from  arrest,  a  privilege 
of   delegates   to   Congress,    54, 
262;   guarantees  of  individual. 
168-189,  282-285;  guarantees  of 
national,  156-167,  190-211,  280- 
282,  286-288;  meaning  of,  178; 
no  one  to  be  deprived  of,  with- 
out due  process  of  law,  177-179, 
181,  213-214,  283,  289;   of  re- 
ligion, 170,  282;  of  speech  and 
press  in  Congress,  54-55,  262; 
of  speech  and  press  in  general, 
170-171,  283;  of  trade,  as  pre- 
ventive of  war,  14-16,  202;  of 
trade,    as   between   the   compo- 
nent   States,    201-205,    286;    of 
trade,   with   States  outside  the 
league,    72,     160-161,    201-205, 
264,  281,  286;  persons  illegally 

confined    entitled    to,    168-160 

282.    See  CAecks. 

General  welfare,  found  only  in 
powers  delegated  to  league,  72- 
74.  162-163,  264,  281. 

Germany,  assent  of,  to  constitu- 
tion, 249-250,  295;  population 
of,  39;  votes  of,  in  Congress, 
44,  47- 

Grand  jury,  not  required,  186. 

Great  Britain,  assent  of,  to  con- 
stitution, 249-250,  295;  popula- 
tion of,  37,  38-39;  votes  of,  in 
Congress,  45,  47. 

Oreat  Powers,  assent  of  majority 
of,  to  constitution,  249-250, 
295;  balanced  against  more 
numerous   small    States,    35-48, 


307 


258-259;  predominance  of,  in 
House  of  Delegates,  35-48,  258; 
represented  equally  with  other 
States  in  Senate,  46-48,  259. 
bee  Checks;  Slates. 

Greece,  population  of,  41. 

Greed  of  nations  as  cause  of  war, 

Xlll. 

Guaranties,  of  component  na- 
tions against  invasion,  217, 
290;  of  nonintervention  in  case 
of  civil  war,  217-221,  290-291; 
of  private  rights  in  civil  cases, 
168-180,  212-216,  282-283,  289; 
of  private  rights  in  criminal 
cases,  181-189,  212-216,  283- 
285,  289.     See  Checis. 

Guatemala,  population  of,  43. 

Habeas  corpus,  right  to,  168-169, 

282;  suspension  of,  169,  282. 
Haiti,  population  of,  43. 

High  seas.  Congress  to  control  in- 
ternational commerce  on,  79, 
82-83,  263,  265;  Congress  to 
control  communications  by  way 
of,  85-87,  265;  Congress  to  de- 
fine and  punish  offenses  on,  92- 
93,  266;  judicial  power  extends 
to  offenses  and  wrongs  on,  143- 
'45,  277- 

Holland,  population  of,  40;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Honduras,  population  of,  43. 

Honor  of  nations,  as  cause  of 
war,  xiv,  17-18;  pledged  to 
support  constitution,  253-254 
295.  ' 

House  of  Delegates,  organization 
of,  36,  46,  49,  257-262;  organ- 
ization of,  how  affected  by 
amendments,  241,  293;  power 
of,  to  make  rules  and  choose 
officers,  6s,  261;  privileges  of 
members  of,  54,  262;  veto  of, 
on  acts  of  Senate,  46,  257,  263. 
See  Checks;  Congress. 

Ignorance    of    other    nations,    as 

cause  of  war,  19-20. 
Immigration,     Congress     not     to 

control,  84.85,  ^65. 


3o8 


INDEX 


.^fi' 


Ili.'A 


Immoralitv  of  nations,  as  cause 
of  war,  3-7,  14;  prevented  by 
federal  union,  5-7. 

Impeachment,  no  power  of,  in 
Congress,  60-63. 

Imports,  Congress  not  to  tax,  72, 
160-161,  264,  281 ;  States  not  to 
tax,  201-205,  286. 

Imprisonment,  discharge  from  il- 
legal, 168-169,  282. 

Independence  of  States,  reserved, 
222,  291.    See  Checks. 

Indirect  taxes,  Congress  not  to 
levy,  72,  160-161,  264,  281; 
States  not  to  levy,  201-205,  286. 

Industrial  boycott,  to  discipline 
States,  242-247,  292-293. 

Internal  dissensions  in  States, 
neutrality  in,  217-221,  290-291. 

International  arbitration,  ix-x. 

International  commerce.  See 
Checks;  Commerce. 

International  conciliation,  ix-x. 

International  Congress.  See  Con- 
gress. 

International  constitution.  See 
Constitution. 

International  copyrights  and  pat- 
ents, 87-88,  265. 

International  courts.  See  Courts; 
Judges;  Judiciary. 

International  executive.  See  Ex- 
ecutive  Department;   Ministry. 

International  law.  See  Law  of 
Nations. 

International  postal  and  other 
communications,  85-87,  265. 

Interstate  commerce.  See  Com- 
merce. 

Interstate  relations,  197-201,  212- 
214,  217-219,  289-291. 

Intrastate  commerce,  not  con- 
trolled by  Congress,  82,  265. 

Invasion,  protection  of  States 
against,  217,  290. 

Inventions,  protection  of,  by  pat- 
ents, >7-88,  265. 

Italy,  assent  of,  to  constitution, 
a4<,-250,  295;  population  of, 
40;  "unredeemed,"  as  cause  of 
war,  xvi ;  votes  of,  in  Congress, 
44- 


Japan,  assent  of,  to  constitution, 
249-250,  295;  people  of,  treated 
as  of  white  race,  37-39,  258; 
population  of,  38,  39,  258; 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Jealousies,  as  cause  of  war,  20-22. 

Jeopardy,  twice  in,  184-185,  284. 

Journals  of  Congress,  261-262. 

Judges,  appointment  of,  126-128, 
274;  classification  of,  on  Su- 
preme Court,  132-134,  274-276; 
compensation  of,  128-129,  274; 
in  each  State  to  support  con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties, 
229-231,  292;  independence  of, 
17,8-129,  274;  jurisdiction  of, 
136-154,  276-278;  of  States  may 
exercise  international  jurisdic- 
tion, 89-90,  273;  removal  of, 
63-65,  129,  274- 

Judicial  decree  'nadequate  to 
settle  politico  disputes,  xi- 
xxiii. 

Judicial  power  of  United  N  - 
tions,  cases  under  constitution, 
laws,  and  treaties,  136-142, 
277;  cases  affecting  ambassa- 
dors, etc.,  142-143,  277;  cases 
on  high  seas,  I43-I45>  ^7T, 
cases  involving  United  Nations, 
145-146,  278;  cases  between 
component  States,  146,  278; 
cases  aflFecting  other  nations, 
147-148,  278 ;  not  cases  between 
citizens  of  di..'erent  States,  148; 
nor  suits  by  private  persons 
against  States,  154,  279;  nor 
personal  proceedings  against 
rulers  of  States,  155,  241,  279. 

Judiciarjr  department,  appellate 
jurisdiction  of  Supreme  Court, 
>S3i  378;  appointment  of,  127, 
374;  compensation  of,  128-129, 
274;  Congress  to  create  sub- 
ordinate courts  of,  88-90,  129- 
130,  266,  273-274;  independ- 
ence of,  128-129,  274;  jurisdic- 
tion of,  136-154,  376-279;  or- 
ganization of,  125-135,  373-276; 
organization  of  Supreme  Court, 
>3o->J5i  374-376;  original  juris- 
diction of  Supreme  Court,  150- 


'.^i 


-a.. 


INDEX 


309 


'S'l  278 ;  removal  of  judges  in, 
62-6J,  129,  »74-  See  Checks; 
Courts;  Judges;  Judicial  Poiuer, 

Jury,  former  jeopardy  is  convic- 
tion or  acquittal  by,  184-185, 
284;  in  civil  -ases,  174-175;  in 
criminal  cases,  187-188,  284- 
285;  no  requirement  of  grand, 
186;  number  necessary  to  con- 
stitute, 188,  285;  number  neces- 
sary to  verdict  of,  188,  285. 

Jurisdiction.  See  Courts;  Judges; 
Judicial  Power. 

Justiciable  disputes,  distinguished 
from  political,  xiv-xxii,  23-24; 
redressed  by  courts  or  arbi- 
tration, xiv-xxii,  23-24.  See 
Checks. 

Land,  Congress  to  tax  only,  71- 
7a,  160-161,  264,  281.  See  Ter- 
ritory. 
Law,  as  foundation  of  morality 
among  nations,  1-7;  citizens  not 
to  be  denied  equal  protection 
of,  in  other  States,  213-214, 
289;  due  process  of,  179,  181, 
ai3-"4.  a83,  289;  equal  pro- 
tection of,  179,  181,  313-214, 
a*3.  "89;  executive  department 
to  enforce  the,  121,  273;  judi- 
ciary to  interpret  the,  136-143, 
377;  passage  of,  35-48,  257- 
366 ;  supremacy  of  international 
constitution  and,  229-231,  292; 
unconstitutionality  of  a,  138- 
143,  373,  392. 

Law  of  Nations,  Congress  to  de- 
fine and  punish  offenses  against, 
93-93,  366;  citizens  when 
abroad  protected  under,  315- 
3i6,  289-290;  neutrality  under, 
in  case  of  civil  war  in  compo- 
nent States,  317-331,  390- 
391. 

League  to  enforce  peace,  some 
obstacles  to,  xxix;  contrasted 
with  federal  union  of  nations, 
Mviii.    See  Checks. 

Legal  rights  of  nations  distin- 
guished from  political  powerc, 
xii-xvi,  XX. 


Legal  tender,  power  of  Congresa 

to  issue,  74-77,  265. 
Legislation,  limitations  on  power 
of,  as  to  Congress,  156-189, 
280-285;  limitations  on  power 
of,  as  to  States,  190-213,  386- 
288;  of  States  as  to  citizens  of 
other  States,  213-214,  389;  un- 
constitutionality of,  138-143, 
277,  292 ;  uniformity  of,  in  tax- 
ation, 69-74,  264,  283,  289;  uni- 
formity of,  as  to  commerce,  79- 
85,  162-165,  365,  281,  283,  289; 
uniformity  of,  as  to  communi- 
cations, 85-87,  265;  veto  of 
States  upon  international,  57-60, 
363-264.  See  Checks;  Con- 
gress;  States. 

Legislative  department,  control 
of,  over  executive,  100-114, 
267-271;  convictions  of  crim< 
by,  181-182,  313-314,  283-284, 
389;  oath  of  members  of,  330- 
331,  292;  organization  of,  30- 
65.  257-262;  powers  of,  66-99, 
264-267,  280-285,  290-291;  two 
houses  of,  preferable  to  one, 
32,  43-50,  357-  See  Checks; 
Congress. 

Liberty.    See  Freedom. 

Life,  no  one  to  be  deprived  of, 
without    due    process    of    law, 

181,  212-314,  283,  389. 

Limitations,  on  amendments  of 
constitution,  240-242,  393;  on 
discipline  of  States  by  Con- 
gress, 347,  394-295;  on  judicial 
power,  153-155,  379;  on  pow- 
ers of  Congress,  156-189,  380- 
385;  on  powers  of  executive, 
105-109,  368,  371-273;  on  pow- 
ers of  States,  190-311,  386-388. 
See  Checks. 

Nfajorities.    See  Votes. 

Measures,  Congress  to  fix  stand- 
ards of,  78,  365. 

Mexico,  population  of,  42. 

Migration  of  citizens,  Congress 
not  to  control,  84-85,  365. 

Military  aims,  as  cause  of  war, 
xiii,  17. 


3IO 


INDEX 


I 


h 


(T-         t 


I 

m  ' 

S  3    ■ 

f  ■       I 

1:     -T: 

Mm 


Military  force,  as  measure  of 
State's  influence,  34. 

Military  officers,  appointment  and 
removal  of,  iig-120,  272. 

Military  preparedness,  as  cause 
of  war,  XV. 

Militia,  States  to  keep,  206-209, 
266,  287;  use  of,  in  repelling 
invasion,  217,  266. 

Ministers,  executive  See  Execu- 
tive Department;  Ministry. 

Ministers,  public.  See  Ambas- 
sadors. 

Ministry,  appointment  of,  105- 
iio,  267-269;  compensation  of, 
112-113,  .271;  composed  of 
prime  minister  and  council, 
105-110,  267-268;  Congress  not 
summoned  or  prorogued  by, 
134;  dependent  on  Congress, 
loo-iio,  267-269;  distribution 
of  powers  among,  11 3-1 14, 
267-268;  eligibility  of,  109, 
260,  267-268;  interpellations 
of,  in  Congress,  122-123;  num- 
ber of,  iio-iii,  267-268;  powers 
of,  115-124,  371-273;  removal 
of,  111-112,  267-268;  selection 
of  prime  minister,  105-108,  268- 
269;  selection  of  subordinates 
in,  109-110,  267-268;  terms  of 
office  of,  111-112,  267-268.  See 
Checks. 

Misdemeanor,  judge  removable 
for,  62-63,  "9i  »74. 

Money,  appropriations  of,  for 
army,  94-95,  266;  appropria- 
tions of,  in  general,  162,  281; 
Congress  to  borrow,  74-75, 
365;  Congress  to  coin,  76-77, 
365;  Congress  to  control,  66- 
<7.  74-77.  265;  Congress  to 
issue  paper,  75-76,  265. 
Monroe    Doctrine,    as    cause    of 

war,  XV. 
Montenegro,  population  of,  41. 
Morality,  of   individual,   secured 
by    law,    1-3;    of    nations,    se- 
cured by  federal  union,  3-7. 

Nationalism,  spirit  of,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii. 


Nations,  ambition  of,  as  cause  of 
war,  17;  cupidity  of,  as  cause  of 
war,  14-16;  honor  of,  as  cause 
of  war,  17-18;  immorality  of, 
as  cause  of  war,  3-7,  14;  jeal- 
ousies and  suspicions  of,  as 
cause  of  war,  20-22;  law  of, 
(see  La<w  of  Nations) ;  preju- 
dice and  ignorance  of,  as 
cause  of  war,  19-20;  pride  of, 
as  cause  of  war,  17-18.  See 
Checks;  States. 

Naturalization,  no  power  of,  in 
Congress,  97-99,  280. 

Naval  officers,  appointment  and 
removal  of,  118-120,  272. 

Navies,  States  to  keep,  206-209, 
287;  support  of  international, 
94-95.  266.     See  Checks;  H^ar. 

Navigable  waters,  control  of,  79- 
85,  92,  265,  277,  281.  See  Com- 
merce. 

Netherlands,  population  of,  40; 
votes  of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Neutrality,  in  case  of  civil  war 
in  component  State,  217-318, 
390-291. 

Nicaragua,  population  of,  43. 

Norway,  population  of,  41 ;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Notice,  no  one  to  be  deprived  of 
rights  without,  177-179,  181, 
313-314,  283,  289;  States  not 
to  be  disciplined  without,  242- 
347,  294;  States  not  to  veto 
measures  without,  57-60,  263- 
264;  States  not  to  secede  wirh- 
out,  226,  391. 

Oath  of  office,  330-231,  393. 

Obligation  of  contracts,  laws  af- 
fecting, 213-214,  289. 

Offenses.    See  Crimes. 

Officers,  appoinMient  of  judicial, 
127,  374;  appointment  of  legis- 
lative, 50-52,  258,  259;  ap- 
pointment of  ministerial,  105- 
114,  267-268;  appointment  of 
subordinate,  118,  119,  372; 
commissioning  of,  133,  373; 
oath  of,  330-331,  393;  removal 
of  judicial,  63-63,  «»9.  "74;  re- 


A 


INDEX 


311 


moval  of  legislative,  50-52,  258, 
»S9;  removal  of  ministerial, 
105-114,  267-268;  removal  of 
subordinate,  118,  119,  272,  See 
Ckeckt. 

Open  door  in  China,  as  cause  of 
war,  XV. 

Original  jurisdiction  of  Supreme 
Court,  150-152,  278. 

Original  suit  by  private  person 
against  State  not  permitted, 
153.  154.  279. 

Panama,  population  of,  43. 
Pan-Germanisrr     and    Pan-Slav- 
ism, as  cause  of  war,  xv. 
Paper  money.  Congress  to  issue, 

74-7«,  265- 
Paraguay,  population  of,  43. 
Pardon,  power  of,  115,  272. 
Patents,  Congress  to  regulate,  87- 

88,  265. 
Peace,  federal   unions  make  for, 

10-24.    See  Checks;  fVar. 
Pension    laws  of   Congress,    162- 

163,  281. 
Peonage,  control  of  domestic,  192- 

193. 
Peru,  populrtion  of,  42. 
Petition,    popular    right    of,    172, 

283. 
Poland,  as  cause  of  war,  xvi. 
Policy,  national,  as  cause  of  war, 

XV. 

Political  ambitions,  as  cause  of 
war,  17. 

Political  disputes,  breed  wars,  23- 
24;  not  justiciable,  xiii-xxi,  23- 
«4- 

Political  powers,  surrender  of,  by 
States  necessary  to  prevent 
war,  xvii,  xxivxxvi,  286-288. 

Population,  armies  of  States  pro- 
portioned to,  207-209,  287;  as 
measure  of  State's  influence, 
36-4J ;  backward,  contrasted 
with  progressive,  37,  258; 
census  of,  35-48,  258;  federal, 
contrasted  with  actual,  38-43, 
258;  of  various  countries,  38- 
43;  unequal,  balanced  against 
equal   sovereignty,  46-47,   258- 


259;  votes  of  States  in  House 
of   Delegates    proportioned    to, 
4fi-47,    258;    white,    contrasted 
with  colored,  37.39,  4,,  258. 
Portugal,  population  of,  40. 
Postal    communication.    Congress 

to  regulate,  85-87,  265. 
Powers,   distribution   of  constitu- 
tional,  30-31.    See  Constitution. 
Powers,       Great.        See       Great 

Poviers. 
Powers  of  States,  limitations  on, 
190-211,  241,  286-288;  surrender 
of,  m  federal  union,  11-12;  sur- 
render of  certain,  necessary  to 
prevent   wars,   xxii,   xxiv-xxvi, 
11-12;    to    adopt    constitution, 
25.0-254,    295;    to    amend    con- 
stitution, 232-241,  293;  to  bur- 
den or  tax  commerce,  201-205, 
286;    to   control    Congress,    52, 
'58..  259,   263 ;    to   control    ex- 
ecutive ministry,   105-112,   267- 
268;  to  control  judiciary,  127- 
»29,      273-276;      to      maintain 
armies    and    navies,    201-205, 
287;  to  make  treaties,  197-201,' 
286;    to    secede    from    league, 
223-228,  291-292;  to  veto  inter- 
national legislation,  57-60,  263- 
264;    to    wage    war,    201-205, 
287.    See  Checks.  " 

Prejudice  of   race,    as  cause  of 

war,  XV,  19-20. 
Presiding    justices    of    Supreme 

Court,  133-134,  276. 
PreM,  freedom  of.    See  Freedom. 
Pride    of    nations,    as    cause    of 

war,  xiv,  17-18. 
Prime   minister,   appointment  of, 
105-108,    268-269;    powers    of, 
115-124,  269,  291-293;  removal 
of,  111-112,  269.    See  Executive 
Department;  Ministry. 
Privileges,    of   citizens    in    other 
States,   212-215,   289;    of   dele- 
gates  to  Congress,  54.55.  262. 
Production  of  goods,  not  part  of 

commerce,  81,  83. 
Progressive  and  backward  popu- 

lations,  37-39,  41,  jjs. 
Property,    meaning    of,    178-179; 


■:inr*;. 


■■'■'Ji-   i' 


4f»' 


312 


INDEX 


not  to  be  destroyed  without  due 
process  of  law,  179,  181,  21a- 
ais,  283,  289. 
Proposal    of    amendments,    236- 

237,  a93. 

Prorugation  of  Congress,  124,  261. 

Prosecution  for  crime.  See  Ac- 
cused; Arrest;  Trial. 

Public  ministers.  See  Ambassa- 
dors. 

Public  opinion,  as  preventive  of 
war,  xzvii. 

Public  purpose,  appropriations 
for,  162-163,  264,  281;  com- 
pensation for  private  property 
taken  for,  175-176,  283;  nature 
of,  162-163,  264,  281;  taxation 
for,  72-74,  264. 

Public  trial,  right  to,  187,  284. 

Punishments,  Congress  to  pro- 
vide, for  counterfeiting,  77-78, 
265;  for  offenses  on  high  seas, 
92-93,  266 ;  for  offenses  against 
Law  of  Nations,  92-93,  144- 
145,  266;  no  cruel  and  unusual, 
189,  285;  of  delegates  in  Con- 
gress for  disorderly  conduct, 
261.  See  Accused;  Arrtst; 
Crimes. 

Quartering  of   soldiers,   173-174, 

283. 
Quorum,  majority  of  either  house 

of  Congress  constitutes,  261. 

Race  prejudices,  as  cause  of  war, 
XV,  19-20. 

Ratification,  of  amendments  to 
constitution,  237-240,  293 ;  of 
constitution,  250-2$4,  295. 

Rebellion,  in  component  States, 
217-219,  290-291. 

Recess  of  Congres^  53,  261. 

Religion,  freedom  of,  170,  282. 

Removal,  of  judges,  62-63,  i>9i 
274;  of  delegates  in  Congress, 
p-52,  258,  259;  of  prime  min- 
ister, 111-112,  268;  of  subordi- 
nate ministers,  109,  112,  267- 
268;  of  subordinate  officials, 
118-120,  272. 

Representatives  in  Congress,  ap- 


pointment of,  50-S*,  358.  aS9; 
compensation  of,  53-54,  262; 
expulsion  of,  261 ;  privileges  of, 
54-55.  afia;  removal  of,  50-52, 

258,  259;  terms  of,  50-Sa.  as«, 

259,  260;  votes  of,  46-47,  258, 
259. 

Reprieve,  power  of,  115,  272. 
Republic  of  Nations,  league  to  be 

a,  166.    See  Ctmstkution, 
Reserved    rights   of    States,   222- 

228,  291-292. 
Residents  of  seat  of  government, 

as  citizens  of  United  Nations, 

97-98..' 59,  a8o. 
Retroactive  laws,  as  to  contracts, 

213-214,  289;  as  to  crimes,  177- 

179,  181-182,  213-214,  283-284, 

289;    as   to    property,    177-179, 

213-214,  283,  289. 
Revenue.    See  Taxation. 
Revolution    in    component   State, 

217-219,  290-291. 
Roumania,  population  of,  41. 
Russia,  assent  of,  to  constitution, 

249-250,    295;    population    o^ 

39;  votes  of,  in  Congress,  45, 

47- 

Salvador,  population  of,  42. 

Search,  warrants  of,  182-183,  284. 

Seas.    See  High  Seas. 

Seat  of  government.  Congress  to 
control,  95-96,  284;  residents 
of,  as  citizens  of  United  Na- 
tions, 97-98,  159,  280. 

Secession  of  States,  accounting 
for  asftets  upon,  227-228,  292; 
compulsory,  242-247,  294-295; 
right  of,  223-228,  291-292; 
State's  right  of,  not  to  be  lost 
by  amendment,  239-241,  293. 
See  Checks. 

Secret  diplomacy,  check  on,  115- 
116,  272,  286. 

Sections  of  Supreme  Court,  132- 
134.  a74-a76- 

Self-incrimination,  185-186,  284. 

Senate,  appointment  to,  50-53, 
259;  compensation  of  delegate) 
to,  53-54,  362;  equality  of 
States  in,  46,  259;  equality  in. 


INDEX 


not  affected  by  amendments, 
«40,  293;  eligibility  to,  46-48, 
SO-S2,  260;  expulsion  from, 
361 ;  privileges  of  delegates  to, 
54-55.  26a;  recall  from,  50-53, 
259.  260;  State  veto  upon  ac- 
tion of,  57-60,  263-264;  to  make 
Its  rules  and  choose  its  officers, 
6s,  261;  veto  of,  on  action  of 
House  of  Delegates,  46,  263. 
see  Checks:  Congress. 

Senators.     See  Representatives. 

Serbia,   population   of,  41;   votes 
or,  in  Congress,  44. 

Slave  trade.  Congress  to  control. 
192-193,  263. 

Slavery,  Congress  not  to  control 
domestic,  192-193. 

Sovereign,   no  personal   proceed- 

s^.X!""'  '"•  ''''  '"• 

Sovereisnty  of  States,  conception 
of,    illusory,   xxiv-ncv,    xxviii* 
equality    of,    in     Senate    bal- 
anced against  unequal  popula- 
tions  in    House   of    Delegates, 
46-47,  258-259;  equality  of,  in 
Senate  not  affected  by  amend- 
ments,   240-241,    293 ;    reserva- 
tion  of,  222,  291.     See  Checks. 
bpain,  population  of,  41. 
Speech,    freedom  of.     See   Free- 
dom. 
Speedy  trial,  right  to,  187,  284. 
Standards  of  weights  and  meas- 

ures,  Congress  to  fix,  78,  265. 
Standing  armies.    See  Armies. 
States,    adoption    of    constitution 
by,  248-254,  295 ;  admission  of, 
to    league,    220,    321,   290-291; 
boycott    of.    242-247,    294-295; 
cession   of   territory  to    United 
Nations     by,     95.96,     157-159, 
367,  280;  citizens  of.  protected 
against    United    Nations.    168- 
189,  J82-285;  citizens  of,  pro- 
tected   in   other,   212-216.   289; 
courts  of,   ma^  exercise   inter- 
national     jurisdiction.      88-92, 
273;   de   facto  government  of. 
recognized  in  case  of  civil  war, 
aiS-aao,  290-291 ;  discipline  of. 


313 


by  Congress,  242-247,  294-295; 
dismemberment  of,  as  result  of 
civil  war,  220.  290-291;  dis- 
putes between,  tried  in  Supreme 
Court,  132-133,  151-153,  ayg. 
equality  of,  in  Senate,  46-48- 
240,  259;  equality  of,  on  Su- 
preme Court,  130-132,  241.  274, 
293;   executives  of,  to  appoint 

judges,  126-128,  274;  execudves 
of,  to  ratify  constitution,  252- 
f54.    295;    expulsion    of,    from 

anteed    against    invasion.    217 
290;    internal    conflicts   within' 
217-219.  290-291 ;  jurisdiction  of 
disputes  between.  145-147,  xj,,, 
278;    jurisdiction   of  cases   be- 
tween    citizens     of     different, 
148-150;    jurisdiction    of    per- 
sonal  proceedings  against  rul- 
"»   of.    ^SS,   279;    jurisdiction 
of    suits    by    private    persons 
against,     154,     jy,;     j^^,     ^^ 
treaties     of,     unconstitutional. 
138-142,229-231,277.292;  lim- 
itations on  powers  of.  190-211, 
286-288;  measures  of  influence 
ot,  33-43;  neutrality  in  case  of 
civil  war  in.  217-221,  290-291; 
not  to  acquire  territory.  209-211, 
286;  not  to  be  interfered  with 
in  dealing  with  their  own  citi- 
zens, 195;  not  to  enter  into  al- 
liances,  200.   r'»6;    not   to   tax 
carrying  capacity,  205,  286;  not 
to  tax  imports  or  exports,  201- 
205,  286;  number  of,  to  estab- 
lish constitution,  248-250,  295; 
officials   of,   to   swear   to   sup- 
port constitution,  230-231,  292; 
original     jurisdiction     of     Su- 
preme    Court     over,     151-153. 
278;     populations     of.     repre- 
•ented   in   House  of  Delegates, 
35-48.  258;  relations  of.  to  each 
other.     212-220,     289-291;     re- 
served rights  of,  323-228.  291- 
'.!92;  secession  of.  from  league, 
223-228.    291-292;     sovereignty 
of.  reserved,  222,  291;  treason 
against  component,  160;  treaty- 


314 


INDEX 


|.  ;: 


14?' 


making  power  of,  200-301,  229- 
231,  286;  veto  power  of,  57-60, 
263-264;  war  powers  of,  206- 
209,  286-287.     See  Cheeks. 

Statute  law.  See  Law;  Legisla- 
tion. 

Subsidiei,  162-163,  281. 

Suffrage.    Sec  yotes. 

Supremacy  of  international  con- 
stitution, laws,  and  treaties, 
229-231,  292. 

Supreme  Court,  allotment  by,  of 
share  of  common  assets  to  se- 
ceding or  expelled  State,  227- 
228,  246-247,  291-292,  294-295; 
appeals  to  sections  of,  132-134, 
275-276;  appeals  to,  from  sec- 
tions of,  i34->35.  275-276;  ap- 
pellate jurisdiction  of,  153, 
278;  appointment  of  judges  of, 
127-128,  274;  classification  of, 
into  sections,  132-134,  274-276; 
compensation  of  judges  of, 
128-129,  274;  equality  of 
States  on,  130-132,  241,  274; 
established  by  constitution,  127, 
373-276;  independence  of,  128- 
129,  274;  organization  of,  130- 
135,  274-376;  original  jurisdic- 
tion of,  150-152,  278;  power  of, 
to  declare  laws  and  treaties  un- 
constitutional, 138-142,  277;  re- 
moval of  judges  of,  62-63,  129, 
274.    See  Checks. 

Suspicions,  national,  as  cause  of 
war,  xxvi,  20-22. 

Sweden,  population  of,  41;  votes 
of,  in  Congress,  44. 

Switzerland,  population  of,  41. 

Tariffs,  Congress  not  to  lay,  72, 
i6o-i6i,  264,  281;  States  not  to 
lay,  201-205,  286;  unfair,  as 
cause  of  war,  xiii. 

Taxation,  bounties  and  subsidies 
not  to  be  granted,  163-163,  281 ; 
by  Congress,  for  what  pur- 
poses, 73-74,  264;  by  Congress, 
limited  to  land,  69-74,  160-161, 
364,  281 ;  by  Congress,  limited 
to  ten  years,  56-57,  263;  by 
Congress,    to    be    uniform,    72, 


264;  by  Congress,  may  orig- 
inate in  either  house,  56;  by 
States,  how  limited,  201-205, 
286;  dangers  of  power  of,  70- 
71;  pension  legislation  by  Con- 
gress, 162-163,  281. 

Telegraphic  and  telephonic  com- 
munication. Congress  to  con- 
trol, 86-87,  265. 

Terms  of  office,  of  delegates  to 
Congress,  50-52,  258,  259,  260; 
of  judges,  128-129,  274;  of 
prime  minister,  111-112,  268- 
269;  of  subordinate  ministers, 
111-112,  267-268;  of  subordi- 
nate officials,  1 18-120,  272. 

Territory,  cession  of,  by  States 
to  United  Nations,  95-96,  157- 
159*  267,  280;  desire  for,  at 
cause  of  war,  xiii,  xxvi,  14-16, 
17;  no  acquisition  of,  by 
United  Nations,  157-159,  280; 
occupation  of,  by  United  Na- 
tions in  war,  157-159,  280; 
when  acquired  by  component 
States,  158-159,  209-211,  380, 
388;  when  divided  in  case  of 
civil  war,  317-320,  290-291. 
See  Cheeks. 

Titles  of  nobility  not  to  be 
granted,  165-166,  167,  281. 

Tonnage,  States  not  to  lay  du- 
ties of,  205,  286;  States  to  keep 
war  vessels  in  proportion  to 
mercantile,  209,  287. 

Torts  on  high  seas.  Congress  to 
define  and  redress,  92-93,  266; 
judicial  power  extends  to,  143- 

145.  277- 

Trade,  as  measure  of  State's  in- 
fluence, 35-36;  desire  for,  as 
cause  of  war,  xiii,  14-16;  desire 
to  control,  as  cause  of  war, 
xxvi;  freedom  of,  as  preven- 
tive of  war,  xiii,  72,  201-205; 
unfair  competition  in,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii.  See  Cheeks; 
Commerce. 

Trade  marks,  88. 

Trade  routes,  desire  for,  as  cause 
of  war,  xiii. 

Treason,       against       component 


INDEX 


State!,  i6o;  sgaintt  United 
Nations,  no  luch  crime  ai.  160. 
aSo-aSi.  ' 

Treaties    authority    of    United 
Nations  to  make,  115-118,  aTz: 
authority    of    States    to    make 
197-aoi,  axa,  286;   breach  of, 
as  cause  of  war,  xvi-xvii;  citi- 
lens  when  abroad  protected  by 
»i3-ai6,  a89,  390;  Congress  to 
assent   to,    116-118,   aoi,   372; 
constitution  the  most  solemn  of 
■".     asi,     352-354;     judicial 
power  extends  to,  136-142,  277; 
limited     within     constitutional 
bounds,  117.118,  272;  ministry 
to     negotiate,     117-118,     272: 
must  provide  for  peaceable  set- 
tlement    of     disputes     arising 
therefrom,    201,    286;     secret, 
checks    upon,    116,    272;     su- 
premacy of,  239-231,  292;  un- 
constitutionality     of,      I«8-I42 
377,  393.  ^' 

Treaty-making    power,    of    each 
State  to  assent  to  constitution, 
353-253,   395;    of   United    Na- 
tions, 116-118,  393. 
Trial,  in  civil  cases  without  jury, 
574-175;   in  criminal  cases  by 
junr,   187-189,  284-285;    public 
and  speedy,  187,  284;  punish- 
ment without,  prohibited,   i8i- 
i8a,  213-314,  383,  389.    See  /te- 
aued;  Arreit. 
Troops,    quartering   of,    173-174, 
383;  proportion  of,  to  be  kept 
/  t7*?''^  v?°*."'°7,  387:   right 
of  United  Nations  to  raise  and 
support,  366-367.    See  /trmu$. 

Unconstitutionality,  of  laws  and 
treaties  of  States,  138-142,  229- 
3JI.  377,  386,  292;  of  laws  and 
treaties  of  United  Nations,  117- 
"»,  13«-I43,  37a,  277,  392; 
veto  of  laws  by  States  be- 
cause of.  57-60,  263-264.  See 
Ckecki. 

Uniformity,  of  commercial  regu- 
lations, 83-84,  162-165,  365, 
»ti,  383;   of  interpretation  of 


315 


constitution,  laws,  and  treaties, 
J35..  137;  of  postal,  etc,  regu- 
lations, 85-87,  265;  of  tax  laws, 
73,  865,  281,  283. 

United  Nations,  constitution  .  of, 
257-295.    See  Constitution. 

Lnjted  States,  assent  of,  to  con- 
stitution, 249-a  5°,  395;  consti- 
tution of,  257-295;  population 
or,  40;  votes  of,  in  Congress. 

,45.  47- 

Uruguay,  population  of,  43. 

Venezuela,  population  of,  42. 

Verdict  of  jury,  i88,  285. 

Vested  rights,  protected,  178-179, 

383,  289. 
Veto,  by  each  house  of  Congress 
upon   the  other,   257,  263 ;    by 
each  State  upon  Congress,  32- 
33.  S7-60,  241,  263-264, 
Votes  in  Congress,  admission  of 
States     to     league     by    three- 
fourths  of,  aao,  231,  390-291; 
amendments     to      constitution 
proposed  by  two-thirds  of,  336- 
337.  393;   amendments  enacted 
by    three-fourths    of,    337-340, 
393;     ap  ointment     of     prime 
minister  by  a  majority  of,  105- 
108,  368;  legislation  by  a  ma- 
jority of,  261;  majority  of,  to 
constitute    a    quorum    in    each 
house,  a6i;  removal  of  judges 
by  a   majority  of,   63-63,   "9, 
374;  removal  of  prime  minister 
by  a  majority  of,  iii-ua,  368; 
States  to   acquire  territory   by 
three-fourths  of,   158-159,  309- 
311,  280,  288;  State's  veto  of 
legislation  overriden  by  three- 
fourths    of,    57-60,    241,    364; 
treaties   ratified    by  two-thirds 
of.  116-118,  373.     See  Cheekt; 
Congrtss. 
Votes  in  Supreme  Court,  law  or 
treaty  declared  unconstitutional 
by    three-fourths    of,    138-143. 
347. 

Votes  of  States,  in  House  of  Dele- 
gates proportioned  to  popula- 
tion, 35-48,  340,  358;  in  Sen- 


3i6 


INDEX 


•te  equal,  46-48,  340,  259; 
expulsion  of  delegaten  in  cither 
houM  by  two-thirdi  of,  361. 

War,  acquisition  of  territory  by 
States  in  time  of,  309-311,  380, 
388-389;  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory by  United  Nations  in  time 
of,  157-159,  380;  appropria- 
tions for,  limited  to  two  years, 
94'9Si  266;  causes  of,  xii-xviii, 
13-34;  federal  unions  check, 
10-24;  guarantee  to  States 
against,  317,  390;  neutrality 
towards  State  in  case  of  civil, 
317-331,  390-291 ;  obligations 
of  States  not  to  be  enforced  by, 
344-347,  287;  powers  of,  how 
far  surrendered  by  States,  94, 
387;  power  of,  vested  in 
league,  93-95,  366;  power  of, 
how  far  vested  in  States,  206- 
309,  387;  results  from  exercise 


of  political  powers  rather  thaa 
legal  rights,  zii,  xv,  xvii,  xix, 
XX ;  right  of  States  to  keep  ves- 
sels of,  306-309,  »87-  See 
Checks. 

Warrant  of  arrest  or  of  search, 
183-183,  384- 

Weights,  Congress  to  fix  stand- 
ards of,  78,  365. 

White  populations,  contrasted 
with  colored,  37-59,  41,  358. 

Wireless  communication.  Con- 
gress to  control,  86-87,  265. 

Witnesses,  accused  to  be  con- 
fronted with,  189,  385;  ac- 
cused to  compel  attendance  of, 
189,  385;  not  to  incriminate 
themselves,  185-186,  384. 

Worship,  freedom  of,  170,  282. 

Wrongs  on  high  seas,  Congress 
to  define  and  redress,  92-93, 
266;  judicial  power  extends  to, 
«43-i45.  a77. 


I': 


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